Preparation. Italian fleet in World War II

Italian fleet in World War II

Chapter I.

Italian fleet on the eve of war

Preparation

During the international crisis, which broke out with the beginning of the Ethiopian campaign in the spring of 1935, the Italian fleet for the first time since the First World War was unmobilized. After the completion of the operation in Ethiopia, many auxiliary fleet services were reduced, but at the end of 1936 the fleet remained mobilized. Civil War in Spain, various international crises and finally the occupation of Albania - all this forced to keep the fleet in a state of combat readiness.

Such events, of course, have adversely affected the preparation for the future world conflict. The permanent readiness of the ships led to the wear of the mechanisms and the maliciousness of the crew, prevented prospective planning. Moreover, the Italian government notified the armed forces that the beginning of the war is assumed not earlier than 1942. This was confirmed during the signing of the Axis Agreement between Italy and Germany. The fleet made up its plans on the basis of this date.

On June 10, 1940, when military actions were to start, many of the components of what is called "War willingness" have not yet been completed. For example, initial plans provided for building 4 new powerful linkers and finish the full modernization of 4 olds by 1942. Such a nucleus of the fleet would force himself to respect any opponent. In June 1940, there was only "Cavour" and "Cesare". "Littorio", "Vittorio Veneto", "Duilio" and "Doria" still completed equipment on shipyards. To finish the completion of the Roma lincard, 2 years was required, for the completion of "impero" - at least 3 (in reality Roma was completed in the spring of 1943, the work on the "impero" was never completed). Premature start of hostilities found in building 12 light cruisers, many destroyers, escort ships, submarines and small vessels. The beginning of the war delayed their completion and equipment.

In addition, the added 2 years would eliminate the shortcomings in the technical equipment and training of crews. This is especially true for night actions, torpedo shooting, radar and asdic. The absence of a radar was stronger for the combat capability of Italian ships. Enemy ships and aircraft impunity attacked Italian ships at night when they were practically blind. Therefore, the enemy has developed new tactical techniques to which the Italian fleet was completely not ready.

The technical principles of the radar and asdica were known to the Italian fleet since 1936. But the war interrupted scientific works on these weapons systems. To bring them to practical application, expensive industrial designs were required, especially for the radar. It is doubtful that the Italian Fleet and the industry manage to achieve significant results, even having the same 2 years. Nevertheless, the enemy would lose the advantage of the surprises of their use. By the end of the war, it was possible to build only a few aircraft radars, and then, rather experimental installations.

During the war, the Italian fleet was expensive for these and other small disadvantages, which often prevented the use of a favorable situation. Nevertheless, the Italian fleet was well prepared for war and fully justified the funds invested in it.

The preparatory measures of the fleet included the accumulation of all sorts of surpluses, and when the war began, reserves of many types of supply were allowed to satisfy any requirements. For example, shipbuilding shipyards worked without delays the entire war and even after a truce almost exclusively on pre-war reserves. The increasing demands of the Libyan front forced the fleet to convert some ports - in addition not one time - and sometimes unexpected tasks resorting only to their own reserves. Sometimes the fleet served asking and other types of armed forces.

The supply of fuel was completely insufficient, and we will see later that this problem became sharp. In June 1940, the fleet had only 1800,000 tons of oil collected literally around. At that time it was assumed that the monthly expense during the war would be 200,000 tons. This meant that the fleet is enough for only 9 months of war. Mussolini, however, believed that this was more than enough for the "three-month war". In his opinion, military actions could not delay longer. Based on such an assumption, he even forced the fleet to convey a part of stocks - only 300,000 tons - the Air Force and the Civil Industry after the start of the war. Therefore, during the war, the fleet was forced to limit the movement of ships to reduce oil consumption. In the first quarter of 1943 he had to be cut off to a ridiculous digit of 24,000 tons per month. Compared with the initial estimate - 200,000 tons as a necessary minimum, it is easy to understand what influence it has been on operations.

All these flaws bated the magnificent spirit of officers and sailors. During all 39 months of fierce battles before signing ITALY, the truce personnel of the Italian fleet has repeatedly showed samples of mass and individual heroism. Following its traditions, the fleet resisted the plantation of fascist political views. It was hard to force himself to hate Britain, whose fleet was always considered a natural ally.

But when the lot was thrown, the fleet, driven by a sense of duty, began a battle, straining all his strength. He was opposed to powerful opponents, but he endured the test of fire with honor and courage.

Opposition of Fleet Unleashing War and its initial plans

At the beginning of 1940, suspicion that Italy would enter the war, already twist in the air. However, Mussolini has not yet spoke specifically to the headquarters of the three types of armed forces, which intends to intervene in the conflict. In the first months of this fateful year, the government to support exports, forced the fleet to sell Sweden 2 destroyers and 2 destroyers. This fact was completely naturally understood by the fleet as a sign of the reluctance of the government to enter into war, at least in the near future. But a few days after the visit, the vision of Ribbentrop to Mussolini in March 1940, followed by the visit of Samner Wellles, the actual attitude of the government to the war began to clearly clear. Before the headquarters, this decision was brought on April 6, 1940.

On this day, Marshal Badolo - Head of the General Staff - convened a meeting of the three headquarters of the headquarters of the Armed Forces and told them about the "solid solution to intervene to intervene at that time and in the place he would choose. Badolo said that the war on land will be kept in a defensive vein, and in the offensive - on the sea and in the air. Two days later, on April 11, the head of the Navy Admiral Kavanyari expressed his attitude to this statement in writing. Among other things, he noted the difficulty of such events due to the superiority of the enemy in the forces and the unfavorable strategic situation. This made the impossible offensive maritime war. In addition, the British fleet could quickly fill! " Any loss. Kavanyari said that for the Italian fleet it is impossible, and soon it will be in a critical situation. Admiral warned that it would be impossible to achieve initial surprise, and that the operation was impossible against enemy shipping in the Mediterranean, as it was already discontinued.

Admiral Kavanyari also wrote: "Since there is no possibility of solving strategic tasks or defeat by enemy sea forces, the entry into the war on our initiative is not justified. We will be able to lead only defensive operations. " Indeed, history does not know the examples so that the country unleascing the war immediately passed to defense.

Showing the non-benefit of the situation in which the fleet will be due to inadequate aircraft support, Admiral Kavanyari completed his memorandum with such prophetic words: "Whatever nature has taken the development of war on the Mediterranean, ultimately our losses on the sea will be heavy. When peaceful negotiations begin, Italy may well find himself not only without territorial acquisitions, but also without a fleet and, possibly, without aviation. " These words were not only prophetic, they expressed the point of view of the Italian fleet. All predictions made by Admiral Kavanyari in his letter were fully justified, with the exception of one. By the end of the war, Italy was left without an army and aviation destroyed by powerful opponents, but still possessed a rather strong fleet.

Mussolini, fearing that the world will return to Europe earlier than Italy will tell his word, did not pay attention to these caution. Moreover, he simply shall them, leaning her confidence that hostilities would be very short - no more than three months. However, the Italian fleet was preparing for war on the basis of operational plans, which more than previously expressed. They can be briefly set out like this: keep sea forces focused to obtain maximum defensive and offensive power; As a result, not to participate in the protection of trade shipping except for special rare cases; Leave the idea of \u200b\u200bsupplying Libya because of the original strategic situation. Having France with his enemy, it was considered impossible to conduct ships through the Mediterranean Sea.

Mussolini did not mind these concepts. He assumed that the conflict would not delay, and therefore coastal shipping can be reduced, and Libya will last six months in the reserves that are collected there. It turned out that all the assumptions of Mussolini are incorrect. The Italian fleet discovered that he was forced to do what was not going to do at all. Exactly 3 days after the beginning of the war in Rome from Libya, the requirement came to urgently deliver the necessary supply. And these requirements that increased with the threatening speed had to be performed, of course, the fleet.

On June 16, 1940, the submarine Zoea began loading ammunition for delivery to Tobruk. Due to the proximity of the base to the front line and its removal from other Italian bases, the command did not want to send transport there, even accompanied by escort. Submarine came out at sea on June 19th. It was the first one of countless in Africa.

These operations carried out under pressure from circumstances became the main occupation of the Italian fleet, although not the most beloved. They led to a serious spraying of forces. On June 20, the Flotilla of the destroyers led by the "Artillery" came out of Augusta in Benghazi to transport anti-tank guns and artilleryrs. After 5 days, the first guarded convoy came out of Naples in Tripoli, carrying various goods and 1727 soldiers. On the same day, the Bragadine submarine was published in the sea with a cargo of materials for Tripoli Airport. These few examples clearly show how the "self-acquisition" of Libya was provided. Head of the General Staff Marshal Badolo, demanding from Admiral Kavanyari sending to Libya's first 3 or 4 convoys, every time it was firmly assumed that "this happens for the last time."

Confidence that the war will end in 3 months, soon disappeared. Mussolini was misled by the statements of Hitler's propaganda about landing in England. In fact, at the end of August 1940, the Italian Supreme Command, on the basis of information received from Berlin, had to give an order to prepare for a protracted war, which would last for several years.

Unfortunately for the Italian fleet, the prerequisites, on which his operational planning was based, were fundamentally incorrect. Nevertheless, the fleet stubbornly fought long 39 months in the hardests - and sometimes hopeless - conditions and caused heavy losses to a mighty opponent. Despite the bloody tests, Italian sailors, from Admiral to the last sailor, always stored loyalty to debt, spirit of self-sacrifice and unchanged courage. Their devotion was simply wonderful, since it was a consequence of not blind obedience, but the manifestation of conscious will, which was confirmed at each stage of struggle.

At the beginning of the war, the core of the Italian fleet consisted of 2 old, but modernized battleships and 19 cruisers. The British and the French had 11 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers and 23 cruisers deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. And without that the huge superiority of the allies became just overwhelming, if we take into account their strength outside the Mediterranean theater, which could be used as reinforcements and to replenish losses. Roughly speaking, Italy had a military fleet with a total displacement of about 690,000 tons, and the opponent is four times more.

It is important to consider the dislocation of fleets of warring parties. The Anglo-French forces were based in Toulon, Gibraltar, Bizert and Alexandria. At this time there were no ships in Malta. Italian ships were mostly shared between Naples and Taranto, several cruisers were based on the Sicilli ports. These forces could be united using the Messinsky Strait, although they were dangerous attacks, passing it. In the northern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea, only a few submarines and compounds of torpedo boats for coastal defense were based.

The Adriatic was the inner sea, the strategic cover of which was carried out from Taranto. Tobruk was a nosed-nipped native near the enemy lines, so the gaps were based only by light patrol ships. Dodecanese Islands and their main base on Leros were actually blocked, since the Greek waters could not be considered neutral. Only patrol and sabotage compounds could be based here. Massawa base in the Red Sea, where there was a group of outdated destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats, was completely isolated from the very beginning of the war and had a limited meaning.

Therefore, it can be said that the dislocation of the Italian fleet corresponded to the geographical factor. The main forces were located in the center of the Mediterranean, and the rest are in a number of peripheral points. The situation at the beginning of the war did not foreteen immediate collisions, unless both opposing fleets do not take obviously aggressive positions. The Italian fleet could not do this and, as it was shown earlier, did not even intend. However, as the opponent stated, his fleet will lead an offensive war, especially the connection to which Admiral Sir Andrew Brown Kunningham commanded.

Italian fleet in World War II

Italian fleet on the eve of war

Opposition of Fleet Unleashing War and its initial plans

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Flot supply and action

During the whole Greek campaign and even a few months after its completion, the provision of lines of supply through the Adriatic demanded that the fleet of significant voltage. Essentially bad weather, the overload of Albanian ports, inconsistent, but always urgent requirements, the British air offensive, the growing activity of the enemy submarines, the danger of unexpected night attacks of British ships, the narrowness of the water area compared to the intensity of movement on it, the huge volumes of transportation - all these factors Together, taken forced the fleet to strain all the strength and spend the mass of energy. The loads were increasingly increased, since at the same time it was necessary to solve other, equally important and urgent tasks, the first of which were all increasing transportation to Libya.

Under these conditions, transportation through the lower adriatic not only required a large number of cargo ships of all sizes, but also forced to attract a large number of warships, in addition to those used to directly accompany the convoy. The cruisers based in Brindisi and Taranto had to patrol in the Orange Strait with the slightest alarm, as well as with the passage of any military convoy. Each report on the appearance of an enemy submarine followed intensive search for several days. The detection of mine barriers delivered by British submarines laid hard work on trawls. When sea transport acquired a vital nature of the fleet without fluctuations, provided for transportation not only to supply vessels, but also ships, including cruisers and destroyers.

As for the Fleet Action, they brought a complete success. You can even call them considerable military success. The transfer of supply and reinforcements to the Greek-Albanian front had a scale of unprecedented. In fact, their full volume is still not known for sure. However, despite. All difficulties and dangers, transportation was accompanied by minimal losses. The cited statistics of transportation from Italian ports to the Greek-Albanian coast proves it. Reverse transitions are not included in these figures that cover the Greek campaign to the youngest, that is, until April 30, 1941. The percentage of loss is shown in brackets. Transportation included:

Personal composition 516440 people (0.18)

Military loads 510688 tons (0.2)

Hind and pack animals 87092 heads (0)

Ganks, armored personnel carriers, cars 15951 pieces (0.55)

By providing these transportations, Italian warships made 1070 outputs. This does not include exits with the purpose of indirect cover of cone.

