History of Ibrahimbek. Kamoludin Abdullaev

The end of Basmachi in Tajikistan

The struggle against the Basmachi was most intense in the border areas, where assistance was received from the British. All the leaders of the Basmachi movement were connected with British intelligence, feeding it with information received from their fellow tribesmen from Soviet Russia and receiving help from the British to conduct forays across the border. 45-day raid across northern Afghanistan by regular units of the Red Army in 1929 https://cont.ws/@artads/907653 - "The secret operation of the Red Army in Afghanistan. 1929" did not sober up the hotheads of the emigrants.
At the end of June 1930, another foray beyond the cordon was undertaken - Soviet troops, parts of a combined cavalry brigade, following an unspoken agreement with Nadir Shah (who was aware of the threat of the disintegration of Afghanistan and the sedimentation of the northern provinces), carried out a raid on the territory of Afghanistan. The purpose of the operation is to destroy the Basmachi gangs in the north of the country. The attack was led by the communist Yakov Melkumov (Melkumyan Akop Artashesovich; according to other sources - Arshakovich). The same Melkumov, about whom rumors were spread at one time that he personally hacked to death Enver Pasha in 1922, who hid in Moscow from the death sentence brought against him in Turkey, and then, by agreement with the Bolsheviks, arrived in Turkestan to help in the agitation to pacify the Basmachi . It must be said that since 1918, many Armenians have served in TurkVO (and after reorganization - in SAVO). They were everywhere - in the troops, especially in command positions, in the Cheka, they sat in tribunals, served in police and food appropriation units, as well as in military party detachments - there were such Special Purpose Units (CHON) and Special Purpose Units (OSNAZ) ).

And sending Enver Pasha into this hell, the Bolshevik leaders could not help but understand that death awaited him there. Indeed, in addition to the Bolshevik Armenians, entire detachments of Dashnaks, who had previously committed atrocities in Persia and on the territory of modern Azerbaijan, as well as in Turkestan itself, joined the regular units of the Red Army: https://cont.ws/@artads/345325 - "Armenian atrocities."
Enver Pasha probably also understood that he was destined for the role of a sacrificial lamb and upon arrival he went over to the side of the Basmachi, thereby delaying his death. And he was killed, contrary to the stories and fantasies of the newly minted Armenian pseudo-historians, not in hand-to-hand combat with Melkumov (Melkumyan), but as an examination showed after the exhumation of Enver Pasha’s body in 1996 - as a result of 5 (!) bullet wounds in the chest. So there was no hand-to-hand combat between Melkumyan and Enver Pasha - with five bullets in the chest you can’t really swing a blade.
Melkumov successfully led the fight against the Basmachi; he himself tried not to get in the way of bullets, spending more time at headquarters or negotiating.

The leaders of the Basmachi were considered heroes by many locals and therefore were always supplied with fresh information. Tribal ties were stronger than the ideology brought from outside. Only people from the blood of the Basmachi and those who did not want to work on the land and earn their living by labor joined the ranks of the various Bolshevik detachments. But there was also an economic background - the farmers who worked on the land knew who this land belonged to for centuries and, in accordance with the previous agreements of their ancestors, sent taxes to their old owners who emigrated to Afghanistan. The Soviet authorities were against this and often interrupted the supply of the bais and prohibited the poor from financing their previous owners. If the tax did not reach the bai, his local representatives came and punished him, or in case of disobedience, the Basmachi entered from abroad and confiscated them with interest.
In the 1920s, discontent flared up in one village after another, Red Army detachments sent to help local Soviet cells were ambushed and attacked, and locals who joined the police often went over to the side of the Basmachi, sometimes in entire units, having previously killed their commanders. Residents joined gangs or provided them with support and assistance, including at the call of the bais and clergy, who proposed to carry out terror against party and Soviet activists, helped the Basmachi seize villages and pointed to all those loyal to the Soviet regime, from whom fodder and food were confiscated. All this required the party and military command to understand local customs, but they were practically not taken into account during the Sovietization of Asian territories. Collectivization was in full swing, relying primarily on the military.

Photo^ Melkumov (Melkumyan), accused by Stalin of a fascist conspiracy and his awards
Melkumyan sometimes personally had to take risks and participate in operations. So it was on that day, June 20, 1930, when, by order from Moscow, it was necessary to move into the territory of neighboring Afghanistan to eliminate gangs that continually crossed the border and staged predatory raids on Soviet institutions and authorities, convoys, caravans and detachments.
In Soviet sources it sounded like this:
“The invasion was explained by the need to ensure socialist construction in the USSR, in particular in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the need to deprive the Basmachi of their economic base and exterminate the Basmachi cadres.”
The border was crossed at the Aywaj border post, after which the Soviet detachment advanced 50-70 km deep into Afghanistan.
The major Basmach leaders, Ibrahim-bek and Utan-bek, without engaging in battle with the Red Army soldiers who outnumbered them, went to the mountainous regions of the Afghan province of Badakhshan. The Soviet detachment under the command of Melkumov (Melkumyan) literally burned everything in its path. Villages inhabited by ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks were completely destroyed, and in villages with a mixed population, cleansing was carried out selectively. In the valley of the Kunduz-Darya River, all the villages and tents inhabited by Kungrad, Lokais, Turkmens and Kazakhs who fled from Soviet power were destroyed, all the crops in the fields and storerooms were burned, almost all the livestock was taken away. It was a real clearing of the territory, hard, lightning-fast and cruel. In Soviet documents, 839 Basmachi emigrants and members of their families appear as liquidated. But given the number of settlements burned along 35 km in the Kunduz-Darya River valley, this figure should be significantly higher. Sources call the seizure of 40 rifles, which indicates a small number of Basmachi among those killed, but rather indicates the destruction of civilians. The report on the operation included data on losses: “Our losses - one Red Army soldier drowned during the crossing and one platoon commander and one Red Army soldier were wounded.” That is, this was a real cleansing of Afghan territory, for which Melkumov received an encouragement. Despite the flight of Ibrahim-bek and Utan-bek, the Soviet leadership regarded the operation as successful - the ideological inspirer of the Basmachi movement, the head of the religious sect Pir-Ishan, as well as the famous bandit leaders - Kurbashi Domullo-Donahan and Ishan-Pakhlavan - were destroyed.
Ibrahim Beg continued to make forays across the border.
Following the secret agreements reached with the employees of the Soviet mission in Kabul, in the spring of 1931, in the spring of 1931, the villages supporting Ibrahim Beg were struck by a sudden attack by the cavalry hired (apparently with Soviet money) by the Turkmen nomads Nadir Shah. The Basmachi leader, together with a detachment of 1.5 thousand Mujahideen, was forced (as soon as the passes opened) to leave the territory of Afghanistan in March of that year, where, after the destruction of the Tajik Bachaya Sakao in 1929, the Pashtun again became the emir. Large Soviet military forces were deployed against Ibrahim-bek on the territory of present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, including units of the 7th (formerly 1st) Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, 3rd Turkestan Rifle Division, 83rd Cavalry Regiment of the 8th Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, and the Uzbek Cavalry Brigade , Tajik rifle battalion, Kyrgyz cavalry division, 35th separate air detachment, police detachments, OGPU and red sticks. The operation to eliminate the Basmachi covered the areas of the Baysuntog, Aktau (Aktag) and Babatag mountain ranges. With each battle, the number of Basmachi decreased, and in the battle near Derbend, 30 km from Baysun in June 1931, Ibrahim Beg’s detachment practically ceased to exist.

Photo: Ibrahim Bey.
The second photo shows Ibrahim-bek (second from left) and members of the special task force Valishev, Kufeld and Enishevsky.
The photo was taken in Dushanbe immediately after the rally on the occasion of the capture of Ibrahim Bey. 1931)
On June 23, 1931, in the mountains of Tajikistan in the valley of the Kafirnigan River, after crossing Ibrahim-bek, he was captured by a special detachment under the command of an OGPU employee and at the same time the director of the collective farm “Kzyl Yulduz” (Russian: “Red Star”) Mukum Sultanov.

In Moscow, at a meeting of the Politburo chaired by Stalin, the effectiveness of the actions of the special services in neutralizing Ibrahim Beg, who convinced the Afghan emir of the desire of the mixed-tribal residents of northern Afghanistan to secede, was noted.
And Ibrahim-bek was taken to Tashkent, where the headquarters of the SAVO and other leading organizations of the Soviet government were then located. In a special department of SAVO, he was thoroughly interrogated, as were the gang members arrested with him:
Abdukayum Parvanachi, native of the village of Dangara, Uzbek-Loka, 47 years old, illiterate.
Salahuddin Suleiman Ishan Sudur, native of the city of Old Bukhara, Tajik, 54 years old.
Ishan Iskhan Mansur Khan, native of the village of Kayragach, Uzbek, 48 years old.
Ali Mardan Muhammad Datkho, native of the village of Beshbulak, Uzbek-Loka, 44 years old, illiterate.
Kur Artyk Ashur Datkho, native of the village of Sasyk-Bulak, Uzbek-Loka, 40 years old, illiterate.
Kurban Kendzhi Toksaba, native of the village of Kizyl-Kiya, Uzbek-Loka, 28 years old, illiterate.
Tashmat Khoja Berdy, native of the Karamankul village, Uzbek, 47 years old, illiterate.
Mulla Niyaz Hakim Parvanachi, native of Bukhara, Tajik, 53 years old.
Kurban-bek Shir Ali, native of the village of Shurchi, Uzbek-Loka, 34 years old, illiterate.
Mulla Ahmad-biy Seid, a native of the village of Munduk.
Mirza Kayum Chary, native of the village of Sary-Ab, Uzbek, 34 years old, literate.
Azim Mark Astankul, native of the village of Koktash, Uzbek-Loka, 51 years old, illiterate.
Ishan Palvan Bahadur-zade, from Kabadian, Uzbek, 44 years old.
Ali Palvan Il-Mirza, from the village of Urulyk, Uzbek-Loka, 42 years old, illiterate.
Shah Hasan Imankul, from the village of Taushar, Tajik, 38 years old, illiterate.
All of them were sentenced to death by decision of the OGPU Collegium on April 13, 1932. The sentence against Ibrahim Bey's assistants was carried out on August 10, 1932. Ibrahim Beg was shot three weeks later, on August 31.

The leaders of the Basmachi movement were forced to recognize the strength of Soviet power and the socialist system. Ibrahim Bey said at the trial:
“When I left for the north of Afghanistan in order to cross into Soviet territory... I heard assurances from the representative of the former emir in the League of Nations, Yusufbai Mukumbaev, that there was a decision of the League of Nations to return Bukhara to the former emir. For me, this meant that foreign states would provide armed support in my fight against Soviet power. I also relied on the fact that I would be widely supported by the population. However, I was convinced of the opposite. In Tajikistan itself, it did not receive support from the population and came to the end that is obligatory for those who do not understand what Soviet power is based on - namely, on the strong support of the working population...” (390).
One of Ibrahim Bey’s henchmen, Suleiman Salakhutdinov, said: “Due to my darkness, I did not imagine the strength of Soviet power. While fighting, I became convinced that our idea, that is, the fight against powerful Soviet power, was absurd” (391). Another of Ibrahim’s assistants, Ishan Isakhan Mansurkhanov, also recognized the strength of Soviet power: “Our plans did not come true,” he said, “because we had no idea about the strength of Soviet power. In the struggle, I became convinced that our undertakings were pointless” (392).
With the defeat of Ibrahim Beg, the fight against the Basmachi in Tajikistan was over. Individual groups led by Utan-bek, who fled abroad, were pursued by detachments of Afghan troops. Some small gangs still made attempts to invade Soviet territory, but each time they met a worthy rebuff from the Soviet border guards.

[On June 24, 1931, a new Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression was signed in Kabul. From the Soviet side, Ambassador L.N. took part in them. Stark, with Afghan - Minister of Foreign Affairs Fayz Muhammad Khan, after which our country increased funding for Afghanistan, and Afghan units, in cooperation with units of the Red Army, during the summer-autumn of 1931 began to destroy the Basmachi detachments of Utan Bey, Turkmen Jan Bey and others Mujahideen, robbers and smugglers...;SS]
Utan-bek with two dozen Basmachi rushed through the mountains and sands of Northern Afghanistan. In early December, he and a small gang fled to Iran under the patronage of the leader of the Turkmen emigration [later he further annoyed the Soviet authorities with his forays; SS].
In December 1931, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became more or less calm. Mass raids by Basmachi stopped [although isolated cases occurred until the late 1930s and early 40s; SS]. The main fight was against smugglers.
http://militera.lib.ru/research...
*****
Detachments of red-stick vigilantes were organized everywhere, consisting mainly of converted Komsomol members and communists and under the leadership of OGPU employees. At the same time, troops and police carried out the destruction of the old elite - the feudal-tribal elite and its sympathizers in all the internal Asian regions of the USSR, which predetermined the final establishment of centralized power in Central Asia.
The Basmachi were exterminated in the thousands after the decision of the OGPU Collegium sentenced Ibrahim-bek’s gang.
SS. 04/08/2018.

(1931 )

Ibrahim bey(taj. Ibrohimbek Chakabaev); (1889 ) -) - leader of the Basmachi movement in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Biography

Ibrahim-bek is a Lokaan by origin, a representative of a local Turkic (possibly Mongolian) clan by origin, related to the Emir of Bukhara. Representatives of the Lokai people do not consider themselves Uzbeks, and during the collapse of the USSR and the formation of Tajik statehood, they demanded to be registered as an independent nation, to provide education in schools either in Tajik or in the Lokai language. Many researchers rightly note the significant difference between the official Uzbek and Lokai languages.

