Was it possible to prevent a world war. Was it possible to avoid the collapse of the USSR
In short, historians and researchers of that conflict have been trying to answer the question of whether the First World War could have been prevented for several decades. However, it has not yet been possible to find an unambiguous answer.
After the murder
Despite the fact that at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, the situation in Europe, due to the accumulated contradictions between the major world powers, heated up almost to the limit, the countries several times managed to avoid the start of open military confrontation.
A number of experts believe that even after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the conflict was not inevitable. In support of their version, they cite the facts that the reaction did not follow immediately, but only after a few weeks. What happened during this time?
French visit
Taking advantage of the summer break in the work of parliament, French President R. Poincaré paid a visit to Russia. He was accompanied by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister R. Viviani. Arriving aboard the French battleship, the distinguished guests spent several days in Peterhof, after which they set off for Scandinavia.
Despite the fact that the German Kaiser at that time spent his summer holidays far from Berlin, and in the activities of other states there was a period of calm, this visit did not go unnoticed. Based on the situation on the world stage, the governments of the Central Powers (then the Triple Alliance) decided that France and Russia were secretly planning something. And of course, what is being undertaken will certainly be directed against them. Therefore, Germany decided to prevent any of their steps, and to act first.
Wine of Russia?
Others in search of an answer to the question of whether the First World War could have been prevented, in short, are trying to shift all the blame onto Russia. First, it is argued that the war could have been avoided if Russian diplomats had not insisted on the unacceptability of the Austro-Hungarian demands made against Serbia. That is, if the Russian Empire refused to defend the Serbian side.
However, according to the documents, Nicholas II offered the Austrian Kaiser to settle the matter peacefully - in the Hague court. But the latter completely ignored the appeal of the Russian autocrat.
Secondly, there is a version that if Russia fulfilled the conditions of the German ultimatum and stopped the mobilization of its troops, then again there would be no war. The proof is that Germany announced its mobilization later than the Russian side. However, it should be noted here that the concept of "mobilization" was significantly different in the Russian and German empires. If the Russian army, when announcing mobilization, was just beginning to gather and prepare, then the German one was ready in advance. And mobilization in imperial Germany meant the beginning of hostilities.
As for the allegations that the German government to the last assured Russia of its peaceful intentions and unwillingness to start a war, then perhaps it was just playing for time? To sow doubts in the enemy and prevent them from properly preparing.
Opponents of the version about Russia's responsibility for the start of the war, in turn, cite the fact that although the Russians were preparing for an armed conflict, they planned to complete the preparation no earlier than 1917. While the German troops were fully prepared for a war on two fronts (simultaneously against Russia and France). The notorious Schlieffen plan served as evidence of the latter statement. This document, developed by the chief of the German General Staff A. Schlieffen, was drawn up back in 1905-08!
An inevitable necessity
And yet, despite different views and versions, most of the historical and military researchers continue to argue that the first world conflict happened simply because at that time it simply could not be otherwise. War was the only way to resolve the contradictions that had accumulated over several decades between the major powers of Europe and the world. Therefore, even if R. Poincaré had not come to visit Nicholas II, the Russian authorities did not accept such an irreconcilable position on the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and did not announce mobilization, and even if G. Princip failed, like his accomplices, the war is all would have started anyway. Another reason would have been found. Let not in 1914, but later. Therefore, the question of whether the First World War could have been completely prevented can be answered briefly only in the negative. It was an inevitable necessity.
In December 1991, the heads of the republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement in Belovezhskaya Pushcha on the establishment of the SSG. This document actually meant the collapse of the Soviet Union. The political map of the world began to look different.
First, you need to decide on what caused the global catastrophe in order to try to objectively assess the situation. There are many such reasons. This is the degradation of the ruling elites of the "burial era", which turned a powerful state into a not very powerful one, and problems in the economy that have long demanded effective reforms. This also includes harsh censorship, deep internal crises, including increased nationalism in the republics.
