China's Tibet issue: is there a solution? Tibet: CIA's Canceled War The Origins of the Tibetan Theocracy.

CONFLICT ANALYSIS
Short description: In the People's Republic of China, the Tibetan problem occupies a special place in interethnic relations. At the same time, it is interpreted in several paradigms, depending on which its interpretation can change radically. In the Chinese paradigm, the Tibetan issue is considered an invention of the separatist-minded Tibetan diaspora and forces hostile to China; in the Tibetan paradigm, it is considered a problem of the historical and political status of Tibet. At the heart of the main paradigms of the Tibetan question is the conflict over the status of Tibet in relation to China, expressed in various forms, but most fiercely in the struggle for the right of representation, or, in other words, the ideological struggle for the right to represent the Tibetan people and their history.
History of the conflict: Before moving into the context of the conflict itself, it is necessary to outline its history.
The People's Republic of China today is a multinational state. Five autonomous regions have been created for the most numerous nationalities in China: Tibet, Xinjiang Uygur, Guangxi Zhuang, Ningxia Hui and Inner Mongolia. But not all Tibetans, but only a little more than half of them live in the Tibet Autonomous Region, while the rest live in smaller national entities included in the nearest provinces of the PRC. This happened because about half of historical Tibet is not part of the TAR.
Over the course of centuries of history, the status of Tibet has changed. From 7th to 9th centuries AD it was a large independent state ruled by local rulers, then a period of fragmentation began. In the 13th–14th centuries, Tibet, together with China, became part of the Mongol Empire.
Subsequently, Tibet was dependent to varying degrees on the Chinese dynasties. Most often, he paid tribute to China, that is, he was part of the unique system of the Chinese world order as a tributary entity. This tribute had not a material, but a symbolic, ritual meaning
During the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), Tibet's dependence on China increased, and two Qing officials permanently stationed in Lhasa gained significant influence. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, in conditions of turmoil and fragmentation, Tibet was practically independent, although the Kuomintang Party government in power in China always considered it part of China.
By that time, a unique governance system had developed in Tibet. The Dalai Lama, the head of the largest Buddhist school, the Gelugpa, became the spiritual and secular leader in one person. The second most important leader in the Tibetan hierarchy was the Panchen Lama, who lived in the city of Shigatse, the reincarnation of Buddha Amitaba himself. The two main lamas of China are in complex religious and political relations with each other - they confirm the truth of each other’s rebirth, that is, they play a key role in the complex system of transfer of power.
After coming to power in 1949, the CCP leaders decided to restore authority over Tibet. In 1951, representatives of the Tibetan government signed an agreement in Beijing “On measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.” According to the 17 points of this document, Tibet was granted autonomy in internal affairs and the previous system of governance headed by the Dalai Lama was preserved, and the central government received the right to maintain troops in Tibet, guard the external border and conduct foreign policy.
In 1959, on the day of the Chinese New Year, the 14th Dalai Lama was invited to a celebration at a Chinese military base. Suspecting something was wrong, the residents of Lhasa surrounded his palace to prevent the “kidnapping” of their leader. An anti-Chinese uprising began, which was brutally suppressed by the Beijing army. The Dalai Lama himself and many of his supporters fled along mountain paths to India, where they formed the Tibetan government in exile. Unlike the 14th Dalai Lama, the 10th Panchen Lama did not go into exile, but tried to cooperate with Beijing. He soon died of a heart attack. The new Panchen Lama, according to tradition, like any other “living Buddha,” had to be found among Tibetan children.
In 1995, the Dalai Lama announced in India that a candidate had been found. He was a six-year-old boy named Gedhuna Chokyi Nyima. The Chinese government reacted immediately and “selected” their Panchen Lama, the boy Gyaltsen Norbu, and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima was taken “under the protection” of the PRC authorities, his whereabouts have since been unknown. The Tibetan opposition calls him "the world's youngest political prisoner."
During the Cultural Revolution, Tibetan culture was almost completely destroyed. The Chinese plan to develop Tibet while simultaneously instilling Chinese values ​​there and discrediting the “living Buddhas,” whom the Tibetans themselves consider true spiritual leaders, was fraught with contradictions from the very beginning. The new educated elite turned out to be even more radical than the moderate emigrants led by the Dalai Lama, who do not advocate independence, but only demand real autonomy, similar to that guaranteed by the 1951 agreement.
The latest events related to the uprising against the Chinese authorities took place in 2008 and were timed to coincide with the beginning of the Summer Olympic Games in China. The Tibetan government-in-exile insists it was a peaceful demonstration, but Beijing says the demonstration almost immediately turned into a pogrom, targeting ethnic Chinese people and destroying their property. The revolt was suppressed in a very harsh manner. The region was immediately closed to all foreign citizens for several months.

Conflict context:
After the Tibetan uprising in 1959, the political, economic and social system of Tibetan society was destroyed in Tibet and a new one, socialist, was built. Many years have passed since Tibet embarked on the path of socialist construction within the framework of a unitary Chinese state, but the question remains relevant: was it possible for “great creation” to emerge from the ruins of “great destruction”?
The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state in which, according to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, "socialist national relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have developed and continue to be strengthened." In areas densely populated by national minorities, a system of regional national autonomy has been created. In ethnic Tibet, whose territory is almost a quarter of the territory of the PRC, the Tibet Autonomous Region and 10 autonomous regions were created as part of four Chinese provinces. At the forefront of China's national policy towards national minorities, the central government has set a dual goal - economic development and ensuring stability in the region. Currently, Tibet is a national region of China with one of the highest GDP. At the same time, Tibet continues to be one of the most unstable regions of the PRC, with very high levels of poverty, huge levels of income inequality between urban and rural populations, and the weakest indicators in education.
The “Cultural Revolution” (1966 – 1976) was perceived by Tibetans as the destruction of the Tibetan way of life and the ethnic identity of the Tibetans and its consequences were a painful, intractable conflict on ethnic and religious grounds. During the period of reforms that began in 1980 and continue to the present, the standard of living of Tibetans has significantly increased, the economic and social life of the people has been modernized, and culture and religion have been restored. However, the stability-development dilemma that underlies Beijing's strategic course remains unresolved in Tibet. Despite Tibet's modernization, its economy is entirely dependent on central subsidies. Liberal policies in the field of religion and culture led to a spontaneous revival of all forms of functioning of religion, and at the same time to such undesirable consequences for Beijing as anti-Chinese protests, the catalyst of which were Buddhist monks.
Large-scale unrest in Tibet in the spring of 2008 became evidence of another crisis in the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Hopes that the Tibetan issue would be resolved after the end of the Olympic Games were not realized. Pressure on China from the world community does not go unnoticed in Beijing. Such pressure can undermine proponents of ethnically oriented policies and benefit hardliners.
The listed facts may indicate the incompleteness of the process of nation-building in the PRC. The Dalai Lama has proposed a "middle way" in which Tibet remains part of China and uses a democratic system that ensures full autonomy for Tibet. The Dalai Lama's plan does not suit China, which believes that his proposed system is a veiled form of independence.
Parties to the Conflict:
- primary sides: The primary parties to the conflict are China and the Central Asian region of Tibet, which is part of it.
For China, the fundamental national interest in retaining Tibet is that Tibet serves as a kind of anchor for China in the Himalayas. If this territory is opened up, and if Xinjiang becomes independent, the wide buffer between China and the rest of Eurasia will be breached. China cannot foresee the evolution of powers - Indian, Islamic or Russian power - in the changing conditions of our world. And, as a guarantee, they want to keep both of these provinces, and in particular Tibet.
Tibet, in turn, believes that the Tibetan ethnic group has been subjected to deliberate destruction since the annexation by China in 1950. The Dalai Lama considers Tibet an autonomy rather than an independent territory, and is ready to discuss the current situation with the Chinese government at any time.
- secondary,tertiary sides: China has taken note of the fact that the Dalai Lama has been in India since the Chinese invasion of Tibet. And China views him as an Indian puppet. They see that the latest unrest in Tibet was instigated by the Indian government, which is using the Dalai Lama to destabilize Chinese Tibet and open the door to Indian expansion. However, the Indian government would be very reluctant to irritate Beijing with any injudicious word or action, considering India's own vulnerability in the context of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the unresolved Kashmir issue.
It should be added to this that China also sees American influence on the Tibet problem. China sees the US largely focused on the Islamic world - and has encouraged India and the Dalai Lama to "test" China, partly to make it difficult for the Olympics to take place and partly to increase pressure on the central government. To ensure the safety of the Olympic Games, the central government has focused its efforts on security as the Games approach. Beijing has also noted similarities between what happened in Tibet and the color revolutions supported by the United States in the former Soviet Union.
Any threat or problem can come from the West and therefore China considers Tibet to be a fundamental component of national security, and they view pro-Tibet agitation in the West as an attempt to strike at the heart of Chinese national security.
China is also a strategic partner of the Russian Federation, which determines the specific attitude of the Russian government to the Tibetan issue, expressed, in particular, in the repeated refusals of the Russian Foreign Ministry to provide an entry visa to the Dalai Lama. This position of the government causes dissatisfaction on the part of Russian Buddhists (Buryats, Kalmyks, Tuvans, etc.), who consider the Dalai Lama to be the hierarch of their Buddhist tradition (Gelukpa), especially since Buddhism is officially recognized as one of the traditional religions of the Russian Federation. The presence of the noted factors makes the Tibetan problem very relevant for Russian foreign policy, thanks to the existing contacts of Russian Buddhists with the Dalai Lama and other representatives of the Tibetan diaspora in India.
The UN General Assembly, in turn, has repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning the violation of human rights of the Tibetan people, but all resolutions remain only on paper.
The situation in Tibet remains not entirely clear, but it is clear that the PRC is unlikely to accede to the demands of the Tibetans or the pressure of the international community.

