18 Tank corps combat path. Prokhorov Battle
In the period from August 1 to August 20, 1942, the 18th Tank Corps (TC) under the command of General Major I.P. Korchagin continued to conduct military actions as part of the main grouping of the 60th Army (a), fulfilling the overall task of the surrounding and destruction of the Voronezh groupage of the enemy.
By August 1, battered in battles were defended in battles from July 24 to August 1 of the 168th German Infantry Division (PD) on the turn of the housing from July 24 to August 1). ok. Plotted, sowing chopped grove "figure", mounds, height 169.4; 57th German PD in North. OKR Voronezh, reinforced up to 2 divisions of anti-tank guns (PTOR), 11th self-propelled guns, up to 30 medium tanks, a 120-mm mortar division and up to 3,150-mm batteries. The reserve of the enemy to the infantry battalion was concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bthe tweeted, working settlement.
In engineering terms, the enemy defense on the piece of Grove "Figure" was quite fortified: the shafts of the full profile, separate cells for arrows and car gunners, the moves of messages, artificial anti-tank obstacles (mine fields). The system of anti-tank, mortar-machine-gun and artillery fire was organized by an opponent from three sides and as a result of this, the bridgehead in front of the groves "figured" was a firing bag.
As a result of the battles from July 24 to July 29, 1942, the 18th TC operating with the 159th rifle division (SD) on the orders of Comandarm 60 moved to temporary defense in order to regroup of forces, at the turn of 250-300 m north and northeastern grove "Figure" and Kurganov and by August 1 had the following grouping: the 1st echelon of the building: parts of the 159th SD - 3/4 km south of the grove "long". 2nd Echelon Corps: 18th Motion Relief Brigade (ISBR) - Southern Edge of Grove "Long"; 180th Tank Brigade (TBR) - Northeast Grove "Long". The 110th and 181st TBR were in the moving reserve of the case commander. They were located in Defense: 110th TBR - North. ok. Underground; 181st TBR - Hollow Santa. Vost. ok. Podgorn In such a grouping, the 18th TC was under August 5, producing regrouping and improving the defense system.
By the beginning of the new offensive 60th, i.e. By August 12, 1942, parts of the 18th TC had the following grouping: the 181st TBR - in the hollow of North. Vost. Underground; 180th and 110th TBR - p.31. sowing. Zap. chopping "hammer"; 18th MSBR in defense. Vost. Stadium and on sowing. ok. Voronezh and Vost. shore r. Voronezh, that west of horses.
On August 9, by order of the headquarters of the 60th and for №013, the army commander set the task of the 18th TC: "With the mastery of the infantry. The edge of the grove is "figure" attack the enemy bypassing the grove "figure" from the south-east, part of the forces to range through the ravine on the road Voronezh - tweeted. The main forces to contribute to the 303rd and 107th CD to defeat the exhaust enemy from the "figured" grove, in collaboration with the 107th CD to occur in the direction of the grove "Triangular", high. 171.0.
In pursuance of the order of commander of the 60th and Major General I.P. Korchagin decided to attack the enemy, having parts of the body in 2 echelons. The 181st TBR, making up the 1st echelon of the corps, had the task to attack in the direction of the Vost. The edge of the grove is "long", bypassing the grove of "figure" from the east, Vost. Skates Unnamed Highs, that South. Grove "Figure", Grove "Triangular" and high. 171.0. In addition, she had to destroy the enemy in the grove "figure" and on the nameless sum. And in the interaction with parts of the 107th diabetes, in the future, step in direction. 171.0.
The 110th TBR, which was the 2nd echelon of the Corps, was set as the task of attacking the enemy in the direction of North. Out of the grove "Heart", Vost. The end of the grove "Long", Vost. The chief of the grove is "figured", to rinse the highway at the bridge and prevent the controversy of infantry and tanks of the enemy along the Highway Voronezh - Plounge, as well as in collaboration with the 303rd SD to master the hangars that Zap. Voronezh. Source position. Zap. Edging Grove "Hammer".
The 180th TBR - the reserve of the corps commander - focused on sowing. Zap. The extrusion of the grove "Hammer", being ready to develop the success of the 303rd and 107th CD and attack in the direction of North. Edge grove "Heart", Vost. The end of the grove "Long", Vost. The edge of the grove "figure", high. 171.0.
All issues of interaction in the preparatory period were detailed in detail with commanders of the 303rd and 107th SD and the personnel of Brigades. Communication with teams was carried out on the radio telephone, through officers of communications and staff commanders, as well as personal communication with the commanders of the Brigades.
At 6.00 12.8.42 by order of the 181rd TC and Signals of the 181st Brigade Commander (Red Rocket), the tanks went into the attack in combat order in echelonno "angle back". With the release of tanks on the line of the grove "Long" on the combat orders of the brigade, a strong artillery-mortar fire of the opponent was opened from directions: old. Semiluki, Plotted, Grove "Figure" and Zap. ok. Voronezh. Maneuvering and driving fires and short stops, tanks by 6.50 went around the grove "figure" with the east. And broke into her south-east. The edge, destroying the living force and the firepoints of the enemy. Speaking the grove "Figure", the brigade made it possible to master the infantry.
The opponent thanks to the vigorous actions of the tanks ran from the grove, throwing weapons and military property. However, he organized a strong fire resistance on the upcoming tanks from the areas of the worker. ok. Plotted. As a result, when approaching the grove "figured" 30% of the tanks was beaten and burned. The rest of the tanks, not looking at the strong artillery-mortar fire focused on them and flight 18 bombers, broke through the Voronezh Highway - Plotted. Seddlary highway, the brigade captured the nameless sum., The bridge over the ravine and kept them during the day. But since the infantry of the 107th SD showed insufficient activity and did not meet with his fire, the tanks were actually destroyed, after which the infantry, not to withstand the counterattack of the enemy by the power of up to 2 battalions from the working village, rolled back to the grove "figure", and in The subsequent left it. After the fight on August 12, the 181st TBR had only 6 T-34 tanks, taking defense in the grove "long".