It is naive to believe that the stars were formed this way and the state disintegrated due to coincidentally coinciding events. The main political opponent of the Soviet Union was not dozing either, imposing an arms race in which the USSR, given all the existing problems, had no opportunity to succeed. We must pay tribute to the intelligence and insight of Western geopoliticians who managed to shake and destroy the seemingly unshakable "Soviet machine".
The USSR broke up into 15 states. In 1991, the following appeared on the world map: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan.
The Cold War, which resulted in the collapse of the USSR, was by no means limited to indirect clashes on all sorts of fronts in countries such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The Cold War took place in the minds and hearts of the citizens of the USSR and the United States. Western propaganda was more sophisticated. The United States and its allies turned all their massive riots and discontent into a show. Hippies could preach love instead of war and the authorities calmly allowed them to state their point of view, nevertheless continuing to bend their policies. In the Soviet Union, dissent was brutally suppressed. And when they were allowed to think “otherwise”, it was too late. The wave of discontent fueled from the outside (and the fifth column took an active part) could not be stopped.
There were a lot of reasons for the collapse, but if you simplify everything, you can come to the conclusion that the USSR collapsed because of jeans, gum and Coca-Cola. There were too many "forbidden fruits", which in fact turned out to be a dummy.
Options for resolving the situation.
Probably, the collapse of the USSR could have been prevented. It is difficult to say which solution would be ideal for the state, for the country, for the people, without knowing all the unknown factors. As an example, consider the People's Republic of China, which, thanks to the flexible actions of the authorities, managed to avoid the crisis of the socialist system.
However, the national component should not be underestimated. Although both the Soviet Union and the PRC are multinational states, the peoples of China and the Soviet Union are by no means identical. The difference between culture and history makes itself felt.
An idea was needed for the people. It was necessary to come up with an alternative to the "American Dream", which teased Soviet citizens from across the ocean. In the 1930s, when the inhabitants of the USSR believed in the ideals of communism, the country turned from an agrarian into an industrial one in record time. In the 40s. not without faith in a just cause, the USSR defeated the enemy, which at that time was stronger in terms of military power. In the 50s. people were ready for the common good to raise virgin soil on sheer enthusiasm. In the 60s. The Soviet Union was the first to send a man into space. Soviet people conquered mountain peaks, made scientific discoveries, broke world records. All this happened largely because of the belief in a bright future and for the good of our people.
For more than 20 years, in terms of most economic and social indicators, the newly formed countries have significantly rolled back.
Further, the situation gradually began to deteriorate. The people began to understand the utopian nature of the ideals of the past. The country's government blindly continued to bend its line, not thinking about possible development alternatives. The aging leaders of the USSR reacted primitively to the provocations of the West, getting involved in unnecessary military conflicts. The ugly growing bureaucracy thought mainly about its own good rather than about the needs of the people, for whom all these "people's" bodies were originally created.
There was no need to "tighten the screws" where the situation did not require it. Then the "forbidden fruits" would not have become so desirable, and the intriguers of the West would have lost their main weapon. Instead of thoughtlessly following the obviously utopian ideals, it was necessary to pay attention in time to the needs of the people even at that time. And under no circumstances should one alternate between "thaws" and other liberalities with strict prohibitions. Domestic and foreign policy had to be carried out reasonably tough for the benefit of national interests, but without excesses.
For more than 20 years of liberal lies to the people, they have persistently and persistently slipped and slipped a completely false idea that civil war is some kind of evil into which the Bolsheviks have plunged the entire country. And if not for a handful of these villains, the country would live in peace and prosperity.
In reality, such a statement is false a priori and leads away from the class essence of the question itself.
