What role the army aircraft played in the Panjscher operation in Afghan. Military Aviation Aviation in Afghan War 1979 1989

Losses of Soviet aircraft and helicopters in Afghanistan (1979-89)

Special attention deserves the issue of losses of Soviet aviation during the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan. At the same time, this value fluctuates, according to various sources, from 103 to 118 aircraft and from 317 to 333 helicopters, i.e. from 420 to 450 lp.

Losses of Soviet La, according to the book "Black Tulip: Memory Book: Afghanistan (1979 - 1989)". - Yekaterinburg, 2000 , distributed as follows:

Table 1

Year

Total

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Aircraft

Helicopters

Total:

Here is the data from another source - here 437 la:

Table 2.

Number of lost la, pcs.

Year

Total

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Aircraft

Helicopters

Total:

According to the work of E. Shytenko "Afghanistan: from the war of the 80s to the forecast of new wars" losses only the Air Force of the 40th Army amounted to 313 la, but he has no information for 1979 and 1982:


Table 3.

Number of lost la, pcs.

Year

Total

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Aircraft

Helicopters

Total:

As can be seen, the difference is quite significant, even if we take into account the losses of WTA and TR, the airplanes of which were periodically flew from the USSR and were not part of the Air Force of the 40th Army. It is possible that some sources took into account only the battle losses of La, and others are also the nebaree

The author's data that is an attempt to bring together domestic and foreign sources (it is natural that they are incomplete and still require verification; they are reflected in the application in more detail in the application) are reflected in Table 4. In this case, all lost LAs were taken into account: shot down (about 405 la) destroyed At the airfields as a result of shelling (about 70 cars), divided due to errors of flights (about 110), faults of aircraft equipment (about 30), the influence of external factors, etc. - Total 635 la (172 aircraft and 460 helicopters).

Including 62 helicopters from the border troops. 28 of them were shot down by the enemy by fire, and the sky losses amounted to 34 helicopters. The greatest losses took place when landing for high mountains - 8 helicopters and during take-offs with them - 5 cars.

For comparison, summary data from tables 1-3 and the author's data are provided (highlighted by "fat" color):

Table 4.

Number of lost la, pcs.

Year

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Aircraft

Helicopters

Class La Unknown

Total:

1

61

29

50

56

78

86

102

96

52

9

13

All aviation (Table 1):

All aviation

(Table 2):

Air Force of the 40th Army (Table 3)

Table 5.

La type

Of these, from the fire impact in the air

Total for other sources

An-12.

An-24.

An-26.

An-30.

IL-18.

IL-76.

Mi-10.

Mi-24.

MI-26.

Mi-6.

Mi-8.

Helicopters *

MiG-21

MiG-23.

Su-17.

Su-24

Su-25

Yak-28r.

Yak-38.

Type set failed

Total:

* - The type of helicopter is definitely not installed.

Thus, the total amount of lost LA according to the author is more than 630, and not 440-450, as is given in official sources. This is due to the unacceptable loss of aviation of border troops in total losses - 62 helicopters (and according to the author of them more than 70), which in addition to the officially stated losses of 118 aircraft and 333 helicopters, gives a figure of 513 cars. The difference in 120 LA occurs because of different approaches to taking into account the lost LA: only combat only are given in official sources, and the author is taken into account by everything, incl. Destroyed on Earth and lost as a result of aviation accidents.

It is possible that due to the lack and distortion of information, the number of lost lae 630, but somewhat less (due to duplication of losses), but one thing can be said for sure: it significantly exceeds the officially stated 451 la.

Most likely, the point in the question of the numerical losses of La will put a complete opening of the archives of the war in Afghanistan, and while it remains to be content with what is already there. Therefore, there are fantastic data from foreign specialists, which, by the beginning of 1987, the USSR and aircraft Sun Dra lost about 1000 la (of which 800 - helicopters, including more than 250 Mi-24 helicopters, and about half of the machines were lost as a result of aviation Accidents that are not related to the conduct of combat operations). According to other data, about 500 Soviet helicopters were lost by October 1988. Another source appreciates the total losses of Soviet and Afghan aircraft in 1400 la. But this is just not reinforced by numbers, and most likely - with a propaganda tint. But we can only get this disinformation ourselves. And, preferably, before foreign colleagues, because it is a matter of our honor: to remember those who died there, all to one, and pray for the rest of their souls.

So, out of 70 Mi-8/17, set in the ACC for 1984 by 1986, 26 were destroyed, and 14 - sent to the USSR for repairs, and from the 16 Mi-25 377th helicopter regiment 10 were destroyed Time period. The total losses of Afghan aviation are estimated by 300 la specialists.

The interest of the Soviet Union, and then his successor, the Russian Federation, to Afghanistan has a very long history. In the middle of the XIX century, this mountainous country with a strongly rough terrain became an enea of \u200b\u200brivalry between the Russian Empire, who was trying to expand the scope of his influence and purchase a port on the shores of the Indian Ocean, and the British Empire, a determined to protect their interests in India. After World War II, the attention of the Soviet Union to this region increased significantly. Both Afghanistan and Iran had the border with the USSR with a length of several thousand kilometers and were buffer states against the hostile to the Soviet Union. The USSR back in 1925 began to assist the Royal Air Force of Afghanistan, and in the 50s. The XX century became for them the main supplier of military equipment.

In 1973, the monarchy in Afghanistan was overthrown, but the republican government who came to power led by General Mohammed Daudom continued to support friendly relations with Moscow. The country's armed forces were equipped with a new Soviet technology, which was purchased in large quantities. This was especially touched by the Air Force, where by the end of the 70s. There were more than 180 units of military equipment, including MiG-17 fighters, MiG-19 and MiG-21, SU-7BM attack aircraft and IL-28 bombers.

In April 1978, a military coup took place. Daud died, and in power there was a People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (NDPA) led by Mohammed HYP Taraki. Soon he was replaced by Hafizulyla Amin, which was educated in America and for this reason did not enjoy confidence in the USSR. In the country, land reform has proven to be held, which caused dissatisfaction with the wide segments of the population. The uprising broke out. On the side of the rebels, several army parts were switched. In March 1979, the rebel forces grew so much that they could even seize herats, a large city in the west of the country, where hundreds of government soldiers were executed, as well as about fifty Soviet advisers and their family members.

Preparations for the invasion

At this point in Afghanistan there were more than a thousand advisers from the USSR. Not wanting to continue to risk their lives, in the Soviet Union, they began planning an operation to enter their troops into this country, which was due to the plan of Soviet strategists to lead to stabilization of the internal political situation in Afghanistan. However, the fate of advisers was not the only factor that worried the USSR. The Soviet leadership was also seriously alarmed by the obvious revival of Muslim fundamentalism and wanted through the upcoming invasion to send unequivocal warnings to Iran and Pakistan. The General of the Army Epishev, in addition, signed an agreement with the then Afghan government, according to which Afghanistan, 100 T-62 tanks and 18 helicopters of fire support Mi-24 were supplied.

The further attacks of the rebels led to the fact that the USSR put another 18 Mi-24 helicopters of Kabul regime, including several fire support machines of the modification D. In December 1978, the Soviet-Afghan friendship agreement was signed. In September 1989, he was registered in UN in September 1989. According to this Covenant, in the event of a safety threat, any of the parties has received the right to intervention to eliminate such a threat. A few weeks before the start of the invasion, the Soviet command focused on air bases in Bagram and Shindande. Provided at his disposal, shock parts of up to 6,000 soldiers. In the period from December 24 to December 26, 1979, when all Western countries in political and militarily were powerless to undertake anything, the intensity of Soviet air transport increased dramatically. A total of about 300 flights of military transport aviation were noted.

On December 27, the Soviet special forces attacked the presidential palace in Kabul, and after the overthrow of the Amina, the former deputy Prime Minister Babolk Karmal was put in power, which before the invasion began in the link. At the same time, the 15-thousand Soviet group of troops began its promotion from the Soviet border to the depths of Afghanistan. It was covered with air fighters-bombers MiG-21 and helicopters of fire support Mi-24.

The Afghan representatives of the Islamic Movement of Fundamentalists had strong resistance in rural areas, declaring the Soviet troops of Jihad, "Sacred War". The United States began to secretly supply the rebels weapons. Initially, they organized the supply of Soviet-made weapons from Egypt.

As sometime, the British, and the Soviet military found that the territory of Afghanistan is simply impossible to control. Mujahideen, who acted with small groups, was easily refuge in mountainous terrain and distant valleys. Soviet bases and airfields scattered throughout the country were islands in a hostile world.

Soon the fighting was in a dead end. Soviet troops regularly conducted operations on cleaning some terrain from the rebels, however, as soon as they went back, the Mujahideen was returned again. Helicopters widely used the Soviet command as a means of fire support. Operations also took part in both fighters-bombers who were based in Afghanistan and distant bombers acting from the bases in the Soviet Union. A special tactic was developed, which was that mobile terrestrial forces kicked out the rebels on the open area, where helicopters destroyed them from the air.

The conditions for conducting hostilities of aviation in Afghanistan

70% of the territory of Afghanistan occupy mountains with poor vegetation. The height of the Hindukush mountain range is up to 6-7 thousand m. The depth of gorges reaches 3000 m, and the width of some of them is such that even a helicopter can unfold there. In the north of the country - plain, in the south and southwest - a large desert.