Tibet occupies a special place in the People's Republic of China and in the world. One proof of its uniqueness is the existence of the so-called Tibetan issue. Moreover, this question exists in several paradigms, depending on which its interpretation can change radically.

In the Chinese paradigm, the Tibetan issue is considered an invention of the separatist-minded Tibetan diaspora and forces hostile to China; in the Tibetan paradigm, it is considered a problem of the historical and political status of Tibet.

There are also paradigms of the Tibetan issue as a “politics of the real” (Realpolitik), or a problem of human rights, an exotic land of mystical spirituality (Shangrila), or, conversely, a country where degraded forms of Buddhism are common. At the heart of the main paradigms of the Tibetan question is the conflict over the status of Tibet in relation to China, expressed in various forms, but most fiercely in the struggle for the right of representation, or, in other words, the ideological struggle for the right to represent the Tibetan people and their history. The main opponents in this struggle are the Chinese government and the Tibetan diaspora represented by Dalai Lama XIV and him government in exile .

Chinese paradigm

The Chinese paradigm of the Tibetan issue exists at three levels - official, intellectual and mass.

It can be said that all three levels are characterized by an understanding of Tibet as part of China; however, when it comes to more specific issues of history, culture, religion, there are different interpretations. For example, academic researchers are not as categorical as official Beijing in asserting that Tibet has been part of China since Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) .

Among the three levels, the official one is fundamental.

It is based on the concept of a unified China, which has been ruled for thousands of years by successive dynasties of different ethnic groups of a single family of peoples of China. With regard to Tibet, it is argued that, starting from the reign of the Yuan dynasty, Tibet has always been in one form or another formally dependent on the central government that ruled China at that time in history. The understanding of Tibet as part of China in modern times was inherited from Qing Empire Republican China, and from it passed to communist China. During the existence Republic of China (1911-1949) control over Tibet was lost, and only in 1951, on the basis of a written agreement of 17 points, Tibet again “returned to the fold of the single family of Chinese peoples.”

The construction of the image of “Chinese Tibet” (as well as “independent Tibet” in the vision of the diaspora) is based on simplified symbols, with the help of which the assertion that Tibet is part of China is substantiated.

According to official propaganda, old Tibet was the embodiment of the brutal regime of serfdom, the Chinese People's Liberation Army liberated Tibet and brought happiness and prosperity to the Tibetan people.

In order to promote the official point of view in the PRC, a huge number of television and radio programs were launched in the media, and popular articles and books highlighting the problems of Tibet were published in huge quantities. No other Chinese nationality has received such attention from the state. The result of the campaign was great interest in Tibet on the part of ethnic Chinese, as evidenced, in particular, by the tourist flow that poured into Tibet, far surpassing foreign ones in number. A network of research centers aimed at studying Tibet has been created in the PRC, conferences and symposiums have been organized to which foreign scientists are invited, and Chinese Tibetologists take part in foreign conferences. I must say that

The campaign is bearing fruit - the official image of “Chinese Tibet” is being accepted throughout the country.

As for the external counter-propaganda of the Chinese government, it is difficult not to note its considerable incompetence. The incessant repetition of the thesis “Tibet is part of China”, the vilification of the Dalai Lama and his “clique”, the portrayal of old Tibet as a society with savage customs, the excessive praise of the actions of the party and government - all this, coupled with spelling errors, causes the opposite of the intended goal among the external audience reaction. Particularly disgusting are the attacks on the Dalai Lama, who is extremely popular in the world.

Thus, the symbols of China’s political myth-making include the image of old Tibet as “hell on earth”, the unifying and civilizing mission of China, the liberation of the Tibetan masses from the yoke of serfdom, the development and progress of modern Tibet.

These symbols still form the image of Tibet in the Chinese imagination. However, the emerging trend of unbiased research into Tibetan problems allows us to hope for a gradual change in this stereotype of Tibet.

Tibetan paradigm

In 1959, as a result of the anti-Chinese Tibetan uprising, about 100 thousand Tibetans fled beyond the borders of their country. The refugees included the Dalai Lama and his family, the Tibetan government, the aristocracy and the highest monastic circles, that is, the entire flower of the Tibetan elite.

Through their efforts, the world learned about the Tibetans and their struggle for freedom and independence, which aroused sincere sympathy for the culture and religion of Tibet and great interest in the Tibetan issue. It can be said that these works as a whole unite such powerful symbols as the presentation of old Tibet as a harmonious society where religion flourished, there was harmony between the higher and the lower, and the economy was self-sufficient to meet the needs of the population; the illegal nature of the Chinese invasion; destruction of religion and traditional way of life; the just struggle of the Tibetan people for freedom and independence.

The main theses of the Tibetan paradigm are the following.

Status of Tibet. Tibet has been an independent state throughout its two thousand year history.

During the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing dynasties, a unique relationship of spiritual mentor and secular patron developed between the lamas - the rulers of Tibet, on the one hand, and the Mongol khans and Manchu emperors, on the other, which completely lost their significance with the fall of the Qing dynasty.

It is also emphasized that these relations took place between the Tibetans and the Mongols/Manchus, and therefore the Chinese government has no right to assert its authority over Tibet based on these relations. After the proclamation Dalai Lama XIII independence of Tibet in 1912 and participation of Tibet as an equal representative in the tripartite (China, England, Tibet) conference in Simla in 1913-1914 and until 1951 Tibet was a completely independent state. That's why,

According to the Tibetan point of view, the entry of Chinese People's Liberation Army troops into Tibet in 1951 was an act of aggression and an illegal occupation of Tibet.