In support of Ibrahim Beg, Seyyid Alim Khan sent Enver Pasha and his other troops. Enver Pasha himself tried to lead and unite the entire Basmachi movement, but Ibrahim Beg was suspicious of him and even took him under arrest. He later refused to support Enver Pasha during his brief successes against the Red Army. In 1922, Enver Pasha lost almost his entire detachment in battle and was killed in a battle with a Red Army squadron while trying to leave for Afghanistan.

On June 23, 1931, Ibrahim Beg was captured by a detachment of the red commander Mukum Sultanov. Ibrahim Bey was taken under escort to Tashkent, where he was brought to trial and immediately after the trial was shot.

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Literature

• Pavel Gusterin. The story of Ibrahim Beg. Basmachism of one kurbashi in his words. - Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2014. - 60 p. - ISBN 978-3-659-13813-3.

Notes

see also

Excerpt characterizing Ibrahim bey

He bowed his head and awkwardly, like children learning to dance, began to shuffle first with one foot and then with the other.
The general, a member of the Gofkriegsrat, looked sternly at him; without noticing the seriousness of the stupid smile, he could not refuse a moment’s attention. He narrowed his eyes to show that he was listening.
“I have the honor to congratulate you, General Mack has arrived, he’s completely healthy, he just got a little hurt here,” he added, beaming with a smile and pointing to his head.
The general frowned, turned away and walked on.
– Gott, wie naiv! [My God, how simple it is!] - he said angrily, walking away a few steps.
Nesvitsky hugged Prince Andrei with laughter, but Bolkonsky, turning even paler, with an angry expression on his face, pushed him away and turned to Zherkov. The nervous irritation into which the sight of Mack, the news of his defeat and the thought of what awaited the Russian army led him, found its outcome in anger at Zherkov’s inappropriate joke.
“If you, dear sir,” he spoke shrilly with a slight trembling of his lower jaw, “want to be a jester, then I cannot prevent you from doing so; but I declare to you that if you dare to make fun of me in my presence another time, then I will teach you how to behave.
Nesvitsky and Zherkov were so surprised by this outburst that they silently looked at Bolkonsky with their eyes open.
“Well, I just congratulated,” said Zherkov.
– I’m not joking with you, please remain silent! - Bolkonsky shouted and, taking Nesvitsky by the hand, walked away from Zherkov, who could not find what to answer.
“Well, what are you talking about, brother,” Nesvitsky said calmingly.
- Like what? - Prince Andrei spoke, stopping from excitement. - Yes, you must understand that we are either officers who serve our tsar and fatherland and rejoice in the common success and are sad about the common failure, or we are lackeys who do not care about the master’s business. “Quarante milles hommes massacres et l"ario mee de nos allies detruite, et vous trouvez la le mot pour rire,” he said, as if reinforcing his opinion with this French phrase. “C”est bien pour un garcon de rien, comme cet individu , dont vous avez fait un ami, mais pas pour vous, pas pour vous. [Forty thousand people died and the army allied to us was destroyed, and you can joke about it. This is forgivable for an insignificant boy like this gentleman whom you made your friend, but not for you, not for you.] Boys can only have fun like this,” said Prince Andrei in Russian, pronouncing this word with a French accent, noting that Zherkov could still hear him.
He waited to see if the cornet would answer. But the cornet turned and left the corridor.

The Pavlograd Hussar Regiment was stationed two miles from Braunau. The squadron, in which Nikolai Rostov served as a cadet, was located in the German village of Salzeneck. The squadron commander, captain Denisov, known throughout the cavalry division under the name Vaska Denisov, was allocated the best apartment in the village. Junker Rostov, ever since he caught up with the regiment in Poland, lived with the squadron commander.
On October 11, the very day when everything in the main apartment was raised to its feet by the news of Mack's defeat, at the squadron headquarters, camp life calmly went on as before. Denisov, who had lost all night at cards, had not yet come home when Rostov returned from foraging early in the morning on horseback. Rostov, in a cadet's uniform, rode up to the porch, pushed his horse, threw off his leg with a flexible, youthful gesture, stood on the stirrup, as if not wanting to part with the horse, finally jumped off and shouted to the messenger.
“Ah, Bondarenko, dear friend,” he said to the hussar who rushed headlong towards his horse. “Lead me out, my friend,” he said with that brotherly, cheerful tenderness with which good young people treat everyone when they are happy.
“I’m listening, your Excellency,” answered the Little Russian, shaking his head cheerfully.
- Look, take it out well!
Another hussar also rushed to the horse, but Bondarenko had already thrown over the reins of the bit. It was obvious that the cadet spent a lot of money on vodka, and that it was profitable to serve him. Rostov stroked the horse’s neck, then its rump, and stopped on the porch.
“Nice! This will be the horse!” he said to himself and, smiling and holding his saber, ran up onto the porch, rattling his spurs. The German owner, in a sweatshirt and cap, with a pitchfork with which he was clearing out manure, looked out of the barn. The German's face suddenly brightened as soon as he saw Rostov. He smiled cheerfully and winked: “Schon, gut Morgen!” Schon, gut Morgen! [Wonderful, good morning!] he repeated, apparently finding pleasure in greeting the young man.

Mohammed Ibrahim-bek was born in 1888 in the village of Kok-Tash, Lokai-Tajik region, into the family of an Uzbek Lokai from the “Aksary” clan of the “Isa-Khoja” tribe Chakabai, who, according to some sources, was an officer in the Bukhara army, according to others, - an official of the Emir of Bukhara.

Before the overthrow of the Emir of Bukhara Alim Khan in 1920, Ibrahim Beg served in the Bukhara army. In 1920, he joined the Basmachi movement, but, having become the Kurbashi of the Lokais in 1922, he began to fight not against the Soviets, but against Enver Pasha, apparently viewing him as an impostor. After the liquidation of Enver Pasha by Soviet troops on August 4, 1922, Ibrahim Beg became the main leader of the Basmachi who came from the former Bukhara Emirate.

Conventionally, Ibrahim Bey’s activities in this capacity can be divided into two stages. The first stage of the Basmachi movement under his leadership lasted from December 1922, when he arrived from Afghanistan and convened a kurultai (meeting) of kurbashi in the Tajik village of Gissar, becoming, in fact, their coordinator, until June 1926, when in June his detachment was defeated, and Kurbashi himself disappeared into Afghanistan.

After fleeing with the remnants of his gang to Afghanistan, Ibrahim Beg took part in battles near the city of Mazar-i-Sharif with Soviet troops who invaded Afghanistan in April 1929 to support the deposed king Amanullah Khan.

The second stage - from November 1929, when Ibrahim Beg came into conflict with the authorities of Afghanistan, which accelerated his decision to invade Soviet territory in June 1930, to June 23, 1931 - ended with the surrender of Ibrahim Beg and his associates to the troops OGPU. As a result of the operation developed and carried out by the Mazar-Sharif residency of the Foreign Department of the OGPU (political intelligence), the Basmachi detachment led by Ibrahim Beg was defeated.

Ibrahim-bek was interrogated in the Special Department of the North African Military District in Tashkent and was shot there on August 31, 1931.

Notes

Lakais (Lokais) are representatives of one of the three largest Uzbek tribal confederations, settled in the territories of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
RGVA. F. 25895, op. 1, d. 875, l. 53.
Sayyid Amir Alim Khan (1880–1943) - ruler of the Bukhara Emirate in 1910–1920. In 1918 he signed a peace treaty with the RSFSR. In 1920, as a result of the Bukhara Revolution, he was overthrown from the throne. Tried to organize a fight against the Soviets. In 1921, as a result of the Gissar expedition of Soviet troops, he was defeated and fled to Afghanistan.
Enver Pasha (Ismail Enver; 1881–1922) - Turkish military and political leader. Graduated from the General Staff Academy in Istanbul (1903). In 1913 he carried out a coup d'etat. During the First World War, he served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief (the Sultan was formally considered the Commander-in-Chief). After the defeat of Turkey, he fled to Germany, and later spent some time on the territory of Soviet Russia. In 1921, he took part in the anti-Soviet Basmachi rebellion in Central Asia and was killed in battle with Soviet troops.
In 1920, two Soviet states were formed on the territory of Turkestan - the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic (mainly on the territory of the former Khiva Khanate) and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (mainly on the territory of the former Bukhara Emirate). The Basmachis, who came from the former Khanate of Khiva, were led by Junaid Khan (Mohammed Kurban Serdar). See: RGVA. F. 25895, op. 1, no. 850.
Amanullah Khan (1892–1960) – Emir (1919–1926) and King (1926–1929) of Afghanistan. On February 28, 1919, he declared the independence of Afghanistan. As a result of the exchange of friendly messages with V.I. In 1919, Lenin established diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and Afghanistan; in 1921, the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship was concluded; in 1926, the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression was concluded with the USSR. Tried to carry out progressive reforms. In 1928 he visited the USSR. Abdicated the throne and emigrated as a result of the anti-government uprising of 1928–1929.
On January 23, 1922, a decision was made to abolish the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK) and create on its basis the State Political Administration (GPU) under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). With the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922, on November 2, 1923, the GPU was transformed into the United State Political Administration (OGPU).

Ibrahimbek. This name kept the Red Army and the authorities of Tajikistan and all of Central Asia in suspense for more than ten years. The fate of this man reflected the complex and contradictory history of the peoples of Central Asia. This essay will focus on Ibrahimbek’s struggle against Soviet power in Eastern Bukhara in 1921-1926 and the ups and downs of his emigrant life, including participation in the alien civil war in Afghanistan until his return to Tajikistan in April 1931.

Kamoludin Abdullaev
IBRAHIMBEK LAKAY

Biography facts

An interesting attempt to give a portrait of Ibrahimbek is the work of his fellow countryman and our contemporary, Doctor of Sciences Nasreddin Nazarov. The author used a large number of new sources, including those of Afghan origin, as well as materials collected during field research in Ibrahimbek’s homeland in the early 2000s.1

The biographical data of this man, recorded in his own words, are contained in his criminal case, opened by the Tashkent Cheka in 1931. So, Ibrahim was born in 1889 in the village of Koktash (modern Rudaki district, adjacent to the southern part of Dushanbe) and came from a tribe lokai, kind of isankhoja. The Isankhodzhin people lived interspersed with other Uzbek tribes and Tajiks on a vast territory from Koktash to Yavan and the north of the Dangara Valley. Lokays and similar tribes (Kongrats, Yuz, Semizy, Katagans, Marks, Durmens, Kesamirs, etc.) are descendants of Uzbek nomads, came from Dashti Kipchak (a vast steppe territory from the lower reaches of the Volga in the west to the northern bank of the Syr Darya in the south -east) in Movarounnahr in the 16th century following Sheibani Khan. They are classified as late or Dashtikipchak tribes. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, they were actually called Uzbeks. By the time they appeared in the region, along with the Tajik aborigines, the so-called “early” Turkic tribes of pre-Mongol origin were already living - Karluks, Turks, Mughals, etc., who came here starting from the 6th century. Many of them settled long ago and lived peacefully with the local Tajiks. The Turks of Kulyab, for example, were at the stage of a complete transition to the Tajik language. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Lokais were the third largest Uzbek people of Eastern Bukhara (after the Congrats and Yuz). In 1924, there were 25,400 people within the boundaries of Gissar and Baljuvon.2 Approximately the same number of Lokais fled to Afghanistan in the first half of the 1920s. There are 4 known divisions (uruga) of this tribe: isankhoja, badrakli, bairam and turtuul. The Isankhodzhin and Badrakli people lived mainly in Gissar, and the Bayram and Turtuul people lived mainly in Baldzhuvon. The Lokais, as well as other Dashtikipchak Uzbek tribes living next to them, as well as the Turkmens, were at the stage of transition from nomadic to settled life. They slowly built small villages on the sites of their camps and tried to combine traditional transhumance cattle breeding with primitive agriculture. The latter, that is, the transition to agriculture - the traditional occupation of the Tajiks, left its mark on the nature of their relationship with the Tajiks, who made up the majority (almost two-thirds) of the population of Eastern Bukhara and the early Turks.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Eastern Bukhara was a series of bekstvos, virtually independent, given by the Bukhara emir to the power of local feudal beks. The Lokais and other Uzbek tribes, which retained many of the features of the nomadic military organization of the medieval Turks and Mongols, lived separately, maintaining their structures, supporting the beks and emirs, and exerting occasional pressure on the settled Tajik farmers. Relations between Tajiks and Uzbek tribes were wary and sometimes hostile. It was caused not only by the fact that the Lokais gradually moved from Gissar to the east, into the territory of the Tajiks, but also by the reverse process of resettlement of the Tajiks of Kulyab and Baljuvon to the south and southwest - to the foothills of Kulyab and Baljuvon and to the Gissar valley.3 However, in the villages , where Tajiks have long lived together with Uzbeks, no discord was observed. The common people lived in communities, preferring to negotiate rather than fight with their neighbors.