After all, what is civil war? Civil war is nothing more than a concentrated expression of the class struggle. In other words, it is a struggle for power between the exploited class, that is, the proletarians, with the exploiting class, that is, those who were in power until recently, lost it and would like to return it.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin wrote: "Whoever recognizes the struggle of classes cannot but recognize civil wars, which in any class society represent a natural, under certain circumstances inevitable continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle." (MILITARY PROGRAM OF THE PROLETARY REVOLUTION).
Could this sharp struggle not have happened? No, it could not, because the proletarians - workers, peasants and soldiers - tried to retain and defend the power they won in October 1917. And a pitiful handful of rich people, not having powerful support within the country, naturally tried to rely on foreign invaders and their bayonets, who did not hesitate to rush to plunder Russian riches. Fortunately, the White Guards were not without pleasure selling their own country to them wholesale and retail, not much ashamed of their actions and not noticeably grieving about the prosperity of Mother Russia.
So, let's fix that the civil war was a war or a struggle for power, between a handful of rich people, i.e. the minority, and the working majority, or the proletarians.
Does this mean that “brother went against brother,” or, in other words, that the rift of discord passed, so to speak, right through the families?
Let's just say that this phrase cannot be taken literally. Of course, individual cases when one brother was in the camp of the Whites, and the other in the camp of the Reds, took place. However, such a situation could arise only due to delusion and misunderstanding by individual proletarians of their class interests due to political illiteracy.
It is significant how Demyan Bedny wrote about this at that time, addressing the lost proletarians who stood up to defend the interests of their exploiters, the tsarist guardsmen and fat-bellied bourgeoisie:
But I feel sorry for the real sufferers - the poor,
It is a pity for those who, trembling in difficult moments,
I'm ready to put on the old fetters myself,
He asks for himself and prisons and fetters,
He substitutes his shoulders for the former "owners" ...
I will note that before the Great October Revolution the so-called "brothers" who stood on the other side of the barricades did not hesitate to rob the common people as sticky, and gnaw them to the bone, not at all thinking about some kind of "mythical brotherhood".
Therefore, in civil the oppressed stood up against the oppressor, and not "brother" against "brother", only this way and not otherwise, and it was impossible to avoid this, except perhaps by tilting the neck again under the yoke and whip of the exploiter.
Thus, those who scream today that civil war is evil are far from being concerned with the desire for peace and non-shedding of blood, but with the abandonment of the struggle in general, for power in favor of the bourgeoisie and landowners, who were removed from it by the will of the people in October 1917. of the year. And this position of theirs, by definition, is deeply anti-popular.
Lenin wrote in his "Reply to P. Kievsky (Yu. Pyatakov)": "The goal of the civil war is to conquer banks, factories, factories and other things (in favor of the proletarians), to destroy any possibility of resistance to the bourgeoisie, and to destroy its troops."
It is clear that such goals could not please those who, until recently, fattened themselves at the expense of the oppressed majority. It was this clash of interests that caused a fierce struggle - a civil war, the refusal of which would be tantamount to surrender to the bourgeoisie and those fragments of tsarism, which, unfortunately, still survived.
History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. Therefore, I will not fantasize about what would happen as a result of a change in certain historical decisions. I just want to take a small step towards understanding whether the war of 1941-45 as such could have been avoided.
Illustrated - Caricature by Clifford Barriman, 1939
Consideration of the prerequisites for World War II traditionally begins with a mention of the Treaty of Versailles. It was a humiliating agreement for Germany, limiting her in the military-political sphere. The Versailles Treaty was one of the reasons for the coming to power of Adolf Hitler.
In 1933, Germany ceases to comply with the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and begins to build up its armed forces.
In 1936 Hitler gets Mussolini to agree to the annexation of Austria. In the same year, Germany concludes with Japan the Anti-Comintern Pact (a pact on the fight against communism). In 1938 Germany annexes Austria. In the same year, as a result of the Munich Agreement, Germany divides Czechoslovakia with the participation of Poland and Hungary.
In 1939 Germany begins the Polish campaign. The partition of Poland is being conducted ... jointly with the USSR, in accordance with the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
In 1940 Germany occupies Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands. In the same year, France surrenders. Germany goes to war with Great Britain.