It should be noted here that after the occupation of Greece from the fleet, it was necessary to continue transportation. In total, 895441 people were transported from Italy to the Greek-Albanian Theater and 1387537 tons of cargo. Common losses were minimal - 0.2% of people and 0.5% of materials.

In late November, the fleet began at the request of the army new operations. This included frequent shelling of Greek and Albanian positions. In addition, actions began against Greek ships and coastal objects that were conducted by Italian ships based on the Dodecanese Islands.

One of the many consequences of the Greek campaign was the isolation of the Dodecanese Islands, which the Italians owned. The inhabitants and troops of the garrison gradually began to feel the shortage of various acutely necessary things. The current situation made the package of convoys an exceptionally difficult problem. For this reason, a certain amount of supply was delivered by submarines. However, since the capacity of the submarine was very small, soon it became necessary to apply the other system. Therefore, three small heights - "Kalino", "Kalito" and "RAB III", each displacement of about 1,200 tons, were adapted for a breakthrough of the British blockade without accompaniment.

The first went to the path of "Kalino", which left Naples on December 1, 1940 and reached Leros in 5 days, not discovered by the enemy. The system turned out to be viable, and flights of the blocadeructors continued until finally Greece was occupied. Loss was not. In total, the blockade performances made 16 flights and transported 16190 tons of cargo.

These travels were accompanied by a thousand and one adventure, but the most incredible fell to the share of Captain Lieutenant Georgio Jobbe. At that very moment when he passed the Casami strait to enter the Aegean Sea, he noticed in the rain squall and closely protected by the British convoy. The convoy walked the same course as the Italian ship. Captain Lieutenant Jobbe, using bad visibility and a large number of enemy vessels, joined the convoy and passed to the Aegean Sea with him. With the first opportunity, he slipped off and safely reached the goal.

Despite the insulation and relative difficulties, the surface ships and submarines based on Leros have spent several disturbing raids on British supply lines between Egypt and the Aegean sea.

Perhaps, for this reason, in the last days of February, the British attempted occupying the Italian Island of Castelezzo, located between Rhodes and Cyprus. At dawn on February 25, about 500 British soldiers of the special assault unit landed on the shore from the landing vessel, covered by the cruisers division. A handful of sailors and customs officers who were on CasteloriSto, who could have been fighting. In the mountainous part of the island, they created a line of defense and requested on the radio. After noon, the Italian destroyers "Sella" and "Crispie" and the Montamians "Lupo" and "Linche", accepting 240 soldiers and sailors, left Rhodes. At night, these ships under the command of Admiral Bianssheri reached Castelaorico, Lupoo entered a small port and began landing forces. The rising strong excitement made to postpone the landing and forced the ships to return to Rhodes. As soon as the weather conditions, Lupo, Linche and 2 torpedo boats returned to Castellor Sea and landed the rest of the soldiers. For the sunset, the British were surrounded and fell under the shelling of Italian ships. In the meantime, "Crispi" and "Sella" transferred new soldiers and weapons. The next morning the surviving English soldiers surrendered. Admiral Kanningham wrote to London, justifying the failure that "Italians acted with utmost energy and enterprise." He called the whole surgery "Introverting".

Meeting in Merano.

Germany and Italy up to this point, they considered their military operations completely independent. If you do not take into account several attempts by cooperation, which were purely symbolic and had only propaganda importance, each country led war on its own. In fact, everyone diligently kept her plans in secret from the partner. When the Hope of Italians for a short war was dispelled, it became clear that the farther, the more Italy would depend on the ally, supplying raw materials and weapons, which Italy lacked. Nevertheless, the Italians continued to fluctuate. They had anxiety the idea of \u200b\u200btoo close cooperation with Germany. After all, the Germans, instead of performing the requests of Italians about the premise of weapons and technology, offered to send fully equipped Germanic parts, such as X Aviakorpus and the African case. This policy had a completely obvious goal - to introduce into the Italian military machine to manage it in the German interests that were too often dispersed with Italian. Therefore, the Italian High Command turned out to be in front of the dilemma - or agree to more or less broad German intervention, or refuse material assistance, which became more and more necessary.

Similar, only even more substantiated concerns existed in the naval area. Germany was not a powerful sea power, and the Italian fleet considered the absurd and intolerable intervention of the Germans in his case in exchange for equipment that fleet would like from Germany. Intervention looked even more strange, given that the Italian fleet could not learn anything from Germanic, excluding certain technical innovations. Prior to this time, contacts between the two fleets were extremely superficial and carried out through marine missions in Rome and Berlin. However, members of these missions played the role of simple observers.

In January 1941, circumstances pushed both fleets to a closer understanding in connection with the German attack in Greece. For the first time, the Germans occupied part of the Mediterranean coast. However, until the very end of the fleet retained complete operational independence. For its part, the Italian fleet hoped that these new circumstances would help solve the hardest challenge to ensure fuel. In mid-February 1941, headquer of the Italian fleet Admiral Riccardi and his German colleague Admiral Reder met in Merano. Negotiations lasted 3 days. The official goal of the meeting was the exchange of ideas in military experience, but we will say about genuine reasons below.

As mentioned earlier, the Italian fleet began war, having 1800,000 tons of oil. Despite the savings and restrictions, introduced immediately, as soon as it became clear that the war is delayed, by February 1941, 10,000,000 tons from this reserve was consumed. It was the ninth month of war. Under such rates, the Italian fleet so "in the summer would have to stop all activity. Representatives of the fleet repeatedly paid the attention of the supreme command to this severe problem, but no agreement with the Germans could not achieve. Therefore, the Italians hoped that direct negotiations with the German commander, who, as a professional, well understood the problem, will give a satisfactory solution to the issue. Indeed, the meeting in Merano attracted the attention of the Rediece to the problem. In the spring of 1941, a certain amount of oil began to arrive from Germany, but it was completely lacked even to meet the minimum needs. Supermarin has already been forced to limit the monthly fuel consumption with a fleet of 100,000 tons, which constituted half the fuel required to provide operational freedom. In reality, for various reasons, this figure did not exceed 50,000 tons, or one fourth need. The flow of fuel not only did not provide normal actions, but also began to seriously affected the operations.

In the summer of 1941, when only 103,000 tons of oil arrived from Germany, the reserves of the Italian fleet were finally exhausted. From this point on, the Italian fleet was forced to carry out operations only when oil supplies allowed. In those periods when they were delayed or interrupted, the fleet's activities were completely paralyzed. Later we will see the crisis that has broken down in the winter of 1941, and the real shackles on the hands of the fleet in mid-1942.

At the meeting to Merano, German representatives boasted their own success in the North Sea and demanded a more aggressive image of action from the Italian fleet. However, the Italian representatives clearly proved that the situation in the North Sea is not similar to the Mediterranean. They showed the need for the Italian fleet to stick to the line of behavior that was elected earlier. Deviations from it were considered possible only in special cases that have not yet been introduced.

In this regard, it should be briefly noted that Supermarar should adhere to general directives and special orders that came to her from the Supreme Command. All these directives had one goal: do not expose Italian battleships unjustified risk. Mussolini wanted to sit at the table of peace negotiations, having a strong fleet at his disposal. It is not a place to discuss how these directives influenced the methods of marine war, but the author must personally testify that in several cases, at least in the first year of war, Mussolini directly influenced the solutions of supermarines towards greater caution.

The Germans in Merano expressed the fears of Berlin that the British could transfer strong reinforcements to Greece. Of course, these concerns gave rise to the preparation of the Germans of their own invasion of Greece. For this reason, the Germans suggested that the Italian fleet put several blows on British shipping between Egypt and Greece. These actions would supplement the attacks of Italian submarines and lightweight forces from the Dodecanese Islands. Admiral Riccardi explained how difficult it would be to find a favorable case to achieve decisive success in the area. He noted that due to the high efficiency of British airflow and a large distances, the enemy has serious chances to take their convoy earlier than the Italian ships arrive. The Germans satisfied the explanations of the admiral, and the question was left.

In early March, Berlin informed Rome that intensive preparations were underway for operations in the Greek front, and insisted that the Italian Fleet would at least take anything to prevent the English transportation to Greece. Landing this) political pressure, the Italian Supreme Command ordered the fleet to fulfill the requirements of the Germans. In essence, the fleet had to reap the fruits of an ill-conceived enterprise, against which he protested earlier.

By performing the order of the High Command, the supermarin began several operations. The number of submarines in the years around Crete was increased. Special assault divisions were ordered again to attack ships in the Court Cove. Finally, large ships were instructed to hold a raid. Supermarar reluctantly performed these orders, feeling that the risk that they entail, significantly exceeds the ability to capture the enemy convoys near the crit. The fleet, however, did not put forward new objections due to the political consequences of the refusal of the operation. The Germans showed an exceptional interest in this enterprise and facilitated the doubts of the supermarin, promising the promotion of aircraft X aviakorpus. They also stated that the German torpedoes damaged two of the three British battleships on March 16 to the east of Crete - as it turned out, a completely unfounded statement.

The operation against British supply lines was based on three absolutely necessary prerequisites:

1. Suddenness.

2. Effective airfunction, which will allow Italian ships to quickly establish contact with possible goals and evade all threats.

3. Effective air covering of ships, which enemy intelligence aircraft will move and protect the ships from air attacks, as they have to act in the waters under the control of British aviation.

Proper aviation assistance was promised. Supermarina assured that the day before the operation of the operation X, aviakorpus will conduct intensive exploration of the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, will raid in Malta and capture any aircraft that can fly from there. At dawn, when the Italian ships will be near Crete, Italian aviation will be bombing the airfields of the island, he will reconnaiss the usual British routes near Crete and to Alexandria itself, and will also cover the ships to Meridian Apollonia. At the same time, X Aviakorpus will reconnaiss the area between Kerenaica and Crete and will cover Italian ships almost all day - until two hours remain until the sunset. Finally, the Italian Air Force made assurances that fighters from Rhodes will accompany and cover the ships all morning while they are located in the Crete area. Given such support from the air, the risk of marine operation became acceptable. All the planned actions of aviation are described in detail so that it can be compared, much whether it was made and how.

The operation consisted of a raid of cruisers supported by Vittorio Veneto by Linkor, which March 22 arrived in Naples from Spice, the operation was planned to start on March 24, but it was detained for 2 days at the request of X aviakorpus. The Germans wanted to agree personally with the Admiral Iakino on the details of German air support, since X the Aviakorpus for the first time had to interact with the Italian fleet. Among other things, it was decided to conduct exercises to escort and identify the ships, attracting a large number of aircraft per day when the Italian connection will be held by Messinsky Strait.

On the evening of March 26, the Italian ships came to the sea. From Naples, Vittorio Veneto was released under the flag of Admiral Iakino, who commanded the squadron, and 4 destroyers. The 1st Division (Admiral Catanao), consisting of heavy cruisers "Zara", "Paul", "Fiume" and 4 destroyers, left Taranto. The 8th division (Admiral Lenyani) was published from Brindisi as part of Abruzzi cruisers, "Garibaldi" and 2 destroyers. At dawn on March 11, Vittorio Veneto was held by the Messinsky Strait. Ahead, at a distance of 10 miles, the 3rd Division (Admiral SanSonetti) was walking. It consisted of heavy cruisers "Trento", "Trieste" and 3 destroyers, which shortly before that came out of Messina. At 10.00 in 60 miles from Augustus, the 1st Division joined them, and at 11.00 - the 8th division.

From this point on, the compound should have moved until 20.00 in the direction of Apollonia (Kerenaica). At this time, being on the longitude of Crete, the 1st and 8th divisions were to be moved to the Aegean Morse, but the extreme eastern point of Crete, which they should have been achieved by 8.00. After that, they should have turned to the reverse course and connect with Vittorio Veneto at 15.00 in 90 miles southeast of Navarina in order to return to the base together. Meanwhile, Vittorio Veneto and the 3rd division were to reach a point in 20 miles of the south of the little Gavdos Island at the southern coast of Crete. At about 7.00, if contact with the enemy will not be installed, they should be treated for a reverse course. Naturally, the purpose of both raids was an attack of enemy conmented or warships. The main danger, especially for ships included in the Aegean Sea, was the possibility of air attacks of the British from Crete or from Greece.

Fights at Gavdos and Matapan

On March 27, the extension of the air cover of Italian ships were planned on March 27, but the German aircraft did not appear. In the afternoon, it was necessary to hold a general rehearsal, but the "large number" of the aircraft also did not appear. But at 12.20 Trieste, "Trieste reported on the British seaplane" Sunderland ", which for half an hour was torn away, and then disappeared. His radio transmission was intercepted and immediately deciphered. It turned out that "Sunderland" because of poor visibility noticed only the 3rd division and did not know anything about Vittorio Veneto and the other two divisions who were walking behind. This contact destroyed the main background of the operation - suddenness. The position of the 3rd division and its course unequivocally pointed to its aggressive intentions.

Supermarine was then criticized for the fact that after losing the element of the surprise, it did not cancel the operation. But it was necessary to remember that the output was not a reaction to the current tactical situation. It was undertaken by external pressure, mainly for political reasons. If the supermarine turned the ships by receiving the resolution of the High Command, after a single and accidental contact, this decision could have far-reaching consequences in the Italian-German political game in Greece. Therefore, the supermarine squadron did not withdraw.

