How often during the times of Tsarist Russia, disputes among people of the noble class were resolved by a duel! And this is all - despite the decree of Peter I of January 14, 1702 banning this kind of fights for the sake of preserving honor and dignity (as if there were no other options to talk “like a man”). However, such a burden fell on the lot of the hot-blooded young people of the “Golden Age”.

Which “victim” do we remember first? Naturally, Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin. And, naturally, almost everyone familiar with his fate had the question: “Was it possible to save him?” What would a modern doctor say about Pushkin’s case, how would he describe the condition and what treatment would he prescribe? Let’s figure this out - using the wonderful work of Mikhail Davidov “The Duel and Death of A.S. Pushkin through the eyes of a modern surgeon."

Over the centuries, many inquisitive minds have studied the numerous documents remaining after the duel, related both to the notes of eyewitnesses and to the notes of the great poet’s healers, among whom were the best doctors of St. Petersburg.

Here is what they write about Alexander Sergeevich’s health and his lifestyle: “At the time of his injury in a duel, Alexander Sergeevich was 37 years old, had average height (about 167 cm), a regular physique without signs of obesity. As a child, he suffered from colds and minor soft tissue bruises. In 1818, for 6 weeks, Alexander Pushkin suffered a severe infectious disease with a prolonged fever, which the attending physicians called “rotten fever.” Over the next two years, relapses of fever appeared, which completely stopped after treatment with quinine, which gives reason to assume that Pushkin suffered from malaria...

The poet led a healthy lifestyle. In addition to long walks on foot, he rode a lot, successfully practiced fencing, swam in the river and sea, and used ice baths for hardening.
We can conclude that by the time of the duel Pushkin was physically strong and practically healthy.”

The day of the duel was approaching...

Wednesday morning, January 27, 1837 (or February 8, new style). “I got up cheerfully at 8 o’clock - after tea I wrote a lot - an hour before 11. From 11 lunch. - I walked around the room unusually cheerfully, sang songs - then I saw Danzas through the window (note: second), greeted him joyfully at the door. - We entered the office and locked the door. - A few minutes later he sent for pistols. - After Danzasa left, he began to get dressed; washed all over, everything was clean; ordered the bekesh to be served; went out onto the stairs, returned, ordered a large fur coat to be brought into the office and walked on foot to the cab driver. “It was exactly at 1 o’clock.” (from the notes of Pushkin’s friend, poet V.A. Zhukovsky, about Alexander Sergeevich’s last day before the duel)

... The place of the duel. “Wrapped in a bear fur coat, Alexander Sergeevich sat in the snow and looked at the preparations with detachment. What was in his soul, only God knows. At times he showed impatience, turning to his second: “Is everything finally over?” His opponent, Lieutenant Dantes, a tall, athletic man, an excellent marksman, was outwardly calm. The psychological state of the opponents was different: Pushkin was nervous, in a hurry to end everything as quickly as possible, Dantes was more collected, calmer.”

...It was 5 o'clock in the evening.

“The seconds marked the barriers with their overcoats, loaded their pistols and took the opponents to their starting positions. There they were given weapons. The tension reached its climax. The deadly meeting of two irreconcilable opponents has begun. At a signal from Danzas, who drew a semicircle in the air with his hat held in his hand, the rivals began to approach each other. Pushkin quickly walked towards the barrier and, turning his body slightly, began aiming at Dantes’ heart. However, it is more difficult to hit a moving target, and, obviously, Pushkin waited for the opponent to finish approaching the barrier and then immediately fire a shot. Cold-blooded Dantes unexpectedly shot on the move, not reaching 1 step from the barrier, that is, from a distance of 11 steps (about 7 meters). It was convenient for him to aim at Pushkin, who was standing still. In addition, Alexander Sergeevich had not yet completed the classic half-turn, adopted during duels in order to reduce the sighting area for the enemy, his hand with the pistol was extended forward, and therefore his right side and lower abdomen were completely unprotected.” It was this position of Pushkin’s body that caused the peculiar wound channel.

Bright flash. Pushkin was blinded for a moment and at the same second felt a blow to his side and something shooting forcefully into his lower back. The poet’s legs could not withstand such a sharp impact and the weight of his own body, he collapsed on his left side face-first into the snow, briefly losing consciousness. However, as soon as the seconds and Dantes himself rushed to look at the consequences of the shot, Pushkin woke up and sharply shouted that he still had enough strength to make his shot. With an effort, he rose and sat down, briefly noticing with his blurred gaze that his shirt and overcoat were soaked with something scarlet, and the snow under him had turned red. I took aim. Shot.

the vest in which Pushkin shot himself

“The bullet flying from the seated Pushkin to the tall Dantes, who was standing with his right side forward, along a trajectory from bottom to top, was supposed to hit the Frenchman in the area of ​​the left lobe of the liver or the heart, but pierced his right hand, with which he covered his chest, causing a through bullet wound to the middle third of the right forearm, changed direction and, causing only a contusion of the upper part of the anterior abdominal wall, went into the air. Dantes’s wound, therefore, turned out to be not severe, without damage to bones and large blood vessels, and subsequently healed quickly...” What happened then?

Help for the poet and transportation.

According to Danzas’s recollections, at the site of the duel, blood flowed “like a river” from Pushkin’s wound; it soaked his clothes and stained the snow. He also noted the pallor of the face, hands, and “widened gaze” (dilated pupils). The wounded man regained consciousness on his own. The gravest mistake of the poet’s second was that he did not invite the doctor to the duel, did not take the means for bandaging and medicine, therefore, no one did first aid and at least a small bandage. Danzas justified this by the fact that “he was taken as a second several hours before the duel, time was running out, and he did not have the opportunity to think about first aid for Pushkin.”

Pushkin, while conscious, could not move independently due to shock and massive blood loss. There was no stretcher or shield. “The patient with a damaged pelvis was lifted from the ground and first “dragged” to the sleigh, then they were laid on an overcoat and carried. However, this turned out to be impossible. Together with the cab drivers, the seconds dismantled the fence made of thin poles and brought up the sleigh. All the way from the place of the duel to the sleigh there was a bloody trail in the snow. The wounded poet was put in a sleigh and driven along a shaking, bumpy road.” What did you achieve in this way? That's right, worsening shock.

The volume of blood loss, according to the calculations of doctor Sh.I. Uderman, amounted to about 2000 ml, or 40% of the total volume of blood circulating in the body. Nowadays, gradual blood loss of 40% of the volume is not considered fatal, but then... All means for restoring lost blood masses have not yet been developed.
It is impossible to imagine the degree of anemia in Pushkin, who did not receive a single milliliter of blood. Undoubtedly, blood loss sharply reduced the adaptation mechanisms of the poor organism and accelerated the death outcome from the septic complications of the gunshot wound that later developed.

At home…

“Already in the dark, at 18 o’clock, the mortally wounded poet was brought home. This was another mistake by Danzas. The wounded man had to be hospitalized. Perhaps, on the way, the poet really expressed a desire to be taken home. But he, periodically being in an unconscious state, in deep faints, for some time having difficulty getting out of them, was still not capable of a clear assessment of what was happening. That Pushkin was hopeless and they did not operate on him cannot serve as an excuse for the second, because Danzas could not have known this on the way. Observing severe bleeding, frequent fainting and the serious condition of the wounded man, Danzas didn’t even have to ask Pushkin where to take him, but make the right decision himself and insist on it!” - says Davydov.