Results of the Chinese occupation. The Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan Youth Congress condemn the national policy of the Chinese government, the goal of which, in their opinion, was the forced assimilation of the Tibetan people, and the specific result was genocide comparable to the Nazi extermination of the Jews.

Current situation. Sharp criticism of the policies pursued by the central government of the PRC.

According to the diaspora, the policies adopted favor the Chinese state and Han migrants, while Tibetans are marginalized, Tibet's environment is deteriorating, the Tibetan way of life is disappearing, and the religion and culture of the Tibetan people are gradually fading away.

Resolution of the Tibetan issue. In the first 20 years of emigration (1959-1979), achieving Tibetan independence was considered the main goal in Tibetan emigration circles. At present, opinions are significantly divided. While the Central Tibetan Administration has begun to adhere to the “middle path” plan, which is to gain full autonomy within the PRC, the Tibetan Youth Congress, many members of the Tibetan parliament and other representatives of the Tibetan diaspora do not abandon the goal of achieving Tibetan independence. In their opinion, independence is possible because the PRC could collapse like the Soviet Union - due to economic and social problems.

The 14th Dalai Lama's current tactic is to maintain a campaign to internationalize the Tibetan issue by accusing China of human rights violations in order to gain Western support and force China to be more accommodating during negotiations.

Thus, we can say that the construction of the image of an “independent Tibet” by the Tibetan diaspora is also based on simplified symbols: old Tibet as an ideal country (Shangrila), illegal occupation, genocide, repression, forced assimilation, just struggle for human rights, for freedom and independence . The sympathies of the vast majority of people in the world lie with this image of Tibet. However, this stereotype, like the Chinese one, is built on political myth-making and denial of history.

Tibet issue in the West

As can be seen, the battle of perceptions between China and the Tibetan diaspora, or the struggle for the right to represent the interests of Tibet, is very fierce. Moreover, both sides stubbornly insist on their vision of the problem. Who wins this battle of ideas? At first glance, it seems that the Tibetan side, since its arguments look stronger, Beijing is holding a defensive position, the Dalai Lama enjoys enormous authority in the world, rewarding him Nobel Prize And US Congressional Gold Medal- evidence of recognition in the world of the justice of the struggle of the Tibetan people.

In this struggle, the West itself is not an outside spectator, but is now a direct participant, as well as the main actor in defining the problem.

However, most in the West and in the world do not take into account that behind this ideological battle lies the real issue and the real politics, which ultimately determine the essence of the problem. The real issue is that Tibet is part of the People's Republic of China and no country in the world recognizes the Tibetan government in exile as the representative of the Tibetan people. But the real policy is that the Tibet issue is being used by the West in the fight against China, which it sees as a potential threat to the existing world order.

It can be said that the position of the Tibetan diaspora and its supporters, which is based on concepts such as the right of nations to self-determination and human rights, belongs to the ideal space and does not take into account the real totality of all factors. In contrast to the ideal, there is the so-called real question, or the understanding of the world as a global order in which dominant forces dominate, some values ​​prevail over others, realism prevails over idealism, those who have statehood dominate those who do not.

The history of Sino-Tibetan dialogue goes back more than 1,400 years.

Mass unrest in Tibet and self-immolations in recent years indicate that another crisis has arrived in Sino-Tibetan relations.

The new leadership of the PRC must understand that continuing a policy that results in violence and hostility does not serve the long-term interests of the state. The main key to resolving the Tibet issue is to quickly find a compromise in the negotiation process. All the hopes of the Tibetans for self-determination, the revival of their religion and culture are associated with the personality of the Dalai Lama, but time is not on his side, which makes the Tibetan issue even more acute. Pragmatic Tibetans understand that they have no chance of fighting on equal terms with “Dragon China” and that the lives of six million Tibetans cannot be used as bargaining chips in a political struggle. Undoubtedly, therefore, it is in the interests of the Dalai Lama, Tibet and the Tibetans, China and the Chinese, to find a middle way to resolve the Tibetan issue as quickly as possible for the benefit of all concerned.

Tibet issue in Russia

It would seem that the Tibetan issue has little relation to Russian reality. However, it is not.

Tibet and its capital, the city of Lhasa, are places that, despite their remoteness, have always attracted Russians.

Many people know the names of the explorers of Inner Asia. Nikolai Przhevalsky , Petra Kozlova , Grigory Potanin , Yuri Roerich. It would not be an exaggeration to say that their discoveries were inspired by the desire to get to the cherished capital of the Dalai Lamas, which, unfortunately, was never realized. Tibet is especially close to Russian Buddhists - Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvans.

At the end of the 17th century, Mongolian and Tibetan monks brought the Buddhist religion to the outskirts of the Russian Empire, and Buryat scientists Gombozhab Tsybikov And Bazaar Baradin became pioneers in the study of this remote region in Russia.

Currently, Tibet has acquired another meaning for Russia: the attitude towards Tibet has become a kind of test of the political will of the Russian leadership.

China is our neighbor and strategic partner, which explains the specific attitude of the Russian government towards the Tibetan issue, expressed, in particular, in the repeated refusals of the Russian Foreign Ministry to provide an entry visa to the 14th Dalai Lama.
I myself am a sinologist by profession, and China is almost like a native country for me. However, this position of the Russian government also puzzles me: it turns out that the interests of the strategic partnership with China are more important for the government than the well-being of its own Buddhist citizens, who are deprived of the opportunity to meet with the hierarch of their Buddhist tradition. In the end, Buddhism is, in fact, and officially recognized as one of the traditional religions of our multinational and multi-religious country. It seems that this problem is by no means minor, it is very acute and relevant.

In addition, the Chinese experience in resolving the Tibetan issue is very important for our country, since the problem of its unity is no less acute than in China.

Therefore, I would like the authorities to pay attention to these issues.

I would like to hope for something else: the work of scientists, including this lecture, can be useful in establishing true good neighborliness and partnership between the peoples of Russia and China.

Acquaintances, journalists and just friends, often ask me: why did official Beijing react so painfully, or rather, so indignantly, to the fact that President Bush, not just anywhere, but in Washington, demonstratively awarded the Dalai Lama as an outstanding human rights activist of our time?

The Dalai Lama, who supposedly has been in exile for almost half a century as an opponent of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, as a fighter against its Sinicization and suppression in this sacred land of religious freedoms for Buddhists?

Reserve of the Middle Ages

I was lucky enough to be the first of my compatriots to visit Tibet back in 1955 and talk with the Dalai Lama when he was still the supreme ruler of the mysterious Shambhala. But I am sometimes amazed by the direction of the questions, which indicate that the minds of some Russians are dominated by stereotypes of Western propaganda.

As an eyewitness who saw Tibet with my own eyes in 1955 and 1990, I will try to answer in order. First of all, saying that the Chinese communists "occupied Tibet" is absurd. Tibet became part of China in the Middle Ages. The rulers of the Celestial Empire have long sought to make the Tibetan clergy their support. In the 13th century, Genghis Khan's grandson Kublai Khan gave one of the prominent Buddhists the title of Emperor's Mentor, or Dalai Lama, and assigned him to rule the Tibetan lands.

This combination of spiritual and temporal power survived until Mao Zedong's victory in the civil war with Chiang Kai-shek. The Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, signed in 1951, provided for the right of the Tibetan people to regional national autonomy within the PRC. Issues of defense and foreign relations were declared the prerogative of Beijing, and Lhasa was given complete independence in local affairs.