The day passed without adventure. At 19.00, the 1st and 8th divisions went to the Aegean Sea, and "Vittorio Veneto", together with the 3rd division, moved to the point of south of Gavdos at 22.00, ordered the first group not to sleep further in the Aegean Sea, but instead to connect with the second group and the next morning to act together. This careful decision to keep all the forces together was motivated by the lack of any information on the movements of the enemy after contact with Sunderland.

At dawn on March 28, "Vittorio Veneto" walked to the outlined zone, the 3rd division was 10 miles ahead of him, and the 1st and 8th divisions were located 15 miles on the left of the stern. About 6.00 "Vittorio Veneto" and "Bolzano" katapulted their reconnaissance hydrosaplates Ro.43. At 6.35, the aircraft with Vittorio Venet "noted 4 British cruisers and 4 destroyers coming to the south of about 50 miles southeast from the Italian compound. At 7.58, the Division noted British ships, later identified as an Orion cruiser, Ajax, Perth and Gloucester, and 4 Esmina Admiral Prodhhem-Wippel. Admiral SanSonetti at full speed hit the British and at 8.12 from a distance of about 25,000 meters opened fire. So began the fight at Gavdos.

British cruisers tried to hide. Following the maximum speed, they managed to resist at the limit of the limit of Italian guns. Italians immediately concentrated fire on "Gloucester", which was forced to go Zigzag to not get hit. But a shootout at such a big distance, complicated in addition to bad visibility, did not bring any italian, nor the British side. (The British opened fire for 15 minutes later the Italians and shot sporadically.)

After about the time of the battle, at 8.50 Admiral Iakino ordered the 3rd division back, and some time after the Italian connection was already returned to its base. It was unlikely that the risk of continuing aimless shootout was justified, especially because Italian ships went far for Gavdos and were almost halfway to Tobruk. Moreover, it was logical to expect that airy attacks of the British may begin at any moment, and the cover fighters have not yet appeared. In addition, RO.43 scouts did not find nearby British convoy, so it was possible to consider the task performed.

After the 3rd division began to go to the north-west, the British cruiser followed her, although they continued to hold out the limits of its guns. At 10.45, Admiral Jacino turned to the south, although neither the British ships nor the planes have yet been suspected of the presence of Vittorio Veneto. He hoped by this maneuver to hold the British cruiser between the Linkor and the 3rd Division. At 10.50 Vittorio Veneto, Votorio Wippel ships, who were captured by surprise. Jacino ordered the 3rd division to turn to form another half of the ticks. In 10.56 Vittorio Venet, opened fire from his huge guns from a distance of 25,000 meters.

British cruisers immediately unfolded and at full speed went to the southeast. Hiding behind the smokes, they rushed from 381-mm shells, sometimes responding with volley. Their high speed allowed them to break away from the lincard. In the official British reports it is said that one projectile is so close to "Orion" that the ship was seriously damaged. The report also says that "Gloucester" was "in mortal danger" at the time when shooting was discontinued.

Pliers, conceived by Admiral Iakino, did not succeed due to the lack of tactical airflow. Since, due to the small radius, RoO.43 had to fly to Rhodes, the Italians remained only to guess about the position of the British. What was seen from Vittorio Veneto could not serve as the basis for confident conclusions, and the 3rd division was too far to intervene immediately. Therefore, Pridhem-Whippel managed to escape southeast.

At 11.00, shortly after Vittorio Veneto opened fire, 6 British torpedoes were noticed with him, who Admiral Kunningham immediately sent to the attack as soon as the cruiser was in a dangerous situation. And indeed, at that moment the ships of Prodhem-Whippel were in a serious danger, as the Italian battleship fired them from 381-mm guns, and it was necessary to quickly change something. At 11.15, British torpedoes came to the initial position for the attack, and Vittorio Veneto, who had already prepared to gather a rich harvest, was forced to maneuver to avoid a new threat. Having met a strong anti-aircraft fire, the opponent airplanes dropped their torpedoes at a distance of 2000 meters from the goal, but Vittorio Veneto was skillfully avoided them, nevertheless, British pilots told Admiral Kanningham, which was achieved by one reliable hit and another likely.

While these events occurred, a group of British cruisers, who had safely left the danger, who had fallen a scene and disappeared behind the horizon.

The time came to 11.30, and Jaakino was still south of Crete. News about enemy convoys have not been received. Air attacks began, the fighter cover did not appear. At the same time, British intelligence aircraft circled in the sky over the Italian squadron continuously until the sunset. It was time to hurry back home, and at 11.30 the Italians took the course for Taranto.

In 12.07, the 3rd division was also attacked by torpedo, but did not receive hit. From 14.30 to 17.00, British aircraft undertook 9 separate attacks, fortunately, unsuccessful.

However, at 15.20 "Vittorio Veneto" was subjected to a combined attack of bombers and torpedo-trapes, which had more serious consequences of the British for the first time applied this tactics, which required the excellent interaction of aircraft of two types. First, bombers appeared and distracted the attention of Italian zenith. Immediately after that, 3 torpedoes came to the ship from the stern, flying literally on the waves. Approaching Vittorio Veneto, these 3 aircraft simultaneously changed the course and dropped torpedoes from three different directions. One aircraft was shot down, but the huge line of the lincard was not so moving to evade the three torpedo, abandoned with a very short distance. The blow came along the left side screws. For some time, the ship could not move, 4,000 tons of water pushed into the hole. This was a critical moment, but soon the ship gave a move again. Taranto remained 420 miles. Using only the right side screws, the battleship has developed a speed of 10 catch, but gradually increased it and finally exceeded 20 nodes. For a ship that is in a similar condition, it was a great achievement. It should be given due to the technical ability and the organization of the crew.

Jacino often and completely repeated the requirement to send cover fighters. Headquarters of Aviakorpus, whose intervention required a supermarine with ever-increasing perseverance, especially after the "Vittorio Veneto" torpedoing, in 17.30 he answered that nothing could do anything. The position of the British squadron remained unknown, and German planes could mistakenly attack Italians.

Since it was logical to assume that enemy air attacks would continue until the sunset, it should have been fear that the battleship would receive young hitting - already with the fatal consequences. Admiral Iakino sent the 8th division to Taranto, and the rest of the ships rebuilt into an unusual system, states of five columns.

Wittorio Veneto was in the center, having the destroyer on the nose and the destroyer for the stern. The column cruiser Cattaneo was going on the right, to the left - the cruiser of SanSonetti. The extreme columns have formed destroyers.

Admiral Jacino still did not know that not only the cruiser Prodhem-Whippel, but the main forces of the Alexandrian fleet hang on his tail, albeit outside of visibility. The last group consisted of "Waraspit" battleships, Baram, Valiant, Valiant aircraft carrier and 9 destroyers. She was a little more Italians and did not have a chance to catch up with them if the planes could not be able to slow down the enemy's waste. Therefore, Admiral Canningham sent all available aircraft into the attack. Confident that Vittorio Veneto is not only torpedoed in the morning, but also hard damaged by bombs during the day (as pilots told), he prepared after sunset to strike the Italian lincard in an artillery battle.

Supermarina and Jacino, on the other hand, all their maneuvers were based on the assumption that only Creiser Prodhem-Whippel was located in the sea, but they were already turned back to Alexandria. In fact, there was no particular information that would acquit a similar assumption. In addition, there were some reasons to suspect that the enemy prepares for night battle against Italians. If only a supermarine or Jacino reacted more attentively to these suspicions, a night battle, which would be described below, could be avoided, or at least reduce losses.

Thus, in the evening of May 28, the Italian command, both in the coastal headquarters and ships in the sea, was completely unable to navigate the situation. These errors had extremely severe consequences exacerbated by a random coincidence.

At 18.00, deciphering the order of Admiral Canningham from Alexandria, Admiral Iakino realized that at sunset, the British torpedoes were attacked by the Italian ships again. In 18.23, 9 aircraft were seen. Being out of the radius of anti-aircraft guns, they almost an hour calmly circled around the Italian squadron, studying the situation. The ships were powerless to drive them. In 18.51, the sun village, and at 19.20, with the onset of darkness, enemy planes began to approach. At this tense moment, the Italian squadron put the smoke, and the cruiser turned on the spotlight to blind pilots. In 19.25, Italian destroyers noticed the approaching aircraft, and all ships opened an intense anti-aircraft fire. Attack lasted 20 minutes. Ships skillfully maneuvered in smoke and darkness, although they were in a dense and unusual rank. The pilots of the enemy torpedoes were amazed by the rage with which the Italians were fighting, and dumped torpedoes at random. When shooting stopped, it seemed that no ship was injured at all. But soon after that it became known that "Paul" at the very end of the attack received a torpedo hit and lost his move.

Meanwhile, the supermarine informed Admiral Iakino, which, according to radio benefits, at 17.45, the British squadron was 75 miles from the present. Positions "Vittorio". From this message, Admiral Iakino could conclude that the British destroyers conducting night patrols are present in the extreme case. Supermarin handed this information without any comments, which seem to confirm the above assessment. Therefore, at 20.18, Jacino ordered the 1st division of Admiral Cattaneo, to which she belonged to Paul, to go to the help of a damaged ship. This order came simultaneously with the request of Cattaneio to send 2 destroyers to help Craiser. Therefore, at 20.38, Iakino confirmed his order and informed Kattaneos about the radiogram of the supermarin from 17.45.

Since Admiral Catanao died in battle, the reasons for which he washed to fulfill the order, were unknown. Perhaps he was waiting for the "floors" of detailed information about damaged damage. Indeed, at 20.53 he received a tug request. A few minutes earlier, Admiral Cattaneo requested confirmation of the orders received and received it at 21.05. After that, he ordered the "dawn" and "fiime" and the destroyers "Alfiera", "Carduchchi", "Oriani" and "Jaoberti" to help the "field". It seems that Admiral Catanao firmly assured that the British ships are far from, as he chose the system of Kilwater, and the destroyers closed the column. Perhaps he himself headed the column, wanting to first see the "floor" to immediately give orders to save the cruiser.

Admiral Canningham believed that "Vittorio", in addition to the injuries received damage from the torpedo and bombs, received another torpedo hit during the attack at dusk. At the very least, the pilots of torpedo tapes told the pilots. The English Admiral did not know that the "floor" stands on the spot, having lost the move. On the other hand, he mistakenly believed that "Vittorio" is now just a drifting ruin. Therefore, after the night of the night, he sent his intelligence destroyers with order to torpes and finish the battleship. They were supported by Cruiser Pridhem-Whippel. The main forces of the British squadron went behind, so the first of the nodules of the fatal coincidences were faced, which led to the tragic ital of the outcome of the night battle.

In 20.32 Radar Cruiser "Ajax" outlined the "floors" silhouette standing still. Pridhem-Whippel, believing that this is a battleship, ordered the destroyers to torperse it. He himself with his cruisers went to search for other Italian ships. Due to confusion in the communication system, the British destroyers did not go to the attack that turned out to be fatal ... for Italians! Instead, the destroyers continued to move north. If they attacked the "floor", it would grow up admiral Catanao.

Kunningham in turn, having come to the area where "Ajax" noticed "floor", Moved extremely carefully, considering that the cruiser discovered the cover of the cover. In 22.03 Radar "Vaitianta" sitting the cruiser "Paul", which is 8 miles at distances. The canningham battleships turned in this direction and prepared to open fire. At the same time, Catanao ships, absolutely unaware of danger, was preparing to assist the damaged cruiser. On combat posts were only half of the team. At "Fiume" was already prepared towing ends.

The second fatal coincidence led Catataneo to the "field" at the same time as the canningham battleships, therefore at 22.25 "Waraspit" and other British ships, approaching the "field", noticed a group of "Zara", first with the help of a radar, then Visually. Another coincidence: "Paul" saw the dark silhouettes of British ships, moving north, and, believing that this ships of the Italian 1st division, filed a signal with a red rocket, denoting his position. Ships Cattaneo saw the rocket and realized that she was from the "floors." Italians all the attention turned there, not knowing about the presence of British ships, which now went with an almost parallel course from the other side.

At 22.28, the British destroyer "Greikhand", who was closer to other enemy ships to the Italians, illuminated Cruiser Chataneo spotlight. The same British ships did the same. Immediately all 3 British linkers opened fire from their 381mm guns on the cruisers almost emphasis. They were joined by the destroyers who fired italian destroyers from 120-mm guns. A greater surprise was impossible to even imagine. "Zara" and "Fiume" immediately received severe damage, stopped and tanned. British battleships made some more salts but at 22.31 turned to the right to avoid the torpedo of Italian destroyers who finally went to the attack. The unthinkable dump of Italian ships and British destroyers was followed, during which some British ships almost suffered from the fire of their own comrades.

"Fiume" received a big roll, fires on it came out of control, and the commander had to give the order to leave the ship, which sank at 23.15. At the "Zare" fires were hampered so much that there was no possibility to break through to the tools or fight fire. I also had to give the order to leave the ship. Since the cruiser sneak too slowly, the senior assistant with a group of volunteers descended into the cellar to blow them down. Admiral Catanao and the ship commander, too, remained aboard. Exploding at 00.30, "Zara" took these officers and many sailors to the bottom along with them.

On the destroyer "Alfiera", despite the difficult damage and many victims among the crew after the very first glues of the British, the surviving tried to give a move. When the British destroyer was noticed, he was fired, as it had nothing else to do. One of the torpedo devices miraculously survived among the wreckage, and his calculation was unshakably stood on his writings. In the end, Michman managed to release 3 torpedoes in the British destroyer, but because of a strong roll of a damaged ship, they passed by. The roll increased everything, and the commander ordered to leave the ship. Very calm, he refused to go down to the rescue boat. Instead, he lit a cigarette and began to help the wounded. He died with a ship.