Finding a surgeon in evening St. Petersburg is not an easy task. However, Fate itself intervened - Danzas met Professor Scholz on the street. Yes, he was not a surgeon, but an obstetrician, but it was still better than nothing. He agreed to examine Alexander Sergeevich and soon arrived with surgeon K.K. Zadler, who by that time had already managed to help Dantes! (such a vicissitude: he was slightly wounded, but help “came” earlier).

“Professor of Obstetrics Scholz, after examining the wound and dressing it, had a private conversation with the wounded man. Alexander Sergeevich asked: “Tell me frankly, how did you find the wound?”, to which Scholz replied: “I cannot hide to you that your wound is dangerous.” To Pushkin’s next question whether the wound was fatal, Scholz answered directly: “I consider it your duty not to hide this, but we will hear the opinions of Arendt and Salomon, for whom we have been sent.” Pushkin said: “Thank you for telling me the truth as an honest man... Now I’ll take care of my affairs.”

Finally (less than a few hours had passed), the seriously wounded poet was deigned to be visited by the urgently invited life physician N.F. Arendt and the Pushkin family’s home doctor I.T. Spassky.
Then many doctors took part in the treatment of the wounded Pushkin (H.H. Salomon, I.V. Buyalsky, E.I. Andreevsky, V.I. Dal), but behind the scenes it was Arendt, as the most authoritative among them, who supervised the treatment. Everyone listened to his opinion.

Some researchers believe that the actions of Arendt and Scholz, who told Pushkin about the incurability of his illness, contradicted medical ethics, because they contradicted the principle developed over centuries according to one of the rules of Hippocrates. It reads: “Surround the sick person with love and reasonable consolation; but most importantly, leave him in the dark about what awaits him, and especially about what threatens him.” It must be said that there are still disagreements between doctors in matters of deontology, but the patient still has the right to know about his diagnosis, no matter how disappointing it may be.

“Arendt chose a conservative tactic for treating the wounded, which was approved by other famous surgeons, H.H. Salomon, I.V. Buyalsky and all the doctors, without exception, who took part in the treatment. No one offered to operate, no one tried to pick up a knife themselves. For the level of development of medicine at that time, this was a completely natural solution. Unfortunately, in the 30s of the 19th century, those wounded in the stomach were not operated on. After all, science did not yet know asepsis and antiseptics, anesthesia, X-rays, antibiotics and much more. Even much later, in 1865, N.I. Pirogov in “The Beginnings of General Military Field Surgery” did not recommend opening the abdominal cavity to those wounded in the abdomen in order to avoid the development of inflammation of the peritoneum (peritonitis) and death.”

Wilhelm Adolfovich Shaak in the article “Wound of A.S. Pushkin in modern surgical coverage” from the Bulletin of Surgery in 1937 accuses doctors of giving the patient an enema, giving a laxative and prescribing oppositely acting drugs (calomel and opium). However, in the surgical manual of Professor Helius, published in 1839, measures such as poultices, castor oil, calomel, enema were recommended for the treatment of wounded in the abdomen, that is, in the 30s of the 19th century, these remedies were generally accepted for the treatment of such diseases.

From the chronicles:

“At 19:00 on January 27, the wounded man’s condition was serious. He was agitated, complained of thirst (a sign of ongoing bleeding) and asked for a drink, and was tormented by nausea. The pain in the wound was moderate. Objectively noted: the face is covered with cold sweat, the skin is pale, the pulse is frequent, weak, and the extremities are cold. The bandage that had just been applied was quite intensively soaked in blood and was changed several times.

On the first evening after the wound and on the night of January 28, all treatment consisted of cold drinks and applying ice packs to the stomach. Doctors tried to reduce bleeding with these simplest means. The patient's condition remained serious. Consciousness was mostly clear, but short-term periods of “forgetfulness” and unconsciousness arose. He drank cold water willingly. Complaints of thirst, nausea, gradually increasing abdominal pain. The skin remained pale, but the pulse became slower than in the first hours after the injury. Gradually the bandage stopped getting wet with blood. At the beginning of the night they became convinced that the bleeding had stopped. The tension between doctors and caregivers eased somewhat.

“At 5 o’clock in the morning on January 28, the pain in the abdomen intensified so much that it was no longer bearable. They sent for Arendt, who arrived very quickly and, upon examining the patient, found obvious signs of peritonitis. Arendt prescribed, as was customary at that time, a “lavage” to “ease and empty the intestines.” But the doctors did not assume that the wounded man had gunshot fractures of the iliac and sacral bones. Turning on the side to perform the enema caused, quite naturally, some displacement of the bone fragments, and the liquid introduced through the tube filled and expanded the rectum, increasing pressure in the pelvis and irritating damaged and inflamed tissue. After the enema, the condition worsened, the intensity of the pain increased “to the highest degree.” The face changed, the gaze became “wild”, the eyes were ready to jump out of their sockets, the body was covered in cold sweat. Pushkin could hardly restrain himself from screaming and only let out moans. He was so irritated that after the enema he refused any treatment offered for the entire morning.”

“On the afternoon of January 28, the wounded man’s condition remained serious. Abdominal pain and bloating persisted. After taking henbane extract and calomel (mercury laxative), there was no relief. Finally, at about 12 o’clock, as prescribed by Arendt, they gave opium drops as an anesthetic, after which Alexander Sergeevich immediately felt better. The intensity of the pain decreased significantly - and this was the main thing in improving the condition of the hopeless patient. The wounded man became more active and cheerful. Hands warmed up. The pulse remained frequent and weakly filled. After some time, the gases passed and spontaneous free urination was noted.”

“By 18:00 on January 28, a new deterioration in the condition was noted. A fever appeared. The pulse reached 120 beats per minute, was full and hard (tense). The abdominal pain became “more noticeable.” My stomach is bloated again. To combat the developed “inflammation” (peritonitis), Dahl and Spassky (with the consent and approval of Arendt) placed 25 leeches on the stomach. Pushkin helped the doctors, caught and administered leeches with his own hand. After using leeches, the fever decreased.”

From the use of leeches, the patient lost, according to Uderman's calculations, about another 0.5 liters of blood and, thus, the total blood loss from the moment of injury reached 2.5 liters (50% of the total volume of blood circulating in the body). There is no doubt that by the time leeches were prescribed, severe anemia had already occurred. The improvement turned out to be fleeting, and soon Alexander Sergeevich became even worse.

From the description of the poet’s friends, “the face has changed, its features have sharpened (“the face of Hippocrates,” typical of inflammation of the abdominal cavity). A painful grin of teeth appeared, lips twitched convulsively even during short-term oblivion. There were signs of respiratory and cardiovascular failure. Breathing became frequent, jerky, there was not enough air (shortness of breath). The pulse was barely noticeable."

Despite the severity of the condition, there was no doubt about it, the treatment tactics remained unchanged. The patient was still given cherry laurel water, calomel and opium.

Last hours

“On the morning of January 29, the condition became critical, pre-agonal. “General exhaustion took over.” Doctor Spassky, who came to the apartment early in the morning, was amazed at the sharp deterioration in the patient’s condition and noted that “Pushkin was melting away.” A council of doctors consisting of Arendt, Spassky, Andreevsky and Dahl unanimously agreed that the agony would soon begin. Arendt stated that Pushkin would live no more than two hours. ... The patient’s pulse dropped from hour to hour and became barely noticeable. The hands were completely cold. Frequent, jerky breathing movements were interrupted by pauses (Cheyne-Stokes breathing).”