The races of the rocks and stones are extremely difficult to find the detection of terrestrial purposes.

8 months a year over Afghanistan is solar, hot weather. Temperature up to +50 degrees. But at this time it is possible to limit the flight weather due to dust storms and too high air temperature.

Mountains make it difficult to use ground RTS. The main way of aircraft is considered to be flights at the rate and time with constant leading control of the paths on visual landmarks. However, the monotony of the mining relief makes it difficult to orientation.

Airfields and seating areas are at a significant exceeding over sea level (up to 2500 m). This reduces the radius of the action of combat aviation and the time of being over the battlefield.

Military Transport Aviation in Afghanistan

Under conditions, when the movement of military columns on the roads was associated with a significant risk and demanded very strong efforts, the Soviet and Afghan troops were forced to use mainly transport aircraft as for the delivery of live strength and technology from the USSR to Afghanistan and for the redeployment of troops within the country . What is interesting, many Soviet transport aircraft flying to Afghanistan have carried the identification signs of Aeroflot, although they were piloted by WTO.

The main types of military transport aircraft used for the transport of troops and cargo in Afghanistan were An-22 "Antey", IL-76 and An-26.

An-22 was the largest transport aircraft of all that regular flights to Afghanistan were performed. However, the main part of transportation from the USSR to Afghanistan, and inside Afghanistan made a reactive IL-76. By the time of entering the troops to Afghanistan, the Soviet VTA was already mainly able to rearrange the data by these machines instead of turboprop AN-12. However, the An-12 also did not completely refuse.

Afghanistan Air Force possessed a small transport aviation that had in service with various types of aircraft. The most modern of them was An-26. Equipped with an auxiliary power plant located in the Motogondol, An-26 has proven itself in heat and highlands and turned out to be indispensable for small cargo transportation.

Military transport aviation (WTA) of the USSR Air Force began to be used to transfer goods to military airfields of Afghanistan in the pre-war period. At the airfield of Bagram, a helicopter squadron 280 OVP and a military transport squadron (detachment) of 10 An-12 aircraft were based on this time.

On December 25, 1979, at 18.00 local time a deposit on the air of the landing as part of the 103rd VDD and a separate PDP. In this operation, 55 WTO aircraft were involved. The length of the route was more than 2 thousand km, and several times the aircraft had to go in the mode of complete radio. Plane landing was made at the Kabul and Bagram airfields. 10-15 minutes was released on unloading.

The military transport aircraft was made 343 flight-flight, including 66 flights An-22, 77 - Il-76, 200 - An-12, spent only 47 hours. Thus, air transport delivered the first Soviet military units to Afghanistan with a total number of 7,700 people, with 894 units of combat technology. In addition to personnel and military equipment, 1062 tons of various goods were delivered. However, it was only 2% of the total amount of cargo, which had to deliver transport aviation to Afghanistan.

At the same time, VTA and paratroopers suffered the first losses in Afghanistan. On 19.35 on December 25, when entering the landing in Kabul, the IL-76 was exploded under the command of Captain Khaling V.V., on board which there were 37 paratroopers and 7 crews. On the morning of December 26, General Egorov on the helicopter from the squadron of the 280th OVP flew to the area of \u200b\u200bthe catastrophe. However, the search and rescue operation was not possible both due to weather conditions and due to the lack of necessary forces and means. Rasually caused climbers from the Army Sports Club, which trained in Central Asia. They were given weapons, 5 paratroopers gave as security, and sent to the fall of the fall. January 1, 1980, after three days of searches, a cabin of the aircraft with the body of the commander was discovered in the mountains. Most likely, the plane came across one of the mountain peaks, and broke in half ...

In subsequent combat actions, it was the daily work of military transport aviation to a large extent to the action of the entire limited contingent. It was performed monthly from 150 to 200 flights both within Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union and back. When preparing and during large-scale operations, the amount of WPT flights reached 400-500 per month. Crews continuously performed tasks for the supply of the contingent of Soviet troops with everything necessary not only for hostilities, but also for life. Parts of the WTO provided the front-line maneuver and army aviation. A significant share in the total volume of transport was also humanitarian goods intended for Afghans. The garrisons were regularly flying around and had seriously injured and patients with sanitary aircraft, which were converted to the mobilization plan. Passenger aircraft IL-18 were converted.

Flights for transportation were carried out, as a rule with limit load. Delivery of goods and ammunition by transport aviation was carried out at the bottom boundary of the cloudness of 1000 meters. However, this rule was often violated due to the requirements of a combat situation, and the most prepared carriages of the BT parts were full and at the bottom boundary of the cloud of 800, and even 600 meters.

In connection with the conversation about transport aviation, it is impossible not to mention the sinister symbol of the Afghan War - "Black Tulip". Thus called the AN-12 military transport aircraft used to transport coffins with the victims. In fact, this name went from the name of the funeral enterprise in Tashkent, producing coffins, upholstered zinc, especially for OCSV. Usually from eight to fifteen coffins usually downloaded from eight to fifteen coffins, accompanied this cargo officer from the division from where the dead or a close friend, who was in battle with the deceased friend. Having delivered the cargo to the union, they were passed on to the RivoNomates, from where the dead were called.

Total crews of only military transport aircraft fulfilled 27 thousand flight planes in Afghanistan (from them 14700 - in the context of countering the electronic airfall), transported more than 880 thousand personnel and about 430 thousand tons of various goods. More than 1,700 WTA military personnel are awarded orders and medals. During the war, the war is lost from the anti-aircraft fire of dubs and as a result of accidents 2 IL-76, 5 AN-26, 8 AN-12 and 1 AN-30. The favorite Tactic of the Mujahideen was to place anti-aircraft drugs near the Soviet airbase, and "pick up" aircraft on takeoff or landing. So, in February 1983, on the airfield of Jelalabad, an-12 shot down at the landing from CRCK, all crew members were killed. And in July of the same year over the same airfield on takeoff from DShK, another An-12 shot down. There were 8 people on board, they all died.

Front Aviation in Afghanistan

Fighter and fighter-bombarding aviation in Afghanistan solved the following tasks:

  • aviation support for troops, covering of transport columns and maintenance of ground troops in raid operations;
  • aviation strikes on the identified enemy objects;
  • cover of helicopter units;
  • the destruction of firepoints, reference points of the Mujahideen;
  • aerial reconnaissance;
  • covering the territory of the drive in the overall air defense system.

The majority of combat work during the Afghan war lay on the Air Force of the 40th Army (until 1980 - the 34th Aviation Corps). At different times, in the order of rotation of military units, six fighter aviation regiments were held through aircraft of the 40th army ( iAP), one assault aviation regiment ( chap), one separate assault aviation squadron ( oshae), one separate mixed aviation regiment ( oSAP), four fighter-bombarding aviation regiments ( ibap), eight separate helicopter aviation regiments ( ovap), eleven separate helicopter aviation squadrines ( ovae.).

The headquarters of the Air Force of the 40th Army was in Kabul. The main airfield of aviation was the airfields of Kabul, Kandahar and Bagram. The airfields had equipped from the USSR, which simplified the task of repair and maintenance on them Soviet aircraft. According to the memoirs of aviators, the living conditions there in the first winter were a real nightmare. We lived in tents and dugouts, somehow escaped from snow and cold rain. Clothes were not filmed for two weeks - she was still noticed to wash it. But over time, real towns have grown around the air bases, with power plants, boiler and water supply.

It must be said that at first after the insertion of OCSV, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the invasion of the Afghanistan troops of the US friendly countries of the Middle East, and even the United States themselves. Based on such a variant of the development of events, fighter aviation was needed. In the future, all fighters performed purely assault tasks - there were no aviation at the Mujahideen.

For the lesion of the living force, unprotected and easily-organized goals, one-time bombing cassettes (RBC), guns, Nurses C-5 and C-24 with non-contact radio drivers for undermining at an altitude of 15-30 m were used. For defeat protected, as well as exemplary purposes, fugasic and fragantic fugasal air bombs caliber 250-500 kg and NURS C-24 with contact fuse.

Stormware Su-25 - "Comb

The fighter grouping of aviation of the 40th Army in the first stage was represented by the MiG-21BIS aircraft - the last modification of the MiG-21. There were cars of two versions: in the usual configuration and with an additional kit of the RSBN near-navigation radio system. The latter significantly simplified flights in difficult conditions, making it possible around the clock declinealization and landing approach even with limited appliances. The approach to the instrumental way was allowed to a height of 50 m at any time of the day and in any meteo conditions. Another advantage of the MiG-21Bis was an increased flight range with a podium suspended tank (up to 1480 km) and increased opportunities for weight and arsenal of weapons (up to one and a half thousand bombs, 32-charged blocks UB-32, GS-23L gun). Thus, not a new MiG-21BIS for some parameters exceeded even more modern cars, such as MiG-23.

The older modification of the "twenty first" - MiG-21 PPM (in March 1980, the units armed with them were recalled and re-equipped with more modern MiG-21cm) as purely shock aircraft. As fighters, they no longer represented values, and shelling and bombing ground objects were still quite capable.