On August 14, the opponent of power up to 2 battalions of infantry with the support of 15 tanks switched to the offensive, forcing parts of the 107th SD to start waste. The fire of the tanks of the 395th tank battalion (TB) 2 tank of the enemy was bent and the attack of infantry was stopped on sowing. The extrusion of the grove "figure". The tanks of the enemy went for South. The slopes of Unnamed High. Our infantry has moved to defense in 400-500 m South. Groves "Long".
From morning on August 18, the brigade was a reserve of the 18th TC commander, having in its composition combat-ready tanks: T-34 - 7 pcs., T-60 - 5 pcs. Tanks were located in the area of \u200b\u200bthe arrow. ok. Podgorny and 2 tanks in the grove "long". During this period, the brigade was preparing to attack the enemy in the direction of the grove "figure", a thorough inspection and repair of the match was made. Classes with a middle room, junior and ordinary composition on the topic "An offensive for the defendant enemy", taking into account the experience of combat operations on August 12, 1942, the opponent was passive actions. The combat orders of the brigade were rare a mortar shelling.
On August 19, by 2.00 Brigade ranked Defense Area - Forest 1 km. Zap. Education, according to the orders of the case commander. 2 Tank Brigades, which were in the grove "Long" replaced with tanks - 110th TBR.
The 110th TBR from August 1 was located in the mobile reserve of the 18th TC commander in the Sea area. Vost. ok. Podgorn During this period, the personnel was engaged in the order of Matchasts, weapons and tanks. On August 8, the opponent in the morning took the force of up to 1.5 infantry shelf and 30 tanks offensive from Voronezh to the north along the railway and r. Voronezh, from the district of the stadium and along the Zadonskoye highway, from the hospital area and working town, starting to close parts of the 303rd and 121st SD. The commander of the corps decided the 110th TBR to attack the enemy in the direction of the assembly on the Zadonskoye highway on the sowing. ok. Voronezh in cooperation with parts of the 303rd SD, having a task to destroy the broken parts of the enemy along the Zadonskoye highway.
At 6.30 August 12, the 110th TBR entered the attack in the echelonno "angle forward". When leaving the turn of the grove "Long", the enemy opened a strong artillery-mortar fire on tanks, as a result 2 T-70 tank was bent. Upon approach to Vost. The extrusion of the grove "figure" team met even more rich artillery-mortar fire of the enemy from the districts: tiller, working town and from the Star region. Semiluki. As a result, part of the tanks was imposed, part of the rest, and the rest broke into the highway, where it was destroyed. The brigade commander decided to entrenched the remaining 3 tanks to the South. The extrusion of the "figured" grove, which, not having time to take positions, were shot art. Fire enemy.
From 13 to 20 August, the brigade occupied the defense of the temper of the East. Podgorno, led the remaining match in order and was engaged in combat training.
No less intense battles were walking on the 180th TBR and the 18th ICCR, where, despite tremendous efforts, minor results were achieved.
August 20, the 18th TC focus on the south-east. Outskirts of NP Podgorny and in the forest Vost. Stoethod, in 3 km north. Voronezh.
In the period of battles from August 1 to 20, the building lost tanks: burnt - 59, shot down - 48. Personal losses: killed fighters and commanders - 134, wounded - 299, was missing - 247. For the same period, the hull inflicted the opponent's following Losses: 23 tanks destroyed, to the infantry shelf, 45 pthor, 8 field weapons, 6 self-propelled guns, 8 cars, 2 dota, 1 dzot, 21 machine guns and 7 mortar batteries.
According to the commander of the 18th TC General Major I.P. Korchagin, the causes of large losses and little of the resulting attacks of the case were:
1. Tanks carried big losses in view of the fact that artillery failed to organize them to accompany them further than South. The edges of the grove "figure" and failed to suppress the enemy artillery that interferes with the promotion of tanks and infantry.
2. The infantry still lagged behind the tanks and did not fix the frontiers achieved by tanks, as a result of which the Highway Voronezh - Punching and Grove "Figured" twice handed over to the enemy, being employed by our tanks.
3. The commanders of the Brigades lost control of battalions after they went into the attack, since radio services quickly retired, and duplicating funds did not provide management. Due to the small number of tanks in the brigades, it was not possible to highlight a sufficient number of cars for officers of communication.
4. Intelligence still remained a bottleneck.
5. A highly organized enemy anti-tank fire system and lack of maneuver due to terrain conditions.
6. Low preparation of mechanics drivers and machine commanders. Mechanics drivers had 2-3 hours of practical driving and were completely unprepared for driving machines with closed hatches with severe terrain.
7. Low preparation of crews and enter them into battle directly from the echelon without prior to sticking and preparing them to battle in brigades, not the ability to maneuver on the battlefield justifies the excessive loss of the match.
8. The opponent in battles under Voronezh applied self-propelled guns, which were accompanied directly in battle orders of tanks. This was a means of strong moving anti-tank defense. Self-propelled guns, shot the dwarves, who pierced the armor of the machines of all our brands.
Nevertheless, one of the objectives of the 18th TC was achieved. Lieutenant-General K.S. Moskalenko remembered later: "These were small-scale private offensive operations. Success they had a little. However, the overall operational result was very positive: the enemy was forced to fully maintain his grouping in the area of \u200b\u200bVoronezh and north-west of him, lost the possibility of transferring troops from here to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. " And according to historian A.M. Abbasova, Voronezh "became the domocal sword, who was constantly hung over the Hitler group at the Volga."
Sheendrikov E.A.