At 14:45 on January 29, 1837 (February 10, new style), having breathed his last, Pushkin died. Doctor Efim Ivanovich Andreevsky closed the eyes of the deceased.

So what kind of wound did Pushkin have? Read about the autopsy data and anatomy of the wound canal in the article.

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A look behind the secret curtain of the past

One of the mysterious historical facts, the mystery of which has not yet been fully revealed, is the assassination attempt on Vladimir Lenin in August 1918. Various versions of what happened constantly appear on the pages of the media, which for the most part, repeating, complement each other with the rich imagination of the authors. In principle, this is natural, and everyone has the right to express their own point of view, but at the same time one cannot sin against the truth, which must be supported by scientific data. It is the lack of a qualified approach that, as a rule, leads the authors of “revelatory” materials into a dead end, which gives the next “whistleblower” a reason to take the wrong direction in the search for the essence. The material presented below is based on scientific facts and logic, and that is why it does not aim to confirm (or refute) the involvement of F. Kaplan in the case as the main person involved. The purpose of the publication is to reconstruct the model of the assassination attempt itself and make comparisons with other descriptions in order to eliminate erroneous versions that do not have an evidence base.

On August 30, 1918, after V. Lenin’s speech at a rally held in the premises of the grenade workshop of the Mikhelson plant, while the leader was walking to his personal car, an attempt was made on his life. Due to the fact that the person(s) who shot was not detained directly at the scene of the incident, in the following text he will be referred to as the “shooter.” And the person(s) who were hit by the thrown combat elements (bullets) will be referred to as the “injured party.”

Place
Excerpt from the protocol of the inspection of the scene of the assassination attempt on V.I. Lenin at the Mikhelson plant: “There is only one exit from the premises where the rallies are taking place. From the threshold of this double door to the parking lot is 9 fathoms (19.2 meters). From the gate leading to the street to the place where the car was parked, to the front wheels - 8 soots. 2 feet (17.68 m), to the rear - 10 fathoms. 2 feet (21.94 m). The shooter (the shooter) stood at the front fenders of the car from the entrance to the meeting room. Comrade Lenin was wounded at the moment when he was approximately one arshin (0.71 m) from the car, slightly to the right of the car door...”

Automobile
None of the mass of previously published materials contains information about the car in which Lenin arrived at the rally on the indicated day, and this may be one of the significant errors in modeling the situation. Many sources mention a Rolls-Royce, but in fact it was a 1915 Turk Mary 28 car. A very expensive handmade car with a 50-horsepower 4-cylinder engine and a closed custom body. There is no information about how this masterpiece of a little-known French company from Marseille came to Russia, but it certainly wasn’t in the Tsar’s garage. The driver of this car was Stepan Kazimirovich Gil, who once served in the royal garage. Lenin introduced a new fashion and began to ride next to the driver, neglecting the convenience and luxury of the rear cabin. This was done in order to emphasize the democratic character of the leader. In addition to the French limousine "Turk-Mary", Lenin also had other cars assigned to him, for example, the "Delaunay-Belleville" from the garage of Nicholas II, which was driven by another driver. However, Lenin liked to ride with Gil: he not only quickly and skillfully delivered him to any point of the city, but was also an excellent conversationalist, and also performed additional functions as a bodyguard.

Cloth
“Vladimir Ilyich, going to the factory, took his coat with him. Therefore, we can say that on August 30, twilight came earlier than usual due to clouds and drizzling rain” - N. A. Zenkovich.

“When conducting an investigative experiment in 1996, the FSB requested from the Historical Museum Lenin’s black drape demi-season coat, a black lustrine jacket, 4 cartridge cases found at the crime scene, 2 bullets and a Browning, pierced by bullets. (The last time the examination of Lenin’s coat and jacket was carried out in 1959, the materials of this survey are stored in the Historical Museum.)" - Yuri Felshtinsky.

Shots
Testimony from witness interviews:
D. A. Romanychev wrote in a statement that “there were only three or four shots.”
E.E. Mamonov testified: “She managed to shoot 3 times.”
M.Z. Prokhorov “saw how someone from the public knocked out the gun from the shooter and the shooter ran away.”
I. G. Bogdevich assured the chairman of the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal Dyakonov that the shooter had wounded the housekeeper M. G. Popova with the first shot. The second and third shots - V.I. Lenin.
I. A. Alexandrov remembered that the woman shot over the shoulder of the boy standing near Lenin.
I. I. Vorobyov stood next to the shooter and saw that she fired the first two shots at Lenin at point-blank range, and the next two at some distance, “probably,” Vorobyov testified, “the second shots wounded the woman who was talking with Lenin.”

Weapon
On September 1, 1918, the Izvestia newspaper published the following appeal. "From the Cheka. The Extraordinary Commission did not find the revolver from which the shots were fired at Comrade Lenin. The commission asks those who know anything about the discovery of the revolver to immediately report it to the commission."

On Monday, September 2, 1918, the day after this material was published in the Izvestia newspaper, a factory worker named after V.E. Kingisepp appeared before the investigator of the Supreme Tribunal V. E. Kingisepp. Savelyeva Kuznetsov. He stated that the Browning gun used to shoot Lenin was in his possession and placed it on the table. It was number 150489, with four cartridges in the clip. Kingisepp involved him in the case of the attempted murder of V.I. Lenin, and Kuznetsov warmly thanked him for his help in the investigation.

“Kuznetsov,” Kingisepp wrote in the protocol, “presented Browning No. 150489 and a clip with four cartridges in it. Comrade Kuznetsov picked up this revolver immediately after the shooter dropped it, and it was in his, Kuznetsov’s, hands all the time "This Browning is involved in the case of the attempted murder of Comrade Lenin."

On September 3, 1918, Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was quick to inform millions of its readers about all this. But the number of cartridges in the clip turned out to be different: “There were three unfired cartridges in the clip. By examining the revolver and the testimony of witnesses, it was possible to establish with accuracy that a total of three shots were fired at Comrade Lenin.”

Version
Oleg Roldugin. "Interlocutor", 02/26/2003
“Russian colleagues also give gifts to the sappers. One of the most memorable of these gifts was a small blued Browning: according to the donors from the RUBOP, it was from this that Fanny Kaplan shot Lenin in 1918.”

Sleeves
V. E. Kingisepp, who conducted the investigation, recorded in the official documents of the Cheka “a clip with four cartridges in it.”

Excerpt from the protocol of the inspection of the scene of the assassination attempt on V. Lenin at the Mikhelson plant: “Mark on the photographs the places where the cartridges fell “4, 5, 6, 7” and write “shot cartridges.”

Bullets
“Doctors V. M. Mints, B. S. Weisbrod, N. A. Semashko, M. I. Baranov, V. M. Bonch-Bruevich (Velichko), A. N. Vinokurov, V. N. Rozanov, V. A. Obukh suggested whether any poison entered Vladimir Ilyich’s body along with the bullets.”

"10 assassination attempts on Lenin"
An extract from the description of the operation to remove a bullet from Lenin’s body in April 1922 at the Botkin Hospital in Moscow: “... the bullet removed from the wound turned out to be the size of an average Browning (from the medical report). The bullet is cut crosswise through the entire thickness of the shell along the entire length of the body... The bullet is attached to the case. Presented to the parties for inspection. After the operation, Lenin wanted to go home, but the doctors persuaded him to wait until tomorrow and assigned him to the second floor, ward No. 44.”