The agreement stated that the central authorities would not change the political system established in Tibet, the functions and powers of the Dalai Lama, and would respect the religious beliefs and customs of the Tibetans.

Four years later, at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai, I traveled to Lhasa along the newly built highway there to see how these obligations were being fulfilled. On September 14, 1955, I had a long conversation with the Dalai Lama and would like to quote verbatim some of his statements.

“I would like to take advantage of your visit,” the fourteenth Dalai Lama told me then, “to convey a few words to the foreign public, to Buddhists in other countries. We Tibetans not only believe in the teachings of Buddha, but also love our homeland, where freedom of religion is respected and protected. Relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples go back more than a thousand years. Since the agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet was signed, our people have left the path that led to darkness and followed the path to light...

In 1955, Tibet appeared to my eyes as an untouched reserve of the Middle Ages. In addition to arable land and pastures, the monasteries were also owned by farmers and cattle breeders.

It was interesting to travel back to the times of Marco Polo. But what was more striking than the exoticism was the medieval cruelty. In addition to religious fanaticism, the feudal-theocratic regime was also based on fear and truly inhuman methods of suppression. I was shocked to see three runaway slaves shackled by the neck with a single yoke cut from a single tree trunk.

The Chinese began with the tactic of “making friends through good deeds.” Sending doctors, veterinarians and agronomists to the sites, they acted only with the knowledge and consent of the monasteries. The growing sympathy of local residents, apparently, prompted the reactionary circles of Tibet to decide to revolt in 1959. Moreover, I am convinced that the Dalai Lama was by no means the initiator, but the victim of these tragic events. Armed uprisings in Lhasa and other places were suppressed. The Dalai Lama and thousands of his supporters had to flee to India.

Shambhala ended slavery

The mutiny dramatically changed the lives of those who fled and those who remained. The period of flexibility and reasonable compromises turned out to be, alas, crossed out. The 1951 agreement was unilaterally violated. And this caused a response wave of accelerated reforms from Beijing.

They were tough, but fair. In transcendental Shambhala, slavery was finally ended. Farmers and cattle breeders were freed from serfdom, as well as from all taxes to the state treasury. They were given free of charge the arable land and livestock seized from the monasteries that took part in the rebellion. They were purchased from the remaining owners.

The elimination of feudal relations caused a noticeable increase in the productive forces. Having become masters of fields and pastures, Tibetans began to annually collect about 700 thousand tons of grain, and the number of livestock approached 25 million. (In the fifties, similar figures were three times lower.)

Over the past half century, the central government has provided $6 billion in free economic assistance to the former Medieval Reserve. As a result, the average life expectancy of Tibetans increased from 36 to 67 years. If during my first visit the population of the region was about a million people, now it is closer to three million. After all, Tibetans, like other national minorities, are not subject to the strict rule existing in the PRC: “one family, one child.”

There are less than 90 thousand Chinese in the autonomous region (that is, 3 percent). About half of them are concentrated in Lhasa. These are builders, doctors, teachers working under contracts. Few people dare to live in a high-mountain climate for more than two years.

So, the population of Tibet tripled, while the number of monasteries decreased by half and the number of lamas by three times. For a region whose traditional culture is inextricably linked with religion, such a change could not be painless. But Lamaism has proven its resilience. Even having lost their possessions, the monasteries exist as if on self-financing - they print holy books, produce objects of religious worship, and most importantly, they receive voluntary offerings from their former serfs, for whom the monks offer prayers.

Where there were 150 thousand lamas half a century ago, there are now 150 thousand students. In a once completely illiterate region, 86 percent of children go to school, and learn in their native language. To train teaching staff, four universities have been established in the region, including the Tibetan University.

We, its rector Tsevan Jigme told me, strive to educate people capable of preserving traditional national culture. For centuries, the only form of its manifestation was religion. The centers of learning were the monasteries, and the intelligentsia were the lamas. But culture was not a common property, but the lot of a minority. This is exactly what we want to change, while preserving everything that makes up our identity.

But let's return to the Dalai Lama, whose separatist statements in exile could not please Beijing. However, recently the Supreme Hierarch of Buddhists has made it clear that his goal is not independence, but the autonomy of Tibet, which, they say, should become “a self-governing administrative unit in association with the People’s Republic of China.”

The word "association" evokes caution in Beijing. But, in my opinion, the possibility of compromise exists. The same agreement of 1951 can serve as its basis. After all, keeping foreign policy and defense under Beijing's control means recognizing Tibet as an integral part of China. The people will not want a return to feudal slavery. But the specific functions of local authorities may be different than in other provinces of the country.

In a word, to me, as a person who saw with my own eyes in 1955 the medieval cruelty of the feudal-theocratic system, and in 1990, cattle breeders and farmers freed from slavery, to me, who again saw Tibet, when the average life expectancy there doubled, the population tripled, and the economic potential has grown fivefold, the fabrications that this transcendental region is “dying out” or “sinicizing” seem absurd, and the Dalai Lama supposedly deserves an award as an outstanding human rights activist of our time.

One of the most significant geopolitical problems in Central Asia to this day remains the “Tibetan issue.” Despite the fact that the ancient land of Tibet, sacred to Buddhists, is not a “hot spot” similar to the hotbeds of the Middle East or Afghan conflicts, there is practically no Tibetan terrorism, unlike the neighboring Muslim Uyghurs, who are also fighting for the independence of East Turkestan, the Tibetan issue concludes contains a tangle of extremely dangerous contradictions of a political, military, ethno-confessional nature.

Officially, the Tibetan issue is just over sixty years old. The countdown begins with the invasion of the Chinese People's Liberation Army into the territory of virtually independent Tibet in 1950. Since that time, radical political, economic, and cultural changes have radically transformed the very nature of social life in Tibet, which has remained virtually unchanged for more than a millennium, forcing all active adherents of preserving traditions, led by the XIV Dalai Lama himself, the head of the spiritual hierarchy of Tibet, to emigrate, and the world community, represented by Western countries and regional opponents of China, is given grounds to assert that a complete act of occupation of a sovereign state has been committed. In fact, the Tibetan issue is much longer and goes deep into the centuries-old relationship between the two closest neighbors - Tibet and China, or rather the states that existed on its territory.

Origins of the Tibetan theocracy

By the way, Tibet owes China (more precisely, one of the imperial dynasties) the political system that existed in the region before its capture by the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China. When the dominance of the Yuan dynasty was established in China in the 13th century, representatives of the latter also paid attention to the empire’s closest western neighbor - Tibet, which by this time was split into separate possessions. Of course, it is difficult to call the Yuan dynasty Chinese - by ethnic origin, its emperors went back to the Mongols and represented one of the branches of the Genghisids, however, since China was repeatedly ruled by foreign dynasties of Jurchen, Mongol, Manchu origin and the years of rule of these dynasties cannot be erased from the history of the country, there is every reason call the Yuan dynasty exactly Chinese. So, Emperor Kublai, the most famous representative of the Yuan dynasty, who ruled China in 1294-1307, appointed the head of the Tibetan Buddhist school, Sakya Pagba Lama, as the de facto leader of the provinces of Wu, Kam and Tsang, which made up the territory of Tibet. Pagba Lama, Khubilai's spiritual mentor, who converted the emperor to Buddhism, thereby becoming the first theocratic ruler of Tibet. The system, in which both spiritual and secular power in Tibet were concentrated in the hands of the head of one of the Buddhist schools, lasted more than six centuries.
In 1578, the Mongol Khan Altyn Khan gave preference to a younger school of Tibetan Buddhism than Sakya - Gelugpa. The head of the Gelugpa school, Sonam Gyatso, received the title of Dalai Lama from the khan, thereby opening the first page of the centuries-old rule over Tibet by the Dalai Lamas, considered the living incarnations of the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara (a bodhisattva is a person who strives to become a Buddha and renounced the world in the name of saving all living beings from the “wheel of rebirth”).