From the listed facts it is clear that the war was gaining momentum and Hitler was not going to stop there. It is especially noteworthy that Germany consistently attacked everyone with whom it had previously entered into agreements on the division of other countries. With the participation of Great Britain and Poland, Czechoslovakia was divided. After that, Poland itself was occupied and war was declared on Great Britain. The partition of Poland was carried out with the participation of the USSR - is it any wonder that the USSR itself became Hitler's next target?
And what happened on the part of the Soviet Union itself?
1939-1940 - Soviet-Finnish war. 1940 - the accession to the Soviet Union of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (previously part of Romania). The participation of the USSR in the partition of Poland has already been mentioned.
And although the Soviet Union did not conduct such large-scale acquisitions of neighboring territories as Germany, it would be wrong to call the USSR's policy passive.
Both states - both Germany and the USSR - pursued a policy of seizing and annexing neighboring territories. The two totalitarian powers were moving towards each other.
By 1941, the situation was like this that on the same continent there were two totalitarian regimes and each of them declared its idea as the only correct one. The general idea of German Nazism was the idea of the superiority of the Aryan race over others. The general idea of communism was the idea of the superiority of the Soviet system over all others. The goal of Nazism is to ensure the well-being of its people at the expense of other nations. The goal of communism is the so-called "world revolution". Both totalitarian regimes each moved towards their own goal, planting their ideas in the border areas. They moved at different speeds, but their meeting was inevitable and given the territorial proximity - the meeting could not be postponed for a long time.
What theoretical possibilities were there to avoid a collision of two totalitarian regimes?
1 - The fall of one of the regimes due to internal problems. However, we know that the Stalinist regime was internally stable enough to survive until the death of the "father of all nations." The Hitler regime also did not experience serious internal problems until the moment when the war acquired a character unfavorable for Hitrel. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that one of the regimes could have disintegrated by itself before a collision would have occurred. Even if this collision were delayed for several years.
2 - Destruction of one of the modes by external opponents. But who could destroy Hitler faster than the USSR? Great Britain was focused on its own defense, France surrendered, Italy became Hitler's ally, the United States is geographically too far away to destroy Hitler before he goes to war with the USSR.
Was there an opportunity for two totalitarian regimes to meet and coexist peacefully? I guess not.
The plan of attack on the USSR (Barbarossa) was developed by the Wehrmacht in mid-1940 and approved by Hitler by the end of the year. Thus, the USSR became Hitler's goal in advance, long before the start of the war. It should be remembered that back in 1936 Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. There is not a single serious reason to assume that in 1941 Hitler could have changed his mind and forgot about his long-term plans (which, it should be noted, did not hatch alone, but together with his party colleagues).
There are versions that Stalin had similar plans to attack Germany and capture Europe. But even without them - Hitler's one aspiration to the east was enough for a clash and the start of a war.
What else could have stopped Hitler? Atomic bomb? But in 1941 it did not exist. With the most intensive development that took place during the war, the atomic bomb appeared only in 1945.
Based on these historical facts, I come to the conclusion that the collision of the totalitarian regimes of Germany and the USSR with a large-scale war - since 1940, was already inevitable.
Perhaps earlier, in 1936-1939, there were some opportunities for Great Britain, France and the United States to restrain the growth of the military power of Hitlerite Germany and thereby "defuse" this bomb. But they did not take advantage of those opportunities. Apparently, they simply did not want to interfere with Hitler, since they considered not him, but Stalin, more dangerous. Hitler - in 1936 he was considered a very progressive respectable politician. Time magazine printed his portrait on the cover. Concentration camps did not exist yet. There was a successful European politician, Adolf Hitler, who rallied his nation and brought Germany out of a protracted crisis. They were not afraid of him. They were afraid of Stalin.
And in 1940 it was too late.