“Who put a revolver with poisoned bullets into her (hand – editor’s note)? And that they were poisoned was proven by medical examination and the bullet that was removed during the operation...”

Vladimir Buldakov: “When, after the rally, a crowd surrounded him near his car, four shots were heard. Lenin was wounded by two bullets, two more scratched the wardrobe maid Popova, whom the head of the Council of People’s Commissars advised to seek an end to the outrages on the part of the so-called barrier detachments, which were excessively gutting self-supplying bagmen carrying food from the village."

Yuri Felshtinsky: “After the opening of the case in 1992, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation carried out, according to E. Maksimova, “a comprehensive forensic examination of Browning No. 150489, shell casings and bullets that hit Lenin.” But the results of this examination were not exhaustive. The experts concluded that of the two bullets, “one was probably fired from this pistol,” but “it is not possible to determine whether the second was fired from it.” Browning jammed and stopped working. But when comparing the bullets “extracted during Lenin’s operation in 1922 and during the embalming of the leader’s body in 1924, it turned out that they were of different calibers.” In addition, “specialists were surprised by the discrepancy between the bullet marks on Lenin’s coat and the places where he was wounded.”

"10 assassination attempts on Lenin"
“When the Red Army soldier Safonov asked him where he was wounded, Lenin replied: “In the arm.” “The doctors came to the conclusion that the bullet, fortunately, did not hit the large vessels of the neck. Had it passed a little to the left or to the right... Another bullet pierced the apex of the left lung from left to right and lodged near the sternoclavicular joint. The third pierced the jacket under the armpit, without causing harm to Vladimir Ilyich."
Historical manipulation of the situation? (Author's note.)

Historical archive No. 2: “a letter from a certain Socialist Revolutionary militant with the initials “A.Ch.” (author unknown) to the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, written no earlier than 1909, is devoted to the methods of terrorist struggle, or rather, to the question of the insufficient effectiveness of terror and ways to increase it "What should revolutionary fighters do in this situation so that even the slightest wound they inflict would be fatal? The answer is obvious: they must act with a poisoned weapon. And specifically, again point by point:

1. Use bullets for browning exclusively lead, without hard shells, as they are easily deformed in the wound and make it easier to process the part for laying a portion of the poison.
2. Provide all provincial committees with supplies of poisons and indicate methods for obtaining them.
3. Develop instructions for poisoning bullets and bladed weapons with poison.
4. Inspect the weapon and put it in order.
5. If there is no poison to poison bullets, use a dilution of infectious bacteria: consumption, tetanus, diphtheria, typhoid fever, etc. immediately before the terrorist attack..."

Injuries
Official bulletin No. 130 August 1918, 11 pm: “2 blind gunshot wounds were stated: one bullet, entering above the left shoulder blade, penetrated into the chest cavity, damaged the upper lobe of the lung, causing hemorrhage into the pleura, and got stuck in the right side of the neck above the right collarbone; another bullet penetrated the left shoulder, crushed the bone and got stuck under the skin of the left shoulder area, there are signs of internal hemorrhage. Pulse 104. The patient is fully conscious. The best surgeons have been involved in the treatment."

“10 assassination attempts on Lenin”:
“I think we won’t remove the bullets now,” Rozanov concluded.
“Perhaps we’ll wait,” agreed Obukh...
After the consultation, the doctors returned to Vladimir Ilyich. Nadezhda Konstantinovna was sitting next to him. Seeing those entering, Lenin wanted to say something, but Rozanov raised his hand in warning. At V. I. Lenin’s apartment in the Kremlin there were doctors V. M. Mints, B. S. Weisbrod, N. A. Semashko, M. I. Baranov, V. M. Bonch-Bruevich (Velichko), A. N. Vinokurov, V.N. Rozanov, V.A. Obukh and others. They noted unusually weak heart function, cold sweat and poor general condition. This somehow did not fit with the hemorrhage, which was not as severe as expected. The patient showed signs of shortness of breath. The temperature has risen. Lenin fell into semi-oblivion. Sometimes he uttered individual words.

“Bulletin No. 2 noted that Lenin’s general situation is serious. But already in bulletin No. 3 it was said that he felt more cheerful. On the evening of August 31, bulletin No. 4 reported that the immediate danger to Vladimir Ilyich’s life had passed.”

On September 18, 1918, the Pravda newspaper published the last official bulletin on the state of health of V.I. Lenin: “The temperature is normal. The pulse is good. There are small traces left from the hemorrhage in the left pleura. There are no complications from the fracture. The bandage is well tolerated. The position of the bullets is under skin and the complete absence of inflammatory reactions make it possible to postpone their removal until the bandage is removed. Vladimir Ilyich is allowed to go about his business."

Vladimir Buldakov: “the bullet, which had a cross cut, entered under the shoulder blade, traveled a very difficult path in the body and, managing not to hit the vital organs, did not “explode” in his body due to the low speed of its flight.”

“Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee”, September 4, 1918: “...On the day of the fatal assassination attempt on comrade. Lenina, the aforesaid Popova, was wounded right through; the bullet, having passed through the left chest, crushed the left bone (meaning: the bone of the left arm between the shoulder and elbow. - Author's note). Her two daughters and husband were arrested, but were soon released.”

From the testimony of policeman A.I. Sukhotin: “Four steps from Comrade Lenin, a woman who looked to be about forty was lying on the ground, the one who asked him questions about flour. She shouted: “I’m wounded, I’m wounded!”, and the crowd shouted: “She’s a murderer!” I rushed to this woman along with Comrade. Kalaburkin. We picked her up and took her to the Pavlovsk hospital.”

Playback
Kingisepp asked Gil to park the car as it was at the time of the assassination attempt. Kingisepp asked Ivanov if he had seen Comrade Lenin.

“I saw,” Ivanov answered. “It was like this: when Comrade Lenin left the workshop, I hesitated there for a while, and suddenly I heard shouts: “They’re shooting!” A traffic jam formed at the door. I rushed to the nearest window, kicked him out and jumped into the yard. Having pushed the people away, I saw Ilyich..."

Ivanov showed the place where Comrade Lenin fell.

Kingisepp asked Gil to sit behind the wheel, and told Ivanov and Sidorov to stand as Vladimir Ilyich and the woman (Popova) with whom he was talking were standing at the time of the shots. Ivanov and Sidorov took their places. Yurovsky took several photographs. He filmed in various positions: standing, lying down, sitting.

The photographs taken by security officer Ya. M. Yurovsky are kept in the case of the assassination attempt on V. I. Lenin. Each photograph has an explanatory text handwritten by V. E. Kingisepp.

In the first photo: The grenade workshop with an open door, and nearby on the left is V. I. Lenin’s car. Having marked the door with the letter “a” and the car with the letter “b”, Kingisepp indicated: the distance from “a” to “b” is 9 fathoms. This means that the car was waiting for Ilyich 25 - 30 steps from the door of the Grenade Workshop.