Ibragimbek’s father, Chakobay, was awarded the rank of toksabo (which corresponded to the rank of colonel according to the emir’s table of ranks) and was an aksakal (elder) of a village of 80 households. He was a wealthy man, according to local standards. Although, in general, social differentiation and class stratification in the Lokai environment were not expressed to such an extent as to call any of the tribal leaders fabulously rich feudal lords who mercilessly exploited their fellow villagers. Chakobay's family consisted of 4 wives, 6 daughters, 6 sons. The household members themselves were employed on the farm; only for a while did Chakobai hire 3-4 workers from outside. Ibrahimbek was the youngest of the sons. As a child, he studied for a year and a half in primary school (maktab), he could read a little, but, by his own admission, he never learned to write. When the time came, Ibrahimbek got married, and then took a second wife. Both wives were childless. Later, in 1921, Ibrahimbek married for the third time - to Bibihaticha, the daughter of the Lokai leader Abdukayum Parvonachi.4 In 1912, when Ibrahimbek was 23 years old, he lost his father. After his death, the father left his youngest son a couple of bulls and large debts, which, however, Ibrahimbek had no intention of paying off. For almost ten years after his father’s death, he hid from creditors, living either at home or going to his fellow tribesmen in other villages. Some sources call Ibrahimbek a horse thief. Apparently, these statements are not far from the truth. Raids on neighbors for the purpose of robbery are not uncommon among the nomads of Central Asia. There are references to the fact that Ibrahimbek had the rank of emir and was involved in collecting tax (zakat), so he can easily be considered one of the emir’s officials.5 Among his fellow tribesmen, he was also known as a skilled horseman and an indispensable participant in popular folk shows - buzkashi (goat tore). This continued until the autumn of 1920, when the “Bukhara Revolution” fell out of the blue on Ibragimbek, who lived the free and idle life of an abrek adventurer6.

Conquest of Eastern Bukhara

By May 1, 1921, Red Army troops occupied almost the entire territory of Eastern Bukhara. Darvaz remained free, with its center in Kalai Khumb, where the Tajiks gathered, led by Ishan Sultan (about whom we wrote in the previous essay). Attempts by the Bolsheviks to break through there in 1921 and 1922. were not successful. The conquest of Eastern Bukhara was determined, on the one hand, by the strength of the Red Army, on the other, by the military weakness and political disunity of the indigenous population. However, very soon the Red Army soldiers discovered that they were not dealing with an “ally of the proletariat,” but with a hostile, or at best, neutral population. As a result, the command had to consolidate the occupied settlements through occupation. The vanguard found itself cut off from the main part of the troops, scattered in the rear in the form of separate garrisons. Such a war required enormous human and material resources. These circumstances, as well as the military resistance of the rebels, literally tied the Red Army hand and foot. She no longer had the strength to go to the mountains - Karategin and Darvaz. Naturally, there could be no talk of any Afghan or Indian expeditions. Looking ahead, let's say that the merit of the Basmachi movement lies precisely in the fact that it became the main obstacle to the “Red Army attack on the East.” Faced with mass rebellion and then rebellion, the Bolsheviks abandoned plans for an immediate advance into Khorasan, South Asia and Western China. They decided to focus on strengthening the positions they had already conquered in Turkestan and Bukhara. Units of the 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division, which made a trip to Eastern Bukhara, called the “Gissar Expedition,” were in a state of complete disintegration by the spring of 1921, due to fatigue, illness, and lack of uniforms. The incredibly difficult conditions in which the protracted “Gissar Expedition” took place inevitably led to a breakdown in discipline and pushed the Red Army soldiers into mass looting and violence against the local population.7 By May 1, 1921, Red Army troops occupied almost the entire territory of Eastern Bukhara. They placed their garrisons in strategically important villages.

Immediately after occupying Dushanbe, Gissar, Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab, without waiting for the organization of civilian authorities, the military began massive food procurements for the needs of the Red Army. Grain, meat and other products were exported from Eastern Bukhara to the Trans-Caspian region8. It is worth recalling that the Soviet government carried out the seizure of products or “food appropriation” outside the borders of its state. After all, the BNSR, formally proclaimed on September 14, 1920, remained independent and independent until 1924. The implementation of surplus appropriation was complicated by the fact that Western and Eastern Bukhara, which traditionally served as the breadbasket of the emirate, were in the area of ​​military operations. As a result, the grain plantations were neglected and abandoned by the inhabitants9. The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Bukhara Republic, Fayzulla Khodzhaev, wrote to Moscow and Lenin in June 1921 that “meat allocation in the republic was carried out with the help of Russian armed detachments and aroused the hatred of the masses towards the Russians in general and the Red Army in particular.”10 Food detachments, special departments of the Red Army carried out requisitions, accompanied by reprisals against the so-called “kulaks” and “adherents of the emir.” By the autumn of 1921, food detachments had collected 1.5 million poods of grain in Eastern Bukhara11. By the way, before the appearance of the Red troops, Bukhara did not lack bread. When in 1917 bread stopped coming from Russia in exchange for Bukhara cotton, Bukhara, having survived one half-starved year, decisively reoriented its agriculture and by 1921 had 5 million poods (80 thousand tons) of grain surplus12. Once again, let's jump ahead and note that the food and material resources of Bukhara (including the emir's gold) in 1921-1922. helped Soviet Russia overcome the food crisis and thereby maintain its position in the region.

From the very beginning, Russia took control of the economy of Bukhara. According to the agreement between the RSFSR and the Belarusian People's Republic of 1921, Bukhara was deprived of the right to grant concessions to foreign states without Russia's permission. Guarding the border with Afghanistan and customs were also the responsibility of the RSFSR.

New authorities and units of the Red Army, due to the lack of suitable premises, were located in schools, mosques and other sacred places revered by Muslims. The Red Army soldiers destroyed and dismantled the few wooden dwellings for firewood. Involuntarily, the population had the impression of the new government as organized and armed robbers, extortionists and desecrators of religion.

A small part of revolutionary-minded Bukharans, as well as those who knew the Russians and sought to avoid bloodshed, showed a willingness to cooperate with the Red Army. On March 5, 1921, two people arrived in the town of Garm from the village of Mudzhikharv and declared that the population “entirely and fully recognizes Soviet power and the new Bukhara government.” One of them was Nusratullo Maksum, the future first head of the government of Soviet Tajikistan13. Among the supporters of the new government were many so-called “otkhodniks” - seasonal workers who worked at industrial enterprises in Fergana and Tashkent (today they would be called guest workers)

But the bulk of the population behaved differently. People fled and hid, fearing executions, arrests and requisitions. Often they left the sites of upcoming battles and returned to their villages upon their completion. In some cases, they simply went to the mountains to wait out a difficult period, in others they fled abroad. Leaving the territory occupied by the “infidels” without resistance, although not recommended, is not prohibited by the Koran.

And finally, there were those who made desperate attempts to resist. It would be surprising if traditional eastern Bukharan society, in which male dominance was absolute, reacted to the Soviet invasion in some other way. In the spring of 1921, an uprising broke out against the Red Army and the Bukhara government in Eastern Bukhara (Gissar, Kurgan-Tube, Kulyab, Karategin). It was headed by the clergy and tribal authorities. His goal was to restore Islamic sovereignty, which was embodied in the Emirate of Bukhara. Detachments of fighters were created everywhere to participate in jihad. The population was called upon to support the Mujahideen in their fight against the “infidels” who had raised arms against Muslims and driven them out of their places. Sufi ecclesiastical Sufi leaders took upon themselves the responsibility of bringing together ethno-linguistically diverse groups. However, in military-operational terms, the detachments were not reliably connected with each other, and especially with the newcomers from Ferghana, although the latter, under the command of Nurmat, Shermat’s brother, arrived in Eastern Bukhara at the request of Alim Khan. Nevertheless, this movement, later called Basmachism by Bolshevik agitators, turned into a formidable force. Particular resistance was shown by the tribes of Kulyab and Baljuvon (Uzbek tribes, Tajiks, Turks, Turkmens), who lost in the battles in the spring of 1921, as F. Khojaev reported, about 10 thousand killed14. Then the largest authority of the Kulyab rebels, Davlatmandbiy, and his detachment attacked the Russian garrison in Kulyab. After the retreat of the Mujahideen, the Red Army brutally dealt with the local population. The information report of the representative of the RSFSR in Dushanbe reported that the Red Army committed a lot of “disgrace” at the same time. As always during military conflicts, the first victims were the weak, including women. Thus, in Kulyab, several women were raped by a special detachment15.

The efforts of the “Basmachi” were aimed both at protection from external attacks and at strengthening ideological, patriarchal ties and solidarity at the community level. Loyalty to religious ideals and assistance to the rebels was considered a public duty, and solidarity with the Mujahideen was welcomed. Accordingly, cooperation with the authorities was punished in the most severe manner.

In addition to the Ferghana people, the rebel Bukharans were supported by a detachment of Tajiks-Matchin (from the upper reaches of Zerafshan) of 2.5 thousand people, led by Abdulhafiz. The fight against the new system was led by a religious authority - Ishan Sultan from Darvaz and the local feudal lord Davlatmandbiy - a Turk from Baljuvon. It was they who turned to the Lokaians with a call to participate in the fight against the Russians and Jadids. In the archives of the Soviet Army there is a mention that Ibragimbek was a “military instructor” for Davlatmandbiy.

So the tribal detachments of the Lokais under the command of Kayum Parvonachi responded to the call of the clergy and local feudal lords and stood up to defend the Emir of Bukhara and their villages from the revolutionary troops and Soviet power. Ibrahimbek later replaced his ill father-in-law as commander, and soon after, Lokai units began to dominate the insurgency in Eastern Bukhara.

In some later sources of Muslim origin, our hero is referred to as “Mullah Muhammad Ibrahimbek Lokai.” Although it is unlikely that Ibrahimbek was a mullah, that is, an educated person in the religious sense. But he had his own spiritual mentor - mullah imom. His name was Ishoni Dovud from Kulyab. For his sweet voice and knowledge of classical poetry, he was called Ishoni Bulbul (nightingale).16 Despite the fact that Ibrahimbek was a believer, he was, first of all, a tribal chief and military leader. According to Baglani, everyone who knew Ibrahimbek noted his personal fearlessness and taciturnity. Ibrahimbek's career can be judged by the fact that at the end of 1921 he held the rank of guard begi (captain) in the emir's army. And in the future, Alim Khan encouraged Ibrahimbek in every possible way, singling him out as his clear favorite, although these two characters in this study met each other only in the late summer of 1926 in Kabul.

The backbone of the Eastern Bukhara Basmachi consisted of tribal (Uzbek) and ethno-regional (Tajik and Uzbek) formations, as well as the remnants of the defeated Bukhara army. The uprising in Dangara was led by the Lokai leader Kayum Parvonachi. Another Lokaian (Turtuul clan) Togai Sary operated in Kyzyl Mazar, while Baljuvon and Kulyab were controlled by the local Turk Davlatmandbiy. In Gissar Temurbek dominated, in Surkhandarya - Khurrambek. Tajiks Rahman Dodho, Ishan Sultan, Fuzail Maksum led detachments in Dushanbe, Darvaz and Karategin, respectively. Ibrahimbek, having his base in Koktash, wandered with his troops between Gissar and Kulyab, finding shelter and support from his Lokais. Thus, almost the entire territory of modern southern Tajikistan and the adjacent Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan from Baysun and Shirabad to Primapirya was controlled by the Basmachi, whose ranks were dominated by semi-nomadic Uzbeks. Among the latter, the Lokais of Ibrahimbek dominated. The detachments were cemented by the authority of the leader, tribal solidarity and the aura of a defender of the faith. It was this triad that ensured the rapid rise of Ibrahimbek. Judging by the names of the leaders, many of them had military ranks (toksabo, dodho, parvonachi, etc.), from which it can be assumed that these were former officers of the Bukhara army, or were awarded titles during the resistance itself. The rebels relied on their own strength and did not have organized material support from abroad. A fugitive emir who, although he lived well, did not have sufficient funds to finance a long military campaign. Weapons were bought in Afghanistan with funds collected in the form of “jihad” taxes from the population. Another source of weapons and supplies was the Red Army. Light firearms and ammunition were stolen, bought from Red Army soldiers, and obtained in battle.

War in Gissar and Kulyab

At the beginning of the summer of 1921, the uprising was suppressed, but Russian troops continued to remain in Bukhara, numbering 20 thousand people - poorly dressed, hungry, undisciplined. Taking this into account, as well as the fierce resistance put up by the rebels, the Bukhara government attempted to make peace with the Basmachi. On behalf of the government of the Bukhrespublika, Ata Khojaev and the head of the Dushanbe police, the Turk Sureya Efendi, declared an amnesty to all the imprisoned “ulamas, mullahs, Amaldors, aksakals and prominent persons of the brothers of the Garm and Dyushambi regions.” On June 20, Sureya Efendi went to Garm. He spoke to the residents, spoke about amnesty, about the role of Russia in the liberation of Muslims from the English yoke, and persuaded that “all citizens who fled and left their homes, as well as Amaldors who fled from the revolutionary government, return to their homes and continue their peaceful lives " The fiery speech of the Turkish officer had a great emotional impact on the audience. Many of those present had tears in their eyes. Touched, Ishan Sultan ordered the surrender of all weapons. In turn, S. Efendi, no less emotional, returned the weapons and... appointed Ishan Sultan chairman of the Garm Revolutionary Committee.17

Plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR B. Durov and government representative Atovullo Khoja Pulathodjaev (Ata Khodjaev) entered into correspondence with Davlatmandbiy. The military command promised to return the requisitioned cattle immediately after the Mujahideen surrendered their weapons. At the beginning of August 1921, a delegation of the Bukhara government and the Russian command, led by Ata Khojaev, arrived in the village of Kangurt to meet with the rebels. The delegation included a certain Saidzhan Dodkho, who later emigrated to Turkey and published his memoirs in the magazine “Yangi Turkiston” in 1928. So, Saijan dodkho recalled:

“We arrived in Kangurt. Together with Davlatmandbiy, Tugay Sary (Lokaian), Ashur (Semiz), Abdulkodir (Karluk), Abdulkayum (Lokayan from Baljuvon), Poshshokhon (Katagan Mogul) and others arrived at the negotiations. Davlatmandbiy was dressed in an Afghan uniform. After the required greetings, he stood up and said: “Until now, no Russian has set foot on Bukhara soil. Your government came and brought Russian soldiers. You took all our property and raped our women and girls. Until Russian soldiers leave Bukhara land, we will continue our war. We will lay down our arms as soon as the Russians leave Bukhara.”18

Representatives of the Bukhara government found it difficult to negotiate with the rebels. The Bolsheviks were largely to blame for the fact that there was misunderstanding and even enmity between the accounting government and ordinary Bukharians. Being the main initiators and executors of the Bukhara coup, in the first year after the “revolution” the Bolsheviks tried to stay in the shadows so that, if anything happened, they could blame all the excesses on the Bukhara communists, former Jadids. Presented as traitors to the masses, the Jadids became targets from the right and left - both the Bolshevik leadership and the Basmachi emirists.