All that could have changed in 1940-1941 was the order of events. Hitler could postpone the attack on the USSR until a later date in order to preliminarily break the resistance of Great Britain. What would be different from this? Basically - nothing. Germany's attack on the USSR might not have been so sudden, but a situation might have arisen in which the USSR would have attacked first. I will not speculate about how the course of the war, its duration and losses as a result of any changes in the timing and order of the attack, would have changed. In any case, the losses would have been huge. Two totalitarian systems, two war machines, tuned in to the total destruction of the enemy - they could not have limited themselves to a short war, they would not have retreated from their goal either in 1941 or in 1942. They would not have crumbled on their own. Everything turned out in such a way that these systems had to collide and fight until the destruction of one of them. History developed in such a way that these systems collided on June 22, 1941 and the Soviet Union defeated in a brutal bloody war with the support of its allies - Great Britain and the United States, which, of course, should not be forgotten.
We won that inevitable war.
We suffered huge losses, but we won.
And no matter what mistakes in the preparation and conduct of the war were committed by Stalin and / or the Soviet military leaders, the main historical event of 1941 - the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - was not their mistake. As of 1941, this was a historical inevitability.
I came to this understanding as a result of studying the historical background of the Second World War. Perhaps you have learned or understood something new for yourself.
25 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some call what happened a natural and logical course of events. Others argue that there was a well-managed process that led to the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Where is the truth? What role did the personality factor play in all of this, and what lessons has history taught us? The first pro-rector of the Academy of Management under the President, Professor Alexander Ivanovsky, historian and philosopher Boris Lepeshko, and political analyst Pyotr Petrovsky are talking about this.
NG: What, in your opinion, are the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR: a loss in the Cold War, a fall in oil prices, an exhausted resource of the command-administrative economy? Or is the ossified ideology to blame? Was this process inevitable or could it have been prevented?
Boris Lepeshko: It all depends on the basic positions. If we consider that the collapse of the USSR is a blessing, then why should it have been prevented? If it was a controlled process, then its authors should be awarded Nobel Prizes for the effectiveness of managerial decisions. If we are faced with the natural course of events, do they grieve over the “natural decline” of obsolete social phenomena? The dispute continues, and I can only express my own point of view: for me everything that happened a quarter of a century ago is a personal, philosophical and political catastrophe. Society did not have the resources to exclude it. Neither intellectual, nor political, nor economic. Moreover, many saw the approach of this "political tsunami", but could not do anything (or did not want to). A similar process took place on the eve of the 1917 revolution. Everyone understood everything, even tried to stop the destructive processes, but how did it end? The same as in 1991. I think for most people the events of 25 years ago meant the collapse of the usual hostel. Subsequently, this turned into a bloody massacre in many former republics of the once united power. When today they say that all this is for the sake of the notorious freedom and democracy, then we need to think about one single question: is this freedom and democracy worth the thousands of ruined lives and refugees in Karabakh, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Moldova?
Alexander Ivanovsky: The collapse of the USSR is undoubtedly the greatest geopolitical catastrophe. Almost 300 million people simultaneously found themselves in a rather difficult situation of uncertainty. I am not even talking about the third world countries, which for several decades were part of the socialist bloc and with its destruction also faced enormous difficulties of shock therapy. In addition, this tragedy led to the beginning of an attack on the social rights and guarantees of ordinary citizens. And not only in the post-Soviet space. Since the early 1990s, social programs have been curtailed everywhere, because the world has become unipolar, and there is no particular sense in supporting the middle class by those in power. At one time, the capitalist countries, under the influence of the USSR, were forced to pursue a more socially responsible policy because of the fear of the leftist coming to power. With the collapse of the Soviet state, social programs began to decline in the West, and the degree of inequality increased. Against this background, people's dissatisfaction with their political elites began to grow in many countries, and the positions of ultra-right nationalist forces were strengthened.