The next three photographs depict “the staging of three moments of the attempted murder of Comrade Lenin.” This is what Kingisepp wrote.
The second photo captures “the moment before the shot was fired.” The car is standing sideways. Gil is driving, he turned his head towards “Lenin” (he was portrayed by Ivanov in the dramatization). Gil is ready to start driving as soon as Vladimir Ilyich gets into the car. At a close distance from the door stand “Lenin” and “Popova”, who asked Vladimir Ilyich about flour (Popova was portrayed by Sidorov). “Lenin” looked at “Popova” and said something to her. The “Shooter” (he was portrayed by Kingisepp himself in the re-enactment) is frozen at the front wheels of the car; he stands with his back to us, but his whole posture indicates that he is taking out a weapon.

In the third photo: "The shooter is preparing to shoot." "Lenin" and "Popova" continue to talk. "Shooter", holding out his hand with a Browning, aims at "Lenin". Gil (he portrayed himself in the re-enactment) notices the “shooter” and rises from his seat, drawing his weapon. But it's' too late. Shots ring out.

In the fourth photo: “The perfect assassination attempt.” Gil bent down to the wounded Ilyich. "Popova", wounded in the arm, runs back. The "shooter" hurries to the gate, the abandoned pistol lies near the open door of the driver's cab...

conclusions
So, even an inexperienced (but attentive) reader of the above materials, after reading them, has a lot of questions due to inconsistencies in objects, facts, and aspects of description.

1. It is generally accepted that the victim Ulyanov was located in the back seat of a Rolls-Royce car. Considering that in fact it was a Turka-Meri-28 car, the place where the victim Ulyanov was during the shots shifted, which means the distance of the bullets was distorted during the reenactment of the assassination attempt.

2. During the investigation and inspection of the clothing of the victim Ulyanov in 1959 and 1996, due to the discrepancy between the entrance holes on the clothing and the body of the victim, the very fact that the clothing belonged to the victim was called into question. And for the sake of objectivity, it is necessary to note that Lenin’s height during his life, namely at the time of the assassination attempt, was 165 cm; after mummification, his height decreased to 158 cm. Hence the discrepancies mentioned above.

3. To determine the exact number of shots, it is necessary to compare the number of wounds and the casings found:
a) the entrance of the wound canal above the left shoulder blade of the victim Ulyanov,
b) the entrance of the wound channel into the area of ​​the left shoulder of the victim Ulyanov,
c) the entrance of the wound channel into the left breast of the victim Popova,
d) entrance and exit holes in the clothing of the victim Ulyanov in the axillary region,
e) 4 (four) cartridge cases found at the scene of the assassination attempt can and should be compared for identity - by series (the mark is stamped on the bottom of the cartridge case), by the imprint of the primer, by the imprint of the pistol reflector, which is clearly visible on the bottom of the cartridge case.

This comparison will not only indicate the number of shots, but also the fact that the cartridges in the case belong to the specifically designated pistol(s).

4. Information on the classification of small arms that appeared earlier in the investigation as a “revolver” or “pistol” should not be taken into account by origin.

In a revolver of any system, to extract (remove) cartridges from the drum, it is necessary to carry out a time-consuming procedure, and this is precisely what the “shooter” did not have time for. At the moment the pistol is fired, the cartridge case is extracted automatically, so the firing device should be called nothing more than a “pistol.” The name of the firing device as “revolver”, previously published in the press and in the case materials, is considered incorrect due to the lack of special knowledge among those who conducted the investigation in 1918.

5. Kingisepp attached the Browning pistol number 150489 with four cartridges in its clip to the case of the attempted murder of V.I. Lenin.

Taking this as a fact, we can confidently say that 3 (three) shots were fired from this weapon, since the clip of this pistol is designed for 7 (seven) rounds. Based on the number of bullets fired and casings found, it can be argued that there was another, previously unidentified person who fired 1 (one) shot. Proof of this is a comparison of the wounds of victims Ulyanov and Popova. The nature of the wounds described indicates the difference in the manpower (energy) of the bullets they carried.

6. The version that Ulyanov’s attending physicians put forward during the first examination about possibly poisoned bullets, which later moved from the category of assumptions to confirmation, cannot be considered as correct.

The first bullet was recovered in 1922, the second in 1924 (after Lenin’s death). In practice, it takes several hours for the poison to affect the body. In addition, medical practitioners were well aware of the punishment they would suffer if they failed to act and prevent poisoning. The version of poisoned bullets made it possible for doctors to avoid liability in the event of the death of the victim Ulyanov.

7. The bullet, recovered from the Botkin hospital in 1922, is described as having a cross-shaped cut along the entire length of the shell and is classified as medium-caliber ammunition.

The described bullet (with notches) belongs to a caliber of 7.65 mm, and the Browning featured in the case has a caliber of 6.35 mm, thus there is a mismatch of calibers. There may be many versions, but only one is accurate: the extracted bullet was replaced in the hospital itself. This is indicated by the fact that the bullet casing has been cut along its entire length, which cannot be done without first removing it from the cartridge. Theoretically, this is possible, but in practice, the bullet is fixed in a Browning cartridge of this caliber with a force of 40 kg, which is impossible to do in home-made conditions, since there is a threat of jamming (misalignment) of the cartridge or a poor-quality shot. That is, in this case, a large amount of powder gases, instead of pushing the bullet, will flow freely along the cuts in the bullet casing.

8. The description of the wound of the victim Ulyanov in the shoulder area in the official bulletin indicates fragmentation of the bone by a penetrating bullet. Another document talks about a healing fracture.

This injury does not match actual similar descriptions. It is known that when a bone is crushed by a bullet, the resulting bone fragments themselves turn into lethal elements, subject to distribution and movement at a certain speed within the body. As a rule, such wounds require surgical intervention and take a long time to heal. It is known that after being wounded, the victim Ulyanov fell to the ground, and it was for this reason, due to an awkward fall, that a bone fracture occurred in the shoulder area. The fracture (but not the injury) is specifically discussed in the Pravda article dated September 18, 1918.

9. The only person who, according to the case materials, exposed his personal weapon was the driver (part-time security guard) of the victim Ulyanov - S. Gil.

The conducted forensic examination shows (and proves) that the shots were fired at victims Ulyanov and Popova from different points. The flight path of the bullet that hit the victim Popova comes from the driver’s seat of the Turka-Meri-28 car, which proves the fact of not only exposure, but also the use of personal weapons by the driver S. Gil against the victim Popova. The reason for this was S. Gil’s immediate suspicion that Popova was the shooter. Additional evidence could be the memoirs of the late Yuri Vasilyevich Alekseev, known in criminal circles under the nickname “Humpbacked”. (He died in a prison hospital at the age of 62.): “Mom was a very beautiful woman. Her godfather, by the way, was Lenin’s personal driver, Gil Stepan Kazimirovich. When he died, he left my mother eight notebooks of memories.”

All realistically possible work has been done. The curtain on the historical secret has been lifted, and for the final reconstruction of real events, it remains to disclose exactly that part of the information that is classified as a “state secret.”

Pavel Makarov,
gunsmith, researcher

August, 2006

SHOT AT THE FOOT OF MASHUK (about the fatal wound of M.Yu. Lermontov)

Associate Professor M.I.Davidov
Urology course at Perm Medical Academy
Medical class. No. 1-2/2006, p. 34-38.

More than 160 years ago, on July 15 (27), 1841, a shot was fired that ended the life of the great Russian poet M. Yu Lermontov. However, until now, some important details of the duel and injury, which became known to us through 25 years of archival searches and inaccessible sources, are carefully hushed up by literary scholars. And although “the black cloud of mystery that shrouded the duel” (in the figurative expression of Lermontov scholars) has already partially dissipated, the whole truth about the duel is still not known to a wide circle of readers.