The first case of clients with the use of aviation occurred on January 9, 1980, the Afghan partisans successfully attacked the military column, which was sown from the massabad. Losses killed in the column were 42 people. Military aviation was caused. Airplanes worked in pairs, in turn, shot by Nurses a large number of hiking minjahidees and cavalry practically in open locality.

Already in February-March 1980, aviation was used by "Mightwall": fighter-bombers supported the promotion of motorized rifle parts, eliminating the foci of resistance of the Mujahideen. The first major operation of this kind was carried out in March in the province of Kunar. The reinforced motorized rifle regiment was supposed to go to the settlement of Asabad to release the garrison of government troops. The only way to the city was kept, mainly in mountainous cornices. Fighters-bombers supported the promotion of ground troops, however, small-sized firepoints were difficult to detect in the rocks, especially at high speed, and the strikes had to be applied mainly by squares. In combat orders of terrestrial troops, the aircaters themselves often could not determine where the fire was conducted. It was not without strikes in their units, but fortunately, there were no dead.

Another common method of combat work was reconnaissance-shock actions, in the surprise - "hunting". The bomber fighters conducted intelligence in the designated zones, and when they were detected, attacked them, having received pre-permission to use weapons.

Subsequently, more modern Soviet front fighters MiG-23ML / MLD were sent to Afghanistan. They, as well as MiG-21, were performed mainly terrestrial strikes (with the exception of rare clashes with Pakistan Air Force) and have proven itself very well.

The assault aircraft in Afghanistan was represented by SU-17 bombers and armored subsonic attack aircraft Su-25. The latter was especially good to be adapted for mining from the air. He was attracted for strikes on advanced targets, and to support troops. SU-25 also conducted independent reconnaissance and shock actions, hunting for caravans and places of parking of Afghan partisans. The combat load at the same time was chosen universal and included a pair of bombs or RBC caliber 250-500 kg and two UB-32 or B-8 blocks. Recognition of the merit of SU-25 was the fact that the ammunition came from the Union was primarily distributed in favor of these aircraft, as they gave the best result. Yes, and the airpars preferred to work with pure attack aircraft, and non-bomber fighters - armor and less speed allowed them to work on land targets of 600-1000 m (fighters from 2000-2500 m), with the minimum risk of "hooking" their. Airway supplies emphasized accuracy of attacks of attacks, the power of their blows and the ability to "point work".

But the fighter-bomber MiG-27D did not find wide use in Afghanistan. This aircraft was created for air operations in Western Europe, during which the deposition of shocks from small heights was envisaged. It was equipped with modern avionics, but turned out to be unnecessary in Afghanistan, where the advantage was used effective, simple and reliable aircraft.

The tactics of the action of impact aircraft depended on the combat situation, weather conditions, the characteristics of the target and combat task. As a rule, 4 groups have highlighted:

  • air defense suppression (2-4 fighter-bomber) - caught a punch of nurses or RBC in the goal area and on both sides of the combat course;
  • target designation (2 Mi-8 or a couple of aircraft) - marked the purpose of Nurses;
  • shock group (4-8 bombers) - to apply the main blow to the target;
  • a group of monitoring results (2 reconnaissance aircraft).

However, such a scheme was relevant rather for combat work on plain, where much space. In narrow gorges, one maximum powerful bombing assault strike was applied so that the enemy did not have time to disperse.

The following beam application techniques were used:

Punching with a pair - After detection of the goal, the host performed the coat with a sliding and a semi-ease, introduced a plane into dive, usually at an angle of 30-40 or more steep decrease. The height of the bombs and the lower limit of the output was determined by security conditions from fire fire, fragments of their own bombs and mountain relief features. The led before the attack lagged behind the lead, increasing the distance for the freedom of the maneuver and, having been aiming independently, after him, built a combat approach

"Carousel" is a more complex scheme in which aircraft enter for bombing with small blows, providing a continuous impact on the target. Required accurate calculation and consistency of action.

Bombing from converting - used to defeat goals with a known location, as a rule, square. Thus, it was possible to transfer bombs, for example, through a mountain range, remaining outside the zone of the air defense. Heat the decline in a canopy, the plane performed a slide with an angle of 25-30 o (or up to 45 o) with the bomb separation at the top point and turned aside. Bombs went up the trajectory, flying to the goal a few more kilometers

Night strike - a lead, finding a goal or focusing on its approximate location, resets the parachute light air bibles from a height of 2000-3000 m and in the next occasion causes a blow using 6-8 minutes of the backlight. Under the action of a pair slave, next to the safety conditions of the night flight with an interval of 2-3 minutes, attacks bombs, na or cannon fire from a common dive from a distance of 1500-2000 m. For secrecy, combat maneuvering was performed with the saber's torches, where the aircraft remained invisible In the dark.

Since 1984, front-line bombers Su-24 begin to engage in Afghanistan. These aircraft could carry 7,000 kg of bombing load, have a range of 2400 km, and could be used with airfields of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. A direct reason for their involvement of military action was planned for the spring-summer 1984. The grandiose offensive of the Soviet troops on Panjshhersk Valley is the stronghold of the famous field commander Ahmad Shah Masuda. In this operation, Su-24 was made carpeted bombing of the defensive positions of the Mujahideen on the way of following the Soviet troops. The bombardments were made from a height of 5000 m. However, they did not bring much success - partly because of too much speed of bomber and low efficiency of bombs (to destroy the global structure with thick walls, a direct hit was required), partly because Ahmad Shah Masood turned out in advance Your main forces from the valley.

Su-24 has established itself with a reliable machine, but its capabilities for anti-playing war were redundant. Nevertheless, where the total destruction of all living things was required, they coped best. Preference was given to powerful airbabers Fab-1500 in conjunction with RBC-500. The first lands were reached Fab-1500, destroying the walls of Duvalov, and RBC-500 was arrived behind them. The last in the explosion was given by hundreds of thousands of steel 5.5-mm balls, exchanging everything into the duct on an area of \u200b\u200b400 to 600 m. If the Mujahideen was hiding in "Zelenka", they turned them together with her.

Gradually, the increase in air defense of the Mujahideen led to the fact that at the end of the war Su-24 was forced to work with 7500-8000 m, respectively, the accuracy of the bombing was very approximate.

Su-24 worked in Afghanistan until the output of OCSV. In the days of the conclusion of the Soviet troops, the bombers "cut the tails", inflicting shutters on saladohange, Charikar Valley, districts from Kabul to Pyanja. Moreover, after the departure of the Soviet contingent, SU-24 for some time was ready to support the troops of Naibulla in the event of a direct threat of Kabul from the opposition. However, the storming of the city did not follow, and on March 6, the bombers were given "Fest".

During the Afghan war, the loss of Soviet shock aircraft turned out to be quite substantial: 21 MiG-21, 11 MiG-23, 34 Su-17 and Su-22 (export version of Su-17), 1 Su-24 (as a result of an accident), 36 Su-25, 2 Yak-28 and 1 Yak-38.

Far aviation

Far aviation in Afghanistan was represented by Tu-16 aircraft, Tu-22m2, and later the newest Tu-22m3 at that time. Far aviation aircraft were relocated from other regions of the Soviet Union closer to Afghanistan - at Hydabad airfields, Semipalatinsk, Mary and Mary-2.

The advantages of long aviation, due to which so powerful power attracted to combat work in Afghanistan, were as follows:

  • the ability to "cover" any point of Afghanistan with airfields at Soviet territory;
  • the possibility of using avia bombs caliber 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg.
  • independence from weather conditions;
  • more perfect than on front-line aircraft aircraft, navigation equipment;
  • invulnerability from the anti-aircraft fire of dubanov, since the flight and bombing was made at altitudes of about 10 km.

However, if the front-line bombers Su-24 were poorly suitable for the opposite war, the far aviation aircraft were created at all for these purposes. They are intended primarily for the crushing of strategic objects and the rear of the enemy, and partisans, as a rule, worn with them all their property and did not have a developed infrastructure.

The only case of combat use of long-term aviation is more or less for the purpose of the bombardment of a lazurite spear in the Jarma district, which was the economic basis of the power of Ahmad Shah Masuda. The bombing was carried out from a height of 10-12 thousand m, while the replica themselves were at an altitude of 6729 m above sea level. The impact of the bombing could not be established.

The next operation with the participation of long aviation has already mentioned the above attack on Panjscher in 1984 Tu-16 and Tu-22m2, as well as SU-24 bombers, could not realize their potential here. Their bombs of calibers 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg did not meet the tasks of the fight against living force - they appeared in the 1940s, as a means of combating large ships. Meanwhile, the radius of death of the shock wave of Fab-3000 did not exceed 39 m and even for Fab-9000 remained within 57 m.

Nevertheless, since 1986, distant aviation is again attracted to work in Afghanistan. This time its task was the destruction of the caves and other fortified Mujahideen objects. Often such shelters, being cut in a solid rock, withstood 500-kilographed air bombs. It was useful for large caliber airbones. A fugance blow caused cracking and college caves. Good results gave bombing on the slopes. The gathering of a huge mass of stones tightly poured the entrances to the caves, cut the few mountain trails, caused the collapse of the eaves. All this created additional difficulties for partisans.