On the morning of August 12, 1921, in the village of Kalta Chinar Ata, Khojaev on the one hand and Davlatmandbiy on the other, in the presence of the Russian consul Durov, the authorized representative of the 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division Shatov, as well as 10 thousand Red Army soldiers, 6 thousand Mujahideen, signed a peace treaty. According to him, the rebel commanders submitted to the government and pledged to lay down their arms. In turn, the Mujahideen demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Bukhara. The agreement stated: “There should be no interference of foreigners in internal affairs on the territory of sacred Bukhara.” The text of the agreement included descriptions of crimes committed against the local population, demands for the return of confiscated property and the immediate withdrawal of special departments from Bukhara territory. A mandatory condition also included the punishment of 12 elders (seniors) who delivered food to the Kulyab garrison of the Red Army. They were accused of “theft, debauchery and robbery of the people.” Subsequently, the aksakals were found and handed over to the new chairman of the Kulyab Revolutionary Committee, Davlatmandbiy. Six of them were soon publicly executed.

Regarding the fall of the emir's power and the signing of the protocol by Davlatmandbiy and the Bolsheviks, the people of Kulyab composed the following verse:

Amiramon gaflat omad
Shikasti davlat omad
Biybobo-ro zur omad
Salomi hukumat omad.

(translation:

Having forgotten about vigilance, our emir did not notice how

Our state has fallen.

It became difficult Biy-bobo 19

A greeting has arrived from the government.) 20

At the end of summer, the withdrawal of units of the 1st Cavalry Division began, which had been in Eastern Bukhara for 9 months and had completely disintegrated. A bountiful harvest was ripening in the fields. However, the peasants of Eastern Bukhara were never able to calmly collect the fruits of their labor. The peace was short-lived. The truce did not lead to peace. Ata Khojaev, who returned to Bukhara, was sharply criticized by the Bolsheviks for concluding peace with the Basmachi. Meanwhile, power in Gissar, Kulyab and Garm was de facto and de jure in the hands of the Mujahideen. Their leaders - Davlatmandbiy, Ishan Sultan - did not think of laying down their arms and recognizing the Bukhara government. In September 1921, in the regions of Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube, the war resumed with renewed vigor. “Bukhara, which seemed to be cleared, had to be conquered again by armed force,” the chief of staff of the Turkfront later wrote. Davlatmandbiy collected gold, silver and 200 horses from the population. All this was transported to Afghanistan to purchase weapons and ammunition. By the end of September, three centers of resistance had formed on the territory of Eastern Bukhara: in Dushanbe, Baljuvon and Garm with a total number of 40 thousand people. On September 21, a crowd of 20 thousand, armed mainly with sticks and hoes, approached Dushanbe, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops and government representatives. A more than month-long siege of the city began. By that time, Dushanbe had been abandoned by the majority of local residents. A Russian garrison remained in the city, consisting of two regiments, the residence of the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Eastern Bukhara and a small Jewish quarter. A detachment of Ibragimbek's Lokais and Matchinites repeatedly attacked the garrison. Meanwhile, help came to the aid of the besieged. On October 18, the Russians launched a counterattack on the village of Mazori Mavlono, during which the Mujahideen suffered great damage. In the end, a detachment of Matcha soldiers, having robbed the surrounding villages, retreated.

On October 20, a new delegation headed by the Chairman of the Bukhara Central Executive Committee (otherwise, the President of Bukhara) Usman Khodzha Pulathodzhaev, known as Usman Khodzhaev, left Bukhara for Dushanbe. This was the brother of Ata Khodjaev, who concluded peace in Kangurt on August 12. On November 23, 1921, Usman Khojaev, accompanied by a detachment of Bukhara militia under the command of the Deputy Military Nazir (Minister) of Bukhara, former Turkish Colonel Ali Riza, arrived in Dushanbe. With them was the Consul General of the RSFSR in Eastern Bukhara, Nagorny.

Arriving at the scene, Usman Khodzhaev began to implement his anti-Soviet plot. The rebellion of Usman Khojaev was prepared in advance. The fact is that the “Temporary Agreement of the RSFSR and the BNSR” provided that the formation and supply of the Bukhara Army would take place under the control of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkfront, otherwise - Moscow. It is clear that this did not suit the Bukhara government. A solution was found. To replace the army, the Bukharans created an 8,000-strong “people's militia” on the principles of a military organization. The militia was outside Russian control and was led by Turkish officers. Thus, U. Khojaev, who appeared in Dushanbe, had full power and had at his disposal an impressive detachment of police. The legitimate reason for his speech was the Kangurt Treaty with Davlatmanbiy of August 12, which provided for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Bukhara. On December 9, U. Khojaev and Ali Riza arrested the military commissar of the Dushanbe garrison Morozenko, along with his deputy Mukhin and the Russian consul Nagorny. The Russian side was given an ultimatum demanding that they surrender their weapons and leave Eastern Bukhara. Only one company and a machine gun team surrendered their weapons. The rest refused to comply. This led to an armed clash with Ali Riza's detachment. The Red Command was released and the Turkfront headquarters was informed of what had happened. Help was sent to help the besieged. In this episode, Ibrahimbek's Mujahideen did not support the Jadids and Turks. When Ali Riza called on the Lokais to help in the fight against the Red Army, Ibrahimbek replied: “You called the Russians, you kick them out, but we don’t want to.” As a result of a three-day battle (December 10-12), the Russian detachment restored the situation. Immediately after U. Khojaev and Ali Riza fled from Dushanbe, on December 13, Ibragimbek insidiously attacked the retreating detachment of U. Khojaev, defeated him and captured many trophies. Then a Lokai envoy arrived at the Dushanbe garrison. By that time, Ibrahimbek, in his own words, had been elected bek by the population of Gissar. In the letter he gave, Ibrahim congratulated the Russians on their victory:

“Comrades, we thank you for fighting the Jadids. I, Ibrahimbek, praise you for this and shake your hand as a friend and comrade, and open the road to you in all four directions and can still give you food. We have nothing against you, we will beat the Jadids who overthrew our government,” wrote Ibrahim on December 20, 1921. Then it seemed to him that with the expulsion of the “Jadids” and the departure of the Russians, the old order would be restored in Bukhara. His peacefulness towards the Russians, of course, was caused by tactical considerations, and in this Ibrahimbek showed himself to be a fairly flexible leader for an emirist.

Of course, the Reds did not think of leaving Dushanbe. The command and the consul chose the following tactics: “support negotiations, accept food assistance, trying to create the appearance of friendship, delay the time until reinforcements arrive - units of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.” The Russian consul, who personally met with “Captain Ibrahim,” suggested that the Lakai should reconcile with the Bukhara government, hinting that in the event of reconciliation, Ibrahimbek himself would not be offended. To Ibrahim's credit, this proposal was rejected. Negotiations continued until the beginning of January 1922 and ended, of course, without result. Additional Russian forces soon arrived and on January 6 hostilities between Ibrahimbek and the Red troops resumed. It is clear that Russia used the negotiations to buy time while simultaneously increasing the antagonism between Ibrahimbek and the Bukharan government.

As Saidzhan Datkho, who was part of Ata Khojaev’s delegation, recalled, it was difficult for representatives of the Bukhara government to negotiate with the Mujahideen. “The Jadids and the Russians are at the same time,” said the Kurbashi. “Our situation was unbearable,” Saidjan recalled. “On one side we were pursued by the Russians, and on the other side by the Basmachi. Both of them called us traitors.” Members of the Bukhara government were deeply disappointed when they discovered that all East Bukhara kurbashi were supporters of the overthrown emir. Nevertheless, they tried their best to explain their goals to the Mujahideen. In the village of Sharshar, the Bukhara delegation was stopped by Togai Sary. Saijan datkho recalled:

“He met me and asked: do you know who I am? I am the one who sends the Jadids and Russians to the next world. In response, I began to explain that we are not Russians or Jadids, but only a national organization. Soon he understood the purpose of our trip, slaughtered a sheep and treated us to pilaf.”21

The position of the educated Bukhara population is well stated by Muhammadali Baljuvoni, the author of “Tarihi Nofe-i” (“Instructive History”).22 Baljuvoni’s views reflect the entire spectrum of experiences of the educated “middle” class of Bukhara during a critical period for the country and society. The author humbly takes his fate and the fate of Bukhara for granted. Without blaming anyone directly, Baljuvoni comes close to the conclusion about the doom of the emir’s system, its hopeless backwardness. It is significant that Baljuvoni had an extremely ambiguous attitude towards the emir, his officials, and the Basmachi. He sharply criticizes the arbitrariness of illiterate and corrupt emir officials and clergy, which led to the fall of Bukhara. As an eyewitness to the establishment of Soviet power in Central Asia, he calls the Basmachi either “brave and courageous” or “inhuman.” In our opinion, there is no contradiction here. Obviously, the idea of ​​defending Islam and resisting Soviet power was not alien to the author, but he could not unequivocally approve of scattered, unconnected Basmachi actions that often took the form of robbery. Baljuvoni's experiences are especially clear to his descendants, who lived through the second civil war in the 1990s.

Escape

In the mid-1920s, the active policies of the Soviet government, as well as economic assistance to the population, isolated the Basmachi from the bulk of the population. Ibragimbek began to avoid direct clashes with the Red Army and hid in the mountains. He and his accomplices looked less and less like defenders of the faith. They robbed and killed civilians suspected of sympathizing with Soviet power. In the spring of 1926, Ibrahimbek made his last attempts to hold out, but in vain, the forces were too unequal. There was no choice. Ibrahim recalled difficult times for him and his fellow tribesmen:

“The Lokais of Gissar and Baljuvon began to complain about their bad life and move to Afghanistan without asking me... A lot of them left with their families and property. Igamberdy went to Afghanistan with his gang, unable to withstand the persecution. In winter, Khudaiberdy was killed in battle. Instead, I appointed Tangrikul as a mullo. My strength was clearly diminishing. Mullah Rajab was soon killed. With the death of Khudayberda Yanga, the Bazar was also occupied by Russian troops. His gang broke up. With a significantly depressed mood, I moved to Baljuwon. No luck here either. In the spring of 1926, Ismatbek’s horsemen cut off his head and partly surrendered to Russian troops. In his place, I appointed Palvan dakho, Ismat’s elder brother, but here again there was a failure: one of the best commanders of my personal detachment, Suvankul, was killed in battle.”23

At the beginning of the summer of 1926, Ibrahimbek remained at the head of a small detachment of 50 people. According to him, it was pointless to remain on Bukhara territory: there were no people, no weapons and ammunition, and besides, there was strong military pressure on the Mujahideen.

“There was only one way out - to go to Afghanistan. That’s what I did, leaving for Afghanistan on the first day of Eid al-Adha.”

The crossing took place in the Beshkap area. It is characteristic that Ibrahim’s departure across the river, into emigration, took place, as did the death of Enver, on the day of the main holiday in Islam, which was celebrated in 1926 on June 23.

NOTES:

1 Nasriddin Nazarov. Muhammad Ibrokhimbek Lakai. Document de travail de I'IFEAC. IFEAK Working Papers Series Issue 20 (June 2006). Tashkent, 2006. The main character of N. Nazarov’s research is designated not as the leader of the Basmachi Ibrahimbek, but as “Muhammad Ibrokhimbek Lakai” - a freedom fighter, religious leader and Lokai national hero. Nazarov’s work should be considered both as a scientific study and as a fact of the reviving national Uzbek (even more local – Lokai) historiographical tradition. His work is also distinguished by its focus on the national moment, which prevents the author from looking at his hero from the outside, from a scientifically objective position.

2 As Karmysheva notes, “before the revolution there were more of them, this tribe especially suffered from the Basmachi.” See: Karmysheva B.Kh. Essays on the ethnic history of the southern regions of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (based on ethnographic data). M: Nauka, 1976. P.97.

3 Karmysheva B. Kh. Decree. op. P. 158.

4 According to Bibikhatichi’s sister, Zumrad Momo Kayumova, Ibragimbek and Bibikhatichi had a son, Gulomkhaidar. In 1932 he died of illness at the age of approximately 4 years. A little later, Bibikhaticha herself died in the arms of her sisters in Dangara (Kulyab region). See: Nasriddin Nazarov. Muhammad Ibrokhimbek Lakai. Document de travail de I'IFEAC. IFEAK Working Papers Series Issue 20 (June 2006). Tashkent, 2006. P. 14.

5 Ibid.

6 Archive of the State Security Committee of Uzbekistan. Criminal case No. 123469 on charges of Ibragimbek with crimes under Articles 58 and 60 of the Criminal Code of the Uzbek SSR (58-2, 58-4 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR), (hereinafter: Case 123469). CC. 3-4.