On the "Carduchchi" fires broke out from under control, and the commander ordered to flood the ship. He also stayed on board. "Oriani" got hit, from which one of his cars got up. However, on one car he managed to get out of shelling. After the complete adventure of the dressing, he managed to get to Calabria. Only the closing system "Jaoberti" escaped damage among universal devastation. He bravely went to the attack. Sounded by projectiles, literally under the dawn of enemy guns, a brave ship was forced to put the smoke, I move away from the opponent.

Meanwhile, "Paul" remained helpless viewer of this tragic performance. The damaged damage did not call, nor make heavy guns, nor even submit a wip to medium artillery. He could only wait for the British and finish him. Finally, the commander ordered to open Kingstons, and the crew leave the ship. The British, however, were still not suspected of the presence of a stationary cruiser. Only at 00.20, the destroyer "Havings", who moved, instead of attacking him. In 1.10, "Hailivok" approached again, this time with the rest of the destroyers. They released several shells and moved away again. The cruiser sounded very slowly, due to the dark and extremely cold water, almost the entire crew "Floors" chose to return on board. The commander, seeing the ego escape from the water, and also that the ship does not roll, although it fell deep enough, ordered to suspend flooding, waiting for help, after all.

However, about 3.00 again, British destroyers appeared. They were scary surprised, seeing a lonely and silent cruiser. He had already plunged almost to the upper deck, half the crew left him, but the flag still hung on the mast. The flagship squadron "Jervis" came up to the board and removed 258 people, including the commander (version, hardly inflated by British propaganda and repeated by Admiral Canningham, as if on board the "floors" reigned "panic and confusion", completely unfounded.). Later, the Italian cruiser was swaming 2 torpedoes. So the tragic clash was completed, the name of the battle at Cape Matapan, although it happened 100 miles south of him.

The events of this night will be discussed by maritime historians, but some moments will remain unclear. Among them is the inconsistency of the information and its interpretation by both opponents. The British were firmly convinced (perhaps, convinced to this day) that they saw a cruiser of the Colloni type, heading the "Zara" group. They argued that they fired him, set fire to it, and he went away. Italians firmly knew that such a ship could not be there. Moreover, the British stated that in the idea and another group of Italian ships behind the Kattaneau squadron, which fiercely fired each other. But in reality, the ships of Jacino not only did not open fire, they were more than 50 miles from the battlefield - so far that all the search for cruisers of Prodhem Whippel and the destroyers were unsuccessful. The crew "Floors" declared that she had exactly seen five burning ships. Who was the fifth? Was this a mysterious cruiser noted by the British? Who could have been if the Italians and the British stated that they did not suffer from other losses in this battle, except the above?

Light of spotlights, outbreaks of tools and distant glow beyond the horizon saw on other Italian ships. However, Catnao ships themselves could not transfer any information about the Boy. Only at the dawn received fragmentary reports of "Oriani" and "Jaoberti". For this reason, and also because "Vittorio" accepted a lot of water, Admiral Iakino did not want to risk blindly new ships to clarify the situation. He continued to go to Taranto, where he arrived in the afternoon on March 29.

Topics, dozens of rescue dams stuffed with saved ships remained at the site of the battle. Admiral Canningham noblely radically radically coordinates supermarine. But because of the bad idea of \u200b\u200bthe sizes of the disaster and the distance to the place of the battle, the help turned out to be limited and belated. The suffering of surviving is impossible to imagine nor describe. Despite such conditions, they all kept with a magnificent courage, a lot of determination and unshakable faith. In total, about 3,000 Italians died at night!

Let's make some conclusions from this battle. The entire operation was based on three assumptions that were not realized. From the moment when Sunderland noted the 3rd division near Sicily, the surprise was lost. Political motives that have made it impossible to stop the operation, we have already mentioned. There was no efficient airflow. Rare and inaccurate reports, which were still received from her, did not allow the Italian headquarters to draw a clear picture of the situation on the sea. Moreover, she could not find out that the Mediterranean fleet left Alexandria and is not far from the Italian Fleet. The ineffectiveness of airflow was aggravated by bad radio operation, because of what part of the reports came too late.

Although several of their fighters seem to appear above the ships of Catanao in the afternoon, another question, whether their short-term intervention had at least some kind of effect. In any case, British intelligence aircraft flew around Italian compound all day March 28 without interference. Of course, the outcome would be serious and in the event that everything ended with two torpedo hits in Vittorio and "Semi". But indirectly precisely these two torpedoes were the decisive element in the strategic success achieved by Admiral Kanningham.

Despite the fact that three key conditions were not fulfilled, the operation had to continue at any cost. The meal at Gavdos was an offensive part of the plan and was performed by the Italians brilliantly. Success escaped them at the very last moment when he was an ear at all in his hands, because of the extremely timely interference of the torpedo pass. The actions of all Italian ships in the second phase of the battle during enemy air attacks were the best. "Vittorio" received a hit only due to the self-sacrifice of the brave British pilot. The protective system was very good and effective, an instantly elected admiral Iakino. Ships managed to rest in smoke and darkness. The crew "Vittorio Veneto" showed miracles of organizedness and skills. He passed 420 miles, evading air attacks, Hot half of the cars did not work. The feed of the lincard almost went under water, but he managed to develop 20 knots.

Although there was no effective air reconnaissance, the available information was to be alarmed by Supermarine and Admiral Iakino - after all, the British fleet could be completely close. If it had a place, the night battle would not have occurred or would fail to be so heavy losses. But the tactical success of Admiral Canningham was achieved mainly thanks to the Radar, about which the Italians did not suspect. Success was also the result of a whole chain of coincidences, following one after another, which increased the loss of Italians. Everything would be different if the British destroyers attacked the "floor" immediately, after he said "Ajax" at 20.33, or Cunningham would arrive for a few minutes before Catanao. On the other hand, it should be noted the full failure of night searches by the British of Italian ships. The battle of the 1st division was no exception, since he had occurred at a perfect accident. The destruction of the Italian lincard was the main goal of Admiral Kanningham, whom he was going to achieve March 28. In his report, it admits that "the fact that" Vittorio Veneto ", although damaged, was allowed to slip away from us, causes extreme regret."

As always, it should be noted that the behavior of Italian crews in the course of the fight deserves the highest praise. Cold pore holds numerous examples of courage and self-sacrifice. But many others are well known, and only the lack of space does not allow you to talk about them here.

At the beginning of chapter, it was said that the measures taken by the Italian fleet to violate the transportation between Egypt and Greece included not only the exits of surface ships, as described above, but also the operations of special assault units and submarines. On the night of March 27, 2 Italian destroyers from Lerosa crossed the Aegean Yura and near the courts have lowered 6 special exploding boats. After 6 years of super secret work on the creation of special types of weapons, their first use in court was crowned with success. Further, this operation will be described, it is enough to mention that it ended with the Swimming of the British cruiser "YORK", a large military tanker and 2 cargo ships in the Court Cove.

The patrol of Italian submarines south of Crete brought a new sick success in a few days. "Amber" in the evening of March 30 attacked from the surface position and soles up the British cruiser "Bonavecher". The same night and in the same area, the Dagabur submarine successfully released 2 torpedoes in the court of an enemy convoy.

The secrecy of marine operations

The experience gained as a result of operations at the end of March led to certain specific results. Mussolini and Air Force finally made sure that the fleet can get proper air support, only having aircraft carriers. Therefore, they removed the veto, imposed many years ago on the construction of aircraft carriers. It was decided to immediately re-equip the transatlantic liner "Roma" to the aircraft carrier, called "Aquila". Later, a similar solution was made on the Transatlantic Lainera "Augustus". He had to become an aircraft carrier "Sparwiere". But due to the deterioration of the situation in the industry, both aircraft carriers did not scream. On the day of signing Italy by the truce - September 8, 1943 - the re-equipment of "Aquila" was almost over, but the planes were not ready for him. To complete the work on "Sparviero", a few more months were required.

Meanwhile, taking into account the lessons of Matapan, the Italian High Command temporarily forbidden to act "outside the radius of covering". The order of March 31, 1941 further limited the operational freedom of Italian battleships. His literal interpretation practically paralyzed the battleships, the exception was cases when the British were approaching the Italian shore.

Analysis of the events of the end of March caused suspicion that Italian plans become news of the enemy. After the war, the documents published by the British confirmed that they expected the appearance of Italians on Crete's supply routes. In addition, it is possible that they learned that the Italian fleet began the operation described above, even before Toga, as Sunderland, noticed the 3rd Division.

Admiral Kanningham in his official report says that his expectations of the outlet of the Italian and were based on the set of signs, ranging from direct observations - the airflow sectors the transition "Vittorio Veneto" to Naples. There was no unnoticed strengthening of intelligence flights over Alexandria. Therefore, even before receiving the report from Sunderland, "he" already ordered the whole fleet to raise anchors on the evening of March 27. " Canningham also accepted other measures to create the most favorable situation. All these preparations, so accurate and decisive, give solid reason to believe that Cunningham has had some specific information that came through the reconnaissance channels or from the radio service service. In this case, Cunningham had a tremendous advantage. He had the opportunity to upset any operation of Italians and unfold his shock forces, in particular aviation, in advance. This greatly increased their effectiveness. Such movements had a multilateral impact on the course of operations.

On the other hand, it should be recognized that even if the British received some information from spies and decryption services about the timing of the start of the Operation of Italians, she could not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the night battle. It became the result of a whole chain of coincidences, which can be completely seen, only considering the entire operation as a whole. In fact, the night battle was the result of the circumstances that have developed during the operation. Bloody meal was a random coincidence for both opponents.

Considering the issue of "espionage" in general, it is possible to say without a doubt that the British were aware of the preparations and movements of the Italian fleet, as well as supermarin. often knew about their actions. For example, in Gibraltar, the Italian fleet had such a large and experienced spy organization, which one can only dream of. But such a statement does not mean that the British most of the information received with spies. In all wars, always and everywhere, the success of the enemy loved attributed to imaginary spy networks. Today we know exactly that the British fleet sometimes claimed that he received information about some actions of the Italian fleet through its spies s Italian headquarters, whereas, in fact, it was the result of direct observations and analyst findings from the assessment of the strategic situation.

In the modern war, there are many channels and ways to obtain direct information, which - at certain frames - gives the possibility of foresight. On a large segment of time, these methods give more complete, more accurate and more recent information, whose most experienced spies whose information is at best questionable. For example, aerial photography, given the continuous improvement of the equipment, gives excellent results. During the periods of its domination in the air, the Luftwaffe directed their intelligence aircraft to the British Mediterranean port of M. almost daily, and to Malta - even twice a day. The information they supplied, by itself allowed supermarine to have a permanent and detailed view of everything that happened in these places and even about what is planned. But the Italians did not have a secret intelligence network in Malta.

Careful listening to the British radio channels also gave a lot of useful information. For example, if the Italians noticed the enhanced exchange of radiograms of a certain type between London and British bases on the Mediterranean, it served as a warning that the new operation begins. Therefore, the Italians could take steps against her in advance. Radio managers allowed the Italians to learn about the death of British ships or about the exit to the sea of \u200b\u200bthe enemy fleet. In the latter case, the direction finding helped determine his position.

Another way to obtain the most important operational information was to decipher the intercepted radiograms. We have previously shown many times how Italian cryptographs succeeded in such work, l will do it further. Although the sea codes are usually drawn up so that they are difficult to decipher quickly and use the data obtained during the developing operation, often Italian cryptographs sought such outstanding results that even now it is impossible to tell about it in detail. Further, they successfully deciphered - and immediately messages of British aircraft. Supermarina often used the eyes of British pilots to get news about the situation on the sea - the news that Italian sources could not provide. Often, using only this method, the supermarin took danger from Italian connections.

In the Italian fleet, preliminary orders ships and convoys have never been sent by radio. Moreover, in many serious reasons, they don't need to list that there is no need, it seems completely incredible that the British at least once manage to decipher the radiogram addressed to the ship to the sea, and this would help them during the operation. However, this cannot be said about the ciphers of the Italian Air Force, split that it was just funny. When Italian and German aircraft began to more actively participate in the maritime war, it became absolutely necessary to inform Supeerreo and X Aviakorpus on the movements of Italian ships in the sea. Higher headquarters guided these messages to their parts using a parabitrary of radio. Therefore, it is likely that the British received information of an operational nature, decrypting messages received from this weak point of the Italian communication system.

It is clear that the enemy was in complete ignorance regarding operations undertaken without aviation support. This applies to the actions of special assault units, the raids of the Blocadevators in the Aegean Sea and the Atlantic and other special operations. Therefore, in some cases, the supermarine preferred to act completely without the help of aviation. This gave a guarantee that all information will remain inside the naval structures and will not be transferred to parts that are not under control of the supermarin.

Another source of information was the analysis and comparison of various information. With the help of deduction: it was often possible to reveal unexpectedly important facts. For example, analyzing complex routes with which the British ships passed through the Sicilian strait, it was possible to establish their true route, although spies have given completely erroneous information. From that moment on, it became possible to seek serious success, as will be described below.