In the fall of 1988, a separate group of long-distance aviation was created, the main task of which was the cover of parts derived from the dra. It included Tu-16 251-Gogv.Tbap from the White Church and two squadrons of Tu-22m3 from Poltava 185th GW.Tbap. At this time, the bombardment acquired the character of the counterweight of the increasing partisan activity, since the ground parts of the Soviet army have already begun to be output, and from the Afghan allies there was little sense. Kabul has already been constantly subjected to missile shelling from various groupings of Mujahideen, and for the answer they were attracted by the "Dalbargies". They bombarded the neighborhood of the city, paying special attention to the places from which the starts were noticed, but the effectiveness of combat work was low - the launchers were mounted, mainly on cars and quickly left from under strike. At the end of November 1988, Lazurite and Emerald Copper Masuda were again subjected to bombardment.

Far aviation aircraft worked under the cover of fighters. Fucked, first of all, Pakistani aviation. The use of Tu-22M3 thermal traps to distract Mujahideen rockets with infrared GSNs was ordinary practice. In combat orders of Tu-22m3, three aircraft Reb Tu-22PD also walked, whose task was to disrupt the possible start of Pakistani missiles CRPROC and, especially attacks F-16.

Since the beginning of February 1989, the departures were performed without accompanying Tu-22PD, since most of the goals were in the central regions, away from the border. The last combat departure of the crews of a separate group of long-distance aviation practically coincided with the moment of complete withdrawal of troops. February 14, when the border remained to cross only General Gromov with his escort, the Dolodskiy bombed the northern regions. The Afghan government insisted on the continuation of the long-term bombing of the long-range aviation as compensation for the departure of the 40th army, but did not go for it. Nevertheless, the "Dalbilodes" was detained at the Mary's airfield three weeks after the withdrawal of troops, in combat readiness "just in case," and left him only on March 13, 1989. During the war in Afghanistan, the far aviation managed to do without losses.

Helicopter war

According to the estimates of aircaters who worked in the combat orders of ground divisions, it was helicopters that had the highest efficiency in firing support. The use of helicopters allowed the Soviet command to respond quickly to the partisan tactics of the Mujahideen. Helicopters were used for fire support of ground divisions, harassment of the exhaust enemy, air patrolling of the terrain and maintenance of the autocolonne, landing of landings on key positions, supplying troops, salvation of shot down flyers and evacuation of seriously wounded. (True, in areas with exceeding the level of sea, over 2500-3000 m, helicopters have already worked at the limit of their capabilities, and Su-25 has provided fire support here).

Helicopters have become real flying tanks and armored personnel carriers who are not terrible was the most crossed terrain. That is why helicopters were priority goals for Fire Mujahideen. The favorite Tactic of the Mujahideen was to fly the helicopter over their disguised positions, and then open the fire after. In May 1980, for the first time appeared in the air of the Mi-24, armed with machine guns for shooting back.

Mi-24 - a combat helicopter with partly armored hull. In the basic version, weapons included a large-caliber machine gun for firing forward, blocks of the Nurses, and 4 Ptti of the Falanga-M complex. Subsequently was repeatedly modified. The most mass version was Mi-24B with a moving machine-gun unit with a four-rolled 12.7-mm machine gun of the YakB-12.7, 16 ptthi and weapons blocks with unmanaged aviation missiles (NA) of various types. Additionally, the helicopter could carry bombing weapons.

Mi-24 played a leading role in the Afghan War. By the end of the 1980s, the number of Mi-24 in the 40th army was brought to 251 units. In battle, Mi-24, as a rule, released a rocket from 1200-1500 m, and at a distance of 800-1000 m opened fire from the machine gun. Helicopter weapons were quite effective against the living force of the enemy: each warhead Nar C-8 provided a continuous defeat within a radius of 10-12 m, and the four-fluid machine gun gave a particularly powerful and accurate fire and punched a thickness to half a meter. To destroy fortified objects resistant to narcs, used airbabs caliber 250 and 500 kg or incendiary tanks by a 500 kg caliber.

In the first months, after entering the Soviet troops to enhance the helicopter support from the air to the Mi-24 helicopters, Mi-8 was added, and some of the cars were borrowed from the civil airline Aeroflot. Mi-8 did not have such a formidable firepower as Mi-24, but were indispensable in landing operations. They were most often attracted to ensure the delivery and evacuation of special forces groups during reconnaissance operations, raids, ambushes. By the way, in Afghanistan on the Mi-8 as a bortyman flew, afterwards the hero of Russia, Guard, Lieutenant Colonel of the Airborne Special Forces - the person is quite well known.

The volumes of everyday combat work carried out by helicopters are not amenable to any description. If in 1985, the average number of departures to one Su-25 was 216, and on the MiG-23 - 112, then the average of 360-400 flights accounted for one helicopter, and individual cars had the amount of departures for the year to thousands.

Hence the terrifying, compared with other types of aircraft, the number of losses - 333 cars, of which 28 heavy transport helicopters MI-6, 174 transport and combat MI-8 and 127 combat Mi-24, 4 Mi-9 and Mi-10. To this quantity should be added another 338 Mi-8/17 and Mi-25/35 Afghan army.

Many of these machines were not shot down directly with firejahedov fire, and their death looked like an accident. However, helicopter accidents occurred, mainly due to the access to the risky flight regimes in extreme battle conditions. For example, an attempt to escape from the shelling rockets on the "shaking" flight, as a result - a collision with the Earth.

Fortune defense Mujahideov

Afghan fighter with SPR "Stinger"

In the initial period of war, air defense of the Mujahideov was a manual small arms. In addition, they did not have a learning for shooting on flying aircraft. At first, the "Chinese method" was used, when the whole detachment opened a massive fire in front of the aircraft in the calculation that he would flush on the wall of the bullets.

But over time, the dusts got the DSHK large-caliber machine guns and 14,5-mm anti-aircraft municipal installations of the ZSU with a lesion range up to 2000 m. According to reports, the mountains literally "west", especially near the partisan bases and reference points. In 1985, the detachments of Ahmad Shah Masuda received the 30 20th Swiss anti-aircraft "Erlikon-Berle" with reaching 2000 m. Gradually, the Mujahidea learned how to build the air defense system around their bases, using a mountain terrain. The firepoints masked and broadcast so that when attacking one of them, a plane or helicopter fell under the shelling of others. Machines have become increasingly "briefing" bullets. Bidden damage was very serious.

In response, Soviet aviation on combat operations began to allocate special groups of air defense suppression of fighters with nar or RBC with balls or fragmentation equipment. At the same time, it was necessary to seek direct hits. The destruction of the calculation did not solve anything - other Mujaheds immediately rose to the place of those killed. Only the dismissal of the fire itself could make the firepoint "silence".

A further increase in airfares of the Mujahideen is associated with the saturation of their air defense CRCC of different types that came to Afghanistan in the neighbral paths. At first it was uncomplicated in the use of "arrows" and "edged ah". They did not require specially equipped positions, could be applied from cars and roofs of buildings, and even secretly delivered directly to the airfields. The first cases of the application of the CRCC were recorded in 1983, and since 1986 this phenomenon has become massive. The advantage of the CRK was also the fact that the undermining of a powerful BC rocket took the aircraft or a helicopter failure even without direct hit. The consequence of damage gained, as a rule, was the loss of the car.

In the fall of 1986, the Mujahideen appeared CRKK "Stinger", expanding the range of their air defense to 3500 m. From that moment on, the real brutal struggle for the air has unfolded. Soviet pilots had to forget about the flights "on shaking". Work with safe heights has become a survival condition. And all the same, aircraft have increasingly obtained serious battle damage, gibbles. The beggars were surprisingly a terrible enemy for Soviet aviation, not to mention the Air Force Air Force.

Incidents with Pakistan Air Force

Soviet presence in Afghanistan did not create problems for neighboring countries, with the exception of Pakistan, where it affected almost immediately and had far-reaching consequences. Thousands of refugees were poured across the border in Pakistan, among whom were Mujahideen. Having arranged in Pakistan the base, they made a raid against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The boundaries of the border were inevitable, since its line was defined very approximately, and the Soviet and Afghan allies were eager to apply a retaliatory strike. Sometimes the violations of the Pakistan-Afghan border were random, by ignorance, sometimes intentional, due to the requirements of the combat situation.

Initially, Pakistan Air Force showed restraint, especially since the relationship between the USSR and Pakistan was not very bad, and both sides acted on the "thin world better than good quarrel." Another reason for the "peace-loving" of Pakistan was an outdated fleet of fighter aircraft: Mirage-III and Chinese MiG-19 with small-range missiles did not have big chances to intercept Soviet aircraft.

Nevertheless, the situation has gradually begged, especially after several tragic incidents. So, in July 1981, the helicopters delivered a group of sappers to minimize the dries from Peshawar on the Jelalabad Road. As a result, those mistakenly minted the Pakistani region of the road, which led to victims.

Pakistan began to strengthen its northern border, throwing the Crotan Sprink there. Since January 1983, Pakistan Air Force received F-16 fighters that sharply strengthened their positions. In the end, it was decided that the Pakistan Air Force is obliged to respond to border disorders, and squadrons based in Peshaware and Camra were presented in a state of combat readiness. Despite the fact that since 1980, Pakistan fighters of interceptors had to take over alarm many times, only in May 1986 they first managed to impose an air battle.