18th tank corps in battles for Voronezh in August 1942
Great Soviet Encyclopedia: "July 12, 1943 in the area of \u200b\u200bthe West and South Prokhorovka during the Kursk battle, the newly in the history of the Great Patriotic War was 1941-45, a counter-tank battle between the coming German fascist tank group (the 2nd Tank Corps of the SS and the 3rd Tank Corps, and about 700 tanks and assault tools) and applying Consturdar 5th Guards Tank Army and three tank and mechanized brigades (about 800 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, SAU). In fierce battles that have launched all day, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and assault guns. , Over 10 thousand people killed and was forced to go to the defense, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost about 300 tanks and sau. On July 12, a fracture came in the Kursk battle, the enemy moved to defense, and on July 16 began to remove his strength. troops Voronezh, and from July 19 and the Steppe Front moved to the persecution and the German-fascist troops were discarded on the original frontier. "
This description of the events is very sinful against the truth. And relative to the number of German tanks, and especially about German losses. In fact, - the phrase "the enemy lost over 350 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Killed and was forced to go to defense" - it should be, unfortunately, not to German, but to the Soviet side. Also, to put it mildly, other BSE approvals are not accurate.
In many Soviet and Russian publications, it is also argued that the Germans under Prokhorovka had a lot of "tigers", "Panther" and "Ferdinand", and the Soviet troops - "only" 500 T-34, and the rest of the lungs. And these figures - 800 Soviet tanks against 700 German, from which the Germans were lost to 400 - repeated with many Western historians.
The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov and at all in his memoirs argued:
"The Nazis exceeded us by the number of combat vehicles, especially heavy."
At the same time, Rothmistrov wrote that on both sides in the battle:
"At the same time, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated."
From this approval of Rothmistrova should be followed that the ratio of tanks in Prokhorovsky battle was not even 800 Soviet against 700 German, but about 500 Soviet against 700 German! It should be noted that in general and in the details of the MEMUMAR ROTMISTROVA - an example of crying distortion of facts. Here, for example, his description of the start of the battle:
"Tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th buildings, shooting on the go, a frontal blow crawled into the combat orders of the German-fascist troops, rapid through attack piercing the fighting order of the enemy. The Nazis, obviously, did not expect to meet such a majority of our combat vehicles. and such a decisive attack. The management in the advanced parts and units of the enemy was clearly broken. Its "Tigers" and "Panthers", devoid of in the near battle of their fire benefits, which they at the beginning of the offensive were in a collision with other tank connections, now successfully Soviet T-34 tanks and even T-70 with short distances. The battlefield smoke smoke and dust, the Earth shuddered from powerful explosions. Tanks have risen on each other and, clutching, could no longer dispay, beat to death, until one of them Flambed a torch or did not stop with the captainers. "
After reading this - it seems that the general of Rothmisters simply never seen tanks in his life. In his view - they have some kind of claws (to curb).
At the end of this article, references to the documents of the 29th and 18th tank buildings are given. From the very first lines, it is seen that the events developed for our tankers by no means so successfully as painted by Rothmisters. And what is his statement in his memoirs about the successful defeat of the "Tigers" and "Panther" light tanks T-70! In August 1943, the same Rothmistrov reported Zhukov directly opposite - at the end of the article reference is given. And, by the way, here's the opinion of Zhukov:
"In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th Tank Army P.A. Ortamistrov writes that the 5th tank army played a decisive role in the defeat of armored troops. This is immodestly and not quite like that. Crasporated and exhausted enemy troops 6 And the 7th Guards and 1st Tank Army, supported by artillery reserve of the chief command and the air army during the period of fierce battles on July 4-12. The 5th tank army had a case with an extremely weakened grouping of German troops, which lost faith in the ability Successful struggle with Soviet troops. "
As for the ratio of the parties of the parties in Prokhorovsky battle, on July 12, 1943, about 700 tanks and SAU were in all parts of the Manstein on all southern Face Kursk Arc (in three tank corps who operated in three different directions against the Soviet 1st Ta, 6- y gv. A, 5th gv. A, 5th gv. Ta, 69th a), and over 800 tanks and SAU was only in the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rothmistrova.
However, against this army on July 12, only the 2nd SS tank corps acted on the approaches to Prokhorovka.
By the beginning of the "Citadel" operation (in the evening of July 4), there were 327 PZ III, IV, VI, T-34 and 129 sturgeon and anti-tank Sau Stug and Marder (combat). There were also 54 self-propelled Wespe and Hummel. Of the tanks - only 35 serviceable "tigers" and not a single Panther (all the 200 "Panther" had been dodged "Gross Doychland" Division of the 48th TC, which for some reason in Soviet sources is always lifted to the SS) .
On July 11, there were 211 combat-ready tanks (PZ III, IV, VI, T-34) and 100 assault and anti-propulsional Wespe and Hummel and Hummel self-propelled Hummel and Hummel houbs (PZ III, IV, VI (Stug and Marder). Among the tanks - 15 good "tigers" and neither "Panthers". "Ferdinand" is not only in the 2nd TC s SS, but in general, the manstein could simply could not - the assault tool glorified by the Soviet military military was released by the Germans of a single party (90 pieces), all of them were used in the Northern Facs of the Kursk Arc, and, By the way, Manstein called it a weapon not justified himself.
It is necessary to add that some sources (Western) lead several large numbers of the number of tanks and the SAU of the 2nd SS TK. This is explained by the fact that or the light PZ II and Commander BefWG are included, or the tanks and SAU faulty at that time are turned on, or those and others together. However, PZ II (which, however, in the 2nd SS TC, there was only 4 pieces) with a 20-mm gunner could not compete even with the light Soviet T-70, and on the Commander Tanks of the Germans (21sts by July 12) There were no guns at all (the gun barrel was replaced with a wooden imitation, and the intrastable space was released for the installation of additional radio equipment).
It is necessary to figure out what to understand under Prokhorovsky battle. In general, battles at a distance of 12-1 km west and south-west of Prokhorovka were walking from 10 to 15 July. On the same days, battles were also used between the 3rd of the German Tank Corps and the Soviet 69th Army at 35-20 km south-south-east of Prokhorovka. On July 12, two mehbrigadids of the 5th GW were involved there. Mechorts, separate tank regiment and one tank brigade of the 2nd GW. TC - about 160 tanks, which were subordinate to Rothmistrov (and another 96th tank brigade of the 69th Army - about 20 tanks).