During several centuries of the Dalai Lamas' rule in Tibet, life here was practically mothballed. Social and economic relations, not to mention the spiritual, cultural component of the life of Tibetan society, remained unchanged. The clergy was considered a privileged part of the population, especially its highest category - “tulkus”, that is, “reincarnations” of Buddhist bodhisattvas, founders of theological schools, and famous monks. In 1717, the Chinese Qing dynasty, also of foreign, Manchu origin, like the Yuan, professed Buddhism, was forced to send Chinese troops into Tibet, who performed the function of protecting the country’s territory from raids of the Mongol khans. Since then, for two hundred years, a Chinese governor and a small military garrison remained in Tibet. Periodically, the Chinese intervened to restore political order on the territory of Tibet, to prevent attacks by the Mongols from the north or the Nepalese Gurkhas from the south, but in its internal affairs Tibet remained virtually a completely independent state.

Until the end of the 19th century, Tibet, which was in relative isolation from the rest of the world, functioned “on its own,” maintaining close ties only with China and the nearest regions, the population of which professed Tibetan Buddhism - with the Mongol khanates, the Himalayan kingdoms and the principalities of Ladakh, Zaskar, Mustang, Bhutan, Sikkim, etc. The situation changed as interest in the region grew on the part of the world's largest powers - Great Britain and the Russian Empire. For Great Britain, which by that time had captured the Hindustan Peninsula, Tibet was considered a strategically important outpost for further penetration into China and Central Asia. The Russian Empire, in turn, tried to resist this, using, among other things, Russian subjects of Buryat and Oirat-Kalmyk origin who professed Buddhism as conductors of its influence in Tibet.

Eventually, the warring parties at several conferences on Tibet issues in the early 20th century recognized the suzerainty of the Qing Empire over the Tibetan region and renounced their claims to its territory. Although, of course, both the British and Russian authorities did not really lose interest in Tibet, especially in the context of the gradual weakening of the Qing Empire. After the Qing Empire finally collapsed in 1913, the then reigning Dalai Lama in Tibet, the 13th Dalai Lama Thupten Gyatso, proclaimed the state sovereignty of Tibet. Thus, almost forty years - from 1913 to 1950. – Tibet existed as an independent state. During this period, the country maintained foreign relations with China, Mongolia, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Great Britain. Thus, the British, taking advantage of the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire, were all able to get ahead of Russia, and then the USSR, in asserting political influence in Tibet.

Independent Tibet

Throughout the entire period of its sovereign existence in the first half of the twentieth century, Tibet remained an equally conserved state, life in which was regulated by legal principles laid down under King Songtsen Gampo, who ruled in 604-650. AD Naturally, the immutability of the political-administrative, legal, and social system had a corresponding impact on the overall level of development of Tibetan statehood. The country lacked modern communications and a full-fledged army, but there were such relics of the medieval past as slavery, corporal punishment, and cruel methods of executing criminals. The country's land was divided between the monasteries, which were the largest landowners (37% of the land), the feudal aristocracy and the government of the Dalai Lama. Entire regions of Tibet, due to the lack of a developed communications network, were actually completely independent in their affairs, and the abbots of local monasteries or feudal princes remained the all-powerful rulers on their territory. On a national scale, absolute power belonged to the Dalai Lama, who appointed four “kalons” - members of the Tibetan government, called Kashag.

However, it cannot be said that the 13th Dalai Lama did not strive to modernize certain areas of life in Tibetan society. At least in the period from 1913 to 1926. A number of measures were taken to strengthen the army, law enforcement system, and education. These measures were taken, first of all, on the instructions of the British station, which gained real influence in Tibet after the declaration of its independence and sought to strengthen the position of the Dalai Lama as an alternative to Soviet influence in the region. A new type of 5,000-strong Tibetan army was created, some of whose soldiers underwent combat training in India. To maintain order in the Tibetan capital Lhasa, a police force was formed, led by invited specialist Sonam Ladenla, who previously headed the Darjeeling police in Sikkim. By the way, before the creation of the police in 1923, all police functions in the country were performed by landowners and the leadership of monasteries. In 1922, the first telegraph line “Lhasa - Gyantse” opened, in 1923 the first secular school was opened in the city of Gyantse.

However, the system for financing modernization activities was impressive. Since 1914, new taxes were introduced in the country - first on salt, hides and wool, then on tea, a poll tax, and taxes on ears and nose. The latter tax was an undoubted “achievement” of the Tibetan theocracy: after its introduction, households had to pay a certain amount of silver for each ear of a person or domestic animal, and earless ones were exempt from the tax. The ear tax complemented the nose tax, which levied a larger sum on long-nosed people than on flat-nosed people. Despite the comical nature of these taxes, in reality these innovations were hardly to the liking of the Tibetan population.

On the other hand, the modernization initiatives of the 13th Dalai Lama were negatively perceived by the conservative part of the high-ranking clergy. When the wind broke the branches of a weeping willow near Jokan Monastery in 1924, and a smallpox epidemic began in Lhasa in 1925, the conservative clergy clearly interpreted these events as a response to reforms. The Dalai Lama had no choice but to disband the police, reduce the army and close the secular school, returning to the previous thousand-year-old model of Tibetan society. However, the Dalai Lama himself was convinced of the need for reforms, since he foresaw the possible collapse of Tibetan statehood in the foreseeable future and it was precisely in order to prevent this that he had previously insisted on improving the army and creating a police force. He owns the largely prophetic words spoken in 1933: “Very soon in this country (with a harmonious combination of religion and politics) treacherous actions will occur, both outside and inside. At this time, if we do not dare to defend our territory, our spiritual persons, including the Victorious Father and Son (Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama) may be destroyed without a trace, the property and power of our Lakangs (residences of reincarnated lamas) and monks may be destroyed. selected. Moreover, our political system, designed by the Three Great Dharma Lords, will disappear without a trace. The property of all people, high and low, will be taken away and people will be forced to become slaves. All living beings will have to endure endless days of suffering and will be riddled with fear. Such a time is coming."

The period of the last seventeen years of the existence of sovereign Tibet was from 1933 to 1950. - characterized by such events as the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933, the creation of a regime of temporary regents who were to rule until a new Dalai Lama was found and came of age, and periodic wars with Chinese generals on the eastern borders of Tibet. Since the new Dalai Lama, XIV Tenzin Gyatso, born in 1935, "discovered" in 1937 as the reincarnation of the previous Dalai Lama and officially elevated to the rank of spiritual leader in 1940, was still a child, Tibet was plagued by ongoing political tensions between aristocrats who claimed to to leading positions at the court of the Dalai Lama. In 1947, the situation escalated to the limit - regent Ngawang Sunrabon received a parcel with a grenade, armed clashes took place between the regent’s people and supporters of his opponent Jampel Yeshe.

Meanwhile, in the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communists, which had long torn apart the territory of China, the Communist Party of China gained the upper hand. The CCP's position on Tibet remained adamant - Tibet is an integral historical part of China and will sooner or later be reunified with the Chinese state. It is noteworthy that this position also found its supporters in Tibet. In particular, the IX Panchen Lama, the second most influential person after the Dalai Lama in the spiritual hierarchy of Tibetan Buddhism and a long-time rival of the Dalai Lama, was oriented towards China. Back in 1923, as a result of contradictions with the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama left for China, where the Kuomintang government appointed him “plenipotentiary for Western borders.” Panchen Lama X, who replaced him after his death, who was 10 years old in 1949, officially welcomed the proclamation of the People's Republic of China (of course, this choice was made by his entourage).