Since that time on November 1988, F-16 from the composition of the 9th and 14th squadrons shot down seven intruder aircraft, one of which was classified as a likely violator. In the first battle, the commander of the 9th squadron kuadri shot down the Su-22 rocket AIM-9. The second violator was brought against fire from a 20-mm gun, but he was able to go towards the border and presumably fell or committed a forced landing in the Afghan territory. On March 30, 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Razzak shot down An-26. The latter performed the task of transporting cargo and personnel at the airfield of the host, located just 15 km from the Afghan border. The fact is that the host area turned out to be completely surrounded by Mujaheds, and held only thanks to the air bridge. Soviet aircraft that performed the tasks of the supply were forced to go to the border, and to substitute themselves under the blow. Subsequently, Pakistan stated that this aircraft "led reconnaissance".

However, on April 29 of the same year, Fortuna turned his back to Pakistanis, who lost one F-16 in battle with six Afghan aircraft. It is possible that this F-16 was shot down by his own lead, which then claimed that he destroyed the enemy car. Afghans returned home without losing a single aircraft.

On August 4, 1988, Major Bochari from the 14th squadron shot down the Soviet Su-25, who piloted Alexander Rutskaya, who later became the vice-president of Russia. On September 12 of the same year, his own combat account was opened by Captain Mahmoud from the 14th squadron, knocking down two MiG-23 fighters. On November 3, the same pilot knocked a fighter-bombarder SU-22.31 January 1989. All the same Makhmud was watched by the An-24, which he flew to the interception, crashed while trying to land. It was already the second An-24/26, shot down by that winter. The first transportalete was destroyed on the night from 20 to 21 November 1988, however, the Pakistani Air Force officially did not officially confirm this fact.

Soviet pilots knew about the constant danger emanating from the Pakistani side. Under the actions of shock groups in the border areas, a pair of MiG-23MLD, armed with missiles and entrepreneurs of PTB-800, was necessarily sent. Fighters carried two R-24P rockets and two R-60, combining weapons for long and near maneuverable battle. In addition to rockets, it is mandatory for a complete ammunition for a cannon. The cover was carried out by falling down in the air with duty in zones at the most likely directions of the opponent's attack.

According to some reports, Soviet aircraft managed to bring down several Pakistani fighters, in particular the case is given when MiG-23Mld knocked down one F-16.

Supply OCSV and raising Taliban

By August 1988, 50% of the Soviet military contingent returned to the USSR. Fully withdrawal of all Soviet troops was completed in February 1989

However, the care of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan did not lead to the end of hostilities. Various rebel groupings began to fight not only with the Kabul regime, but also among themselves, as a result of which the Government of Naddjibuly lasted in power for another three years, which surprised many. This is partly explained by the fact that the former communists divided power with the strongest of all grouping of the Mujahideen.

In April 1992, the president of Nadzhibul was finally overthrown, and the Islamic regime headed by President Rabbani was established in the country. The Minister of Defense in his government was appointed Masud, who began fighting against the forces of the Motion "Patan Hezb-E-Islami", headed by the former Prime Minister Gulbeddin Hecmatiir.

To prevent Heekmatius to capture power, Masood has entered into an alliance with General Abdul Rashid Dstum. The latter controlled the province in the north of the country with the center in the city of Mazar-Sharif, and earlier he served in the army of the Communist Kabul government.

The Air Force of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was influenced by Islamization and cleaning. Air bases were under control of various groups. Kabul and Bagram base bases became the bones of Masud Air Force, Shindand and Jelalabad moved to Hematia, and Mazar-Sharif to the dustum. The situation was complicated by tribal straightenings, often taken the form of armed conflict.

The basis of the power of Hecmatira was the camps of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and it was from there in 1994 a new, much stronger threat appeared.

The Islamic police of the Taliban consisted mainly of religious students - followers of the fundamentalist teaching Mullah Mohammed Omar. Speculating on hostility of various warring groups, the Taliban quickly enlisted the support of the wide masses of the population and took control of extensive areas in the south of the country.

The fierce struggle continued until September 28, 1996, when Taliban's forces were captured, finally, Kabul. Then it seemed that the capture of the fundamentalists of the North of the country was already solved and this is just a matter of time. However, the Taliban pushed many of his former supporters from himself, primarily an exceptionally strict interpretation of Islamic laws. Taking advantage of this, Ahmad Shah Masood united around himself a significant part of the units of former Mujahideen and struck a strong blow, throwing the troops of the Taliban to Kabul.

The combat readiness of the Air Force Parts, which came under the control of various communal groups, fell to a very low level. Only transport aircraft and helicopters rose in the air. In 1995, several fighters of the Afghan Air Force were shot down and at least three SU-20 bomber fighters owned by the Mujaughnes, one of whom was destroyed by the "MiG" of the Afghan Air Force. Also, the Taliban lost a few helicopters.

With the departure of the Soviet Army, the war did not end, she moved to a new stage ...

Dangerous Sky of Afghanistan [Experience of combat use of Soviet aviation in Local War, 1979-1989] Zhirohov Mikhail Alexandrovich

Military Transport Aviation

Military Transport Aviation

Against the background of quite numerous articles on combat aviation in Afghanistan, the experience of using transport aviation in this war remained in the shade. Nevertheless, for Soviet transport aviation, this war has become a serious test.

The role of military transport aircraft in Afghanistan was simply invaluable and increased from year to year. This was primarily due to the peculiarity of the country's geographical position, almost complete lack of railways and constantly intensifying the opposition of rebels when the ground columns move.

Transport aviation in the dub solved the following tasks:

Air transport;

Management and relay;

Aerial view of the terrain;

Evacuation of wounded and patients.

With an increase in air traffic intensity, an airfield network of Afghanistan was expanded, which could land transport aircraft. By 1987, it was the following airfields:

1. Kabul, Kandahar, Bagram, Shindand, Mazar-Sharif, having a concrete or asphalt concrete covering of a runway 3000-3500 m.

2. Kunduz, Jelalabad, who had an asphalt WFP coating of 1500-1800 m.

3. Aizabad, Gardes, Host, Lashkaryg, Zaranj, Chagchargang, Herat, who had groundwalls.

With the appearance of the rebels in the commodity quantities, the PZRK flights over the territory of the Dr. Airplanes of transport aviation was performed at the heights of 7600-10,000 m.

The peculiarity of the transport of troops (passengers) was that during flights on board, parachutes were delivered by the number of passengers. 40 km before the flight of the border of the Drive from the territory of the USSR the crew and passengers put on a parachute system in which they were up to landing.

The duty of the onboard equipment and the mechanics of the aircraft included the adjustment of the parachute system of passengers, as well as instructing the rule and order of leaving the aircraft.

The response of air defense also led to an increase in the number of air corridors (so, when changing the conditions of the current situation on a team with KP or by decision of the crew commander, there was a replacement of the aircraft's route to the backup).

The method of landing for all Afghan airfields was the same, except for the Kabul airfield, and included the following mandatory elements. The approach to the airfield was carried out at the maximum echelons (but not lower than 7600 m). For 50 km on the RP airport aerodrome, the crew occupied a height of 6700 m. From the turn of 50 km. Exit to the end of the airfield of the airfield in PMU, and SMU - on the drive, was carried out at an altitude of 6400 m. 20 km to the airfield of the crew released chassis and flaps in Running position, and 1 km - to the landing. The construction of a maneuver for a landing approach was carried out by the "two reversal of 180 degrees". The decrease in the aircraft was made with a vertical speed of 15 m / s. For the first approach, the height of up to 4300 m was lost. The reversals were carried out with a roll of 30 degrees. Before the start of the second navigation, in the horizontal flight over the runway at 4300 m, the pressure of the airfield or the WFP threshold and the further decrease was made by the pressure of the airfield.

When decreasing from a height from 4300 to 1500 m, the crew was performed by shooting the thermal traps of the CDS in the first mode - on one trap from the right and left side of the aircraft. From a height from 1500 to 900 m in the second mode - two traps, and from a height of 900 to 200 m, a shooting of ASO-2B traps was taken.

A feature of the take-off and a set of secure echelon at the TRA airfield was the fact that the crews used the take-off mode of operation of the engines as possible, which led to premature development of the resource of the engines.

A set of secure echelon, a decrease and landing approach occurred in the protected area of \u200b\u200bthe airfield, the radius of which was 15 km.

Afghanistan also widely used flights of transport aircraft at night. In this case, it was taken into account that the experience of applying the rebels of the air defense agents was practically not. In addition, in the middle of the night, the possible start of the PZRK by the aircraft is visually easier than the day, and in the initial stage of launch, which made it possible to use the aircraft tools of the type of KDS or ASO-2B in a timely manner.

Clear thing that such departures demanded a certain experience and interaction of crew members. Therefore, as a rule, most of the VTO crews necessarily carried with an instructor on board at night at specific airfields to familiarize themselves with the location and visibility of light landmarks in the area of \u200b\u200bthe airfield, the singularities of entering and planting at night.