7 RGVA, f.110, op. 2, d. 71, l.38.

8 Archive of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (ACPT), f.31, op.1, d.49, l.14.

9 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), f.122, op.1, d.77, l.l.55,71.

10 RGASPI, f.62, op.1, d.444, l.11.

11 AKPT, f. 4511, op.16, d.135, l.67.

12 RGASPI, f.122, op.1, d.245, l.123.

13 AKPT, f. 4511, op.1, d.147, l.17.

14 AKPT, f. 4511, op.16, d.135, l.158.

15 RGASPI, f.122, op.1, d.83, l.10.

16 Eshoni Dowood followed into emigration with Ibrahim in 1926. After Ibrahimbek’s escape (return) to Soviet territory in March 1931, Eshoni Dowood was imprisoned for several years in an Afghan prison. Ashoni Dowood ended his life as a very old man in the 1970s. He was buried in Badakhshan, Afghanistan. From a conversation with Bashir Baglani. Dushanbe, August 24, 2006

17 AKPT, f.4511, op.16, d.135, l.67. Later, Sureya Efendi will join Enver, but will soon become ill with mental illness and will be sent for treatment to Kabul. - IOR:L/P&S/10/950.

18 Yangi Turkiston, 1928, No.13.

19 about there is Davlatmandbiyu.

20 That is, Soviet Bukhara. This quatrain was recorded in February 1991 from the words of Bashir Bagloni, who came from a family of Tajik emigrants in Afghanistan, who then lived in Dushanbe. B. Bagloni is the former Minister of Justice of the DRA.

21 Yangi Turkiston, 1928, No.13.

22 Baljuvoni Muhammad Ali ibn Muhammad Said. Tarikh-i nofe-i. Dushanbe: Irfon, 1994. The book was published by academician A. Mukhtarov thanks to the support of academician M. Asimi, who was killed during the second civil war in Tajikistan in 1996.

23 Case 123469. P.25.

Part II

Emigrants from Central Asia fled mainly to Afghanistan. From the early 1920s to the 1930s. about half a million Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs fled from the Bolsheviks on the left bank of the Amu Darya. The wealthy part of the emigration, however, did not intend to stay long in backward and restless Kabul. Its representatives contacted the British embassy in Kabul and then to Peshawar. After careful filtering, interrogation (and maybe recruitment?), the British issued visas and passports to a select few lucky ones to allow them to buy a ticket on a ship to Karachi. From there “ours” went to Turkey and Europe. The religious elite of Turkestan and Bukhara sought to go to holy places - Mecca or Medina. And today you can find hundreds, if not thousands, of our compatriots there. Many joined the Muslim community in British India. But most of the emigrants, including the Lokais, remained in Afghanistan. Ibrahimbek, who fled in June 1926, was almost immediately invited to the capital of this country.

Interesting description of Kabul in the early 1920s. gives the wife of the Soviet ambassador F. Raskolnikov, “Valkyrie of the revolution” Larisa Reisner:

“The city was flooded with a motley crowd, in which one could see representatives of all classes - Indian money changers, Pashtuns ... Bukharan emigrants with flat, colorless faces, satraps swollen from laziness with an admixture of anxiety and bitterness, natural in their new position as hangers-on at a foreign court.”

In Kabul there was an intense struggle between supporters of the Soviet and British political orientation. There the Lokai leader met the Fergana kurbashi Kurshermat, whom he immediately did not like:

“He seemed to me to be a frivolous, talkative person. If you believe him, he has constant ties with all the states that are at enmity with the Soviet Union, in particular with England and France, and there is some kind of agreement with the French; he seems to be conducting business negotiations with all of them.”1

The Afghan government demanded that Ibrahimbek, like other high-ranking fugitives, not leave his assigned residence without special permission. The fugitive emir of Bukhara, Alim Khan, assigned the Lokayan a pension of 1,500 rupees per month. Later, the Afghan government began paying Ibrahimbek another 500 rupees. This, apparently, was enough for a comfortable life in the capital. However, Ibrahim was not satisfied with the prospect of remaining inactive in the company of the emir’s overweight servants. He persistently petitioned Alim Khan and the Afghan government for permission to leave Kabul and settle in border Khanabad among his Lokais. However, there was a refusal. It is clear why the government insisted on Ibrahimbek's stay in Kabul. Firstly, to isolate the dangerous Lokaian from the armed forces loyal to him in the north; secondly, so as not to spoil relations with Moscow; thirdly, to avoid troubles in the northern provinces; fourthly, Ibrahimbek was in the position of “honored guest” of the government and therefore no one could accuse Amanullah of disrespect for the famous “fighter for the faith.” As they say, the wolves are fed and the sheep are safe.

Apparently, Soviet security officers were watching Ibragimbek. According to their report, in mid-October 1926, a delegation from his relatives and associates arrived to Ibrahim in Kabul, “which was well received by him.” The summary also reports that “in conversations, Ibrahimbek was interested in the political and economic development of Tajikistan.” He was also interested in “whom the Soviet government is now shooting.”2 In the winter of 1926/1927. Ibrahimbek's family arrived in Kabul. For the next two years he lived with his family and associates (up to 13 people in total) in Qala-i Fatu. In winter, to escape the frost, Ibrahim traveled with Alim Khan to Jalalabad. This continued until the events associated with the fall of the Amanullah regime in early 1929 and the unexpected accession of Habibullah (Bachai Sako) to the Afghan throne.

Ibrahimbek and Bachai Sacco

Habibullah, the son of Rashid, a grape seller and water carrier, a Tajik from Kukhdoman, is another character in the history of the Bukharians in Afghanistan. We reserve the right to talk about the amazing fate of Bachai Sako some other time, but for now we note that, having ascended the Afghan throne at the beginning of 1929, Habibullah first of all called for the fight for the liberation of Bukhara, and also promised to bring from India, a Muslim shrine - a sandalwood gate. The population of the northern provinces, including emigrants, joyfully received the news of the new emir. Ibrahimbek testified that Bachai Sako, in the first days of his reign, met with Alim Khan and had a warm conversation with him. Soon Ibrahimbek himself was accepted by the new emir.

Bachai Sako, having ascended the throne, provided “carte blanche” to emigrants who were in cramped conditions in terms of movement around the country. One of the emigrant leaders, Fuzail Maksum (from Karategin), did not fail to take advantage of this. With his five or six companions, he fled from Kabul north to Badakhshan. From there, with a small detachment of emigrants, Maksum moved to Soviet territory and carried out a bloody raid to Garm. His detachment was stopped by a brave Soviet landing (the first airborne landing in the history of the Red Army!) with the support of local volunteers. Having been defeated, Maksum returned to Afghan Badakhshan with 9 people, from there to Mazar-i Sharif to Said Hussein, the Minister of War of the Bachai Sako government. A little later, Fuzail Maksum returned with Said Hussein to Kabul. Maksum expressed his impressions of the raid as follows: “I wanted to do the job, but the Karategins went against me, and I was forced to leave.”

The Turkmen leader Junaid Khan also showed activity. Back in June 1928, he, having broken the resistance of the Iranian border guards, safely crossed the Soviet-Iranian border. In Iran, he said that he did not intend to stay there, but had the goal of getting to Afghanistan. Avoiding clashes with Iranian troops, Junaid crossed into Afghanistan, into the province of Herat. Soon Junaid came out in support of Bachai Sako, which he reported in a letter to Alim Khan.

The power of Bachai Sako was held more or less firmly only in Kabul.3 In a situation of a sharp weakening of central power, every Afghan sought to be under the protection of his community. Ibrahimbek also sought to quickly get out of Kabul and connect with his fellow tribesmen in the north. He asked to be released, but the Bachai Sako government was slow to respond. In April 1929, a group of Lokais arrived in Qala-i Fatu. These were Ibrahim's close associates - the Lokais Alimardan Dodkho and Mamadali Dodkho and with them unarmed people in the amount of 50 people. They stated that they intended to accompany Ibrahimbek to Khanabad. 4

The Lokai's desire to leave the capital and unite with their fellow tribesmen reflected the gradual mobilization of fragmented Afghan communities and the approaching civil war. Mobilization, as always in Afghan history, proceeded along ethno-regional, tribal and confessional lines. War was a constant companion for the Afghans, and tribal militias were the main form of military organization.

In early April, Bachai Sako summoned Alim Khan and told him the following: the Afghan Ambassador to the USSR Ghulam Nabikhan Charkhi (brother of Ghulam Siddiq, Amanullah’s close associate and his foreign minister), at the head of a detachment of several hundred Turkmen and Hazaras crossed the Soviet-Afghan border and opposed Sakoists. At that time, few people knew that it was an expedition equipped with supporters of the deposed king and Red Army soldiers led by the former Soviet military attaché in Kabul Vitaly Primakov. The decision to organize this operation was made several weeks earlier at a night meeting with Stalin, who hosted Ghulam Siddiq and Vitaly Primakov. 5

Bachai Sako asked Alim Khan to send a detachment to the north. Having received the task of the new emir, Ibrahimbek with a detachment of 50 Lokais immediately set out in a northern direction. In Pandshir, Ibrahimov’s men caught up with Said Husayn (the sworn brother and minister of war of the new emir) and then followed together. They soon arrived in Aliabad, a once deserted place reclaimed by emigrants. There were 4 thousand households (20 thousand people) of Lokais and other Uzbeks located here. Having finally found himself in his native element, Ibragimbek, according to him, became familiar with the situation and was in no hurry to interfere in events. The new government of Afghanistan at this time was busy recruiting for the army. People went into it reluctantly, fearing to leave their villages and families. Minister of War Said Husain appealed to Ibrahimbek with a demand to intensify military preparations and quickly come to the defense of the government of Bachai Sako. Following the tribal rules and Sharia laws, which prohibited the killing of Muslims without a fatwa, Ibrahimbek in Chardar convened a council of elders with the participation of Turkmens, Uzbeks of the Lokay, Kongrat and Durmen tribes. Those gathered decided to support Bachai Sako. A detachment of 400 Turkmens, 400 Congrats and Durmens and 100 Lokais was created. 6

While the emigrants were conferring in Chardar and gathering detachments, Said Husayn, having suffered defeat in Tashkurgan from the Nabikhan-Primakov detachment, retreated. Meanwhile, a united detachment of emigrants, Lokais, Congrats and Turkmens, began to defend their settlements. Ibrahimbek commented on his decision:

“I ordered: post a guard, and if the enemy appears, destroy him. In this case, I called the enemy all those who dare to disturb the peace of the emigrants.”7

Did groups of emigrants take part in battles on the side of the new emir? Ibragimbek, Alimardan, Kayum Parvonachi and other emigrants interrogated by the Tashkent Cheka in the summer and autumn of 1931 did not mention the battles with the Primakov-Charkhi detachment. They probably did not want to irritate Soviet investigators and thereby worsen their situation. But they were happy to talk about the battles with the Hazaras of the detachment of Ghulam Nabi (not to be confused with the Pashtun Ghulam Nabikhan Charkhi). When the soldiers of Ghulam Nabi attacked the Dehdadi fortress on August 29, 1929, they were defeated by the emigrants. The Hazaras were driven for eight hours without a break to Buynakar (Buinasar). 8 Things got to the point that the Hazaras begged and asked Said Husayn to recall Ibrahimbek back to Dehdadi. The fight against the pro-Amanulist Hazaras in Dehdadi-Buinakara was, without a doubt, the most striking page of the military successes of the emigrants in Afghanistan. Then the situation returned to normal, and Said Husain invited Ibrahimbek to follow him to Kabul to protect him from the Pashtuns. Ibragimbek was in no hurry to help the Sakoists this time either. He went to the elders and introduced them to Said Husayn's proposal. Ibrahimbek reminded them that if he left, the emigrant villages would be left unprotected, and the Hazaras would try to take revenge on the Uzbeks for the defeat in Dehdadi and Buynakar. In the end, Ibrahimbek did not listen to the Sakoists. He settled with his people in Taliqan, near Aliabad, and Said Husayn went to Kabul alone.

Thus, it would be incorrect to consider Ibrahimbek a consistent supporter of the Sakoists. This free local was not a reliable partner for politicians, no matter what goals they pursued. In fact, the ideals (if any) of the Sakoists in Afghanistan, as well as the earlier Jadids in Bukhara, were alien to him. He was primarily interested in the well-being and safety of his fellow emigrants who lived in Aliabad, Talikan, Ak-Tyube and other settlements.

The autumn of 1929 arrived.

“The situation in the Kattaghan (now Kunduz-K.A.) province became incredibly confused,” recalled Ibrahimbek. “It is difficult to understand in whose hands the province was, although formally it was governed by Bachai Sako. Riots began, one village went to another, settling old scores.”

The weakening of the central government had a devastating effect on Afghanistan. The bonds of “internal imperialism” that held various religious and ethno-territorial groups in a single space suddenly weakened. This led to discord and general anarchy, which brought Afghanistan to the brink of a national catastrophe.

The situation was resolved by the head of the Pashtun clan Musokhiban Nadir Khan, who arrived from France via India. On March 22, 1929, at a jirga (congress) of representatives of the southern tribes, he challenged Bachai Sako, but did not support Amanullah. On October 13, Bachai Sako and his supporters, attacked by the army of Shah Mahmud Khan, fled from the Afghan capital. On October 15, Nadir Khan entered Kabul, and on November 2, 1929, Habibullah, the son of a water carrier, the only non-Pashtun (Tajik) who was the emir of Afghanistan, was hanged at the Kabul airfield.