Joining China

On October 7, 1950, 40,000-strong units of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) entered Tibet from the provinces of Qinghai and Xinjiang. Naturally, the Tibetan army, consisting of only 8,500 troops, poorly armed and untrained, could not provide full resistance. Moreover, not all Tibetans were in the mood for military action; many, on the contrary, saw Chinese expansion as a solution to the country’s internal problems. More than three thousand Tibetan soldiers and monks went over to the side of the PLA, and on October 11, the entire 9th battalion of the Tibetan army in full strength. In December 1950, the fifteen-year-old Dalai Lama XIV and his retinue left Lhasa and moved to Donkar Monastery. At the same time, negotiations began on the peaceful liberation of Tibet. Since Tibet was unable to continue armed resistance, and the Dalai Lama was unable to secure the support of the world powers, who were in no hurry to quarrel with China and the Soviet Union standing behind it, which five years ago won the war with the Nazis, the Tibetan leadership had no choice There is no other way out than to make concessions to China and agree to the inclusion of Tibet as an autonomous entity, while maintaining full internal sovereignty.

The Tibetan side put forward the following demands: complete internal independence of Tibet, the absence of Chinese troops on its territory, the preservation of the Tibetan army, the presence of a Chinese representative in Lhasa with a guard of no more than 100 people, and the representative must be a Buddhist by religion. As a result of the negotiations, Tibet made concessions - all military and foreign policy issues became the responsibility of the PRC, a military district was created in Tibet and the PLA contingent was stationed. At the same time, China promised to preserve the political and social system of Tibet. On May 23, 1951, the agreement was signed. Thus, Tibet became a national autonomous region within the PRC, although for some time after the introduction of Chinese troops it still retained remnants of internal autonomy. In parallel, the PRC began the creation of Tibetan national autonomous regions within the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan, where a significant number of Tibetan-speaking people professing Lamaism traditionally lived.

After the establishment of Chinese rule over Tibet, the Dalai Lama headed the autonomous region. However, China, of course, did not really intend to preserve the political system of Tibet in an unshakable state, especially since it did not fit into the framework of the communist ideology that the Chinese leadership was guided by. Gradually, a significant number of Chinese began to penetrate into Tibet - both military personnel and civilians, sent to promote communist ideology and atheism. Naturally, this situation did not suit the Tibetan clergy and a significant part of the Tibetans, who were under the full influence of the Dalai Lama. In the ancient provinces of Kham and Amdo, now part of the provinces of Gansu and Qinghai, the atheization of the Tibetan population was proceeding at full speed, which led to an uprising of believers and a massive outflow of refugees to Tibet, which still enjoyed a certain autonomy. A real guerrilla war broke out in the southern regions of Tibet. Guerrilla detachments totaling 80 thousand people acted against the PLA, which was fueled by new people who fled Chinese repression in the provinces of Gansu and Qinghai.

Guerrilla warfare in Tibet

On March 10, 1959, a popular uprising broke out in Tibet on the day of the Monlam religious holiday, organized by Kama and Amdos refugees. The rebels captured a number of important buildings and attacked Chinese military and civilian administrative installations. On March 28, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced that ““the majority of the local Tibetan government and the reactionary clique of the top of Tibet, having entered into an agreement with imperialism and gathering rebellious bandits, rebelled, harmed the people, took away the Dalai Lama, and disrupted the Agreement on Measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, consisting of 17 articles, and on the night of March 19 led a widespread offensive by local Tibetan troops and rebels against People's Liberation Army units in Lhasa." The uprising lasted 20 days and was crushed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army on March 30. However, in the southern and central regions of Tibet, the guerrilla war against the Chinese authorities continued, lasting until the end of the 1970s.

As a result of the suppression of the uprising, 87 thousand Tibetans were killed, 25 thousand were arrested. The 14th Dalai Lama and his supporters fled the country to neighboring India, Nepal and Bhutan. A mass exodus of Tibetan believers, mainly representatives of the clergy and aristocracy, from Tibet to other states began. In total, more than 80 thousand Tibetans emigrated during 1959. The Dalai Lama, who settled in India, announced the creation of a “Tibetan government in exile.” Thus, the uprising, which pursued the goal of liberating Tibet from Chinese rule, actually turned out to be beneficial to the Chinese authorities. After all, after its suppression, the regime of autonomous rule of the Dalai Lama was liquidated, and the active core of the anti-Chinese opposition was destroyed or expelled from the country. China received a “wide corridor” for the final modernization of Tibet along the lines of the rest of the country’s provinces and the establishment of communist ideology and an atheistic worldview on its territory. On the territory of Tibet, repressions began against the Lamaist clergy, as well as the believing population. Monasteries were closed, the monks were either “re-educated” or destroyed. Local authorities that existed before 1959 were dissolved, and their functions were transferred to Chinese committees composed of PLA soldiers and communist Tibetans.

Supporters of Tibetan independence counted on help from Western states, but, according to Tibetan leaders, it was not provided in the proper amount. US intelligence agencies trained small groups of Tibetans in the state of Colorado and on the island of Sailan in the Pacific Ocean, after which they were flown into Tibetan territory by plane. In the 1960s The training of Tibetan guerrillas began in a training camp on the territory of the Kingdom of Mustang in Nepal. However, the detachments of partisans deployed into the territory of Tibet, armed with rifles, carbines, and mortars, were very soon destroyed by units of the Chinese army that were superior in strength.

However, the United States did not increase the volume of military assistance to the Tibetan guerrillas, since in reality it was not so much interested in the sovereignty of Tibet as in weakening Chinese positions in the region.

Until the end of the 1960s. In the south of Tibet, up to 30-40 thousand partisans operated; underground organizations in large cities of Tibet continued to function until 1976. However, they no longer posed a real danger to the Chinese Communist Party, which had established itself in Tibet. Especially considering that the majority of the Tibetan population over the past years had become accustomed to Chinese rule, many Tibetans joined the ranks of the PLA, pursued military and party careers, and no longer thought about returning to the country’s previous socio-political system. US CIA assistance to Tibetan partisans was gradually curtailed, especially after China fell out with the Soviet Union and became one of the key opponents of the USSR in the world communist movement.

However, the suppression of the guerrilla war in Tibet did not mean a final solution to the Tibetan issue, nor did it mean the end of Tibetan resistance to Chinese power. So, in 1987-1989. The Tibet Autonomous Region of China, as Tibet has been called since 1965, was rocked by a wave of riots. Beginning with a demonstration by monks in Lhasa on September 27, 1987, the unrest spread beyond the Tibet region to the neighboring provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan, which also have significant Tibetan populations. As a result of the riots, from 80 to 450 people died (according to various sources). Another uprising broke out in March 2008 when Tibetan monks demonstrated to commemorate the ouster of the Dalai Lama. A crowd of young people who supported them began to destroy Chinese shops and institutions. Several people died. As a result of the protests, 6,500 Tibetans were arrested, four were sentenced to death. The unstable political situation in the region has forced the Chinese leadership to significantly increase the number of prisons and camps in Tibet and nearby provinces: there are 25 prisons and camps in the Tibet Autonomous Region, and another 32 in the neighboring province of Qinghai.

Who benefits from the Tibet issue?