Such a practice was introduced after the Tu-134 crew, which transported the governing staff of the 40th Army from the Schindand airfield at the Kabul airfield, ran away from the flight route and the city of Peshawar on the territory of Pakistan accepted for Kabul. In this case, only a clear management on the part of the KP stopped the intersection of the state border of the neighboring state.

In another case, the An-26 crew, which served flights along the route Kabul - Zaranj at the twilight time, dreamed from the route and landed at the Iranian airfield. The crew of the 50th OSAP flew in Afghanistan for less than a month and driving the equipment of the Pub. Began to destroy blocks. Navigator - Lieutenant from the cubes - shot himself, not to get in captivity. After capturing the aircraft Iranians, the crew was interviewed. After two-week negotiations on the Midth, the plane and crew returned (took their civil tu-154). The crew commander was expelled from the party, removed from the flight work, however, then restored.

In order to increase the transportation in Afghanistan, except for the Turkwo Air Force and the 40th Army, other parts of the USSR WTO were attracted (delivered personal composition, ammunition and food). The crews of the IL-76 carried out carriage only during the airfields of Kabul, Kandahar and Shidand (at the same time, the cars were left out of the threat of shelling from the rebel). At the same time there was a bottleneck and unloading of goods.

All other transportation on the TRA airfields carried out the Turkway Air Force and the 40th Army, exploited by An-12 and An-26.

Until 1985, in addition to the tasks of transportation, the Air Force of the Air Force solved the task of mailing delivery to the territory of the drive on the An-12 aircraft. When re-equipment of individual WTO regiments on IL-76 aircraft, the mail delivery task was assigned to Turkvo Air Force.

Interestingly, at different stages of war, transport An-26 used as bombers. That's what Colonel-General Vitaly Egorovich Pavlov, Hero of the Soviet Union, was recalled, the Hero of the Soviet Union, a compartment of the 50th OSAP: "In 1982, we at the An-26 In addition to relay, except for the export from the airfields of patients, we were injured in Kabul or Tashkent 26 Put pylons and hang bombs. What did they like us? First, climbed to height. By this time I was already flying myself to the An-26 in full. They rose and dumped around 6000-7000 m. We went to 6000 m, and there are no 7000 m. An-26 almost with us in combat orders can go, we have the same speeds almost. It holds the speed of 300, and we are 250 somewhere. He overtakes us, we give him a team - he resets the lighting bombs. And all the gorge burns. They are decreasing 12-15 minutes on parachutes. In the afternoon, if the dresses were squeezed, they cannot be determined. They covered the drums as a stone. And when the plane is buzzing - they can run in panic. They start shooting it, and we are already here. We begin where they are, and then beat. "

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Soviet pilots were drawn into Afghan war in fact before the official date of its beginning December 25, 1979. The fact is that aircraft of military transport aviation delivered military goods to all airfields of Afghanistan since 1977

However, the autumn of 1979 was especially intense flights. As the adviser to the head of communication troops and the Republic of Air Force and air defense of the DRA (1980-1981), Polkovnik Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko, "In October 1979, the Kabuli airfields were frequent. More often it was IL-76, less often An-22. They flew several sides of the day and, quickly unloading, flew. In the usual mode, the Kabuli Airport could receive aircraft only during the day.

But in October and especially in November and at night there were ten and even twenty IL-76 at night at Kabul. Airplanes were freed from the shipment and flew before dawn. What they brought, "disappeared" from the airport, too, before dawn.

Foreign correspondents accredited in Kabul, unsuccessfully tried to reveal the essence of night traffic. For response to their numerous questions, the Afghan Foreign Ministry spent almost daily press conferences and briefings, on which the regular questions about the night transportation of Soviet aviation answered that in the Bagram ("as you, gentlemen, you know") a group of transport aircraft of the GVF USSR (on An-12 sides really attended the identification signs of Aeroflot). In the afternoon, they are transporting various goods to our applications, and at night they work educational tasks put on Afghan pilots to acquire the appropriate flight qualifications. It is mostly night ups and landing, so it seems that a lot of aircraft arrive. "

The general statistics of the departures will be given at the moment, it is not possible, I will give the chronicle of flights of Soviet transport aircraft to Afghan airfields only a few days of March 1979:



And besides, by December 1979 there were aircraft parts that were based directly on the territory of Afghanistan: so, a helicopter squadron from the composition of the 280th OVP (the commander - Lieutenant Colonel of Belov) and the 224th separate Detachment of MGA were based on the Bagram airfield Eight An-12 (commander - Colonel of Ishmuratov) 2
In fact, the unit was supplied with crews and technique from the WTO regiments and performed the functions of an advisor squadron. The squad was in Afghanistan from August 1979 to November 1988

These parts and the nature of their actions are known extremely few. Collected the fragmented information, the following can be argued: The Belova Group itself consisted of the servicemen of the 280-nm Army Aviation Aviation of the USSR Air Force, which was based on the Kagan airfield. The group was selected on a voluntary basis the most prepared crews, and the preference was given to pilots who had experience in the Pamire.

As part of the preparation for the search for a squadron into Afghanistan, 12 helicopters have painted the stars and homemade stencils caused the identification signs of the DRA Air Force. At the same time, the crews changed regular outfit on overalls and civilian clothes.

On August 23, 1979, the group flew from the kagan to its move and after five hours the flight landed at the Bagram airbase. In parallel, 24 flights of the An-12 and 4 flights - IL-76 were completed for the delivery of technical property. Initially, the direct participation of Soviet helicopters in combat operations was originated, but the main military adviser (which, in fact, was subordinate to the squadron) was almost immediately imposed a ban on the participation of squadron pilots in hostilities. Moreover, the Soviet crews were prescribed to even refrain from the return fire during the fulfillment of their tasks.

The primary tasks were identified: delivery of goods, personnel, food in Gardenes and Shindand, and most importantly - "government transportation". One helicopter was constantly ready to provide possible search and rescue work. In addition to Bagrama, individual crews were periodically on duty in the centers of provinces and in Kabul.

The Afghan leadership estimated the work of the transport heeling squadron in his own way and tried to take it also by the transportation of national economic cargo. At the same time, as some researchers of Afghan issues say, the squadron has become a tool in a large-scale political and economic game. The fact is that military assistance to Afghanistan the USSR provided practically free. However, other economic agreements existed, the successor of the post-revolutionary Afghanistan remained. So, for the supply of Gaza USSR owed Afghanistan, according to various estimates, from 270 to 500 million US dollars. But Afghanistan did not go to the repayment of this debt due to military supplies from the USSR. Afghanistan offered to buy a batch of Mi-8 along the line of Aviaxport, and the real settlement was assumed for the supplied cars and spare parts for them. The Afghan guide refused, having such a help, as a free Squadron Mi-8 with Soviet crews and service. Then the Soviet leadership gave an order to send a squadron to his homeland and began to implement the plan. It made the Afghans forced. But after that, they insisted on the use of reliable Soviet equipment with even more reliable crews.

It is also worth saying that Soviet pilots at the end of 1979 in Afghanistan had more than enough: on intergovernmental agreements, in all Afghan aviation union (levels to the squadron) were Soviet military specialists.

Advisors - senior teams of the Air Force and Air Fwells in the period 1978-1979. Worked: Major General Aviation OG Orlov, Major General Aviation A.G. Arushetian, Colonel N.D. Orlov, Colonel N.G. Berdichevsky, Colonel E.I. Mishoustin, Major V.A. Pekroin, Lieutenant Colonel V.D. Stadnichenko, Colonel A.I. Bedniks.

In addition, in the main headquarters of the Air Force and air defense of the DRA during this period, they worked: Major General Aviation A.A. Egorov, Polkovnikov E.N. Kuznetsov, P.M. Kopachev, N.P. Kozin, O.S. Savrashenko, Yu.V. Rodowaev, V.P. Anhin, I.I. Nesterenko, A.I. Uvarov et al.

Another little-known fact is interesting: immediately before entering the Soviet contingent at the airfield Bagram arrived after the overhaul of Afghan aircraft, which were distilled by Soviet crews. These pilots were not at all accidentally detained - in order to take direct participation in hostilities.

In the first days of December 1979, the USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov brought to the leadership of the General Staff of the information that in the near future may be adopted a political decision on the direction of the Soviet troops to Afghanistan in the amount of up to 75 thousand people.

On December 25, 1979, at 6:00 pm local time began a transfer of airborne troops on the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. Thus, for the transfer of personnel and technology, the 103rd VDD and a separate parachute regiment was made 343 flight-flights, including 66 Routes of An-22, 77 - IL-76 and 200 - An-12. In total, both aerodrome were delivered 7,700 personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1062 tons of various goods.

Here's how, for example, I described the events in the Kabul airport of the Soviet adviser Polkovnik Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko: "Il-76 aircraft landed with equal intervals, folded on the tracks and still lowered the ramps, revealed all hatches. In short-term stops, paratroopers were poured out of the working engines from the field of sides and popped out from 1 to 3 BMD, artillery guns and other techniques were rolled out. The aircraft drilled further and as the WFP was released and left for a new personnel and technique. "

As for the aviation grouping of the invasion, it was created by mid-March 1980, taking into account the deployment and conduct of hostilities by the general public compounds and units on the separated operational directions.