These 180 Soviet tanks and the three Rifle divisions from the 69th Army on that day were fighting against the German 19th Tank Division (14 tanks - 11 PZ III and 3 PZ IV) and the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks (in the morning of July 11 in it There were 23 tigers on July 12, there is no). The remaining two tank divisions of the German 3rd tank corps - the 6th and 7th (in both in the amount of about 50 pz III and PZ IV) - they fought against three more rifle divisions of the Soviet 69th army. Taking into account the 228th battalion of assault guns (19 SAU), there were about 110 tanks and SAU of the 3rd of the Germans in this direction.
Apparently, the fact that some of the forces (less than 20%) of the 5th GW. She was sent on July 12 to the rescue of the 69th Army and fought against part of the forces (however, among them there were two tens of "tigers") of the German 3rd TC, and served as the basis of Soviet historians to rank in the area of \u200b\u200bShakhovo - Alexandrovka to Prokhorovsky Battle.
However, these Soviet historians did not mention the Soviet 69th army at all. But they often remember the German 11th tank, and the tank alleged SS division "Gross Doychland" (from the 48th TC), which were not at all in the Prokhorov direction, and on Oboyansky, against the Soviet 1st, the 6th GW. And and parts of the forces of the 5th GW. BUT.
It is noteworthy that in the huge work of the Prokhorov Field, published in 1998 by the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskaya Field", practically nothing about the fights in the Shakhovo area.
In general, if we are talking about the battles on July 12, 1943, it is possible to speak only about the battle of the 2nd SS TC against most parts of the 5th GW. Ta and 5th gv. BUT.
Directly in the direction of Prokhorovka, only one German division was operated - "Leibstandard SS Adolf Hitler", as part of 56 tanks (of which 4 "tiger", 47 pz IV, 5 PZ III), 10 Stug assault SAU and 20 Marder anti-tank SAU.
On the morning of July 12, she standing in positions, met the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th GW, who arrived at her. The one and the 9th Guards Airborne Division of the 5th GW. BUT.
According to Soviet documentary data in the 18th TC, 68 T-34, 18 MK4 "Churchill", 58 T-70. In the 29th TC - 122 T-34, 70 T-70 and 20 SAU (11 Su-122 and 9 Su-76). In total, there were 336 tanks and 20 sau, of which 190 T-34.
The Soviet offensive began at 8.30 am. By noon, the 18th TC approached the positions of the Germans and, having met strong resistance, moved to defense. The 29th TC to 10.30 also approached the German positions (state farm "Oktyabrsky"), where he was stopped by German aviation. At 11.00 "Oktyabrsky" was taken by a motorized brigade brigade of the 29th building, but after the counterattack of Germans, the brigade retreated. At 16.00, the last attack of the 29th TC was taken (by the forces of the remaining 15 tanks) in the position of the "Leibstandart" in St.x "Oktyabrsky", but unsuccessfully.
In two days of fighting (July 12 and 13), the number of combat-ready "tigers" of the Division "Leibstandart" decreased by one thing. On the evening of July 13, the division was at 16 pz IV less than in the evening of July 11 (and 10 saough more - due to the battles renovated in previous days). Unfortunately, there is no data on the loss of lebstandart armored vehicles specifically for July 12. Human losses of the "leibstandart" for this day - 39 killed, 5 missing and 235 wounded.
According to the documentary (Soviet) data published by V.N. Zamulin in March 2003, both Soviet tank corps lost July 12, 1943 - 256 tanks and SAU (72%), of which 152 are irretrievably, and at least 1.304 killed and missing, about 1.100 wounded.
The other Division of the 2nd Tank Corps of the SS, "Reich", fought 61 tanks (1 "Tiger", 8 T-34, 18 PZ IV, 34 PZ III), 27 assault SAU Stug and 12 anti-tank Sau Marder south of Prokhorovka - against 2 "Tank corps (highly weakened by battles from July 5 - it remained 35 T-34, 4" Churchill ", 46 T-70) and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps (84 T-34, 3" Churchill ", 52 tons -70 - However, one tank brigade (44 tank) acted in the 69th A) band and the 183rd Rifle Division of the 69th Army. Thus, the division "Reich" opposed 180 tanks, of which 93 T-34.
Soviet 2nd gv. TK began an offensive at 10.00, the 2nd TC remained on the occupied positions. By noon, the offensive was stopped by German reactive artillery and aviation, at 15.00 Division "Reich" passed on the offensive, pushing the Soviet parts.
As a result, "Reich" has moved to 2 km to the east (on a plot of 5 km wide), there are relatively light losses. On the evening of July 12 (20.35) in the division, it was added due to repaired 8 PZ III, 1 "Tiger", the number PZ IV, T34 and STUG III did not change. Human losses - 41 killed, 12 missing, 190 wounded. On the evening of July 13, there were already 75 tanks in this division, including 11 T-34.
Losses on July 12, the 2nd TC and the 2nd GW. TK - 85 tanks (47%), of which 44 are irretrievably, only in the 2nd GW. TC - 154 killed and missing, 510 wounded (according to Soviet documentary data published by V.N. Zamulin).
Division SS "Tenkopf" (94 tank - 10 "Tiger", 30 PZ IV, 54 PZ III, 20 assault SAU Stug and 11 anti-tank SAU Marder) on a bridgehead for the pseud fought against the 97th, 95th, 52th, 42nd Guards Rifle Divizions 5th GW. Army.
For combat orders of divisions of the 5th GW. And stood the 31st Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army. True, the 31st TC was strongly weakened in battles from the beginning of the "citadel" and only 64 tank remained in it. For some reason, he did not participate in hostilities on July 12.
"Totenkopf" began to occur at 5.25 in the morning, crushing through Psle.
Rothmisters argued that on the evening of July 12, he threw against the strongly advanced parts of the Division "Totenkopf" 24th Guards Tank and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigades (105 tanks) from the 5th Guards Mechkorpus. However, Soviet combat documents studied by V.N. Zamulin say that these two brigades did not participate in the battles on July 12 in the battles.