The study of the details of the transitions of British cruisers-mines between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar not only allowed the Italians to accurately predict when such a ship will be sent through the Sicilian Strait, I gave the opportunity for Supermarine once to achieve outstanding success. It happened during the Tunisian campaign. Not too distinct reporting about an unknown ship, noticed at night south of Sardinia. Based on the analysis of previous events, the right conclusion was made that this night the British miner barrel will put mines exactly 12 miles north of Ras-Al-Quran (Tunisia). The Italian convoy, which was in this direction, was immediately turned that he saved him from destroying. The trawls later found a minefield exactly in the place that predicted with the help of clean deduction of supermarine analytics.

No other sources of information that are not related to the category of "pure" espionage should not be forgotten. Pseudo-lane representatives have always been a productive source of information for both opponents. It is enough to mention the diplomatic and consular offices of the United States who worked in Italy, even in major Italian ports until December 1941. Other such representative offices acted in Italy without restrictions throughout the war. It is logical to assume that such representation, using diplomatic immunity, had a set of valuable services to the enemy. Tourists and correspondents from neutral countries also often brought valuable military news. At times, careful study of the press of enemy countries, even their official military communiqué, turned out to be a fruitful source of information.

In general, the complex organization of modern maritime operations at times did it impossible to keep them secret. For example, when wiring Korvoev, Supermarine had to report various details to dozens of marine, but "stuffy and army headquarters, not only Italian, but also Germanic. Further, it had to be done to carry various, non-associated communication networks. If you recalculate all people who have dealt with these messages, such as secretaries, supplies, telegraphists, telephonists and others, one can see that the information has become known to hundreds of people, many of whom have not supposed to have access to it. It was a serious drawback, but due to the complex and indefinite organizational structure of the three types of the Armed Forces of the two different countries, the supermarin was never able to somehow strengthen adherence to secrecy.

In short, we can safely say that sometimes the British knew about the operations of the Italian fleet, as well as the supermarin often knew about their operations. However, this provision should almost be fully attributed to the account of non-invalid sources of information, which today are at the disposal of any country. On the other hand, it is completely clear that the enemy knew nothing about our operations, if information about them remained only inside the naval structures.

Occupation of Dalmatia and Greece

At dawn on April 5, an offensive began in Yugoslavia. From the Italian fleet immediately it took an increase in the escort of Albanian convoys, since it was logical to expect that the Yugoslav Fleet would try to attack them using the Cuttaro base nearby. But instead, Yugoslav allowed and capture his ships in good terms, not counting the destroyer "Zagreb", which one of the officers blew up at the cost of his own life. The Italian fleet has tried to immediately introduce all ships into operation with its crews. The destroyers "Dubrovnik", "Belgrade" and "Ljubljana" were renamed to "Wise", "Cement and Lublana", respectively. The 4 best torpedo boats were summarized in the 24th Flotilla Mas. The remaining Yugoslav ships were completely unsuitable for the service and brought more trouble with constant repairs than good.

Italian fleet delivered a lot of trouble occupation of hundreds of islands of the Dalmatian coast and transportation of many army units as garrisons in coastal cities. Naturally, he had to quickly occupy Yugoslav naval bases and the main ports, which fell into the hands of Italians practically not affected. The Italian fleet resumed the activities of the headquarters and services in these places, which demanded the placement of personnel and equipment taken from other ports. In the strategic meaning of the occupation of Yugoslavia, little gave a fleet, did it appear as part of the Adriatic convoys to send along the Dalmatian coast.

At the end of April, expecting Greece about the capitulas, the Italian fleet took appropriate measures and focused people and technique in the ports of Southeast Italy. At the same time, an agreement was comprehended with the German fleet on the division of responsibility in the Greek waters and on the subsequent attack of Crete. It was decided that:

1. The Aegean Sea, of course, with the exception of the Italian Sector of the Dodecanese Islands, goes under the control of the German fleet. It should have become its first appearance on the Mediterranean. The German fleet had to ensure the work of all the necessary services and provide the crews all ships captured there.

2. Water to the west of Corinth are under the jurisdiction of the Italian fleet, which carries a similar responsibility.

3. The Italian fleet will keep in the Aegean Sea of \u200b\u200bthe Nucleus of Fleet - initially 8 destroyers and 1 flotilla torpedo boats - plus auxiliary vessels for cooperation with Germans in operations in this sector. Italian ships will be under the command of the Italian headquarters responding to supermarin, but the operational leadership in the Aegean Sea carries the German Admiral Schuster.

The German fleet always strictly adhered to these agreements, which cannot be said about the two other types of the Armed Forces of Germany, when they appeared on the stage.

Since the end of April and on May 20, the Italian fleet has conducted an occupation of the ionic islands, all the cyclad and various ports in the sea. Of course, as rehee happened in Yugoslavia and Kerenaica, the organization of port services of the fleet demanded rediscovery to Greece a large number of people, as well as equipment, equipment, all possible supply and surcharges, which in turn demanded an increase in traffic. The fleet fully fulfilled everything that was required of him, and in a short time he created a highly efficient infrastructure in Greece. The Italian headquarters was created in Constanta (Romania) to lead the movement of the Italian vessels who came to the Black Sea through Dardanelles.

The quick collapse of the Greek front forced the Alexandrian Fleet to conduct an urgent evacuation of the British troops from Greece to Crete. Approximately 30,000 people were removed, and exclusively at night. The enemy's losses were very small, as the German Air Force did not have night aircraft.

At this time, the British armed forces were in a deep crisis, both on land and at sea.

Therefore, the actions of the Italian fleet in the Aegean Sea could give excellent results. Nevertheless, no attacks were produced. For this caution, the fleet is particularly criticized by those who were displeased with its negligence in the battle at Matapan. The fact that British aviation in the Eastern Mediterranean at this moment was in critical condition, became known to the Italians a lot later, by that time she, like aviation in Malta, was already intensified. In addition, the British were evacuated only on light ships. It did not matter, since the Alexandrian Fleet was in constant readiness for the exit to break any opposition to evacuation. It should be noted that at that time he had 3 linkers, while the Italians had only 2. It should also be noted that after the battle at Matapan, the Italian High Command forbade a fleet of operation outside the fighter radius. In the Aegean Sea, only the German IV Aviakorpus, who recently arrived from Germany could effectively cover the ships. His command rejected proposals on cooperation. The author has reason to believe that the IV Aviakorpus did not want to help the Italians in the Aegean Sea, intending to get all the fame of future victories.

Soon after, the story was completely repeated when the attack of Crete. Again, the Italian fleet did not participate in this operation, except for the provision of absolutely necessary escort ships to accompany the military convoy. Although the case provided several opportunities to use the fleet forces, they were missed. In addition to the above reasons, the main thing was the firm statement of the IV Aviakorpus, which he will cope with everything. In addition, the Germans flatly refused to provide an air cover with Italian ships. Moreover, the Germans stated that it was not responsible for any chance if Italian ships appear in the Aegean Sea. They warned that German aircraft can attack Italians, as their pilots did not fly over the sea and could not distinguish allied ships from enemy.

The validity of these warnings confirmed the attack of several JU-87 against the Sagittario Ministry of Justice, which accompanied the convoy with German troops. Another JU-87 group attacked 5 Italian destroyers carrying German troops. The last barely managed to leave Piraea, and it was assumed that the German aircraft were covered with air. As a result of this attack, the destroyer "Sella" was seriously damaged. Another example of this kind was and the bombardment of 2 Italian torpedo boats, which followed at high speed of the south of this group. In this case, German pilots took them for 2 British submarines! These attacks occurred in broad daylight and despite the fact that the German aircraft north of Crete was forbidden to attack ships with dimensions less than the cruiser. Finally, the fact that the Germans have retained in full secret from the Italian Supreme Command Attack Crete, said that they did not want to have any rivals in the deregious of Lavrov. Therefore, the Germans in principle excluded any opportunity to cooperate with the Italian fleet. As a result, the Italian fleet failed to prevent the evacuation of the British from Crete as well as their Greece.

Those closely related to events in the Greek Front turned out to be one risky enterprise of the British. In early March, they tried to hold a convoy through the entire Mediterranean Sea from Gibraltar to Crete. They were not solved on this adventure from January 10. The British were forced to make huge efforts to cover the convoy. In the order of preparation for operation on March 2, the cruiser and 2 destroyers passed through the Sicilian strait from Malta to Gibraltar. These ships left Malta with a deaf at night and switched the sheds unnoticed. However, the next day they were attacked by 20 Italian bombers and 3 torpedoes, as well as several German aircraft. But these efforts did not give anything. On the other hand, the cargo ship "Paracombi", disguised under the French vessel "Wed-Croch", exploded in the Italian mine near Cape Bon, when he followed the military ships. Also exploded in the Italian mini British destroyer "Jervis" who left Malta.

On the morning of May 8, the reconnaissance aircraft reported that the British Gibraltar squador accompanies the convoy in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Bon. Alexandrian fleet was also seen in the Central Mediterranean. Only too late the detection of British connections did not allow the Italian fleet to intercept them before they enter the Sicilian Strait. Therefore, the order was given at night to deploy the destroyers and torpedo boats. To the west of Trapani, they were supposed to support 2 cruisers divisions. Meanwhile, Italian-German aviation joined the battle and damaged the British linear cruiser "Rinoun". Strong excitement prevented Italian destroyers to spend a sudden attack, but during the night repeated explosions on a minefield near Pantelleria. In the morning, fragments were seen, which was an obvious sign of the death of ships. It was possible to "assume that the British lost in Italian mines at least 2 vessels, one of them was definitely a cargo ship" Banffishi ", but another ship failed. Another cargo ship - Empire Song - exploded on Mine and sunk near Malta. The next morning, May 9, 8 bombers year with the cover of 37 fighters and 13 dive bombers JU-87 were sent to the attack of British ships. These planes did not find an enemy, although JU-87 attacked someone, but did not achieve the result. Finally, on the morning of May 10, the north of Tunisia was replaced by 1 cruiser and 4 enemy destroyers. They moved to the West at high speed. These ships accompanied the convoy to Malta and now returned back, alkalizing the Sicilian strait unnoticed. To attack them, the Italians sent 21 aircraft. The cruiser was damaged. Meanwhile, the Germans sent 15 aircraft for attacking the convoy, but they did not find the convoy.

Italian fleet did not participate in these operations for good reasons. Because of the late detection, he could not intercept the convoy of West Sicily. If the ships came out as soon as the report was received - on the evening of May 8, - contact with the enemy could only be established in the afternoon of May 9th. Such a course of events has become possible if the British wished to take the battle and did not shift further to the south. Moreover, at the moment there were only the battleships "Cesare" and "Doria", against which 3 lincard could come out of Alexandria. The Italians absolutely could not rely on the air cover. It is quite obvious that they would hit the attacks of the British aircraft carrier aircraft. In general, the risk was significantly more than dubious results that such an enterprise could bring. On the other hand, showing the throttle of imagination, Supermarin could have foreseen the return of the lightweight forces found in the morning of May 10. Savil in advance the cruising division, it was quite possible to intercept the British near the banks of Tunisia.

Information received from airflow introduced a delusion supermarine. She did not have the concept that the battleship "Queen Elizabeth" along with Konvay broke into the east. The presence of this ship in the Eastern Mediterranean was found only later on other channels. It should be noted that the presence of two "Cesare" type linkers in Taranto during the German landing on Crete was the reason for the transfer of these reinforcements of the fleet, which was already superior to Italian. The hurry translation of Queen Elizabeth in Alexandria created the nucleus of the fleet from a battlefields, which could counteract any operations of 2 Italian battleships.

The adventures of the Municipality "Lupo" and "Sagittario"

Preparation for attack Crete was completed in mid-May, when X Aviakorpus was translated from Sicily to Greece, stopping the raids in Malta. Plans IV Aviakorpus was envisaged first to conduct massive bombings. The parachutists then were to capture Kania and airfields Malema, Heraklion, Retimo. At night, in Kania should be to arrive a convoy from Piraea, which consisted of two dozen small cargo and coaster with German troops on board. The convoy covered the escort police department "Lupo" captain 2 rank Francesco Mimellley. The convoy also had to deliver the division of the Italian regiment of San Marco (maritime infantry) and some equipment for the occupation of the Court Cove. The next night, a similar convoy, headed by the Municipal Sagittario, was to plant troops in heraklion. The operation was supposed to finish in 3 days.

Despite the careful preparation, German parachutists, discarded on Crete in the morning of May 20, were in a very difficult position. In heraklion, the landing was destroyed. In the male, the Germans managed to capture only part of the airfield.

The same failure was waiting for them in Retimo. Seeing these serious failures, in the afternoon, on May 21, the Germans sent the conversions of Lupo and Sagittario. Their goal was landing with a fight - the operation, to which the troops were absolutely not ready. Moreover, although the water around the island patrolled hundreds of axis aircraft, none of them were warned about the passage of convoys. Therefore, the British managed to destroy one convoy and disrupt the landing of the second.

On the night of May 21, the convoy "Lupo" has already noticed the coast of Crete. And at that moment it was suddenly attacked by 3 British cruisers ("Dido, Ajaks", "Orion") and 4 destroyers. As soon as the enemy ships were discovered, "Lupo" put the smokes around the convoy and went to the attack. The heroic battle followed with superior forces. At first, the "Lupo" was fired by the destroyer, and then attacked the approaching cruiser. While both sides are the fire, the Ministry of Emergency Retained 2 Torpedoes from a distance of only 700 meters. Under the hail of shells, Captain 2 rank Mimelli cut through the enemy's system between the Ajax and Orion cruisers. He slipped literally a few meters away for the stern "Ajax", shelling it from all guns and machine guns. The fate of a small ship in this battle was, of course, was predetermined. "Lupo" received many hits, but MImbelley, using general confusion, managed to sniff. Enemy ships destroyed helpless equestrian, from which there were only 3 boosses (all Italian). However, in the turmoil, the British at times fired each other, making serious damage. Maneuvers "Lupo" were such fast and decisive that the British decided that they were fighting with several ships. "Lupo" spent a great fight, especially if we consider that the Ministry of Emergency received at least 18 hits with 152-mm projectiles. Although the crew losses were very heavy, the ship was not surfed, despite the statement of "Ajax" that his artillery "spoke in a sins" Italian ship.