Naturally, the basis for the basing of aviation parts was the airfield network of the Air Force of Afghanistan, which provided if necessary, carrying out aviation regrouping in order to increase its efforts in certain directions.

According to military intelligence, before entering the OCSV, the country's airfield network was as follows: "There are 28 airfields on the territory of Afghanistan, including 9 with capital running and landing strips (runway), 8 of them are suitable for the basing of tactical aviation, their calculated operational capacity was 120-160 aircraft. The largest airfields - Bagram, Kabul (Khoja-Revash), Kandahar, Herat and Shindand (Sezbevar). Airfields Kabul and Kandahar refer to the category of international. All these airfields are equipped with 1-2 capital WFP wide mainly 45 m, taxi tracks and group concrete planes of aircraft. At these airfields there are warehouses for various purposes, hangars, service and residential buildings. Shelters for aircraft from protective walls are built only at the airfield of Bagram.

Ground aerodromes are used mainly by civil aviation. As spare airfields for the basing of tactical aircraft aircraft, 6 soil airfields can be used - in Dehdadi, Lashkaryah, Matun, Kandahar, Firebad and Chagacharan. Airfields with an WFP less than 1800 m are used by light aircraft aircraft. The constant basing of the Air Force (Air Force) is carried out on the most equipped airfields: Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar Sharif and Shindand. The main means of radio navigation equipment of the territory of Afghanistan are second-rack radio beacons, which are available on 11 airfields. Kabul airfields (Khoja-Revash) and Kandahar have, in addition, the low-speed radio navigation system. The length of international airlines in the country is over 2 thousand km. Air transport is carried out by one National Airline Bakhtar Afghan Erostez, which serves both domestic and international airlines. 3
"Afghans" Donetskins. Donetsk: LLC "IPP" Promin ", 2010. P. 495.

Thus, at the time of entering the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the airfields were a bit, and with an increase in the aviation component, almost immediately the question of the construction of new airfields was aroused. In the shortest possible time, several sets of metal airfield coating from K-1D plates for creating strips and halters were brought.

The Turkway Airfield Airfield Service was able to bring to mind the country's airfield network - by the mid-1985 Soviet parts were built or significantly converted seven Afghan airfields: Herat, Shindand, Farns, Kandahar, Kabul International Airport, Bagram and Jalalabad. Airfields in Mazar-Sharif, Kunduze, Ganzi and Paul and Shakry did not have strategic importance and were reconstructed to a much lesser extent.

Thus, during the war in Afghanistan, eleven airfields were able to provide round-the-clock flights of reactive aviation in any weather conditions, however, Jelalabad was used only by helicopters.

The key to the basing of Soviet aviation was the base in the Bagram (the largest number of Soviet aircraft and helicopters were based) and Shindande (here, among other things, the repair and maintenance of aircraft technicians were repaired). From these airfields made combat departures predominantly SU-25 attack aircraft and fighters MiG-23.

The airfields of the Soviet aviation airfields were additionally established radio-media navigation and communications, combined teams were established on the management of flights, combat management, and the air traffic of Soviet and Afghan aviation over the territory of Afghanistan.

Soviet aircraft, together with Afghans, were based on four airfields (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar), on four airfields were found separately Soviet (Kunduz, Firebad and Jalalabad) and Afghan (Mazar-Sharif) part.

With aviation regrouping in the interests of the upcoming operations, practically all had airfields were jointly based on Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters. To enhance the protection and defense of the airfields, each of them was allocated by one motorized rifle (less often - parachute-landing) battalion.

The general staffing composition of the Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 2) initially included two aircraft shelf and one separate squadron, one mixed aviation and three separate helicopter regiment, three separate helicopter squadrons and one helicopter detachment. There are only 60 combat aircraft and 19 military transport aircraft, 253 combat and combat helicopters. Taking into account the physico-geographical conditions and dislocation of the combined-arms and individual parts of the 40th Army and the aircraft groups assigned to them, the Aviation Group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40-y) was divided into four groups: "North", "Center", " South "and" West ".

The combat composition of the Air Force of the 40th Army at 2.01.1980


Sometimes during large operations, individual aviation units from these groups were attracted to actions in other areas, however, planning the fighting, they tried to avoid due to the difficulties of aviation regrouping. "Worked" in the sky of Afghanistan, intelligence aircraft, bombers from far aviation. A lot was at the Afghan airfields and sanitary aircraft, the IL-18 from the Ural aircraft carriers of the civil air fleet were converted to which by mobilization plan.

With relocation to Afghanistan fighters and fighters-bomber at the airfields of Bagram (115th Guards IAP), Kandahar (136th apibration) and Shindand (217th apibration, then the squadron 136) was introduced by combat duty of Soviet aircraft in the general system Afghanistan air defense.

Already when entering the troops to Afghanistan, Soviet aviation suffered its first loss - December 25, 1979, IL-76 crashed with paratroopers on board.

Flying in the top three IL-76M from the composition of the 128th Guards VTAP (commander - Captain V. V. Gol Ovchin) When building a landing at the airport, Kabul ran into a mountain. The black box failed to find, as the plane fell high in the mountains in a hard-to-reach place. Rather, the cabin with the crew was on the other side of the ridge, where else could be reached, and the remains of pilots with great difficulty, but got it. And the salon, where there were 34 paratroopers and techniques, fell into an inaccessible gorge, and only in September 2006 they managed to find them.

Immediately after the fall of the aircraft, the military tried to get to the disaster site. About how it was difficult, the preserved records of search and rescue work are told:

"12/26/1979. When performing a landing maneuver, an IL-76 aircraft crashed with crew, paratroopers and appliances on board. He crashed into one of the vertices surrounding the Kabul airfield. As a result, 7 people of the crew and 34 paratroopers were killed.

12.27.1979. In the morning, Major General Egorov A.A. I flew at the Mi-8 helicopter to the alleged area of \u200b\u200bthe catastrophe, but did not find the exact place of fall due to heavy snowfall.

12/28/1979. The head of the operational group of military transport aviation caused a group of CSKA climbers, which were trained in Tian-Shan. For them, it was a complete surprise, and they very much regretted that they had no helicopter with them, whose crew was trained for landings and rescue work in the mountains. All climbers in bright down jackets are noticeably allocated among the gray-green mass of troops.

12/30/1979. 8 climbers planted on the mountain, 2 aviation engineers and 5 paratroopers. There is an agreement with a hospital about the transport of bodies who died in the aviation catastrophe in the morgue.

At 16.00, the Mi-8 helicopter discovered the ridge of the mountain at the IL-76 strike place, one part of the aircraft on one side, the other - on the other side of the ridge. The most interesting parts are on the opposite side of the slope on which the climbers tent is installed.

01/01/1980. At 10.30, climbers found the IL-76 cabin with the remains of the Body Shishov - Assistant Commander of the Ship ... " 4
Ablazov V.I. Above all Afghanistan cloudless sky. Kiev, 2005. P. 116.

Interesting details about these tragic events in their interview with journalists of the Russian service of the BBC, the head of the Alpinist Group Yervand Ilyinsky shared 5
And E. - Head coach of the national team of Kazakhstan on mountaineering and honored coach of the USSR.

: "Once, at the end of December 1979, a phone call rang in Alma-Ata.

Called from Moscow. The conversation was short - reported that it was necessary to urgently fly out in Dushanbe, at some rescue work at an altitude of up to six thousand meters, the fourth category of complexity. I was told to gather a group and take idle there.<…> On the upcoming war, then no one else knew - the Soviet leadership announced the entry of troops to Afghanistan only the next day.

When landing, we stick to persons to the portholes. The runway was a solid, surrounded by Soviet military tents, and right around the perimeter stood BMD - the martial cars of the landing machine.

We were surprised, but accepted such a cluster in Afghanistan of Soviet troops just for some kind of teachings.<…> On the morning of December 27, we finally told about the upcoming operation, about the aircraft fell in the mountains, dead paratroopers and portfolios with documentation.<…>

After that, we went to the foothill Gindukusha. The road was going through the numerous villages, and I had a strange impression that the war was war, and lunch lunch - somewhere, someone fought, and in the villages, life was going on.

Later we moved to the helicopter, which delivered us directly to the crash site, which was at an altitude of 4,200 meters. The snow was very deep, the helicopter could not land and hung in the air, and we jumped down down meters from two or three.

We were ordered to look for the bodies of the dead and collect their documents than we and were engaged in several days. There were not body, but fragments of the bodies - after all, the plane crashed into a rock at speeds of about 500 km / h. In addition, shells were scattered around - we went like a minefield. There, in the snow, among mines and human remains, we met a new one, 1980.

On the morning of January 1, one of ours found a black leather portfolio and handed it to the authorities. After that, the work began to roll. "

Aviation use during the war

At the first stage of war on combat activities of the aviation grouping in Afghanistan, the shortcomings in the logistics of troops seriously affected. Often on bare stones, in the deserted terrain, pilots and technicians have to equip landing platforms, parking for aviation and special equipment, together with parts and units of the ground forces to organize their protection and defense. Due to the fact that the preparation for the entry of troops in Afghanistan was performed, the troops were not ready for war in many ways. The rear, food, broad, domestic security had many problems: so, lacked elementary spare parts, there were no lights and special equipment for repairing aircraft and helicopters in the field.