According to "Totenkopf" from 20.00 July 12, she did not meet Soviet tanks. But on the report of the 2nd TK SS from 21.50 July 12, Tankov Tankov Division was continued to fight with Soviet tanks North-west of Polezhaev. Obviously, it was the 24th GW. TBR, as part of 61 tanks, of which were lost at least 13 (according to Soviet documents).
In the evening (at 20.35) on July 12, in Totenkopfe, it was 1 pz III less than a day ago. The number of other tanks and SAU has not changed. Human losses - 69 killed, 16 missing and 231 wounded. (However, according to data on July 21.35, PZ III was less than 21, PZ IV at 13, "tigers" at 10 - probably part of these losses is likely to enter the late evening on July 12.)
Regarding Soviet losses in the section of the Division Action "Tenkopf" on July 12 - only the 95th GW. SD lost 948 killed, 729 disappeared and 1.649 wounded.
Thus, in fact, under the Prokhorovka on July 12, no more than 311 German tanks and SAU were fighting against 597 Soviet tanks and SAU.
The outcome of the battle:
- in the central site (18th and 29th tank buildings and the 9th Guards Airborne Division against the SS division "Leibstandart") - the Soviet offensive was stopped, after stubborn battles in the district of the Oktyabrsky district, the Germans remained in the previous positions , However, the 18th TC wedged into a narrow plot (2 km on the front) to a depth of 5 km between Tenkopf and Leibstandart Divisions, and the 29th TC took a draw of the lane in front of Oktyabrsky (the question of the occupation of this statement by Soviet parts remains a dark stain);
On the northern plot (97th, 95th, 52nd, 42nd Guards Rifle Divisions and the 24th Guards Tank Brigade vs. Totenkopf division) - Germans have advanced 5 km, at a plot of 6 km on the front;
In the southern site (2nd Guards and 2nd Tank Corses, the 183rd Rifle Division against the SS division "Reich") - the Germans have advanced by 2 km, at a plot of 8 km on the front.
On July 12, the 2nd TC COP lost damaged and destroyed order (there is no accurate data) 70 tanks and SAU - 22% of German armored vehicles, including losses from the 5th GW. BUT.
5th guv. She lost 343 tanks and SAU on this day (according to Soviet documents studied by V.N. Zamulin) - 57% of Soviet armored vehicles participating in Prokhorovsky battle (not counting losses in the Shakhovo region).
The loss of the personal composition of the SS tank corps for July 12 - 149 killed, 33 missing and 660 wounded, in the amount of 842 soldiers and officers (as part of July 1, as part of the COP corps were 72.960 soldiers and officers, of which 4.164 Soviet citizens were most Division "REYIX" - almost 8% of the personnel, in the "Leibstandart" and "Totenkopf" by 5%).
Soviet losses on July 12 under Prokhorovka - more than 10 thousand people killed, missing and wounded (on July 1, the total number of the 5th GW. The same 5th GW. A - about 130 thousand soldiers and officers); Only the 29th TC Lost July 12 - 1.991 people, including 1.033 killed and missing, and the 95th GW. SD - 3.326 people.
It is worth noting that July 12, 1943 Blow 1st Tha (Lieutenant General Katukov) and the 6th GW. A (Lieutenant-General cleaner) had much better results than the actions of the 5th GW. Ta and 5th gv. A. The German 3rd TD and MD "Gross Doychland" were discarded about 4 km at a plot of 12 km on the front. At the same time, the ratio of forces was only one and a half times in favor of Soviet armored vehicles (according to the total number - 220 against 140, but the Germans had 11 "tigers" and 30 "Panther"). Also was allowed (2 km at a plot of 10 km on the front) 11th TD Germans, and partially 332nd PD.
And it should be noted that there are Soviet sources, and officially, where, in principle, there is practically no lies about Prokhorovsky battle. This, for example, a one-volume "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945", Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1970. On page 249 all the battle is given 1 paragraph - 17 and a half rows:
"Evaluating the situation, a representative of the Marshal A.M.Vasilevsky rates and the command of the Voronezh Front decided to put powerful counterdaddar. For this, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Ortamistrov and the 5th Guards Army of General A. were attracted to the Front. S. Jadova, as well as part of the forces of the 40th army, 1st tank, 6th Guards and part of the forces of the 69th and 7th Guards armies. On July 12, our troops have passed into the offensive. The struggle flared up on the whole front. With Both sides were attended by a huge mass of tanks. Especially heavy fights were the troops of the 5th Guards Communarily and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Prokhorov region. They came across the extremely resistance of parts of the 2nd CC Tank Corps, which continuously counted. It happened A major counter tank battle. A total of about 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated in it. The fierce battle lasted until late evening. Multi-window steel machines Skuffed in piles of metallic scrap. From tanks flew towers, trunks of guns, caterpillars rushed into pieces. Clouds of dust and smoke crap all around ... Both sides suffered large losses. "
As you can see, it is clear that only the 5th GW participated in Prokhorovsky battle. Ta and 5th guv. A - against only the 2nd TK SS. Panthers and Ferdinanda (and even "tigers" are not mentioned), as well as any parts of the 3rd or 48th tank corps of the Germans, as well as part of the Soviet 69th A.
And nothing is said about the victory of Soviet weapons in Prokhorovsky battle. It is not given, however, the ratio of forces and losses of the parties ...
As for the figure "About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns" - then it can work out only if you summarize all Soviet and German tanks and SAU, fighting on July 12 and under Prokhorovka, and in the Shakhovo area - 780 against 420.