Nadir's revenge, or "jangi lakai"

Soon after the fall of the Bachai Sako government in November 1929, a new naibul-hukuma (governor) of the Katagan-Badakhshan province of Safarkhan was appointed to Khanabad. The emigrants called him Nazir Safar. Safarkhan was well known to Ibrahimbek: since 1921, he had been a liaison between the emigrants, in particular Alim Khan, and the Afghan government. The new Afghan authorities gave the Uzbeks an ultimatum: to hand over their weapons and return the money they received from the previous government. They also demanded the extradition of two adherents of Bachai Sako - Muhammad Hashimkhan (commander of the provincial troops during Bachai Sako) and Gulyam Kadyrkhan (gundmyshr, military leader), who had found refuge in the emigrant camp. Safarkhan and his son and deputy Anvarjan equipped detachments to capture Ibrahimbek. But it was not so easy to catch the Lakai leader, who had extensive military experience in guerrilla warfare. The unlucky Anvarjan was captured by Ibrahimbek’s horsemen. Holding Anvardzhan as an “honorary prisoner,” Ibrahimbek persuaded him to agree to a “peace treaty.” Although, according to this agreement, Ibrahimbek vowed not to take actions that could harm Afghanistan, he reserved the right to make decisions that were important from his point of view. Having signed this agreement as “Muhammad Ibrahimbek divonbegi, tupchiboshi, gazi,” the Lakai leader, presenting Anvarjan with a horse and a robe, escorted him with honors to Khanabad to his father.

Nadir, presumably, was furious at the intractability of the Bukharan. However, he could not launch a punitive offensive to the north due to the fact that he did not have the necessary military and material resources. Typically, Kabul rulers did this only as a last resort. As a rule, they preferred to negotiate with local authorities, mainly with tribal leaders, winning them over to their side with various promises and gifts. In this situation, Nadir Shah continued to try to win Ibrahimbek to his side. The Uzbeks were offered new lands for settlement, but they were rejected by Ibrahimbek. The emigrants did not want to leave the border areas, so close in landscape to their native Gissar and Kulob. Being near the border, they maintained contact with their homeland and did not lose hope of returning.

In the spring of 1930, Nadir appointed the will (ruler) of Mazari Sharif Muhammad Yaqubhan. Following the example of Soviet nationality policy, this experienced politician, a former minister in the Amanullah government, began to emphasize the ethnic groups (rather than tribes or religious and regional groupings) of the province. At the same time, each of them was given the opportunity to be represented in government bodies. (It is noteworthy that three years later Governor Shen Shikai would pursue a similar policy of equal rights for nationalities in Chinese Xinjiang, neighboring Afghan Khorasan). Having recognized the agreement with Anvardzhan as worthy of observance, Yakubkhan’s next decision appointed the Lakai... as his deputy, so that he, as a “friend,” would protect Nadir from the Kukhistanis, Turkmens and other “common enemies.” The nomination of Ibrahimbek was akin to the appointment of East Bukhara leaders as “revolutionary committees” and commanders of volunteer detachments by the Soviet government. Ibrahimbek was given the honors due to him in connection with his appointment. The Lakai elders were extremely flattered. 9 They probably thought that it was not Ibrahimbek, but the entire tribe that was awarded this high position. However, Ibrahimbek was prevented from taking up his duties by the fact that at that time there was a detachment of 500 rebellious Turkmens and Kukhistanis in Aliabad. They sought the help and protection of emigrants. Nadir and Yakubkhan ordered Ibrahimbek, as a deputy will, to disarm them. Thus, they wanted to deal with the Sakoists and Turkmens with the help of emigrants.

There is serious controversy surrounding the story of Ibrahimbek during his stay in Afghanistan. In the history of Afghanistan, this period is known as “Jangi Lakai”, that is, “Lakai War”. Safarkhan quite reasonably considered the appointment of a fugitive Bukhara basmach to a government position as a rash act that could, at a minimum, irritate the USSR, and at a maximum, lead to the formation of an “Uzbek-Tajik” state in the very north of the country. On the other hand, Nadir’s actions towards Ibrahimbek were not consistent and kind. Before allowing Ibrahimbek to take up his duties, Nadir suddenly wanted to talk to him personally. Mir Fatta, (full name Mirfattokh), a close associate of Alim Khan and the son of Usman Parvonachi, the last prime minister of the Bukhara Emirate, was sent to Aliabad. Along with Mir Fatta, Agzam Khoja, another close associate of Alim Khan from Qala-i Fatu, arrived. They brought two firmans, which contained orders to proceed to Kabul. Until the end of the year, Nadir and Alim Khan sent delegates to Aliabad with letters several times. Ibragimbek, who had developed excellent intuition over many years of constant stress and risk, guessed that a conversation with the padishah could end in the most deplorable way for the Lakai. Ibrahimbek went to Shibergan for advice from Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak (the Turkmen leader and the main spiritual leader of the emigrants, both Turkmens and Uzbeks), who confirmed his suspicions. As Kayum Parvonachi recalled, Ishan Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak and Ibrahimbek sat locked up for three days, talking about something in private. Did they talk about joining forces to seize power throughout the north? Did they have a plan to go back across the river? Or were they simply discussing possible options for getting out of the situation, namely, should they put up with Nadir or continue the confrontation?

In the end, following the advice of the Turkmen leader, Ibrahimbek decided to abandon the trip to Kabul and limit himself to paying a visit to his boss, the will of Mazari Sharif Yakubkhan. The order of the trip from Shibergan to Mazar-i-Sharif was as follows: first, Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak leaves with a hundred prominent Sufis, and the next day, depending on the reception given to the Sufis, Ibrahimbek goes with his kurbashi and a two thousand army of Uzbeks and Turkmen. The march of an emigrant army the size of an infantry division, led by Turkmen sardars and a Lakai “general,” bore little resemblance to the assumption of office by a civilian. Probably, the emigrants were preparing, as best they could, something like a military coup or seizure of power in the northern provinces. Understandably, the Afghans began to suspect that the emigrants were up to no good, and posted guards at the residence of the first Sufi delegation that arrived, led by Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak. Then Voli sent a letter to Ibrahimbek demanding that he leave people and weapons in Balkh, and that he himself come light to Mazar-i Sharif. By that time, the emigrants learned that Ishan Khalifa was surrounded and that the Hazaras were opposed to the Turkmens. After stormy and emotional meetings, it was decided that Ibragimbek would go to Mazar, but not alone, but with a detachment of 400 armed horsemen. On May 1, 1930, Ibrahimov’s men approached Mazari Sharif, but did not dare enter the city to meet with Yakubkhan. The arrival of Ibrahimbek at the head of an impressive detachment of Basmachi alarmed the Soviet consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif to the extreme.

Ibragimbek and his detachment stayed in a private house on the outskirts of the city. He, according to him, did not like that he was not given due attention. The arrivals found that the city was almost empty and no one was greeting them. The Uzbeks and Turkmen were especially upset that only one pot of pilaf was prepared for them. Apparently, something scared or alerted Ibragimbek, and he did not dare to escalate and decided to retreat to gain time. The next day, after heavy rain, he left for Siyagird. Yakubkhan soon called there. A telephone conversation took place, during which Ibrahimbek expressed his grievance to him. In response, the will repeated the demand for Ibrahimbek to arrive for service in Mazar-i-Sharif alone and in a carriage. The latter did not like the prospect of just such a service.

The Afghans, meanwhile, were on alert. They separated Ishan Khalifa from the Uzbeks and began successful negotiations with the Turkmens in order to neutralize them. Ibrahimbek had no choice but to invite the Turkmens accompanying him to return to Balkh, and to go to his Lakai people in Aliabad. A day after this, a new delegation arrived from the will to the Lakaians. It included representatives of various ethnic groups in the province. They once again assured the emigrants of the friendly attitude of the Afghan authorities and Yakubkhan towards them and invited Ibrahimbek to Mazar. To the previous conditions (surrender the Kuhistanis and return the weapons), the delegation added an offer to all emigrants to move from Aliabad and Ak-Tyube to other places, away from the border.

The hypothesis that in 1929-1931. Ibrahimbek was involved in intra-Afghan feuds, during which each of the parties sought to use the strength of the Uzbek troops for their own purposes, which seems to us more likely than those in which it is argued that the emigrants pursued some of their own, “Napoleonic” goals (the fight against the Pashtuns , building your own state, etc.). In 1930, various feudal-clerical groups competed for influence in the northern provinces. Supporters of the major Uzbek feudal lord Mirza Kasim from Mazar-i-Sharif and Tajiks from the Sakoist camp also tried to lure the emigrants to their side. They, unlike the emigrants, did not take risks, since they operated on their own Afghan territory. The emigrants were guests, and for them, supporting one side or another was fraught with great complications. They could be accused of causing harm to the country that granted them asylum. Available sources allow us to conclude that the emigrants were always concerned primarily with their own safety and survival in the face of mortal danger posed by Nadir, who was thirsty for revenge. Ibrahimbek and Ishan Khalifa were not sophisticated politicians, but they could not be suspected of lacking instincts. It is interesting that in the legend of the Muhajirs, outlined to the author by Bashir Baglani, Ibrahimbek also appears as a victim of intrigue:

“At that moment, one local Uzbek told the muhajirs: “You, Tajiks and Uzbeks, are slaves of the Afghans. Let's form our own state together." Ibrahimbek refused, and Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak also refused. Local (Afghan) Tajiks and Uzbeks provoked Ibrahimbek during meetings, saying: “You are a ghazi, do what you think is necessary, do not listen to Emir Hashim Khan10: binni-i poizori afgon kach ast”11. At the same time, they complained to Emir Nadir Khan about Ibrahimbek and claimed that the latter was going to lay claim to the Afghan throne. Therefore, the emir demanded that the Muhajirs lay down their arms. On Navruz (probably March 22, 1930 - K.A.) Ibrahimbek arrived in Kunduz for a meeting of influential people. None of those present stood up to greet the newcomer. Voli (the ruler) reluctantly greeted Ibrahimbek. Voli said:

- Bek bobo, I say in the presence of the elders - hand over your weapons. The state will protect you, if necessary.

Ibrahimbek replied:

– My weapons are not directed against Afghanistan. It is ours, we got it in battle.

Then, Ibrahimbek mounted his horse and went to the Muhajirs. He told the families: “We’re leaving.”

Thus, the attempt at reconciliation with the Lakais and bringing Ibrahimbek into the service of Nadir as a deputy to the will of Kunduz ended in nothing. The situation remained tense, although open confrontation was avoided. Ibrahimbek and his detachment were still considered to be in Afghan service.

Unexpectedly, at the end of June 1930, an event occurred, for which there are no direct indications in available Soviet sources. Red troops entered northern Afghanistan again. Without encountering resistance from Afghan troops, they carried out a punitive raid on the villages of the most restless emigrants - Aliabad and Ak-Tyube. 12 These were units of the SAVO cavalry brigade under the command of brigade commander Yakov Melkumov, famous in Tajikistan. 13 Ibrahimbek informed Safarkhan about the attack, and he and his detachment prudently avoided a direct meeting with the Red Army. The next day an order came from Safarkhan to engage in battle with the Reds. The Lakaians discussed the situation at the council. They saw that the local authorities were not interfering with the Russians, and suspected that the Afghans had deliberately provoked this invasion to pit them against the Red Army. Soviet sources confirm that Ibrahimbekov’s troops avoided the clash, but, nevertheless, claim that the Red Army killed hundreds of Basmachi. 14

Similar actions to intimidate “counter-revolutionary detachments” and settlements located in the territories bordering the USSR were undertaken by the Soviets more than once. They were carried out during the Civil War in 1918-1920. in Estonia and Latvia. In Western China, invasions, by prior agreement with the Chinese authorities, against the White Guards of Ataman Bakich and the rebel Dungans of Ma Zhuning were carried out in 1921 and 1932. In the Far East in 1929, a Red Army detachment invaded Chinese territory and destroyed the Russian village of Tenehe. 15 To these we can add the so-called. The “Kolesovsky campaign” of the Turkestan Bolsheviks to independent Bukhara in March 1918 and the Gilan campaign in 1920 in Persia. These military incursions, from the Soviet point of view, were nothing more than the defense of their borders by infiltrating and occupying border areas. They were a manifestation of Soviet imperialism and contributed to the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment throughout the world. In all such cases, the main victims of the attack were emigrant civilians.

Another Soviet invasion operation, this time on Afghan territory, like all the previous ones, did not increase the popularity of the USSR. Data on the number of Basmachi killed (up to a thousand!) look unconvincing and exaggerated, although, according to Ibragimbek, “great destruction was carried out in Aliabad and Ak-Tyube” 16.

Soon after the red detachment left for Aliabad, another messenger named Agzam Khoja arrived with an order from Alim Khan and Nadir Shah to arrive in Kabul. The tone of the letter was harsh and categorical. Alim Khan threatened that if his order was not carried out, then all communication between him and Ibrahimbek would be terminated. This was Alim Khan's last letter to his Lakai vassal. By refusing to obey the order, Ibrahimbek put his patron Alim Khan in a difficult position. Despite the fact that the exiled Bukharan monarch had warm relations with Bachai Sako, nevertheless, he could not be counted among the latter’s principled supporters. Throughout the “troubled” time, the overthrown Bukhara ruler remained in Kabul and distinguished himself only by the fact that he sharply criticized Amanullah’s policies in his appeals and in the book of memoirs “Tarikhi khuzal millali Bukhoro,” published in that very year 1929 in Paris. His connection with the north was sporadic, and he did not have much influence on the decisions made in the emigrant communities. By and large, Alim Khan was increasingly at the tail end of events, benefiting from the existing status quo. So now, after Nadir’s accession, he decided to restore the trust of the Afghans by returning the emigrants to submission to the padishah. Moreover, Nadir Shah, unlike Amanullah, was opposed to the USSR and enjoyed the support of England, on whose help Alim Khan always relied. In such a situation, Alim Khan, if he wanted to maintain the favor of the court, had no choice but to condemn the opportunistic Ibrahimbek and side with Nadir.