After a few hours, the stage "Sagittario" came. At 8.30 on May 22, this destroyer led his convoy to Kania, when Lieutenant Giuseppe Chigal Fulgosi received an order to return to Milos, as the situation on land became complicated. As soon as Chigal managed to turn, as the masts of British ships appeared in the east. It became an unpleasant surprise. Although his planes circled in the sky, none of them warned about the presence of the enemy. Chigal ordered about 30 convoy courts to go as quickly as possible, and he himself began to put the smoke to cover them. Then, instead of hiding in the smoke itself, he turned towards the enemy.

As soon as the British squadron, consisting of 5 cruisers and 2 destroyers under the team of Admiral King, noticed Sagittario, she opened fire from a distance of 12,000 meters. The enemy shells fell around the destroyer, but the rapid zigzag helped "Sagittario" to escape from a concentrated fire.

When less than 8,000 meters left to the second cruiser, Chigal turned directly to him and released his torpedoes. Then, intending to keep the British away from Convo, he further cut the distance. Above the enemy cruiser, in which torpedoes were released, a post of smoke rose, and Chigal decided that he had achieved his hit. However, at this moment, the British ships stopped the fire and turned to the southwest. Chigal released several more shells on the nearest destroyer and completely satisfied turned back to join the convoy. No one bothered him. But the tests of "Sagittario" have not ended yet. Several JU-87 five times attacked the destroyer, but fortunately, damage did not affect. It is easy to understand that when Chigal returned to the Piraeus, the German Alpine arrows literally carried him on his hands on the streets.

From British reports it became known that Admiral King justified his unexpected departure to the fear of enemy air attacks. However, it is clear that such an explanation is not consistent with the facts, and it is sharply criticized by the British themselves, as can be seen from Churchill's memoirs. A fact is one thing: the convoy, covered by only one destroyer, was under the sight of the British guns. 5 cruisers and 2 destroyers would destroy the entire convoy in a few minutes. The convoy was a very important goal, and his destruction did not require much risk. At the same time, the departure of the British squadron did not mean that it would avoid air attacks. Shortly after this incident, the British squadron, heading for Cerigo, was attacked by the JU-87, which caused serious concerns of the "Naid" and Carliser cruisers. From all this it follows that the British Admiral made a mistake.

From official British reports it became known that the "Sagittario" torpedoes did not fall into the goal, but Chigali's actions caused serious consequences. As soon as Admiral Kanningham learned that Admiral King allowed his prey to slip out, he ordered Worspite and Valiant Linkuram and "Gloucester" and "Fiji" cruisers, which at that time were west of Cemerig, enter the Aegean Sea, Connect with the squadron of Admiral King and find the disappeared convoy. When the combined squadron went to the northeast, it was subjected to fierce attacks of the JU-87, which were hard to damage the "Waraspit". Admiral King again commanded the overall departure. This maneuver, however, did not save his ships. Dragged the goal of the JU-87 was sinking the cruiser "Gloucester" and "Fiji" and the destroyer "Greyhaound". "Valiant" and other ships were damaged.

In the meantime, things in Crete went badly, and German commanders began to conscious their mistake. One aircraft turned out to be not enough. Parachutists alone could not break the resistance of the British. Events developed so badly that on May 26, IV Aviakorpus decided that the operation failed, and requested permission to terminate in Berlin. Hitler replied that it should be continued at any cost - so the author heard in the German naval headquarters in Athens.

On the other hand, by a strange coincidence, the British at that moment decided that they could not resist more, and began to develop the evacuation plan of the island. If the British knew the position of the enemy, they may have done the last effort and kept Crete. But instead, the latter effort was made by German aviation and parachutists, spurred by the order of Berlin. They acted exclusively boldly, however, despite all their efforts, the situation continued to remain very uncertain, since the parachutists suffered terrifying losses. Those who survived, literally rolled down from fatigue.

When the author arrived in the bay of the Court with his flotilla of torpedo boats on May 28, the parachutists told him that in the previous night "could no longer stand on the legs." They also said that in the next morning the attack was undoubtedly everyone would perish, but still attack to save their honor. However, the British did not know all this and during the night "truce" moved to the southern coast of Crete to evacuate. Therefore, when in the morning of May 28, the Germans went and a suicidal offensive, they met only a weak resistance of rear barns.

During this operation, Italian ships in neighboring dodecanes did not remain without affairs. While the destroyers provided the occupation of the cyclad, 5 torpedo boats were patrolled in the Camo Sch. On the night of May 20, they attacked the British cruising and dusty squadron. The attack met a furious fire, but the torpedo boats released the torpedoes and moved away without damage. However, they did not achieve hit. Those of the time on Rhodes Admiral Bianghi, although he had a meager forces, began to prepare a convoy from auxiliary ships to land in Sitia on the northeastern coast of Crete. The convoy accompanied by 5 destroyers and several torpedo boats left Rhodes in the afternoon of May 27 and arrived without incident to the target after 24 hours. The last stage of the journey was very risky, as the nearby were found 3 British cruisers and 6 destroyers. Fortunately, the British ships were too busy with a reflection of aviation attacks and submarines and arrived to the Casami strait, only when the landing had already taken place. Thanks to this improvised expedition, the eastern part of Crete to the Malea Bay was later occupied by the Italians.

While landing in Sitia was walking, at dawn on May 29, the Italian torpedo-makers had hit the British destroyer "Chiroord", which lost his move. When the Italian torpedo boats, patrolling in the area, approached, to apply a fatal blow, the destroyer exploded and sank. They remained only to choose from the water of the saved crew members.

Describing the Cretan Operation, you should mention the actions of the submarine "Onch". At night, on May 21, she attacked 3 destroyers in the Casami Strait and, perhaps, hit the torpedo to one of them. During the Cretan campaign, Alexandrian fleet was extremely active and acted, not paying attention to the loss. Practically thoring the German attack of the island, he suffered further sacrifices by evacuating most of the British army from Crete. To ensure evacuation, Admiral Canningham constantly held 2 lincard in the sea south of Crete from 15 to 28 May. However, it was the first and last case in the history of the Mediterranean war, when the British fleet was forced to act with the complete domination of the enemy in the air. As a result, he suffered heavy losses. But the Italian ships were almost the entire war in such a situation. This example shows how success could be achieved on the Mediterranean if Italian-German aviation managed to keep superiority in the air and began to interact with the Italian fleet.

The German Air Force stated that they fused many ships in the waters around Crete. These should add the results of the Italians. But the reality differed somewhat from loud statements. For example, the Germans declared that a heavy cruiser "York" in the Court of Court. In fact, it was committed 2 months ago, Italian special assault units. British documents show that they were surfplanted: the cruiser "Fiji", "Gloucester" and "Calcutta"; Esming "Juno", "Greyhaound", "Kelly", "Kashmir", "Chiroord" and "Imperial", as well as 10 subsidiary ships. Were damaged: Linkors "Waraspit", "Valiant" and "Barem"; aircraft carrier "Formic"; Cruiser "Ajax", "Orion", "Naid" and "Carlisle" plus 10 destroyers. The losses of commercial ships are definitely not known, but only in the Court of Court, they died 10 pieces.

To these losses should add theft of the Greek fleet. His ships were softeled or German aviation in ports, or its own crews at the time of the occupation of the ports of the axis troops. Only the old armor-powered cruiser "Urooroff", 2 destroyers, 8 Mortgies and several submarines managed to dwell into British ports.

Indirectly, the Cretan campaign led to the death of the Italian destroyers "Kurtathon" and Mirabeth, which accompanied convoys to the Greek Theater. Both destroyers were injured on May 20 in Greek mines.

E.B. Canningham

Odyssey Sailor

By the third week of March 1941, we realized that the Germans would no longer postpone their offensive in Greece. Moreover, from March 25, an increase in air intelligence activity over south-western Greece and Crete was noticeable, daily attempts began to explore Harbor Alexandria. The unusual perseverance with which the enemy followed the movements of the Mediterranean fleet, made us think that the Italian fleet intends to take something serious.

The enemy had a rich choice. He could attack our vulnerable convoys with a weak accompaniment carrying troops and supplies to Greece. He could send a convoy with a strong accompaniment to the Dodecanese Islands. There was a chance that the Italian fleet will take a sabotage to cover the landing in Greece or Kerenaica. There was also a general attack against Malta. Of all these possibilities, the most likely was the attack of our convoys, going to Greece, most likely to the south of Crete.

The most obvious way to counteract this was the dislocation of the linear fleet to the west of Crete. However, in this case, the enemy airfunction would definitely quit it, and the Italian fleet would postpone their operation until we were forced to return to Alexandria to refuel. In order for us to have a real chance to intercept the Italians, we had to have completely reliable information about their exit to the sea. We themselves should be published at the beginning of the night, so as not to be discovered the next morning by enemy aircraft. If we had retained our way out of Alexandria, it would help the success of the operation. The movement of our convoys in the Aegean Sea was so well known to the enemy that it was impossible to change them, so as not to cause suspicion. At the same time, this meant the risk of attack against them.

During the night, on March 27, one of our boats from Malta reported a combination of 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer in 80 miles east of the southeastern tip of Sicily. They moved to the southeast, approximately in the direction of Crete. The visibility of life is bad, and the flying boat could not follow the enemy, between me and my headquartt broke out a fierce dispute, which actually means the appearance of Italian cruisers. Their position and course clearly indicated that the battleships should be located nearby and that their goal would clearly be our Greek convoys.

It so happened that on March 27, the extent was only one convoy. He moved to Piraeas in the already indulged near the southern tip of Crete. He was ordered to follow the same course, but with the onset of darkness to turn back. Reverse convoy from Piraea received an order to linger with the exit.

I myself was inclined to think that the Italians would not be solved for anything. Later, we noticed "the usual intensity of Italian radio beergovors, and in the ends, they decided after the onset of darkness to go into the sea so that our battleships were between the enemy and the place where he expected to see our convoy Captain 2 rank Awer, that we will not meet the enemy.

Fortunately, we decided to go out in advance after the onset of darkness, because at noon and before the sunset over Alexandria, enemy intelligence planes appeared. They reported that the fleet is peacefully on the anchors.

I also invented my little tricks to better hide our plans. We knew that the Japanese consul in Alexandria had a habit of reporting all the movements of the fleet, which would notice, although it remained unclear whether the enemy receives this information in a timely manner so that it would be even meaning. I decided to deceive this gentleman. I went to the shore to play golf, visiting the suitcase, as if I intended to stay on the shore all night. The Japanese consul has spent the entire second rug of the day near the golf hole. It was difficult to confuse him with anyone - a low, thick, with a characteristic Asian face, so awkwardly folded that the stubborn head of the headquarters nicknamed his "stupid axis."

Little trick worked, as it was assumed. Throwing his suitcase, I returned to the "Waraspit" after the onset of darkness, and at 19.00 we went to the sea.

That the Japanese consul thought and did when the empty harbor saw the next morning, I was no longer interested.

Leaving the harbor, "Waraspit" was too close to Else Bank, which filled his mud capacitors. This affected later, since our speed was now limited to 20 knots. The night passed calmly, we moved to the north-west at this speed. The squadron consisted of "Waraspit", "Baema", "Vaitianta" and "Formic", who were covered by the destroyers "Jervis", "Janus", "Nubine", "Mohauk", "Stewart", "Greyhaound", "Griffin", "Hotspur" and "Having".

As I said, one convoy was in the sea in the danger zone, it was ordered to change the course with the onset of the night. Vice Admiral Pridhem-Whippel, who operated in the Aegean Sea with Orion cruisers, Ajax, Perth, Gloucester and Esples, Hastie, "Hiruord", "Vendetta", received an order to go out Point south of Gavdos to the dawn on March 28.

At dawn with "Formydla", reconnaissance aircraft were raised, and at 7.40, one of them reported that he sees 3 cruisers and several destroyers near the place where our 4 cruisers were supposed to be. Naturally, we accepted them for the Squadron of Pridhem Wilpela. However, shortly before 8.30, Podchhem-Wippel himself reported that he sees in the north of 3 enemy cruisers and destroyers. It became clear that the enemy fleet came out into the sea, so I willingly pay lost 10 shillings.

However, the situation remained confusing, and it was difficult to understand how many enemy connections were noticed by airplanes. One report mentioned "battleships", and it seemed quite naturally that the Italian cruiser was supported by a linear squadron. On the other hand, we could not be sure of that. Previously, the Italian cruiser and battleships were confused by the aircraft.

Cruiser Prodhem-Whippel was about 90 miles ahead of us, so we developed that the speed of Waraspit, that is, no more than 22 knots due to the malfunction of the refrigerators. Those Team, Pridhem-Whippel identified the observed cruisers as heavy. As he wrote: "Knowing that the ships of this type have a higher speed, and their guns are further than on my cruisers, which allows them to choose a distance of battle, I decided to bring them closer to our lincoars and aircraft carriers."