But the quote from Marshal's memoirs of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky, in those days - a representative of the rate of VGK in the southern Face Kursk Arc:
"The document was preserved, which was sent by me on July 14 from this area of \u200b\u200bthe Supreme Commander of the Supreme Commander and in its own way may indicate what happened:
"According to your personal instructions from the evening of 9.vii.43, I continuously in the troops of Rothmistrova and Zhadov at Prokhorovsky and southern areas. Until today, the opponent continues to be massive tank attacks and counterattacks against our tank parts at the front of Zhadov and Rothmistrova. Liquidation Army breakthrough, created 11.vii a serious threat to the rear of the main forces of the Rothmistra Army and the Zhadov Corps, demanded the allocation of two mehbrigades from the 5th mechanized corps and individual parts of the Rothmistrova to the Shakhovo region, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovskaya. The elimination of the Libery Army breakthrough in the areas of Cheerful, Vasilievka, Petrovka 12.VII.43. Forced to throw the remaining parts of the 5th mechanized body there. It and the other was largely weakened by the forces of the main blow of the Rothmistra from Prokhorovka in the south-west direction. According to observations of the progress of the battles and by testimony. prisoners, I conclude that the enemy, despite the huge losses like In human forces, and especially in tanks and in aviation, still does not refuse the thought to break through to the Oboyan and further to Kursk, seeking this at the price. Yesterday I personally watched the south-west of Prokhorovka the tank fight of our 18th and 29th buildings with more than two hundred enemy tanks in the counterattack. At the same time, hundreds of guns accepted in the battle and all the Rs are available. As a result, the entire battlefield for an hour was graduated by burning German and our tanks. "
As you can see - contrary to the statements of Soviet historians, the Germans were not stopped and all the more pushed on July 12 under Prokhorovka.
Division "Totenkopf" has advanced that day a few kilometers, the Lybstandart Division practically retained its position, Division "Reich" continued to occur until July 16, coming out on the line 6 km south of Prokhorovka.
Moreover - on July 16, the commander of the Troops of the Voronezh Front Vatutin gives an order to the commander of 38, 40, 60s, 5, 6 and the 7th Guards armies "to keep a defensive operation". (TsAMO. F. 203. Op. 2777. D. 75. L. 437-440)
And on July 17, Vatutin gives an order to the commander of the 5th Guards Tank, the 5th Guards and 69th armies "to improve defense". The 5th Guards and 69th armies Vatutin ordered to organize a "durable defense", and the 5th GW. That step into the second echelon. (TsAMO. F. 203. OP. 2777. D. 75. L. 450-452)
Why did Prokhorovsky battle been won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces? The answer gives combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.
29th Tank Corps:
"The attack began without the artwork occupied by the turn of the pr-com and without cover from the air.
This gave the opportunity to open a concentrated fire on the combat orders of the corps and is impunity to produce tanks and motorized bombing, which led to great losses and a decrease in the attack tempo, and this in turn provided the opportunity to lead more effective fire of artillery and tanks from . The terrain for the offensive did not favor their intersection, the presence of impassable for tanks of the north-west and southeastern roads Prokhhorovka-Benhenichino forced tanks to press the road and open their flanks, without having to cover them.
Separate divisions that have come out forward, even to St.x. The Komsomolets, who lasted the big losses from the artogne and the fire of tanks from ambushes, moved to the line of fire forces.
The cover of the upcoming tanks from the air was absent until 13.00. From 13.00 the cover was carried out by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 cars.
With the exit of tanks to the front edge of the defense of the pr-ka from the forest with / s. Watchdog and east. ok. The PR-K opened a hurricane fire from the ambushes of Tiger Tanks, self-propelled guns and fet guns. The infantry was cut off from tanks and forced to heal. Blowing into the depths of defense, the tanks carried big losses.
Parts of the pr-ka with the support of a large number of aviation and tanks switched to the counterattack and part of the brigade were forced to move away.
While attacking the front edge of the pr-ka self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of the battle orders of tanks and even pulling forward tanks, had losses from the anti-tank fire of the pr-ka (eleven self-propelled guns were output). "
18th Tank Corps:
"The opponent's artillery led an intensive fire on the combat orders of the corps.
The building, without having due support in fighter aviation and carrying large losses from the arthogne and intensive bombing from the air (by 12.00 the opponent's aviation produced up to 1500 aircraft), slowly moved ahead.
The locality in the hull action strip is crossed by three deep ravines passing from the left bank of the river. Psle to Zh.d. Belenikhino - Prokhorovka, why the coming in the first echelon 181, 170 tank brigades were forced to act on the left flank of the hull strip in the strong reference point of the enemy of the FX. OCTOBER. 170 TBR, operating on the left flank, by 12.00 lost up to 60% of its combat material part.
The opponent to the outcome of the day from the District of Kozlovka, Greznoy took the frontal attack of tanks with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the combat orders of the body from the direction of Kozlovka, Polezhaev, using his tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding combat orders of air.
Performing the task, 18 TC met the well-organized, strong anti-tank defense of the enemy with pre-sword with tanks and assault implements at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6.
In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and technique, my order No. 68 part of the corps moved to defense on the reached frontiers. "
Report by Rotmistrova Zhukov:
"... Forced to report to you that our tanks have lost their superiority to the tanks of the enemy in armor and armament.
The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices in German tanks puts our tanks into a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure increases.
T-70 tanks simply can not be allowed to tank battle, as they are more than easily destroyed by the fire of German tanks.
I have bitterness to state that our tank technique, except for the introduction of SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled installations, during the war years did not give anything new, and the lack of disabilities on the tanks of the first release, somehow: the imperfection of the transmission group (Main friction, gearbox change box and side friction), extremely slow and uneven turn of the tower, exceptionally bad visibility and the close of the crew is not completely eliminated and today. "
As you can see - our soldiers fought, as they could - as they were ordered to the weapons that they were given. And not their fault that the onset of the 5th GW. That was poorly prepared that the forces and the location of the Germans were not explored before the offensive, which was not an artillery and aviation support that Soviet tanks (T-34, Churchilli and T-70) were inferior in combat and technical qualities of German (PZ III , PZ IV and TIGRAM).