Stimulation of anti-Chinese protests in Tibet is carried out, first of all, by the Dalai Lama XIV and his entourage. Now based in India, the Dalai Lama naturally hopes for the return of Tibetan independence, arguing that Chinese rule is destroying the culture and religion of the Tibetan people. In many ways, he is right - the policy of modernization of Tibetan society really changed Tibet beyond recognition and eliminated many of the traditional foundations of Tibetan society. At the same time, it is difficult to argue that it was during the period of sixty years of Chinese rule over Tibet that the quality of life of the Tibetan population increased many times over. Secular educational institutions, enterprises, modern social and communication infrastructure, and healthcare were created - that is, everything that the Tibetans were deprived of during the years of independence.

On the other hand, many Tibetans, especially members of the clergy, do not like China's policy of undermining the role of Lamaism in the social life of the region. These sentiments play into the hands of several world and regional powers. Firstly, Delhi is interested in the independence of Tibet, since this solution is optimal for creating a buffer state between India and China. Secondly, it is difficult to deny the interest of the United States, which is one of China’s main geopolitical rivals, in undermining political and social stability in the PRC. Finally, Japan also sees support for the Tibetan liberation movement as an opportunity to weaken China's position in Asia.

To collapse the Chinese state, or at least significantly destabilize it, the United States will use, first of all, two key instruments of pressure - the Tibetan issue and the Uyghur issue. At the same time, the United States, of course, has no interest in creating strong and independent states on the territory of the modern Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. For American intelligence services, liberation movements in these territories are only a tool of pressure on China, therefore, by supporting Tibetan or Uyghur oppositionists, the Americans are pursuing exclusively their own goals, although they cover them up with arguments about human rights and national self-determination. However, neither the United States nor other states are going to openly quarrel with China, so all Tibetan delegations arriving in the United States or Great Britain for support receive the answer that Tibet is part of China, but there are “concerns about the observance of human rights on its territory.”

The Tibetan independence movement is supported by a large part of the Western public. This is due, first of all, to the widespread interest in Buddhism, Tibet and Tibetan culture among the educated segments of the American and European population. Richard Gere, Harrison Ford, Sting and other world-class media personalities spoke out in support of Tibetan independence. A very large number of Americans and Europeans, and now Russians, have accepted Tibetan Buddhism and recognize the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader. Accordingly, they support his position, primarily guided by ideological and religious choice, and not by considerations of socio-political expediency, the benefit of sovereignty to the Tibetan people themselves.

The American and European public's perceptions of Tibet are largely based on the romanticization of life in this country before its inclusion in the PRC. Tibet is portrayed as a mythical fairyland without violence, ruled by wise Buddhist lamas, although such idealization is very far from reality. At least, the Russian-language sources of travelers who visited Tibet at the beginning of the twentieth century (and these are the memoirs of the Buryat Gombozhab Tsybikov, the famous orientalist Yuri Roerich - the son of the no less famous artist Nicholas Roerich) testify to social backwardness, poverty of the majority of the population, and the cruelty of the authorities in the then sovereign Tibet. The denial of China's real achievements in providing the Tibetan population with modern social benefits, including access to education and healthcare, and the eradication of slavery and feudal relations in the region appears to be either a consequence of ignorance or a deliberate distortion of facts. Moreover, the massive support in the West for the Tibetan independence movement in reality only dooms the region to the tightening of China’s domestic policy, for which the Western public’s position on Tibet is evidence of the bias of the Tibetan independence movement by Western powers and their intelligence services.

As for Russia’s position on the Tibetan issue, it should be remembered that Russia is a neighbor and strategic partner of the PRC, which encourages the Russian leadership to maintain a distance from the Tibetan national movement. Thus, the Dalai Lama was regularly denied permission to visit the territory of the Russian Federation, although in Russia, in three republics - Kalmykia, Buryatia and Tuva, as well as in the Irkutsk and Chita regions - there live a significant number of Buddhists - representatives of the indigenous population of these regions. Buddhism of the Gelugpa school, the head of which is the Dalai Lama, is recognized as one of the four traditional faiths of the Russian Federation. Naturally, Russian Buddhists have the right to see their spiritual leader, but allowing the Dalai Lama to enter the country could complicate relations with the PRC, and Moscow is well aware of these consequences.

It is obvious that the Tibetan issue needs a political solution, since any other outcome will only bring grief and suffering to the Tibetan people and other peoples of the region and will in no way contribute to the true prosperity of this ancient land. Since the history of relations between China and Tibet goes back more than a thousand years, we can say that the Tibetan issue in its current form is just one of the stages of centuries-old communication. Probably, the harmonization of relations between the Tibetans, supporters of the traditional development model, and the Chinese government would have occurred much faster if the American, British, and Indian authorities had not been engaged in aggravating the situation, actually fueling and stimulating the destabilization of the political situation in Tibet.

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Tags: Tibet, China, problem, separatism
Last updated 05/01/2009.

One of the two most visible manifestations of separatism in China (together with the problem of Uighur separatism) in Xinjiang), Tibetan separatism manifests itself in an acute form more often and older in age. The roots of the problem of Tibet and China's conflict with this region go back to hoary antiquity, since Tibet has long been claimed by various Chinese administrators, and the local theocracy defends its rights. Resolving the Tibet problem seems difficult, given the scale of Tibetan separatism that sometimes takes on. For the 2008 riots, see below.

China bases its rights to Tibet on the periodic control of its territory by Chinese leaders at different times, such as the control of the Qin and Ming dynasty emperors, and the Tibetans deny that this control gives rise to a claim to the right to rule Tibet and believe that by 1949 the last had all the signs of an independent state, and for quite a long time, and observers believe that the Chinese position, abstracting from the issue itself, looks much more echeloned. Since 1917-1918, due to the unrest in China, Tibet was de facto independent, the Dalai Lamas controlled approximately the territory of the current autonomous region.

In 1949, during the restoration of central government control over the country's territory, the PLA entered the Tibetan foothills, and, like the CCP administrators at that time, behaved in an exemplary manner, paid generously for everything, did not take anything from anyone and did not harass anyone in any way , all the old leaders remained in force and received gifts, cash grants and new privileges, the arrival of the army was accompanied by cultural events for local residents. At the beginning of 1950, Chinese troops began to appear on the banks of the Yangtze, east of the key fortress of Chamdo, which guarded the boundaries of the possessions of the Tibetan rulers at that time. On January 7, General Liu Bochen announced the imminent liberation of Tibet, in September-October the Chinese moved forward; 7 divisions were involved in the offensive, namely 5 from the 2nd Army and 2 from the 1st Army, i.e. a total of 35 thousand people. The Tibetan army, consisting of 8,500 soldiers with 50 cannons, 250 mortars and 100 machine guns, offered little resistance. On October 18, Chamdo fell, and the Kham garrisons, instead of fighting the Chinese, began to plunder the area. After the fall of Chamdo, the Tibetan government moved south, to the border, and then returned to conclude a 17-point agreement: all privileges remain, all traditions are respected, military and administrative power passes to the leadership of the PRC, for which a headquarters is established in Lhasa, but the same economic and political systems remain in force; The Tibetan army is being integrated into the Chinese one. Tibet was given the status of national autonomy under the overall leadership of the CCP. In September 1954, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama traveled to Beijing for the first meeting of the Chinese National People's Congress.

In the mid-50s, in areas inhabited by Tibetans outside of Tibet proper, in the so-called “ethnographic Tibet” (about half of all ethnic Tibetans of the PRC live outside the Tibet Autonomous Region), economic transformations began in the spirit of the CCP program. The TAR territory itself was excluded from the land redistribution program, and in 1957 Mao Zedong promised the Tibetans to begin agrarian reform only in six years, and if conditions were not ripe by then, then to postpone it, but in eastern Kham, when trying to carry out reform, it came to uprisings In Tibet itself, resistance was first expressed in the celebration of the New Year, the birthday of the Dalai Lama, etc. The Chinese government in the mid-50s made a habit of mobilizing Tibetans for the construction of highways, where the death rate was very high. Unrest began, and even the statement that no one would be forced to work, that there would be democratic changes and that the army would be withdrawn did not calm them down. The situation, however, continued to deteriorate. The first outbreak of anti-Chinese unrest followed in 1957. In 1958, a large uprising took place in the Amdo region.