The Italian cruiser chased him and at 8.12 opened fire from a distance of about 13 miles. At first they focused on the "Gloucester", and their shooting was quite accurate. "Glostru" had to "shove the snake" in order not to get hit. At 8.29, the distance decreased by 1 mile, and "Gloucester" himself gave 3 volleps from his 6 "guns. All of them went unless. The enemy turned to the West and in 8.55 stopped the fire of Podchhem-Whippel turned next to him to save contact.

Shortly before 11.00, Pridhem-Whippel noticed the enemy battleship in the north, who immediately opened the accurate fire from the distance 15 miles. Our cruisers turned away under the cover of the smoke and rushed at full speed. To be under Grad 15 "shells was quite unpleasant.

We are not too good for us to "Worspate". We knew that Linkers type "Litheio" are able to develop up to 31 nodes, and at night, Gloucester reported that due to problems in the car, it can give no more than 24 knots. In addition, a strong cruising squadron was located north of Prodhem-Whippela. However, the type of enemy lincard miraculously increased the speed of the "glossom" to 30 knots.

He followed something to take, and "Valiant" received an order at full speed to assist Transgem-Whippel. I sought to adhere to the attack of torpedo to the moment the enemy battleships will not be so close to our ships, that in case of damage to one of them, we will certainly intercept him and destroy it. However, circumstances dictated an image of action. The shock wave was already in the air, and I ordered "formard" to send them to the goal. The attack weakened the pressure on the Cruiser Pridhem-Whippel, but she, unfortunate, made the enemy battleship turn away. He was at a distance of about 80 miles from us. This meant that I could not impose a fight before the sunset, if it succeeds at all.

Meanwhile, the small speed of Worspite caused me serious concern. I knew that the senior mechanic remained sick on the shore, but I also knew that the flagship mechanic engineer-captain 1 rank B.J.G. Wilkinson is on board. Therefore, I sent for him and ordered him to take something. He descended down, and soon I noticed with satisfaction that "Valiant", who was walking behind the feed at full speed, no longer presses us. We walked at one speed.

A serious catch at that moment was caused by the fact that the wind blew from the east, right from the stern. This meant that periodically we should unfold in this direction in order to allow "formard" to carry out flights. However, in 1J.30 it became clear that immediate assistance was needed, therefore, "Formic" was separated, so that he could carry out flights on his own, while the linear fleet was going to the goal at full speed. "Formic" quickly lagged behind, and I was slightly worried when I saw him attack the torpedoes. With relief, we saw that he left torpedo.

At about noon, the impact airgroup returned and reported one likely hit in the battleship, which was "Vittorio Veneto". After a few minutes, the Flying boat of the CVS reported another enemy compound, consisting of 2 battleships like "Cavour" and several heavy cruisers. The battleship attacked by the aircraft of the WFF was under the guise of only the destroyers. However, 20 miles southeast was the cruising squadron. The reports of the aircraft indicated that the enemy was moving to the West.

We noticed our own cruisers at 12.30, and "Formicel" was ordered to raise the second shock wave to attack Vittorio Venet, which is 65 miles in front of us.

We started pursuit, but it was quite clear that she would be long and fruitless, if only "Vittorio Veneto" will not be damaged by our air attacks and will not reduce the speed. The chase dragged even more, as it was necessary to reduce the speed of up to 21 knots to allow "formard," and "Barma" to keep his place in the ranks. However, luck smiled at us. Eastern wind verse and installed full of calm with light gusts of wind from the West, which allowed "formard" to carry out flights, while maintaining its place in the ranks.

Shortly after 15.00, one of our aircraft reported that "Vittorio Veneto" is still 65 miles ahead and moves to the West. The second shock wave began an attack and reported about 3 hits, and also that the speed of Vittorio Veneto fell to 8 knots. This magnificent news was too optimistic, the guck as our goal was still 60 miles from us and left with a speed of 12-15 knots, that is, we could not intercept it before the onset of darkness. The small group of Sudfish WFF from the Malem aerodrome in Crete also attacked one of the cruising squads and reported on possible hit. In the afternoon, the CVS bombers from Greece also caused a number of strikes. No ship received hits, although there were close gaps.

These attacks have frightened the Italians. We were especially nice that they received a portion of the bitter medicine that we were bread for months.

Now it has become necessary to enter direct contact with the enemy ships. Therefore, at 16.44, Vice Admiral Pridhem-Whippel received an order to go at full speed to establish visual contact with the outgoing enemy. The Esminans "Nubien" and "Mohaw" were sent forward to ensure a visual connection between Creisers of Podchhem-Whippela and a linear fleet. The situation was still extremely confusing, since the whole second half of the day we continued to receive anxious report on the presence of a second enemy compound that had linkers in their composition, northwest of Vittorio Veneto. These messages, as we learned later, were erroneous. More in the sea did not beat a single linker.

Now we had to transfer the night battle plan developed by us, as the darkness approached. It was decided to create a shock connection from 8 destroyers under the command of Captain 1 rank of Philip Maca at Dzhervis. If the cruiser had established contact with Vittorio Veneto, the destroyers had to attack it. If necessary, our battleships entered into force. If the cruiser failed to establish contact, I intended to describe the circle to the north and northwest to try to find and capture Vittorio Veneto. At the same time, "Formedla" was ordered to send a third wave of torpedo to the attack.

But we needed an exact picture, so at 17.45 Waraspit raised an intelligence aircraft with an observer of the commander-in-chief of the captain-lieutenant E. S. Bolt on board to clarify the situation. By 18.30, we had the first series of reports from this experienced and knowledgeable officer, who quickly told us everything that was required. Vittorio Veneto was 45 miles from Worspite and walked to the West at a speed of about 15 knots. The entire Italian fleet gathered together. The battleship went in the middle, on both sides they went the columns of cruisers and destroyers, and the curtain of the destroyers was located ahead. Other aircraft continued to report linking battleships and heavy cruisers in the North-West.

Around 19.30, when it was almost dark, the third wave of Torpedon's "Waraspit" began an attack. At the same time, Pridhem Wippel said that he sees enemy ships in 9 miles to the north-west. A little later, the aircroup reported on one likely hit, although there were no accurate instructions that the battleship received new damage.

There was a difficult moment of decision making. I was still firmly convinced that we went too far, so it would be just stupid, not to make weight possible for the destruction of Vittorio Veneto. At the same time it was like that the Italian Admiral knows perfectly about our position. He had many cruisers and esminists of escorts, and any British admiral in my place would not bend to send all the destroyers available to him, supported by cruisers with torpedo devices. Some of my headquarters argued that it was stupid to run blindly for a leaving enemy with our 3 heavy ships, having in addition on the hands of "Formic", because at dawn we could be under the blow of enemy diving bombers. I carefully considered this point of view, however, the discussion began to coincide with my dinner with my dinner, so I said the staff that I first have to eat, and then let's see how I feel.

When I returned to the bridge, my spirit was high enough, and I ordered the shock connection of the destroyers to find and attack the enemy. We moved along, slightly doubting how the remaining 4 destroyers that remained with Lincars would be able to reflect the attack of enemy destroyers if the Italians risk it to take. At this moment, the enemy fleet was 33 miles from us, making the still 15 knots.

Vice Admiral Podchhem-Whippela had their own problems. To establish contact with Vittorio Veneto, covered with 3 cruisers and 1st essentials, was a difficult task, especially if we consider that Pridhem Wippel had to keep all his 4 ships together in readiness for the immediate start of battle. And Pridhem-Whippel failed to find an enemy battleship.

At 21.11 we received his report on the enemy ship standing without a move in 5 miles to the left of him and the detected radar. We continued to chase behind the enemy fleet and only slightly turned to the left to bring closer-CJ with a standing ship. Waraspit did not have a radar, but in 2l10 "Valiant" reported that his radar was singing this ship in 6 miles on the left of the nose. It was a big ship. "Valiant" determined that his length exceeds 600 feet.

Our hopes have fastened. It could be "Vittorio Veneto." Linear ships turned to the left of 40 ° all suddenly. We were already on combat posts, and the main artillery was ready for battle. The towers were deployed in the right direction.

The counter-admiral of the Willis was not with us, and the new chief of headquarters Kommodor Edelsen was still observed. A quarter of an hour later, at 22.25, examining the horizon on the right of the nose into the binoculars, he calmly reported that he sees 2 large cruisers and 1 small ahead of them. They crossed the course of our linear fleet to the right left. I looked there in my binoculars - the cruiser really had. Captain 2 rank Power, a former submariner and an unsurpassed specialist in identifying enemy ships at first glance, said that this is 2 "Zara" cruisers and "Scarlet cruiser ahead of them.

Using the transmitter with a small radius of action, the linear fleet was deployed into the brilvater column, and I went to the top, the captain's bridge, from where a wonderful circular review was opened. I will never forget the next few minutes. There was a dead silence, almost tangible physically, it was only possible to hear the voices of artillery players, translating guns to a new goal. It was possible to hear orders repeated in the CDT, standing behind and above the bridge. Looking forward, it was possible to see the unfolding towers of them 15 "guns, groping enemy cruisers. Never in life I have not experienced such an excitement, as in the second one, when he heard a calm voice from the CDT:" The header KDP sees the goal. "It meant that the guns Ready to shoot, and his finger is lying on the gay. The enemy was at a distance of no more than 3,800 yards - very close.

Order Open Fire gave the flagship artillery fleet captain 2 rank Jeffrey Barnard. You could hear "Din-Ding Ding" of artillery gongs. Then there was a huge orange flash and a terrible roar, when 6 heavy guns shot at the same time. At the same time, the Masonian "Greyhaound", which was part of the cover, illuminated by a searchlight, one of the enemy cruisers arising from the dark silver blue silhouette. Our searchlights also opened after the first volley to gave full light on a terrible picture. In the beam of the searchlight, I saw our 6 shells flying in the air, 5 gangs fell slightly lower than the top deck of the cruiser and exploded, throwing the dazzling flame. Italians were captured by surprise. Their guns stood on zero. They were broken before they could have at least some resistance. Captain 1 rank Douglas Fisher, the commander of Worspite, he himself was an artillers. When he saw the results of the first volley, then the voice, full of surprise, involuntarily said: "Great God! But we hit! "

"Valiant", which went for the stern, opened fire at the same time with us. He also struck his goal, and when "Waraspit" suffered fire to another cruiser, I saw "Valiant" spreads his goal to pieces. The speed of his shooting struck me. I would never believe that heavy guns can shoot so quickly. "Formic" fell out of the line to the right, but a hot fire sang on the norm "Vaitiant" "Baram".

The position of the Italian cruisers was indescribable. It was possible to see entire towers and masses of debris whipping into the air and splitting into the sea. Soon the ships themselves turned into flaming ruins embraced by flames from the nose to the stern. The whole battle lasted a few minutes.

Our searchlights were still open, and immediately after 22.30 we saw on the left of the nose of 3 Italian destroyers, which, obviously, went beyond the cruisers. They turned, it was possible to see that at least one released torpedoes, so the battleships turned to the right of 90 ° all suddenly to avoid them. Our destroyers entered the battle, which turned into a crazy landfill. "Waraspit" shot on the enemy from 15 "and 6" guns. To my horror, I saw that one of our destroyers - "Having" - covered with our shells. It seemed to me that he was killed. "Formedla" also sang. When the battle began, it came out of the line to the right at full speed, since the artillery night battle is not the best place for the aircraft carrier. When he was already in 5 miles from us, he was spoiled by the "Worspite" spotlight, who was smoked in search of enemy ships from a subka side. We heard the commander of 6 "Batteries of the right side orders to bring to the gun, and barely managed to stop him.

4 of our destroyers accompanied the linear fleet. It was "Stuart", captain 1 rank G.m.l. Waller, cafe; "Greyhaound", captain 2 rank u.R. Marshall-E "Dean;" Hailivok ", Lieutenant G.G. Watkins;" Griffin ", Lieutenant-Lieutenant J. Li Barber. They received an order to finish enemy cruisers, and linear ships, attaching" Formic ", moved to North to free them the way. According to their own reports, it is difficult to restore the movement of the destroyers. However, they had a crazy night, and they sank at least 1 enemy destroyer.

At 22.45 we saw intense shooting, lighting shells tracing bullets in the southwest. Since no one of our ships were located on this path, it seemed to us that the Italians were fighting each other, or the destroyer of our shock connection went into the attack. Immediately after 23.00 I ordered all the forces not engaged in the destruction of the enemy, to move to the northeast. As I see now, this signal was poorly thought out. I intended to give our destroyers a complete freedom to attack any ship that they would notice, and at the same time facilitate the collection of the fleet in the morning. It was also assumed that the captain of 1 rank poppy and its 8 destroyers, which are 20 miles in front of us, will perceive this signal as a direct order not to move, until they fulfill the attack. However, the same order, unfortunately, forced the Vice Admiral Podchhem-Whippel to stop attempts to establish contact with Vittorio Ventet.

A few minutes after midnight "Hailing", torpedoing the destroyer and finishing it with arthogne, said that he sees the battlefield about the area where we led the battleship battle was the main goal of Captain 1 rank Mac, and the message "Hailing" made the Mac Maca message forced Rush back, although he was in 60 miles west of this place. However, after an hour of "Hailing" corrected his report, having submitted that it was not a battleship, but a heavy cruiser. Shortly after 3.00 he sent another message, indicating that it came close to the "field". But since Watkins previously spent all the torpedoes, he requested the instructions - "Take a cruiser on the board of PLI to undermine the stern with deep bombs?"