The onset of the global monopoly of one center of power has led to powerful financial crises that follow one after the other, leaving countries virtually no time to recover. On the whole, international politics has become more unpredictable, terrorist attacks and wars have become more frequent, local conflicts and the problem of refugees have intensified. A period of global instability has come.
Peter Petrovsky: I disagree with the fact that the country did not have the resources to prevent the approach of a catastrophe. Let me remind you that the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries by that time occupied a third of the world economy in terms of aggregate GDP and had all the basic technologies. But due to the weakness of the management, they were unable to maintain their positions.
Speaking about the reasons for the collapse of the USSR, I would appeal to the ancient thesis: who benefits from it? Immediately after the war, two blocs were formed in the world - the Soviet and the Euro-Atlantic. The latter did not hide his goal of winning the victory over the socialist system and worked well in this regard. Energy prices also played a fatal role in the fate of the USSR. In the 1970s, when they grew rapidly, Western countries focused on energy-saving technologies, robotization and industrial automation. The Soviet Union followed the path of dumping prices for hydrocarbons within the boundaries of its block. This provided advantages for a while, but, on the other hand, slowed down the transition to computer technology, automation and electronics. As a result, by the 1980s, when oil prices collapsed, Western economies were more competitive. The Soviet leadership, instead of rapidly modernizing the economy, began to transform the political system. It is impossible to artificially implant democracy in a society without having a prepared economic, social and ideological ground for this. In this I see the main lesson of the events of 1991.
NG: That is, if there were a stronger and more decisive personality in Gorbachev's place, everything could have turned out differently. But is the role of personality really so significant here? After all, under the sick and feeble Brezhnev, the USSR did not collapse ...
P.P .: Brezhnev became the leader who created the detonator for the explosive device that destroyed the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was unable to neutralize this detonator. In comparison, for example, with the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Gorbachev made a lot of mistakes. Instead of carrying out economic reforms, introducing anti-crisis management, Gorbachev engaged in populism, disintegrated the management system, and carried out incomprehensible actions to stimulate and create popular fronts. That is, he created numerous centers of political forces that fought among themselves and made the system uncontrollable.
B.L .: Without a doubt, Gorbachev bears personal responsibility for what happened to our country. And his activities require an appropriate legal and political assessment, of course, negative. As for the role of the individual, take a look and try to assess the national development of Belarus outside the context of the personality of Alexander Lukashenko. Or the defense of England in the 40s of the last century outside the will and character of Churchill. Or the fate of France after World War II outside de Gaulle. Everything immediately becomes clear. Among the factors that determine the fate of any country, a specific person plays a decisive role.
A.I .: I do not dispute the thesis that all the problems began at the top and they were largely due to the lack of staff rotation, the protracted process of their rejuvenation. But as far as the possibilities of the socialist economy are concerned, here I am far from extremes. I think the truth is still in the middle. It is obvious that numerous large projects carried out in the USSR (achievements in space, military industry, social policy) would have been impossible without the leading role of the state in the economy. Another thing is that at some stage the economy froze and did not develop. But socialist ideas are alive and in demand in the world. Today, both in Russia and in Belarus, about 60 percent of the population adhere to conservative, social democratic traditions.
The existence of the USSR balanced the situation on the world stage. The factor of checks and balances made it possible to avoid many negative scenarios, including a nuclear war.
NG: Any society by its nature is committed to conservatism, which is not at all an obstacle to development. The question is who will lead the country at a particular stage and where will the energy of the masses turn. In this context, the example of the former Soviet republics is indicative. After all, everyone began the path to independence with virtually equal starting conditions. But someone managed to prove their worth, to prevent conflicts, to maintain controllability, while someone else cannot get out of the abyss of chaos and political squabbles. Why?