In June 1930, Nadir Shah appointed Ahmad Alikhan, who had previously worked in the Amanullah administration, to the post of “raisi tanzimiya” (representative for maintaining order) of the Katagan-Badakhshan province. 17 Raisi Tanzimiya met with Ibrahimbek near Khanabad, but he failed to melt the ice of mistrust. The parties exchanged mutual claims and grievances and parted ways. Ibrahimbek did not give any specific assurances, promising to respond to Alim Khan’s ultimatum later with a letter. Sahibnazar Rakhimov, a Karategin Tajik, one of the rare literate people who were close to Ibragimbek at that time, during interrogation at the Tashkent Cheka, reported that a few days later Ibragimbek, after consulting with the Kurbashi and elders, answered Akhmad Alim Khan approximately as follows:

“I don’t believe your proposal, I consider it insincere. If you really want to keep me and my people with you, then why didn’t you take any measures against the arrival of the Russians? (Referring to the invasion of Melkumov’s detachment - K.A.) Apparently, my disarmament is connected with my handing over to Soviet power.”

Having received such a sharp response, Raisi Tanzimiya ordered the supply of food to Ibrahimbek’s troops to be stopped and repeated his order to immediately surrender their weapons. Then Ibrahimbek retreated into the mountains, then went down to the Amu Darya, where he encountered a detachment of Afghans.

The entire June-July 1930 passed in minor skirmishes between Ibrahimbek and Safarkhan’s troops. 19 Around the same time, the first battle took place between the Nadirovites and emigrants in Khazarbag. There, 500 Afghans with two guns set up an ambush. Ibrahimbek with a detachment of 200 horsemen took part in the battle, as a result of which the Afghans, having lost 70 people killed, found themselves locked in the fortress. 100 prisoners, 2 machine guns, 100 rifles were taken. 20 The defeated Afghan troops, retreating, plundered the villages of emigrants. After this clash, Ibrahimbek gathered his horsemen and took measures to repel a possible attack by the Afghans. In essence, this was the beginning of the war. From July to October 1930, the “Lakai War” covered the entire border region from Meymene to Badakhshan. This entire area with its most important communications (roads and crossings) was taken under the control of emigrants. All crossings into Soviet territory were also guarded by them. 21 Kurbashi were appointed beks of settlements. Small Afghan garrisons were driven into fortresses by emigrants.

In October 1930, approximately 5 thousand militia with machine guns and cannons under the command of Muhammad Ghaushan were sent from Kabul to Khanabad. 22 These were not regular troops, but armed tribes of the border provinces, many of whom were not even Afghan citizens (that is, they came from the Pashtun tribal zone on the border of Afghanistan and British India). They attacked peaceful emigrants and robbed their families. From the interrogations of the Pashtuns he captured, Ibrahimbek found out that

“The tribes acted under the following agreement with Nadir Khan: Nadir will not compensate for those killed and lost. Whoever remains alive is free to dispose of the enemy’s property as he pleases. Therefore, the so-called Afghan troops robbed mercilessly, took everything to the last, raped women. There was no organized supply of food to these detachments; everything was built on a system of robbery. That is why I constantly had the population on my side and successfully beat the Afghans.”20

Approximately the same assessment of the actions of the tribes in northern Afghanistan in the fall of 1930 is given in a letter addressed to Nadir Khan by an Afghan priest named Mieshokh-i Khairkhoh from Imam Saib. It is interesting that, without hiding his antipathy towards Ibrahimbek (“cursed be the father of this pig”), the author of the letter nevertheless confirms his assessment of the actions of the Afghan tribes:

“The people began to fear for their lives. People from the Wazir, Masud, Jadran tribes are engaged only in robberies and did not fire a single shot... They robbed the entire Katagan and half of Badakhshan and took possession of thousands of rupees, but they cannot get enough. They enter the homes of unsuspecting people. Having lost shame and conscience, having forgotten God, they walk around the villages, doing whatever they please... People are waiting for their death, people are leaving their lands.”

“May I become your victim. Or ask the tribe of Wazirs and others for the last time whether they are of any use other than harm, or order them not to harm. Are they not fed up with the mercy of God and the generosity of the padishah? Let them be ashamed, and then the strife between the Uzbeks and everyone else will end.”24

So, in the fall of 1930, “jangi lakai” resumed with renewed vigor. This time the war broke out between detachments of the Muhajirs and their Afghan supporters with the newly arrived detachments of pro-government Pashtun mercenaries who supported Nadir Shah. Here Ibrahimbek benefited from the experience of fighting with regular troops of the Red Army, which he acquired in Bukhara. He avoided direct clashes with large units and unexpectedly counterattacked individual units. Local Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks, due to their ethnic community, were on good terms with the emigrants and, in general, supported the Muhajirs in the fight against the Afghan troops, which consisted of Pashtuns. Baglani, this prominent representative of the second generation of Central Asian emigration, assesses Ibrahimbek’s activities in Afghanistan positively in the sense that he objectively defended minorities from Pashtun chauvinism. According to Ibragimbek, local Uzbeks and Tajiks sent 25 detachments of 2.5 thousand people in support of the emigrants. 25 They were given weapons obtained in battles with the Afghans. The local population also helped in supplying the troops. The Uzbek tribe Katagan provided the greatest assistance to the emigrants. Ibrahimbek explained their antipathy towards the Afghans by the fact that “about 60 years ago they were brutally conquered by the Afghans.”26

In Katagan, the total number of losses in the emigrant detachments was 70 people. Afghan losses, according to Ibrahimbek himself, were estimated at 2-2.5 thousand. 27 At the same time, other leaders - Kuganbek, Mullo Holdor, Mullo Jura Dahan - operated in the Rustak direction. They occupied Yangi Kala and Julcha, besieged the Rustak garrison in the fortress, and captured many trophies, including weapons. 28 In the village of Bangi, another 300-400 local Uzbeks and Tajiks joined Ibragimbek. The combined detachment consisted of 1.5 thousand horsemen. They were opposed by detachments of the Mangal tribe. The Afghans were overwhelmed and fled. Pursuing them, the attackers burst into Khanabad from different directions. “The commotion here was exceptional,” Ibragimbek recalled with pleasure. 29 For several days, detachments of emigrants were held under threat of attack by Taliqan.

Meanwhile, the Basmachi Kurbashi leaders began to settle in different areas as beks. According to Alimardan, they overfed themselves, began to riot, taking horses and food from the population. This was the reason that local Tajiks and Uzbeks began to move away from Ibrahimbek.30 Then the Uzbek emigrants decided to enlist the support of the Turkmens. Utanbek went to Shibergan to negotiate with Ishan Khalifa.

For the Afghans, the failure of their operation to pacify the north with the help of mercenaries from the border areas became obvious. Nadir Shah was faced with the need to organize a new, larger expedition. He did not have the means to carry it out. In addition to the north, he also had problems in the permanently rebellious border zone of the Pashtun tribes. Therefore, he entered into negotiations with the British regarding the provision of military assistance. At the same time, Nadir Khan took a risk, since the Afghans, as well as the Soviet side, could bring charges against him of secret collusion with the British. Negotiations began on June 16, 1930. The British showed understanding and provided a service to Nadir in such a sensitive situation. 31 By October 14, 1930, the delivery of 10,000 guns and 10,000 pounds sterling to Kabul was completed. It was a gift from the British government, part of which was used to suppress the uprising of emigrants from Central Asia.

So, having received help from England, Nadir Khan decided to put an end to the unrest in the northern provinces, which had not stopped since the fall of the Amanullah government. For this purpose, on December 4, he sent his brother and Minister of War Shahmahmud to the north. 32 In February 1931, the “Lakai War” entered its final phase. Shahmakhmud led large detachments to a concentration of emigrants in Ak-Tyube. By that time, only 200 families remained in this village. The Kongrat leader Ishan Palvan (Bahadurzade) from Kobadian recalled that representatives of Shahmakhmud came to the Kongrats and Lakais and invited all the elders to Khanabad.

At this time, Ibrahimbek, according to him, became very ill and sent his young commander Utanbek into battle at the head of a detachment of Congrats and Durmens, who took a position 2 kilometers from the Afghans and staged a firefight that lasted 12 days. The families of the emigrants, seeing that the confrontation with the Afghans had gone too far, tried to urge the Kurbashi to make peace. But the latter did not let the tribes leave them. Utanbek, for example, forcibly returned families who tried to leave for Mazar-i Sharif. He even ordered that good horses be taken away from them to prevent them from escaping again. Later the tribes split up. Some followed the troops to the border, others decided to stay.

The situation of the emigrants worsened:

“I saw that the situation was thickening and was clearly not in my favor... Therefore, I invited my aksakal, Mulla Jurakul, to go to Sarai Kamar (the modern village of Pyanj in Tajikistan-K.A.) and negotiate with representatives of the Soviet government so that we would be accepted and given the opportunity to live peacefully. Mulla Jurakul went and returned. He said that they listened to him and promised to communicate with Stalinabad and Moscow on this matter.”33

Ibrahimbek recalled. Soon he sent another emissary, Mulla Yusuf, to the USSR to negotiate the transfer. However, there was no clear answer from the Soviet border guards. It was then, at the beginning of December 1930, that the Afghans, led by Shahmakhmud, began the persecution of Ibrahimov’s followers. Without allowing them to come to their senses, the Afghans drove the emigrants to the border. At the end of February, Ibrahimbek received a letter from Ishan Khalifa, the leader of the Turkmen and the main authority among emigrants, the meaning of which was that it was impossible to stay in Afghanistan and that it was necessary to go to Iran.

“I told him,” Ibrahimbek recalled, “that wherever we went, we would be required to hand over our weapons, and that the best direction was Soviet territory. There, in our native places, we will hand over our weapons to the Soviet authorities.” 34

The Turkmen discussed the Uzbek proposals and rejected them. Thus, the paths of the Lakais and Turkmens diverged. However, the relationship between them has not changed. The cooperation of emigrant groups, their admiration for the common Naqshbandi spiritual leader Ishan Khalifa was combined with their isolation from each other and a “balanced” oppositional attitude towards each other.

The Turkmens turned their horses to the south. They abandoned the Uzbeks, who were retreating to the border under attacks from the Afghans. Soon the Turkmen abandon their previously stated intention to flee to Iran. Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak, the head of a close-knit and large community of Turkmen, unlike Ibrahimbek, managed to come to an agreement with the Afghans and maintain normal relations with Alim Khan and Nadir. Thanks to his political experience and ability to find compromises, he maintained the integrity of the Central Asian emigration in Afghanistan and did not stop his efforts to fight against the USSR until the end of World War II. Ibrahimbek remained a stubborn nonconformist, a freedom-loving bandit, the leader of a marginalized and cursed tribe, entangled in the intricacies of Soviet and Afghan politics in the first third of the twentieth century. Life in Afghanistan weighed heavily on him. He could not and did not want to wage a more complex political struggle against his enemies. Equally, it was far from a never-ending “balanced” conflict between various ethnolinguistic, sectarian and regional Afghan groups.

Ibrahimbek recalled his experiences associated with the departure of the Turkmens and military failures in the war with the Afghans in February-March 1931:

“At that time, I had a firm decision to break out into Soviet territory at all costs, but before that, to deal with the Afghans, who were always on my tail.”35

This is the general outline of the history of the final stage of Ibrahimbek’s stay in Afghanistan. It can be considered clear only after it becomes clear what the departure of the emigrants to Soviet borders was: flight from the Afghans, re-emigration, or an invasion with the aim of raising an uprising against Soviet power? Was it not the result of the efforts of Soviet and Afghan diplomacy that the Afghans drove emigrants not somewhere into the interior of the country, but precisely to the Soviet border? Indeed, the trap version looks plausible. However, many uncertainties remain regarding the relationship between Ibrahimbek and Soviet power on the eve of the transition. Could Ibrahimbek leave with women and children without guarantees from the Soviet side? Probably, some guarantees were nevertheless received, and he really counted on an amnesty for himself and the emigrants. But to do this, he had to demonstrate his love of peace and surrender immediately after crossing the Soviet border. However, the thought of surrendering to him, the invincible ghazi, was disgusting. The proud Lakaian hoped to conclude an agreement without compromising his prestige. He, of course, did not exclude the possibility of fighting on the Soviet side before surrendering.
According to Ibrahimbek himself, he was inclined to lay down his arms, but the fugitives from the USSR who were arriving in an endless stream told him “that the entire people are oppressed by Soviet power and are groaning from it.” In fact, in 1930, the USSR government adopted a decree on irrigation of the Vakhsh Valley of Tajikistan. Collective farms began to be created, new settlements arose, and old ones were renamed. Cities with unusual names appeared on the map of the newly formed Tajik republic: Stalinabad, Kaganovichobad, Baumanabad, Kuibyshev and others, glorifying new leaders and heroes. Farms from various regions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan moved to the south of Tajikistan, many of which fled further – beyond the Amu Darya. Among them there were many Basmachi. Only during 1930 and the beginning of 1931, several groups of opponents of Soviet power arrived from Tajikistan to Ibrahimbek, including Mirnazar, Usmankul (son of Davlatmandbiy - “martyr”, buried next to Enver Pasha), Azim Mark, Kugan Toksabo, Shokhasan and many others. The emigrants of the first wave (1921-1926), to which Ibrahimbek belonged, were amazed at the scale of the second wave of emigration. In addition to the Basmachi themselves, Afghanistan at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. masses of those who already had experience of life in the USSR fled.