The reasons for the fight between lieutenant of the Tenginsky infantry regiment Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov and retired major of the Grebensky Cossack army Nikolai Solomonovich Martynov were revealed by us in the documentary story “Case No. 37” (Moscow magazine, No. 7-8 for 2003).

On the day of the fight with Martynov M.Yu. Lermontov was at a young, blossoming age - he was 26 years and 9 months old. However, his health was far from ideal.

He was born from a seriously ill mother, Maria Mikhailovna Lermantova (Lermontov is the poet’s literary pseudonym), who suffered from advanced consumption and died from it shortly after giving birth. The pregnancy proceeded with complications, and the birth was very difficult. The boy was born premature, with deformities of the torso, arms and legs. The midwife immediately stated that “this boy will not die a natural death.” As a child, Misha suffered from rickets and scrofula; I had a severe form of measles, after which I could not get out of bed for 3 years.

In 1832, in the arena, 17-year-old cadet Lermontov received an open fracture of his right tibia from a blow from a horse’s hoof. The bone did not heal well, the right leg remained deformed, causing Mikhail to limp severely. Lermontov had many years of contact with neglected tuberculosis patients (mother, father, tutor), very often suffered from colds and infectious diseases of the bronchi and lungs, had signs of compensated respiratory failure and, possibly, undiagnosed pulmonary tuberculosis.

Mikhail Yuryevich had a small stature (about 160 cm), an ugly figure with a very large head and a disproportionate torso, pronounced kyphosis (hunchback) due to congenital and acquired deformation of the cervical and thoracic spine, was bow-legged and suffered from lameness. Lermontov's chest was deformed from congenital bone deformity and improper development as a result of rickets.

Before the duel with Martynov, Lermontov already had experience in two duels (1830 and 1840) and a reputation as a very accurate shooter, but this did not play any role, because before and during the fatal duel he abandoned his shots.

The duel between Lermontov and Martynov took place at about 18:30 on July 15, 1841. (hereinafter dates are given according to the old style), 4 versts from Pyatigorsk, on the northwestern slope of Mount Mashuk, not far from the Perkal rock. The place for the duel was chosen in a hurry, because when the duelists and seconds, who initially gathered at the colony of settlers of Karras, headed from there to select a suitable site, they were quickly overtaken by a huge thundercloud approaching Mashuk.

On Martynov’s side, the seconds were Lermontov’s friend, cornet M.P. Glebov, who lived in Pyatigorsk in the same apartment with Nikolai Solomonovich, and 22-year-old Prince A.I. Vasilchikov, son of the Chairman of the State Council, secret enemy of Mikhail Yuryevich. On Lermontov’s side – his relative (cousin) Captain A.A. Stolypin and brother-in-law Prince S.V. Trubetskoy. However, after the duel, it was decided to hide the names of Stolypin and Trubetskoy, since both were hated by Nicholas I. Therefore, during the investigation, the roles of the remaining seconds had to be redistributed: Glebov was the first to call himself Martynov’s second, the crafty Vasilchikov got the role of Lermontov’s second. The duel was attended by witnesses (the guide and several friends of Lermontov and Martynov), who were located mainly in the adjacent bush.

The conditions for the duel drawn up the day before by Vasilchikov (with the connivance of Glebov and Stolypin) were harsh. Moreover, it was already known that Lermontov refused to fire his shots, and, therefore, Martynov would shoot, in fact, at an unarmed enemy.

According to the conditions, the distance between the barriers was 6 steps (according to other sources, 10 steps). This corresponds to 4-6.5m. From the barriers, 10 steps are measured in each direction, where the duelists stand before the start of the duel. From these points, the opponents must converge on the command “Converge!” Next, the seconds give the commands “One”, “Two”, “Three” at large intervals. The conditions did not give anyone a special right to the first shot. Everyone could shoot while standing still, or on the move, or approaching the barrier, but certainly between teams “Two” and “Three”. After the count of “Three” you can no longer shoot, the round of the duel is considered over. According to the conditions, there should be a total of three such rounds with the opponents moving to the extreme points.

Thus, under the terms of the duel, Lermontov, who had refused to fire in advance (everyone knew that he always kept his word), was put in a hopeless position. The opponent had the right to three shots from very close range.

Large-caliber long-range German pistols of the Kuchenreuther system with flint-percussion fuses and a rifled barrel were used in the duel. Experiments by forensic scientists have shown that this weapon has the same penetration power as a modern TT pistol. From a distance of 10 steps (6.5 m), a bullet fired from a Kuchenreuther pierces a person’s chest right through.

The shooting training of 26-year-old combat major Martynov was quite sufficient to hit the enemy from such a short distance. Because of the desire to whitewash the killer, after the duel rumors spread that Martynov allegedly did not know how to shoot and hit Lermontov by accident. A similar opinion could also have been formed due to the shooting style of Nikolai Solomonovich, who took aim by turning the pistol at 900, which he called “shooting in French.” Another duel of Martynov is known, which took place in Vilna, in which he, quickly approaching the barrier, turned the pistol “in French” and accurately hit his opponent.

The duel between Lermontov and Martynov took place under a huge thundercloud approaching from Beshtau. When the seconds measured the distance and distributed loaded pistols to the duelists, a storm arose, and then a terrible rain began to fall. The dueling ground was uneven, and Lermontov was placed above Martynov.

Having received the weapon, Lermontov repeated that he would not shoot at the enemy. Glebov commanded: “Get together!” Martynov quickly walked up to the barrier, raised the pistol, turned it “French” and began to aim.

Mikhail Yuryevich slowly moved towards the barrier, turning with his right side forward to reduce the affected area. Approaching the barrier, he raised his right hand with a pistol.

Martynov took a long time to aim: the frequent slanting rain hampered him. The command “two” was heard, and then “three”. According to the rules, it was no longer possible to shoot; the opponents had to be sent to their original positions. Instead, one of the seconds shouted: “Shoot, or I will scout you!” Mikhail Yuryevich responded mockingly: “I won’t shoot at this fool!” - raised the pistol even higher and fired into the air. From the recoil he leaned slightly back and to the left. His arm remained extended upward, and his right side, pushed forward, turned out to be completely unprotected. But Martynov did not lower his pistol. He moved even closer, mechanically stepping one step (50 cm) in the thick curtain of rain over a purely symbolic barrier - a cap lying in the mud - and fired.

Let's pay attention to the following points. Due to the unevenness of the dueling platform, Lermontov was higher than Martynov, so the bullet followed an upward trajectory. At the moment the enemy shot, the poet stood, turned half-turn, with his right side forward, his right hand with the pistol was extended upward as much as possible, and his body was tilted back and to the left from the recoil (Lermontov had just fired into the air) and to counterbalance the outstretched right hand. The right shoulder and, accordingly, the right half of the chest were located significantly higher than the left shoulder and the left half of the chest. The asymmetrical and unnatural position of the upper half of Lermontov’s body was intensified by his kyphosis (hump) and deformations of the chest as a result of congenital and acquired (rickets) bone deformity. In addition, in the right pocket of Lermontov’s coat there was a lady’s gold hair clip, which he took before the duel (for luck?) from his cousin Ekaterina Bykhovets. Left in the poet's pocket due to forgetfulness, it additionally deflected the bullet in a direction that was extremely unfavorable for Lermontov.