B.L .: There is no clear and acceptable answer to this question. There is always a whole complex of reasons, phenomena, which are often not possible to build into a certain hierarchy. All attempts by theorists (from Plato, Hegel, Marx to postmodernists) to offer a coherent answer were unsuccessful. And they will never be crowned - this is both a plus and a minus of our existence. That is, any development always contains an element of unpredictability. It is impossible to imagine that analysts will calculate everything and offer win-win development options in the future. But one thing is clear: in order to minimize the catastrophic nature of development, one must be well-to-do in terms of the capabilities of the national elite (not corrupt, not comprador), the national economy, and the national education system.
P.P .: I think that in some countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, the Baltic countries), local elites simply overestimated their strengths and capabilities, often acting on a wave of emotions and to please certain political forces. The contribution of the same Baltic states to the all-Union system was equal to the Belarusian one. What happened to our neighbors in the end? Unprecedented depopulation and deindustrialization. An opposite example is Kazakhstan with its difficult ethnic situation. In 1991, many predicted the fate of a hot spot for him. But the republic survived. On the one hand, thanks to the strong personality of its president. On the other hand, the political elite had an understanding that the new conditions mostly carry risks and it is important to see and stop them in time. Common sense also prevailed in Belarus. We focused on the development of what we have, we didn’t cut short, we didn’t cut ties with the past, we preserved traditions and continuity. That is, we chose the pragmatic path, abandoning vulgar recipes and liberal shock therapy, which was persistently offered to us from outside. This made it possible to preserve the basic economic units and made it possible for the management system to function normally.
The Soviet Union is when there is not terrorism and drugs in the Caucasus, but resorts, sanatoriums and the world's best mineral water. In Ukraine, not the battles on the Maidan, not the fighters with the swastika, but endless wheat fields, the aviation industry, clean cities and kind, happy people. In the Baltics - not SS marches, but the production of high-precision electronics and radio engineering.
NG: Well, in politics, as in life, everyone chooses his own path. After the disappearance of the USSR, some of the new young states were drawn to the EU, others chose integration in the Eurasian space. What predetermined this choice? And why have Russia's attempts to become the center of gravity of the former Soviet republics so far not led to great success?
B.L .: After the disintegration of the USSR, new mechanisms of a historical, ethnic, and other nature “turned on”. Somewhere in the first place were the priorities formed by the national elites. Somewhere there was a desire to return to the national “golden age”, outside the socialist context. Someone took a reference point to other centers of power. The complex of these factors determined the national choice in various post-Soviet countries. Nobody foresaw such a development of events, and therefore we can safely say that logic is in second place here. Everything is decided by the ratio of various factors "working" here and now. As regards Russia, everything has been said a long time ago. And about greatness, and about heroism, and about problems (“you are wretched, you are omnipotent, you are powerful, you are powerless” - there is neither add nor subtract). For the past two centuries, Russia has been in the center of world attention, having declared itself quite loudly with both bloody revolutions and a victorious war. What will be tomorrow? Probably no one knows this.
P.P .: The problem is that neither now nor in the 1990s has Russia proposed a global project, a global alternative (primarily in terms of values) to the existing unipolar system of world order. It is clear that this should not be a project of returning to the USSR. Digging into the past and looking for grievances is also unacceptable. This should be a project for the future. If Russia can clearly formulate it, then the success of reintegration on a new basis is guaranteed. If Russia remains on revanchist positions, falls under the influence of ethnic, imperial and other ambitions, then nothing will come of our Eurasian Union.
A.I .: Studies of public administration systems from the 18th century to the present show that they were all built hierarchically. Each country had its own historical memory, heritage and, in accordance with this, developed in one direction or another. It is clear that the crumbling pieces from the USSR had to stick to some shore. Somewhere big money played a role, somewhere the stake was made on promises. There was, in general, a completely controlled process of moving the borders, moving countries to certain blocs. Over time, the first disappointments and resentments appeared, because some did not wait for the promised, others wanted more. All this once again testifies to the fact that you always have to live with your own mind and “choose your own track”. There has never been and never will be gratuitous progress. To live better, you have to work hard yourself.