According to V.N. Zamulina, Deputy Science of the Director of the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskaya Field", by decision of the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalina, was established a commission chaired by Georgy Malenkov to investigate the causes of large losses incurred by the 5th GW. That under Prokhorovka.
In the report of the Commission submitted by Stalin in August 1943, the fighting of the Soviet troops on July 12, under Prokhorovka, are called a sample of unsuccessful operation.
An explanation of the fact that after the war in the USSR, the results of this battle were raised from the legs on the head, perhaps such - Nikita Khrushchev, who gave an indication in the late 1950s, to write a multi-volume history of the war, "fought" himself at the southern Face Kursk Arc as a "military member of the military Council "Voronezh Front. Not in the rules of Soviet historians were embarrassing the leaders.
In addition, Nikolai Bulganin (Western Front) and Lion Mehlis (Bryansk Front) were at the Northern Face Argument in July 1943. On July 12, 1943, these fronts under the command of Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky and Colonel-General Markian Popov began a strategic offensive operation of Kutuzov, hitting the 2nd Tank Army of Germans. On the very first day of the offensive, the German defense was broken on three sites from 10 to 16 km on the front and a depth of 4-9 km.
That is why the day on July 12, by law, can be considered a turning point during the Kursk battle (moreover, from this day, the promotion of the German 9th Army was stopped against the central Front of the Army Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky).
However, the Actions in the Northern Fac of the Kursk Arc before July 13 coordinated Marshal Georgy Zhukov - and in October 1957 Khrushchev removed him from state and party posts - Minister of Defense and Member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. A little later, in September 1958, with the posts of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Bulganin flew. Mehlis, although he died in 1953, was also named with one of the active figures of the cult of Stalin.
And, apparently, in favor of Nikita Khrushchev, the turning point of July 12 began to bind not with the actual success in the Northern Face Kursk Arc, and with Prokhorovsky battle in the south of the arc, which was ordered to consider the red army who was crowned with the victory of the Red Army, despite the fact that The German plot continued to occur and after July 12.
However, this offensive of Manstein's troops no longer had a strategic goal - because the events in the Northern Face of the Kursk Arc (the inability, as the Blevian background reported on July 13, Hitler, further promotion of the 9th Army and deep breakthroughs on three sites of the 2nd Tank Army) Mean the end of the German operation "Citadel".
Therefore, at the South Face, Manstein, after July 12, only tried to apply a larger damage to the Soviet troops, having traveled to eliminate the bag in the Shakhovo area, so that she was then without interference to take his strength to favorable position for defense, freeing part of the troops for other front sites.
This task is mostly manstein succeeded. On the night of July 18, the SS tank corps was allocated from Prokhorovka, having 203 service tanks, including 23 tiger, and 117 assault and anti-tank sau. Lybstandart SS was sent to Italy.
In total, from July 5 to July 17, the 2nd TC MOP lost irretrievably 34 tanks (9 pz III, 22 PZ IV and 3 Tigger), 6 assault sau and 5 anti-tank sau.
As Marshal Zhukov wrote:
"The Troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, coming out on July 23 to the front edge of the German defense, could not immediately go to the counter-offensive, although this was required by the Supreme Commander."
Belgorod-Kharkiv Strategic Offensive Operation "Rumyantsev" on South Face Kursk Arc began on only August 3, 1943.
In conclusion, it should be noted that, contrary to the established opinion, the Prokhorovsky battle was by no means a purely tank battle.
First, against the 2nd Tank Corps of the SS, in addition to the 5th GW. That fought the infantry 5th Guards Army - five of the eight divisions, and another Rifle Division of the 69th Army.
Secondly, in the Division of the SS tank corps, formally - tanning-grenadier, included one tank shelf (2 battalions) and two infantry shelf (6 battalions).
Of course, in addition to infantry, artillery (including reactive) both sides actively participated in Prokhorovsky battle. Aviation participated, however, if the Soviet documents talk about the strong activity of German aviation and the small activity of their aviation, the German documents claim that due to bad weather, the activity of German aviation was insufficient.
Formed in June 1942. The hull control includes the control of the housing (formed by the Moscow auto-rotary center) 110th, 180th, 181st tank brigades and the 18th motorized rifle brigade and other divisions. Parts of the housing were formed to have fallen, tank brigades did not have anti-aircraft guns and radio stations, and the motorized row brigade was just unable: it lacked only 628 people of the younger committee, there was no ammunition and chauffeurs for cars. The headquarters of the corps was not fully staffed, many officers did not match their positions.
Battle way
In the recent days of June, the part of the body began to move in the area of \u200b\u200bVoronezh, where profits were profit on July 2 - 4, 1942. On July 4, 1942, the Corps is included in the Bryansky Front.
The case immediately after unloading was introduced into battle with individual parts, acting at the front of 78 km. The 18th motorized rifle brigade took the defense of the north of Voronezh; The 180th Tank Brigade turned on the turn of the village of Deer Welcome; 110th Tank Brigade - South Voronezh; The 181st Tank Brigade had to destroy the enemy who wasted the south-west of Voronezh. The corps brigades entered into a collision with the enemy even before arriving in Voronezh commander of the Major General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, who before that he commanded the 241st Rifle Division in the North-Western Front. Colonel S. K. Romanov was appointed Commissioner of the Corps.
On July 7, 1942, the Bryansk front was divided into Bryansk and Voronezh fronts, the corps is included in the Voronezh Front.
In the period from August 1 to 20, 1942, the Corps under the command of General-Major I. P. Korchagin continued to conduct military actions as part of the main grouping of the 60th Army, fulfilling the overall task of the surrounding and destruction of the Voronezh groupage of the enemy. One of the purposes of the onset of the 18th TC was achieved. Lieutenant-General K. S. Moskalenko remembered:
"These were small-scale private offensive operations. Success they had a little. However, the overall operational result was very positive: the enemy was forced to fully maintain his grouping in the area of \u200b\u200bVoronezh and to the north-west of him, the possibility of transferring troops from here under the Stalingrad and the Caucasus "
On October 1, 1942, the Corps (except for the 180th TBR, which remains in the Voronezh Front, instead of her in the corps included 170th TBR) is derived from the composition of the Voronezh Front to the reserve of the Tatischevo rates.