According to one of the pilots of An-12 Viktor Viktorovich Istratova: "The provision of flights in the part was nicudual. Suffice it to say that linen we were erased by yourself, the elementary souls in the module was absent. Saved the bathrooms and the famous "Buchila" in the end of the 31st strip in Jalalabad. I remember constantly hot compote in the flight dining room. Amazing care for the health of pilots - so that the throat does not get sick. Prepared disgustingly. Constantly there was a stew. "

Such uncomfortable was the reason for the spread of infectious diseases. Only the hepatitis virus in the troops of the 40th Army for the first year of stay in Afghanistan had 17 thousand people, of which 280 people of flight and 291 people of engineering and technical composition. Sources of water in the country had greater infection, actually water without consumersion was almost unsuitable for use.

Another major problem at the first stage was the preparation of flights. In the early years of war, during the selection of aviation personnel, a superficial approach to their business and moral qualities was often allowed to fulfill the combat missions in Afghanistan, which was affected by military discipline and respect for law enforcement. So, for drunkenness and smuggling during the first four years from Afghanistan, 346 officers and 495 ensigns were early for the first time.

Experience quickly suggested the need to create a special qualifying commission, which was entrusted with the tasks of studying the moral and psychological qualities of the military personnel in the Air Force, their health status, the level of training in the specialty. In parallel, the same commission was an explanatory work regarding the features of the residence of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan.

At the same time, traditional methods, forms and means of peacetime, such as are: political classes, polythephsis, political officers, conversations and lectures.

However, after decades, after the end of the war, it is still necessary to recognize that political workers failed to explain to the end, which was the international duty in Afghanistan. Apparently, they themselves did not all understand due to the lack of complete and objective information, clear explanations of the party-political bodies. Polymatot workers, like everyone, performed international debt, mastering the main form of party-political work of the Times of the Great Patriotic War - a personal example. Very often during the fighting with the death or injury of the commander, the deputies took command of themselves.

It is also important that the political workers did not study such disciplines as sociology, psychology, psychodiagnostics or psychoanalysis in Soviet times. It was believed that the "Moral Code of the Communism Builder", adopted in 1961. The XXII CPSU Congress will ensure the political and moral qualities of military personnel when performing international debt.

Systematic approach Work with personnel acquired after the entry of the directive of the commander of the Turkestan Military District. In accordance with its requirements, the commanders were prepared not only on the basis of an individual and differentiated approach, but also applied stepwise training in the district, army, parts and divisions.

The practice of implementing planned replacements in the compositions of the Afghan regiments was that helicopter squadrons were sent from the regiments in the Union in Afghanistan, the links. That is, the regiment deployed in Afghanistan, carried one unchanged number, but his squadron could belong to various regiments and at the end of the timeline returned to their parts. In the same scheme, planned replacements occurred in separate helicopter squaders. Dowcompleting units with individual crews was carried out in the case of combat losses or single substitutions.

At the same time, an aircraft training system was developed to replace into Afghanistan. Until 1986, the flight composition was prepared for replacement in two stages in the places of permanent basing and precomposition at the airfields of Afghanistan directly in the fighting area. For example, a short predeport (usually it was a week) for the pilots of army aviation was given at the airfield of Kagan.

After organizing the 1038th Center for the preparation of the flight composition, preparations for replacement in part, stationed at the airfields of Afghanistan, was carried out in three stages, each of which consisted of theoretical and flight training.

The first stage was carried out at the airfields of permanent base, the second stage - in the 1038th TsPLS at the airfield of Chirchik and the Chirchik-Mountain Polygon, the third stage - at the airfields of Afghanistan.

Such preparation was extremely necessary, as landings and upshots with high-mountain or dusty sites, at high temperatures are one of the most complex elements in flight preparation of the pilot helicopter. This is what he remembers this hero of the Soviet Union, the test pilot of Vasily Petrovich Khoshenko: "The engines, throwing out hot gases from the heat pipes, spinning the carrier screw. The carrying screw drops down hot air and mixes it with hot gases coming from the engines. This mixture, dropping to the ground, spreads to the sides, raises dust, and then rises up and gets into the screw. Around the helicopter is formed so dense shine from air, hot gases and dust, which even before takeoff, the helicopter is in a downward flow of air. Climb vertically up a helicopter with heavy load can not, for this not enough for many thousands of horsepower. "

As a result of the passage of the progress program in special centers, the flight composition was generally ready to conduct hostilities using new tactical techniques in the context of the Republic of Afghanistan. In the process of precomposition, the commander of the parts determined the composition of the standard groups of various tactical purposes on the basis of the individual characteristics of each pilot. The flight composition, which did not master the progress program with good quality, was submitted to his parts. With such a methodology for the preparation of the flight composition, the number of combat and non-nebatic losses significantly reduced.

The system of targeted training of aviation frames to combat actions as a whole is justified - the personnel included in the fighting is mainly more or less prepared in technical, tactical and moral and psychological relations.

Nevertheless, two or three months of combat work was required, the quality of the piloting technique, tactical thinking and combat use of flights was noticeably increased. Thus, the accuracy of bombing at pilots with excellent training on arrival in Afghanistan was 60 meters, with a good - 90 m and with satisfactory - 130 m. After the expiration of the adaptation period, it dropped more than doubled, significantly increased the number of direct hits. In about the same progression, the results of the use of unmanaged missiles and rifle-cannon weapons grew.

A feature in the activity of the flight composition was also the fact that the pilots immediately had to comprehend all the fighting capabilities of their helicopters. The fact that yesterday in peaceful conditions was considered impossible and unacceptable, here became the norm. Such a norm during the war in Afghanistan steel was reversed with a roll of 45 degrees and more, combat use of all types of lesions on recovery angles at 30 degrees and more, unique landings of helicopters on the cornices of mountains at three or more than a thousand meters, evacuation of patients and wounded from Inaccessible places, delivery of oversized cargo on the outer suspension. Life and combat situation forced to significantly expand the flight operation of helicopters. Statistics more than ten thousand flights on a range of heights from two to five and above thousand meters convinced that a well-trained, psychologically prepared pilot withstands about an hour of flight under these conditions.

Operational data that complyed with the requirements of the combat training of helicopterists in peacetime, ceased to satisfy them in a real combat situation. Exceeding the calculated characteristics, as a result, entailed many phenomena to which both pilots and technicians were not even theoretically prepared. So, the helicopters had forced to get acquainted with such unusual phenomena as "tightening in the dive", "V.", "pickup", "vortex ring", etc. Every such a case became a subject of careful analysis: the pilot's actions were analyzed in each unusual phenomenon, All flight parameters were taken into account, at what stage when the element is performed, it originated. Experience was gathered on the grains, and recommendations were processed for each specific case.

A great job in the scientific substantiation of these phenomena and work out practical recommendations was done: Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Colonel A. Volodko; Candidates of Technical Sciences Polkovnikov A. Ustynko, M. Elkin, Samoylov, Kuznetsov, Commanders and pilot tests of the center of combat use of army aviation, heads of military training department, Major Major General P. Nvitsky, Colonel A. Koshelev, in . Seleznev, V. Tarasov, A. Shurenkov, I. Smirnov, Testing pilots of the GNIs of the Air Force and Specialists of the OKB named after M.L. Mile led by the designer of M. Tishchenko helicopters.

Thus, there was a development, a generalization and introduction into the practice of combat experience, which was taken into account primarily in the documents on the preparation of flights.

In difficult conditions of the mining and deserted terrain, for the full use of the flight tactical characteristics and combat capabilities of the equipment and the successful performance of combat missions, there was a need to seek new techniques and methods for combat operations. Based on the characteristics of each period, the nature of the aircraft activities of the Air Force of the 40th Army on the performance of combat missions changed. To a greater extent, it concerned the preparation and execution of combat missions in flights.

An increase in the likelihood of being hit by the electronic air defense agent led not only to the change in the tactics of aviation actions, but also increased attention to the issues of moral and psychological training of flights, more substantially developing all issues of aviation interaction with terrestrial troops when they are supported, landing the tactical air landing and provision His fighting. The transition to active combat actions at night made serious adjustments not only to the organizational work of aviation and general-official commanders, but also entailed an increase in the moral and psychological loads of flights, an increase in clarity in organizing a search and rescue support and conducting search and rescue work during the fighting .

Particular attention was paid to target flight flights for combat operations. Thus, arriving pilots under the guidance of experienced instructors necessarily performed flights in the area of \u200b\u200bthe airfield and flights to perform individual combat operations. The requirements of the USSR MO Directive dated May 12, 1981, it was noted that the experience of hostilities of our troops in Afghanistan showed the weakest link in their preparation - mountain and night training. It was indicated for a number of disadvantages in solving tactical issues, firing preparation, low physical endurance. The task was to establish a fundamental improvement in the preparation of troops to action in conditions of mountainous terrain and at night and, in particular, to the training of army aviation actions in the mountains and at night together with the general compounds and units.

The main tasks that had to solve the summer composition were aviation support, as well as the cover and maintenance of troops. However, in addition, the Soviet pilots performed a rather wide range of tasks.