Forcibly driven from various parts of the USSR to the south of Tajikistan for the development of the Vakhsh Valley and the development of cotton growing, they waited for the fall, when the water in the Amu Darya subsided and the nights became longer, so that they could easily leave for the Afghan coast. Among those who fled were people of different nationalities, including Russians (including Cossacks), Tatars, Jews, and people from the Caucasus. Mainly, these were the Tajiks and Uzbeks of Fergana and Zerafshan, who would later raise the agriculture of Afghanistan, as well as its culture, to a high level. In Ibragimbek’s own detachment there was a Russian doctor and several Ossetian fighters. According to Ibrahimbek, when he went to Ishan Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak “to negotiate a joint transition to Soviet territory, he (Ishan Khalifa - K.A.) told me (Ibrahimbek - K.A.) that during January and February 1931 up to 20 thousand farms moved to Afghanistan.”36 New arrivals during the war with the Afghans in 1930-1931. formed the core of the most combat-ready emigrant detachments. Many of them had many years of stubborn resistance to the Bolsheviks behind them. Most of the refugees went to Ibrahimbek. For them, he was a symbol of the uncompromising struggle against the Bolsheviks. Refugees said that the authorities were confiscating property, persecuting religion, making arrests and repressions, and therefore they were forced to flee. These people had no illusions about Soviet power and were determined in the most decisive manner. The emigrants convinced Ibrahimbek that if he crossed the border of the USSR and started fighting there, then the entire population would support the Basmachi and oppose Soviet power. It is likely that among those who persuaded Ibrahimbek to cross for the purpose of uprising were sent Bolshevik agents. Their goal was to lure the Basmachi to Soviet territory.

Still, the decisive factor that determined Ibrahimbek’s fate was the diplomatic maneuvers of the Afghan government. Alim Khan's close associate, Yusufbay Mukimbayev, turned out to be a close friend of the new king of Afghanistan, Nadir Shah, with whom they met more than once in France and Switzerland. According to Alimardan Dodho (one of Ibrahimbek’s kurbashi, who was captured with him), having ascended the throne, Nadir invited Mukimbayev to Kabul and offered to become a mediator to lure Alim Khan and Ibrahimbek to his side. It was on the advice of Mukimbaev that Alim Khan insisted that Ibragimbek come to Kabul.37 As stated above, Ibragimbek, sensing something was wrong, refused to carry out the orders of his patron and Nadir.

At the same time as Lakai, Nadir resolved the “Turkmen question” in the most decisive manner. He disarmed the Turkmen Klych Sardar and Pasha Sardar, who had been in Kabul since the time of Bachai Sako (1929), with their 90 horsemen. The latter had no choice but to testify their submission to the new king. Nadir, in turn, acted like a magnanimous ruler. Having honored the sardars with the rank of "corneil", he sent them with a generous gift - 100,000 rupees - back to Khalifa Kyzyl Ayak. 38 Kyzyl Ayak reconciled with the Afghans, but did not oppose Ibrahimbek. In March 1931, he simply did not support him and left him alone with the Afghans. Being a smart politician, the spiritual leader of Central Asian emigrants could not help but guess that by breaking up with Ibragimbek, he was dooming the latter to obvious death.

Thus, the Afghans, having appeased the Turkmens in advance, began an operation to eliminate Ibrahimbek and his Basmachi. They pressed the emigrants to the very border. Ibragimbek was left completely alone. The Turkmen and Alim Khan turned their backs on him, and Nadir considered him his mortal enemy. There was nothing holding him back in Afghanistan anymore. Having reached the gentle bank of the Amu Darya, Ibragimbek faced a difficult choice. For him, surrendering to Soviet power without a fight meant saving himself and his loved ones, but “losing face.” It was unthinkable for the proud Lakay to lose the trust of the troops and the support of part of the population, who continued to see him as an uncompromising and invincible hero and “ghazi”. On the other hand, fighting the Red Army on Soviet territory, with unfriendly Afghanistan in its rear, meant inevitable death. At the end of March, Ibrahimbek gathered his kurbashi in the town of Kaptarali. It was decided:

“to go to Soviet territory, and then it will be clear: if the population supports us, we will begin a broad struggle against the Soviets, if not, we will start negotiations with the authorities on surrender.”39

So, the Afghan war of Ibrahimbek, nicknamed by the British the Afghan Robin Hood40, ended after the end of the celebration of Nowruz, at the end of March 1931. Unable to understand the intricacies of politics, he fell victim to the intrigues of Afghan headphones, disappointed by the betrayal of his former friends, he obeyed more primitive instinct than sober calculation , makes the only correct decision from his point of view - to go to Soviet Tajikistan. At the same time, he said: “It would be better if the Bolsheviks killed me than the Afghans.”

Conclusion

A detailed answer to the question of what Basmachism really was will take many pages. The author tried to answer this question in his monograph. In this publication, we will limit ourselves to pointing out what it was not. Basmachi was not a unifying national or Muslim movement, an alternative to colonialism and Bolshevism. It never became a mass movement for freedom from foreign rule, similar to Indian nationalism, which became a worthy response to British colonialism. All 1920s there were two unrelated centers of resistance in the region: the Turkestan movement of nationalist pan-Turkists and the religious-emirist insurgency of Bukhara. The first turned out to be an elitist, closed phenomenon, unable to breathe its reformist spirit into the masses. The second, deprived of proper cultural leadership, turned into a destructive force that stood in the way of the modernization of society initiated from outside.

In the religious-emirist uprising of Eastern Bukhara, our hero occupied a central role. Many critics of Ibrahimbek quite rightly point to the criminal aspect of Basmachi. In fact, the Basmachi movement was one of the manifestations of the religious liberation war, which led to a surge of uncontrolled violence and losses among the civilian population. There were also purely criminal, or rather criminal-ethnic, detachments in its ranks. However, the goal of the Basmachi movement was not violence against the population. Equally, the repressions of the Soviet government were secondary to the central task of “building socialism.”

Ibrahimbek bore little resemblance to the leader of the military-political movement. He, like other “Robinhoods”, of whom there was no shortage of various peoples and cultures, was, in the words of the remarkable neo-Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, a “social bandit”, 41 in whom the centuries-old desire of the poor, oppressed and deceived agrarian population for freedom was embodied , heroism and justice. Of course, Ibragimbek’s “social banditry” was not directed against the rich, as was the case with his contemporary Mexican Pancho Villa, or his older fellow countryman Tajik Vose. Ibrahimbek did not return property, but the illusion of restored dignity, honor and protection. Like other “social bandits,” Ibrahimbek was a rebel in the sense that he, riding a wave of mass mobilization, challenged routine peasant passivity, submission, and inaction. He was not so much a leader as a symptom of popular discontent. The Basmachi, although they did not specifically set such a goal, left their mark on world history by containing the flames of the “world revolution” off the coast of the Amu Darya and the foothills of the Hindu Kush. However, the actual contribution of the Basmachi to the liberation of Central Asia is small. The Basmachism only pointed to the presence of such values ​​as freedom and independence, but it did not know how to achieve them.

NOTES:

1 Case 123469. P. 224.

2 AKPT, f. 1, op. 1, d. 276, l.69.

3 Adamec W. Ludwig. Afghanistan’s Foreigh Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century. Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain. Tucson, Arisona: The University of Arisona Press,157.

4 Case 123469. P.43.

5 See: Agabekov G. GPU Notes of a Chekist. pp. 179-180.

6 Case 123469. P.44.

7 Ibid.

8 Case 123469. P.50.

9 Case 123469. P.61.

10 Here Baglani misspoke. The emir at this time was Nadir, who was replaced by Zahir Shah in 1933. Hashim Khan was Prime Minister under Zahir.

11 “An unworthy Afghan has a crooked nose” (that is, you should not trust them).

12 Case 123469. P.65.

13 Melkumov was well known among the Basmachi and emigrants as Yakub Tura.

14 Pharmacist P. “Special operations of the Red Army in Afghanistan in the 20s” http://www.rkka.ru/ibibl1.htm

16 Case 123469. P.72.

17 IOR:R/12/LIB/108

18 Case 123469. P.347. It is interesting that Rakhimov is not on the list of those sentenced. Apparently he was interrogated as a witness.

19 IOR:R/12/LIB/108.

20 Case 123469. P.26.

21 Case 123469. P.28.

22 Ibid.

23 Case 123469. P.171-172.

24 National Archives of Afghanistan. Collection of individual documents, No.435 (From the personal archive of S. Shokhumorov)

25 Case 123469. P. 197.

26 Case 123469. P.202.

27 Case 123469. P.172.

28 Ibid.

29 Case 123469. P.88.

30 Case 123469. P.37.

31 IOR:R/12/LIВ/108.

32 Marvat F. Dar mukobili kommunizmi rus. P.130.

33 Case 123469. P.79.

34 Case 123469. P.91.

35 Case 123469. P.91.

36 Case 123469. P.177.

37 Case 123469. P.164-165.

38 Case 123469. P. 197.

39 Case 123469. P.36.

40 Sunday Times, December 7 1930.

41 See: Eric Hobsbawm Bandits. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000.

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Basmachi leader (captured in 1931) Ibrahim Beg Photo: 1920s

Historical reference: The “Basmachi Front” passed through the territory of three modern Central Asian republics - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The so-called “Basmachi movement” is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon in the history of Central Asia. It received very different assessments in Soviet, Western and modern Central Asian research literature. But most authors agree that the Basmach movement in Central Asia, regionally, had several centers, each of which had its own characteristics.2 As a rule, researchers identify four centers of the Basmach movement in Central Asia, among which are Fergana, Bukhara, Khorezm ( Khiva) and Samarkand. Southern Kyrgyzstan occupies the eastern part of the Fergana Valley, and thus, both geographically and in terms of its regional, ethnic characteristics, composition of participants and the main characters of the movement, belongs to the Fergana hearth of Basmachi. From a military-geographical and geopolitical point of view, the importance of the region of southern Kyrgyzstan has always been great. The region is located at the junction of the borders of 4 large Asian states - China, India, Afghanistan and Bukhara. The city of Osh, the most important economic, commercial, cultural and religious center of the Fergana Valley, was also the most important center for the intersection of communications. Russian geographers (in particular V.F. Novitsky), who studied the region as a possible theater of military operations, back at the end of the 19th century. It was established that from the city of Osh through the passes of the Pamir-Alai range it was possible to get to India and China. In addition, Osh is a kind of junction of routes leading from Semirechye to the Fergana Valley and Tashkent.

In some years, the total number of Basmachi reached several tens of thousands of fighters. At the same time, dozens of rebel groups were operating throughout the former Turkestan. The most important Basmachi leaders were Madamin-bek, Ibrahim-bek, Dzhunaid-khan, Irgash, Zhanybek-kazy, Kurshermat, Muetdin-bek, Enver Pasha. By the fall of 1926, the Basmachi movement was largely defeated throughout Central Asia. The movement received new impetus in connection with forced collectivization in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Ibrahim Beg, who gathered over 1 thousand horsemen, invaded Tajikistan from Afghanistan in 1931, but was defeated and captured. The rebels in the Turkmen Karakum also became more active, holding out until 1933. The last Basmachi groups disappeared after the USSR and Great Britain agreed in 1942 to end mutual hostile activities from the territory of Iran and Afghanistan.

After Madamin-bek, the Basmachi movement was headed by Sher Muhammad-bek (better known as Kurshermat), whose detachments operated in the eastern part of Fergana. By that time, the Bolsheviks were able to form a combat-ready army led by Mikhail Frunze, carried out mobilization in Turkestan, and began to confiscate horses in villages for the needs of the Red Army, thereby undermining the material basis of the Basmachi movement. The Emir of Bukhara, Seid Alim Khan, maintained neutrality, fearing the defeat of the emirate (which he ultimately could not avoid anyway), and did not provide assistance to the Fergana rebels, preventing their relations with Afghanistan.

In the summer of 1920, Kurshermat managed to unite part of the Basmachi detachments of Fergana into the “Army of Islam” and launch an active offensive in the area of ​​​​Andijan, Jalalabad, Osh, Kokand and Namangan. In the second half of 1920, the Red Army defeated the troops of Kurshermat and his comrade-in-arms Muetdin Beg, after which they were forced to switch to the tactics of guerrilla warfare, raids and sabotage. Frunze, having achieved success, transferred troops to conquer the Bukhara Emirate, which gave the Ferghana Basmachi the opportunity to gather their strength. At the end of 1920, the movement gained new momentum.

In the fall of 1921, the former Turkish Minister of War and leader of the Young Turks, Enver Pasha, arrived in Turkestan and began to unite all Muslim and pan-Turkic rebels. He established connections with Kurshermat and Junaid Khan and formed a 20,000-strong rebel army. At the end of 1921, Enver Pasha's troops captured Dushanbe, then Karshi and began an attack on Bukhara. But during stubborn battles they were driven out of Vabkent, Gijduvan and Kermine, and on June 15 - 29, 1922, Red Army troops defeated the rebels near Baysun, Baldzhuan and Kofryuk. On July 14, 1922, units of the Red Army entered Dushanbe. In August, the main forces of Enver Pasha were defeated, and he himself was killed in battle.

By April 1921, most of the large detachments were defeated. In the fall of 1921, Kurshermat emigrated to Afghanistan, transferring command to Muetdin Beg. By the first half of 1924, there were no rebel groups left in the Fergana Valley; the rest went to the mountains.