All these factors contributed to the formation of a peculiar ascending direction of the wound channel, and the high destructive power of the weapon and the extremely short distance between opponents determined the penetration of the chest.

Lermontov received a gunshot wound at about 18:30. Immediately after the enemy’s shot, Lermontov’s torso seemed to break; he silently fell, making no movement either back or forward, without even having time to grab the sore spot, as the wounded usually do. The wound on his right side was smoking, and blood was oozing from his left side. Several convulsive movements passed through the wounded man’s body, then it became quiet. The poet lost consciousness, his eyes were open, but looked with a dull, uncomprehending gaze. Breathing was maintained. A few minutes after the injury, consciousness returned, but it was inhibited. Glebov, bending over to the wounded man, heard: “Misha, I’m dying...”

The condition of the wounded person in the first 20 minutes after injury should be assessed as critical. He experienced painful shock and massive bleeding began, apparently from large vessels located in the chest cavity. Blood poured out from both chest wounds, but more of it flowed from the bullet exit hole located in the left half of the chest, in the 5th intercostal space along the posterior axillary line. There was a third wound, moderately bleeding, located on the back surface of the upper third of the left shoulder, where the bullet, exiting the chest, cut through the skin, subcutaneous tissue and part of the muscle. The bleeding from the two chest wounds was intense, and the wounded man lost a large amount of blood while at the scene of the duel. So much of it accumulated under the victim that the strongest thunderstorm rain, which continued intermittently for several hours, could not wash it away from the ground where the poet lay, and it was discovered the next day, July 16, during an inspection of the scene by members of the investigative commission. Blood completely soaked all the poet’s clothes (an army frock coat and shirt). Along with external hemorrhage, there was undoubtedly internal bleeding of the same intensity (into the chest cavity). According to our calculations, the poet could have lost about 2.5-3 liters of blood (50-60% of the blood volume) at the scene of the duel.

The wounded man was conscious for about 10 minutes, and then lost consciousness again and for a long time. The poet remained at the place of the duel in the open air for 4 and a half hours, watered by pouring rain. From the moment he was wounded, for 2 hours he was surrounded by Stolypin, Trubetskoy and Glebov, and then by Trubetskoy and Vasilchikov.

Data on the poet's life expectancy after injury are contradictory.

The official point of view of literary scholars is indicated in the Lermontov Encyclopedia: “Lermontov died without regaining consciousness within a few minutes.” This point of view is based on the materials of the falsified investigation and the stories of Martynov’s second Mikhail Glebov.

This version of Lermontov’s almost instantaneous death after the enemy’s shot was extremely beneficial not only to Glebov, but also to all the seconds, because: a) it relieved them of responsibility for not bothering about inviting the doctor to a duel (in case of instant death, the doctor would not have helped ); b) justified their sluggishness, which led to Lermontov lying in a field in the rain for 4 and a half hours without assistance (does it matter when the murdered man was brought to Pyatigorsk?).

However, there is an opposite point of view, which claims that the poet lived much longer, within 4 hours after being wounded.

Let us quote Martynov’s testimony from the investigation materials: “He fell from the shot I fired, and although signs of life were still visible in him, he did not speak. I... went home, believing that help might still get to him in time.” Thus, Nikolai Solomonovich said goodbye to the living Lermontov. Judging by the appearance of the wounded man, Martynov seriously hoped that medical help would still arrive and could save him from death.

The assertion that Lermontov died in the next few minutes after being wounded goes against the order of the commandant of Pyatigorsk V.I. Ilyashenkov to send the lieutenant brought from the scene of the duel... to the guardhouse. Well, in fact, a man who rose to the rank of colonel, who led the military and civil administration of the city for many years, could not be as stupid as modern Lermontov scholars explain? Most likely, Ilyashenkov, when giving the order, was sure from the reports (of the parade ground adjutant A.G. Sideri, seconds or witnesses to the duel) that Lermontov was still alive. And only when the poet was brought to the guardhouse, they were convinced that he was already dead.

In modern literature, the testimony of Lermontov’s servant, the young Gurian Christopher Sanikidze, is carefully hushed up: “When Lermontov was transported from the place of his fight with Martynov (with Sanikidze being present), Mikhail Yuryevich was still alive, moaning and barely audibly whispered: “I’m dying”; but halfway there he stopped moaning and died calmly.” One of the first biographers of the poet, P.K. Martyanov, who personally talked with the landlord of Lermontov’s apartment, V.I. Chilyaev, and other people who lived in Pyatigorsk in the year of the duel, claimed that the poet died already in Pyatigorsk, when he was taken around the city.

Finally, some scientists, for example, Professor S.P. Shilovtsev*, from the point of view of the nature of the wound, criticize the official view that Lermontov allegedly died instantly at the scene of the fight, and suggest that the wounded man lived for several hours after the killer’s shot.

So, contrary to the testimony of the seconds, who claim that the poet died almost instantly at the scene of the duel, there is documentary evidence and scientific evidence that the victim, who was in extremely serious condition, lived longer, for about 4 hours from the moment of injury.

But then two very important questions arise: 1) how was the provision of medical care to the wounded organized? 2) was the victim transported from the scene of the fight to the city in a timely manner?

According to the dueling rules, the duties of the seconds included providing the duel with a doctor and crew for the wounded. However, all 4 seconds failed to fulfill their duties by not inviting a doctor and not taking care of the crew.

Vasilchikov’s behavior immediately after Martynov’s fatal shot causes bewilderment. He volunteered to go for the doctor and the crew. 2 agonizing hours of waiting passed in heavy rain, after which the prince appeared at the place of the duel... alone, without a crew and without a doctor. How to evaluate Vasilchikov’s behavior: helplessness or criminal inaction?

3 decades after the Pyatigorsk tragedy, Vasilchikov claimed in the press that he visited two “gentlemen doctors,” but received the same answer from them, that because of the “bad” weather they could not go to the wounded man, but would come to the apartment when he will be delivered to the city. Having received negative answers to his request, Alexander Illarionovich was satisfied with this and calmly returned to the place of the duel, not even ashamed of his helplessness in front of the other seconds.

But how could doctors refuse to help a seriously dying patient? Of course, they acted criminally, violating the laws then existing in Russia and the Hippocratic Oath, or rather the “Faculty Promise”, which was given by graduates of medical faculties of universities.

Pyatigorsk in 1841 was a small town in which only a few people worked as doctors: Drozdov, Rebrov, Norman, Roger, Conradi, Barclay de Tolly. Which of them did Vasilchikov address? Archival searches have not yet provided an answer to the question.

Be that as it may, the wounded poet died, lying in the open, in the pouring rain, covered only with an overcoat, and he was never provided with medical assistance.

Seconds Stolypin, Glebov and Trubetskoy, who were next to the seriously wounded man at the scene of the fight, showed confusion and passivity. They only watched as their comrade's life faded away. They did not take painkillers, cardiac and other medications for the duel. The officers, who were required to master first aid methods on the battlefield (in the form of self- and mutual aid), did not even bother to bandage the wounds and they, all three, remained open and continued to bleed profusely.

“The great young poet lay there, unbandaged, slowly bleeding,” one of his first biographers, P. A. Viskovatov, who independently investigated the circumstances of the duel in Pyatigorsk, bitterly described the wounded Lermontov’s many hours in the open air.

The seconds did not even think of protecting Lermontov from the pouring rain: moving him under the bushes, building something like a hut or shelter.