"Greyhaound" and "Griffin" already joined "Hayeive", and then the captain of 1 rank Mac came up on "Jervis" to the board "Floors". The ship was in a state of indescribable disorder. Panic covered people jumped overboard. A drunken crowd gathered on the semi-love, dated clothing, personal belongings and bottles. There was even a shadow of order and discipline. Having removed the crew, Mac Skilled the ship to the torpedoes. Of course, the "floor" was the ship, which was reported by Pridhem-Whippel and Valiant between 21.00 and 22.00. He stood without a run to the left of our course. He was not fired, he himself also did not shoot. However, Torpeda got into it during the last attack at dusk and completely brought him out of order.

His mining in 4.10 was the final act of a night performance.

At dawn from "Formydla", intelligence planes rose, additional aircraft flew out of Greece from Crete, but they did not even find signs of the enemy in the West. As we learned later, Vittorio Veneto managed to increase the speed at night and disappeared.

At dawn, our cruiser and destroyers met with a linear fleet. Since we were almost confident, on the "Waraspit" during the night landfill, Squad's own destroyer, then with excitement, they were counting. All 12 destroyers were present to our inexpressible relief. I was faced with my heart.

Morning was beautiful. We returned to the fight area and saw a calm sea, covered with a layer of oil, covered with boats, dams and debris, a variety of floating bodies. All the destroyers that I could highlight, took up the salvation of people. In total, considering the crew "Floors", the British ships saved 900 people, although some of them later died. In the midst of rescue work, we attracted the attention of several JU-88. It reminded that it is stupid to linger on trifles in the area where we can expose powerful air attacks. Therefore, we were forced to go to the east, throwing several hundred Italians in water. Most more that we could do for them - transfer to the open text their exact coordinates to Italian admiralty. A hospital ship "Gradiska" was sent, which rescued 160 more people.

An annoying mistake prevented the flotilla of Greek destroyers to take part in the battle in which I am sure they would be bravely. The destroyers were sent through the Corinth Canal in Argostoli with all possible hasty. They arrived too late to take part in battle, however, they had time to pick up in the Italians.

All the second half of the day my fleet was subjected to fierce air attacks. Although it was not easy to break through the barrier of the Formydla fighters, several bombs broke out the immediate aircraft carrier. We arrived in Alexandria without further incidents at the beginning of the evening on Sunday, March 30. On April 1, I ordered to serve a special thank you, on board all the ships in commemoration of our success at Matapan.

Soon after that I was visited by the Patriarch of the Orthodox Greek Church in Alexandria, who brought congratulations on the occasion of the victory, which he described not only as a great deliverance, but also as a manifestation of God's power, for which he himself and all his pasties thank the Almighty God. After returning to the city, he presented a fleet to the icon with the image of St. Nicholas, the patron saint of sailors and travelers, which was placed in the Holy Prestole in the Worspite Ship Church.

Although "Vittorio Veneto" escaped, we sank 3 heavy cruisers - "Zara", "Paul", "Fiume" - and 2 destroyers - Alfiera and Carduchci. Italians lost more than 2,400 officers and sailors, mostly from artillery fire. "FIME" received 2 - 15 "volley with" Waraspit "and 1 - from Valianta;" 3 Ara "received 4 volley with" Waraspit ", 5 - with Valianta and 5 - from Baema. Impact of these 6 - and 8-gun volleys :, each projectile which weighed almost tons, it is impossible to describe.

The celebration reigned on the fleet. Our sailors were justified justified that they were more than paid for permanent bombing, which were subjected to during exits in the sea.

Our losses from Matapan were insignificant, we lost only 1 aircraft with the crew.

And once again, before completing the review of this Bay, I must give tribute to the excellent work of the WFF. I will quote my report published in the Appendion to London Gazette July 31, 1947:

"The highest assessment is the courage and self-control of pilots and the impeccable work of the Deck Team" Formic "and terrestrial personnel in the Malema. An example of the courage of our young officers may be Lieutenant F.M. Trens Spence, who, not to stay aside, flew on the only available plane with a torpedo from Elsusis in the Malema and, despite all the difficulties of intelligence and a bad connection., He himself conducted exploration. Later he took off together with the second aircraft and took part in the attack of Torpedon-Powder at dusk. "

Looking back, on the battle, which is now officially known as Matapana fight, I have a leg to admit that there were several cases that could be done better. However, the calm consideration of the subject from the soft chair, when there is a complete information about what happened is very different from the control of the battle at night from the ship's bridge in the presence of N (Friend. You can constantly make decisions that a few seconds are released. Fast moving ships, pronounced very nearby, and The roar of the guns do not facilitate thought. Some fact that the battle took place at night, so thickens the fog over the scene, which some of the participants can remain in complete ignorance regarding the true state of affairs.

Nevertheless, we have achieved significant results. These 3 heavy cruisers were well protected against 6 "shells and were a constant threat to our smaller and easily armored ships. More importantly, the sluggish and passive behavior of the Italian fleet during the subsequent evacuation of Greece and Crete was a direct result of a heavy strike obtained by him Matapan. If enemy surface ships intervened during these operations, our already difficult task would be almost impossible.

Admiral Angelo Iakino, who commanded the Italian fleet, kept the flag on Vittorio Veneto. I read His report on the operation of NIGHT Boy, there is no doubt that airfunction largely led him. It was a surprise for us, as we knew how effectively the Italian intelligence aircraft in other cases. However, as Admiral Iakino says, the interaction of the Italian fleet with aviation in the field of tactics was weak.

It seems that they relied on the reports of Germanic aircraft, and since the weather was quite acceptable, it is not clear why their airflow failed. At 9.00 on March 28, the German aircraft reported on aircraft carrier, 2 linkers, 9 cruisers and 14 destroyers, which at 7.45 were the gams and there. It really was our fleet, which, according to Admiral Iakino, at this time calmly stood in Alexandria. However, having considered the closer card, Admiral decided that the pilot was mistaken and discovered his own fleet, which was reported to Rhodes. He did not suspect that British battleships are in the sea, until the very last moment.

On the evening of March 28, when "Paul" was damaged in the burden of our air attack, the information that Admiral Iakino had forced him to suggest that the British battleships are in 90 miles from him for feed, that is, in 4 hours. Therefore, his decision to send "Zara" and "Fiume" to help the damaged cruiser should not be criticized. At first he intended to send the destroyers, but then decided that only the admiral could decide the place to take the "floor" to the tug or flood. But the counter-admiral of Carlo Catanao died at the "dawn" and could not say anything.

In fact, the British battleships were not 90 miles, but twice the closer.

The result is known to us.

Admiral Iakino's book also reveals an inconceivable state of the full unpretentiousness of the Italian fleet to night battles. They did not consider the possibility of night battle between large ships, so the calculations of heavy guns were not on combat posts. This explains why the tower "Zara" and "Fiume" stood on Nola when we noticed them. They had good ships, good guns and torpedoes, fluent powder and much more, but even their newest ships did not have a radar, who helped us so well, and their art of the night battle of heavy ships was at the same level as we were 25 years old Back in the time of the Etland battle.

The head of the Italian Sea General Staff Admiral Riccardi was very coldly met Admiral Iakino. Mussolini, on the other hand, was not so unfriendly and patiently listened to Jacino's complaint about the poor work of the airflow. The results of this battle strengthened the determination of Italians to build an aircraft carrier to provide a fleet with intelligence aircraft. But I must recall that Italy never completed the aircraft carrier to the surrender in September 1943.

Martial ships of the world

Linkors "Julio Cesare" ("Novorossiysk"), "Conte di Cavur",
"Leonardo da Vinci", "Andrea Doria" and "Kayo Duilio".

Participation in World War II.

Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, and at the Mediterranean Sea immediately began active actions of opposing fleets. Wearing battles in North Africa, the Italians were forced to supply their troops and bring reinforcements by the sea, for which all the forces of the fleet were widely involved. During this period, they surpassed the enemy - the British - almost in all classes of ships, except for aircraft carriers, the absence of which in the Italian fleet was compensated by the presence of a large number of coastal aircraft. Clear-type high-speed linkers gave Italy well-known tactical advantages, and a properly planned squadron battle at this time could bring her success to the sea, for what the victory in North Africa would follow.

However, Mussolini, who believed that the domination at the Mediterranean could be conquered with the help of aviation with the help of aviation, wanted to preserve the fleet until the end of the war, which, in his opinion, was close. This led to the well-known caution of Italians in sea battles with the participation of large ships, while their minor ships were always fighting to the end. The first squadron battle confirmed it.

July 6 in the strategic cover of convoy (five ships) from Naples in Benghazi: "Cesare" (Flag of Council Admiral I.Kompioni, commander - captain 1 rank P.Varoli), "Cavur" (Commander - Captain 1 rank E. Chiorlo ), Six heavy and eight lung cruisers, as well as 32 destroyers. On July 9, a squadron on the way back from Benghazi to Taranto met at M. Punta style with the English Mediterranean Fleet, which was released on the interception of Waraspyt battleship, "Royal Periov", "Malaya", the aircraft carrier "needle", six light cruisers and Fifteen destroyers.

At 13.30, the torpedoes with the "needle" attacked the Italian cruiser, but they did not find battleships. After an hour and a half, the Italian heavy cruiser of the right flank discovered English ships and from the distance of 25 km opened fire. The British answered. Soon at a distance of about 26 km, battles entered the battle. At 15.48 Campioni, using the fact that the British only one "Waraspit" was modernized and could shoot at such a distance, first ordered to open fire. Response volks rang out in five minutes, and already at 16.00 381-mm shell with Waraspit got into the middle of the Cesare Corps, on which a fire began under deck. The smoke fans succumbed to boiler houses, and four adjacent boilers (No. 4-7) failed, causing a drop in speed from 26 to 18 knots.

Damicated in Taranto "Duilio" was lucky more. Although Torpeda, who fell into the battleship around midnight, made a 11x7 m sample in his board, the crew was able to defend his ship, and he remained afloat. But damage correction took almost a year.

On January 3-5, 1942, the last combat yield of "Cesare" was held in the composition of the long cover of the convoy in North Africa (operation M43), after which it was removed from the active nucleus of the fleet. In addition to the lack of fuel, the role was played here and the fact that he had a bad separation on the compartments and, as the experience of Cavura has shown, could die from one torpedo hit. Use it when moving domination in the air to the allies was too risky, and the old battleship was put in reserve. Most of the crew was written off to other ships and headquarters of escort convoy groups that needed experienced personnel.

In the middle of the year, the same fate suffered Doria and Duilio, although in early June 1943, in the expectation of the allied landing on the Apennin Peninsula, they began to re-equip them for a combat service. Two months later they were ready, but they could not get out of the Taranto base in the sea due to the lack of ships for escort. They intended to even be flooded in the area of \u200b\u200bApulia to prevent landing there.

By the end of the year, "Cesare" stood in Taranto, and in January 1943 he moved to the floor where he began to be used as a floating barracks. There he caught the news of the exit of Italy from the war. In just 1940-1943, "Cesare" performed 38 combat yields to the sea, after following 16,947 miles for 912 running hours, which he needed 12,697 tons of oil.

After concluding a truce "Cesare" returned to Taranto, and on September 12, he arrived in Malta's final of Italian battleships. Despite the fact that there are no still damage to airplanes on the floor, the ship under the command of Captain 2 rank V. Karminati passed all the way with incomplete crew and without escort. Since the German torpedo boats and aircraft followed him with completely definite intentions, this transition can be considered the only heroic page in the history of Cesare. German aviation with the help of planning radio-controlled bombs on the approach to Malta has already sinks the newest Italian battleship "Roma", the sown to give up one of the first. In order for the same fate, the British was sent by the British, the British sent him to meet the Waraspit battleship. Under the convoy of his old offender "Cesare" and entered the Maltese raid.

In the form of compensation for their losses in the war with Italy, the Allies insisted on the participation of a number of Italian ships in further combat actions. But the absence of the German fleet on the Mediterranean (Germans also acted only submarines and boats) and many organizational problems that followed after the inclusion of Italian ships into the percussion compounds, limited this participation only with light and auxiliary ships, as well as transports.

In addition, there were a lot of causes of a political nature, which in a difficult situation after the truce required the preservation of the Italian fleet. Therefore, the Allied Command decided to leave Italian battleships in Malta under its direct control. Later, in June 1944, three of them, the oldest, including "Cesare", which had limited combat value, were allowed to return to the Italian port of Augusta, where the allies began to use them for training purposes. The new battleships from sin were away to the Suez Channel and kept them there just as the French ships in Alexandria were held in 1940-1943.

After the end of the war, most Italian ships focused on Taranto, where, standing on a joke, they expected their decisions by their future fortune-winning countries.

Duilio and Andrea Doria arrived in Malta on September 9, 1943. From June next year, they were used mainly as training ships. September 15 and November 1, 1956, respectively, they were excluded from the lists of the Italian fleet and for the two subsequent years disassembled metal.

Opposition of Fleet Unleashing War and its initial plans

Preparation. Italian fleet in World War II

Linkors "Julio Cesare" ("Novorossiysk"), "Conte di Cavur", "Leonardo da Vinci", "Andrea Doria" and "Kayo Duilio".

Participation in World War II.

Linkors "Julio Cesare" ("Novorossiysk"), "Conte di Cavur",
"Leonardo da Vinci", "Andrea Doria" and "Kayo Duilio".