From December 15 to December 31, 1942, participated in the Battle of Stalingrad during the operation
Ryasantsev Nikolay Dmitrievich - Commander of the tank platoon of the 170th Tank Kirovograd Red Banner Brigade (18th Tank Znamensky Red Body Corps, 6th Tank Army, 2nd Ukrainian Front), Guard Lieutenant.
Born on December 19, 1920 in the village of Zemevo now the Castornensky district of the Kursk region in the peasant family. Russian. In 1930, together with their parents, Semiluki Voronezh region moved to the village (now). Here graduated from a seven-year school. Worked the secretary of the village council. Caused to the army on August 20, 1941. He graduated from the Stalingrad Tank School.
During the Great Patriotic War in the existing army - from February 1, 1942. Fought on the Western, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. Double wounded - August 15, 1943 and September 21, 1944.
From June 15, 1944, he fought on the 2nd Ukrainian front in the 170th tank brigade of the 18th Tank Corps.
Especially distinguished in the course of the Yaskovine-Chisinau strategic offensive operation in Romania.
In the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Burchelul on the Highway of Iasi - Vasluju on August 23, 1944, with a crew of 5 hours, an unequal battle with the city of Yasi under the cover of tanks and self-propelled guns by an enemy column was carried out. He brought 3 self-propelled and 4 anti-tank guns, destroyed dozens of Nazis. Cleaning the highway from the enemy, contributed to the promotion of the brigade to the city of Hush, who was taken with the participation of the 18th Tank Corps on August 24.
W.kasem of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 24, 1945 for the courage and heroism, shown in the Yaskovina-Chishentic operation, Ryazantsev Nikolay Dmitrievich Awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
On January 10, 1945, the Guard Senior Lieutenant N.D. Ryazantsev was missing in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Faleschersh (20 km west of Budapest).
The name of the hero was wearing secondary school No. 2 in the city of Semiluki, where the museum of combat fame was created, also called N.D. Rysantsev. The museum contains and exhibited materials about the life and exploits of the hero.
He was awarded the Order of Lenin (03/24/1945), a Red Banner (09/16/1944), Suvorov of the 3rd degree (02/18/1945).
From 20 to 29 August 1944, N.D. Rysantsev at the 2nd Ukrainian Front participated in the Yaskovo-Chisinau strategic offensive operation (August 20 - 29, 1944).
In this operation, the 18th tank corps was introduced into a breakthrough at the site of the 27th army of the North-west of the city of Iasi and, by ordering this city from the West, rapidly moved to the southeast, to the city of Hush, to meet the troops of the 4th mechanized corps 3 -Ho Ukrainian front, closure ring of the environment of the Yaskovina-Chisheven group of troops of the enemy.
By August 24, this grouping of the German-Romanian troops (the 6th German and 3rd Romanian army) was surrounded, dissected on the part, and then crushed. In Romania, as a result of the popular uprising, the fascist government of Antonescu was overthrown, and Romania declared war in Germany. August 31, the 18th Tank Corps entered Bucharest.
For the difference in this operation, N.D. Ryazantsev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and presented to the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union.
In September 1944, he participated in battles with German-Hungarian troops, undertaken on September 5, offensive from the territory of Serbia against the 1st and 4th Romanian armies in Transylvania, from the area of \u200b\u200bsouth of the cities of Timisoara and decisive.
The compounds of the 18th Tank Corps along with the 53rd army, overcoming the southern Carpathians, reached the area of \u200b\u200bBrud and Virgo cities, broke the advanced part of the enemy and captured the bridgehead for the deployment of the forces of the army and the front in the Hungarian Plain. Relaxing the fierce attacks of the enemy, the Soviet and Romanian troops raped his attempts to capture the passes. After that, the troops of the 53rd army and the 18th tank corps in cooperation with the 1st Romanian army, developing the offensive to the North-West, liberated the city of Arad and Beyush and on September 22 came to the Romanian-Hungarian border. On September 23, the compounds of the 18th Tank Corps and the 243rd Rifle Division entered into the territory of Hungary, and three days later released the first Hungarian city of Mako.
From October 29, 1944 on the 2nd, and then the 3rd Ukrainian Front participated in the Budapest strategic offensive operation, during which the 188-thousand group of German-Hungarian troops in Budapest was surrounded by the forces of two fronts. During this operation, the 18th tank corps, coming from the area of \u200b\u200bLake Velenze, was moved to the north with stubborn battles, bypassing Budapest from the West, towards the 6th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The corps took part in the liberation of cities of Bichke (December 24, 1944) and Estergom (December 26, 1944). Going to the Estergoma area, the corps met with the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army, completing the environment of Budapest.
In this operation in combat for settlements of Lovashben, Vitesi (Medne Feyer, 18 km northeastern city, Tekesfechervar) December 22, 1944, commander of the company T-34-85 Guard Senior Lieutenant N.D. Ryasantsev, skillfully maneuvering on the field The battle, with his mouth rapidly moved ahead, destroying and turning into a messy flight superior enemy forces. During the day of battles, without having his losses, the company destroyed 7 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9 armored personnel carriers, 5 guns of various caliber, up to 100 soldiers and officers, defeated opponent's traffic in the height of 226.0.
N.D. Raszantsev personally destroyed 2 tanks, 3 armored personnel carriers with crews. As a result, further promotion of the brigade tanks was ensured. Awarded the Order of Suvorov 3rd degree.
From a premium sheet to assign the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union *
08/23/1944 The commander of the platoon of Ryazantsev, fulfilling the task - to deliver ammunition for the 1st tank battalion in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Hushi, passing the Highway of the Yaszy - Vaslauy, in the Burcelul district suddenly met with the tanks of the opponent, who covered the huge column of the 10th tank Division of the enemy, From the area of \u200b\u200bIasi to Vaslamui.