They were only 4 miles from Pyatigorsk, but for an unforgivably long time they could not take measures to transport the poet to the city. The cab drivers did not want to go in heavy rain to pick up a wounded man; they had to be forced to do so. Ultimately, the poet was brought to Pyatigorsk by the servants of Lermontov and Martynov, Ivan Vertyukov and Ilya Kozlov, on a cart hired in the city.

The doctor (Barclay de Tolly) arrived at Lermontov’s body “to provide assistance,” as recorded by eyewitnesses, only late at night from July 15 to 16, when Mikhail Yuryevich was taken to the apartment and he was already dead.

Thus, during his lifetime, the wounded Lermontov was never provided with any medical assistance - neither first nor medical.

Let us consider the nature of the injury and the course of the wound channel.

Seconds and witnesses to the duel, who did not have medical training, believed that Lermontov was wounded directly in the heart. Their opinion, recorded in the investigation materials, seemed unshakable and is still taken for granted by the majority of modern Lermontov scholars and readers - fans of the great poet.

The first to claim that Lermontov did not have a wound in his heart was the poet’s friend N.P. Raevsky. Nikolai Pavlovich participated in washing the poet’s body when he was brought from the place of the duel. Therefore, Raevsky himself personally saw the wounds on the naked body. The opinion of the former officer Raevsky is also valuable because by the time he wrote his memoirs about the duel (1885), he, having long since retired and graduated from the medical faculty, already had extensive experience as a doctor. Thus, in essence, these are the memoirs of a doctor who knows anatomy well. Raevsky's testimony about the course of the wound channel is much more valuable than the opinion of the seconds, who did not see a naked body with wounds and did not have a medical education.

In his memoirs, N.P. Raevsky, objecting that the wound was right in the heart, notes that Lermontov had a wound in his right side, the bullet passed through the chest from right to left, exiting from the left side of the chest and hitting his left arm.

A medical examination of the body of the deceased was carried out on July 17 by a doctor at the Pyatigorsk military hospital, 30-year-old Ivan Yegorovich Barclay de Tolly (a relative of the famous commander). It read: “... Upon examination, it turned out that a pistol bullet, hitting the right side below the last rib, when the rib fused with the cartilage, pierced the right and left lungs, rising upward, exited between the fifth and sixth ribs of the left side and, upon exiting, cut through the soft parts left shoulder."

Unfortunately, Barclay de Tolly limited himself to only an external examination of the body, without performing an autopsy. As a result, it is impossible to say with 100% accuracy which organs were affected. The conclusion is very brief, without descriptions of the size of the wounds, in connection with which later V. A. Schwemberger and other authors prone to fantasy accused Barclay de Tolly of allegedly confusing the entrance and exit holes, and de killed the poet completely not Martynov, but an unknown bribed “Cossack” who shot from behind, from behind the bushes!

Barclay de Tolly with absolute confidence points to the ascending direction of the wound canal, from the XII rib on the right to the V intercostal space on the left. We have already given the probable reasons for such advancement of the bullet in Lermontov’s body, describing the position of the body at the moment of the fatal shot. By the way, the version of a ricochet as a result of a bullet hitting a gold hairpin looks very compelling in light of the fact that, covered in blood and damaged, it was actually found in the right pocket of Lermontov’s army frock coat. However, the history of surgery contains many cases and much more unexpected rebounds. Barclay de Tolly, if you carefully re-read the death certificate he composed, believed that Lermontov received a through gunshot wound to the right and left lungs. He makes no mention of the heart injury at all. Probably, when examining the wounds on the corpse and mentally reproducing the path of the bullet from the inferolateral wound on the right to the posterosuperior wound on the left, the doctor believed that the heart remained in front of the wound canal.

Nizhny Novgorod professor of surgery S.P. Shilovtsev also believes that the poet’s heart was not touched. In his opinion, the bullet passed through the hepatic angle of the transverse colon, the liver, the diaphragm and the left lung, bypassing the heart and right lung.

The causes of Lermontov's death, in our opinion**, are lung damage and profuse bleeding.

Gunshot damage to the lungs and pleura led to hemopneumothorax, acute respiratory and heart failure. Trauma to the large vessels of the lungs caused intense bleeding with very large blood loss.

In addition to the already mentioned signs of bleeding, one should mention the sharp pallor of the skin and mucous membranes of the corpse. The “dueling” shirt and frock coat were so soaked in blood that it was not possible to preserve them for history, and they were burned. The bleeding was not only external, from the wounds, but also internal. So much blood accumulated in the pleural cavities that it continued to flow intensively and for a long time from the poet’s body even after his death. Combat officer A. Charykov, who came late at night on July 16 to the apartment of the murdered man, was involuntarily amazed at the abundance of blood pouring out: “... I saw the poet’s corpse, covered with a sheet, on the table; underneath is a copper basin; at the bottom of it there was red blood, which was still oozing from his chest for several hours.” The ladies who came in large numbers to the deceased “did their handkerchiefs in the blood of the murdered man, oozing from the unbandaged wound.”

Without at all claiming to be infallible in judgment, we will draw some conclusions about Lermontov’s injury:

1. The wound was very serious, hardly compatible with life; the chances of recovery, given the level of development of medicine at that time, were minimal, amounting to no more than 10%.

2. Lermontov’s death was not instantaneous, as stated in the investigation materials and official Lermontov studies; life was preserved in it for up to 4 hours from the moment of injury.

3. The death was significantly accelerated by the failure to provide medical care to the patient, for which all 4 seconds and the doctors they contacted were guilty.

4. With the provision of timely medical assistance at the scene of the duel and rapid transportation to a medical institution, the poet’s life could have been extended by another few hours or days.

At the wound site, in addition to other measures, it was important to apply sealed bandages to the wounds of the chest wall. Considering the level of development of medicine at that time, the chances of survival even with rapid hospitalization of the wounded in the Pyatigorsk military hospital remained low. In 1841, this hospital was located in an adapted building (an old barracks) at the foot of the Hot Mountain. The conditions for treatment there were poor, there were not enough places. A larger and better equipped military hospital was located 40 versts from Pyatigorsk, in Georgievsk, but, taking into account horse-drawn transport and the condition of the Caucasian roads at that time, it can be argued that the seriously wounded Lermontov would not have been taken to Georgievsk.

The question arises: could Barclay de Tolly, with his qualifications, have performed a thoracotomy with suturing of lung wounds and stopped bleeding from large vessels in the chest cavity? Quite obviously not. After all, operations on the thoracic organs in 1841 were not performed even by world-famous surgeons in well-equipped operating rooms. In addition, blood transfusions and intravenous infusion of plasma substitutes were not yet known to medicine in the first half of the 19th century, which complicated the fight against blood loss; Antibiotics and many other necessary medications were not discovered.

Therefore, we assume that the seriously wounded Lermontov’s chances of recovery were minimal, probably amounting to no more than 10% (this percentage of the wounded survived at that time with such injuries). However, it is the doctor’s duty to fight until the end for the patient’s life, prolonging its precious days, hours and even minutes. Only then, with a clear conscience, can he look into the eyes of the patient’s relatives, his friends and us, the descendants.

* Shilovtsev S.P. // Questions of war surgery. – Gorky, 1946. – P. 68 – 74.
** Davidov M.I. // Annals of Surgery. – 2002. - No. 2. – P. 75 – 79.