On March 10, 1959, a huge, unprecedented demonstration for Tibetan independence took place, and subsequent events resulted in about 100 thousand refugees. The Tibetans themselves claim that the Dalai Lama was called that day “to a theatrical show” at the Chinese army camp by the commander of the garrison, it was stipulated that without guards and weapons, and certainly secretly, and the Tibetans refused to let him in. By that time, the capital was home to almost twice as many people as usual due to brutal military operations in the countryside, and the mood among the citizens was very anti-Chinese. After long hesitation in light of the beginning of Chinese artillery fire on the neighboring swamp, on March 17, the Dalai Lama decided to leave Tibet. During the crisis, he asked the oracle several times, and he gave the answer that he should stay, and after the mortar attack he changed his mind. The Dalai Lama, with a small group of relatives and accompanied by about 80 Khams, fled to India, which was greatly helped by the outbreak of a sandstorm. On March 30, the Dalai Lama crossed the Indian border. I happened to come across a statement that it seems that Mao Zedong ordered not to prevent the lama from leaving Tibet, hoping to split the ranks of the traditional leaders of Tibet.

During the pacification of rebellious Lhasa alone, during 5 days of fighting and artillery shelling of the Lama’s palace, about 12 thousand people were killed, and a total of 65 thousand. On the current websites of supporters of Tibetan independence, it is reported that 87 thousand people died, which The figure comes from an army archive captured in 1966 during an attack on a military convoy. The UN in 1959 voted 45 to 9 (26 abstaining) to condemn China's actions; On December 20, 1961, 56 “for”, 11 “against” with 29 abstentions, the UN General Assembly adopted another resolution demanding respect for the rights and freedoms of Tibetans, including the right to self-determination (resolution 1723).

In light of all this, an insurgency known as the Chushi Gangdrug began to grow. The movement began as a gathering of passionate individuals under the guise of religious offerings in Lhasa. The slogan launched by the movement is “all tsampa eaters must unite” ( tsampa is a local traditional dish ) little by little gained supporters. What tactics to resort to was decided after the rituals and by drawing lots. With the consent of the Dalai Lama, where at a meeting in Chaktsa dri-Gutang they decided to create the “volunteer defense forces of Chushi Gangdrug” (the term itself means “land of four rivers and six ridges”) on June 16, 1958. This event was perhaps the first in history, which placed on one side of the barricades all three large subethnic groups of Tibetans - Khams, Amdos and Khampas. In general, the rebel forces maintained the following balance: 70% Kham, 25% Amdo, 5% from central Tibet. The forces of the movement were divided into groups of 50-100 people and sent to different corners of Tibet with the task of attacking the PLA. The main obstacle to turning the ChG into a real threat to the PRC was the lack of a decent amount of weapons, which the participants purchased with their personal savings and tried to seize from the warehouses of the Tibetan government army. Some funds were raised by the Tibetans from the diaspora themselves, who organized a hotel in Pokhara, carpet factories, basket production, handicraft workshops, a Pokhara-Kathmandu bus service and a taxi service in the capital of Nepal. The Indians provided some, especially after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The Kuomintang, which settled in Taiwan, took part in the fate of the rebels. The CIA, which became the main supplier and sponsor of the movement, also began to provide assistance to the Tibetan rebels. In August 1958, the first cargo from the Americans followed; they delivered cargo on B-17s, which were piloted by emigrants from Poland and Czechoslovakia; the B-17 was easy to buy on the international market, and this, like the use of emigrant pilots, made it possible to deny US intervention. For this same property, it was decided to make the Enfield rifles the main small arms of the insurgents. An interesting detail: with the help of Kelloggs, a camp ration with their favorite “tsampa”, to which vitamins and additives were added, was developed, put into mass production and delivered to the rebels. The rebel forces trained first at a camp in the Pacific; on the east coast, the Tibetans, accustomed to the altitude, felt unwell and in March 1958 the bulk of the trainees were transferred to Camp Hale in the Rocky Mountains, prepared for them, to the former base of the 10th Mountain Division in World War II. Training was conducted only in English, and only 1 of the teachers eventually managed to master Tibetan. Students were taught Morse code, getting them to perform 12-20 words per minute, reading and drawing maps, reconnaissance tactics and organization of reconnaissance, using a portable mimeograph; at one time there was also a course on the history of communism with a description of the technology used, but it was abandoned because in the classroom freethinking began. In total, about 3,000 people were trained. , who, upon completion of training, were dropped from airplanes into Tibetan territory.

The first attack took place in August 1958 in an area called Nyamo, and in the first months things went so that there were soon no Chinese garrisons left south of the Brahmaputra, except for the fortified one at Tsekhang. The insurgents, however, had no connection with each other, a very weak supply base, and the downside was the habit of new cadres, going “to the field,” dragging their entire family with them. In 1959, the military ousted the Black Army from Kham, so that the rebels operated only in the region south of Lhasa. The emissaries who arrived after training in the United States tried to establish a rebel movement according to the instructions of the CIA, creating small mobile groups without a specific reference to a base that would operate along the entire highway, but the Tibetans were usually not able to renounce their families, herds and everything else, which is why all the rebels the camps quickly became visible to the authorities and were subjected to reprisals, as happened first in Pembara, and then in other locations.

In such unfavorable conditions, the main base of operations became an area called Mustang\Mustan, a section of Nepalese territory wedged into Chinese territory, and the plus and minus of which was inaccessibility: it could only be reached from Tibet on foot through dangerous paths, and from the Nepalese side for 13 days on a mule, which, accordingly, created convenience in terms of infiltration, but also big problems in terms of logistics. Mustang was then a de facto independent kingdom. A camp was established in Mustang territory with Indian and American knowledge and assistance to train and coordinate the rebels. Theoretically, it was supposed to gradually, in complete secrecy, several hundred people at a time, introduce rebels into Tibet through Mustang, so that they would establish bases on Chinese territory, and to do so gradually and in complete secrecy, but there were many more people willing than the organizers of the program expected : the camp was expected to accommodate 300 people, but seven more showed up, and about 6,000 people always remained.

From here the Tibetans began to raid across the border; their working season was from August to April, when the Brahmaputra could be forded. The groups were organized, to the detriment of tradition, not according to the territorial or clan principle familiar to Tibetans, but on a random basis. Acting in groups of 40-50 people, the rebels mainly raided garrisons along the valley, and sometimes reached the highway; in 1966, they destroyed a large convoy, killed the entire headquarters group of the local military group, and captured a large amount of documentation. Propaganda campaigns were also carried out, and once a British cameraman was invited to film one of the attacks, but the film appeared so late that it did not have any impact on Tibetan affairs. However, soon a PLA division was stationed in the valley, and movement was transferred to the northern highway. In general, the rebel movement by that time was not in the best shape, partly due to the advanced age of the bulk of the cadres - they were all already over 40, and the rebels suffered considerable losses due to those killed from overexertion, exhaustion, etc. The conflict lasted on a small scale until the late 60s, when the Americans finally stopped supporting them. Nepal then tried for several years to remove the insurgents from Mustang, but succeeded only in 1974. Some of the camp's inhabitants managed to fight their way through Chinese territory to India, despite a powerful barrier. A number of cadres were accepted into the ranks of the Indian Army, and became the basis for the current SFF.

From the beginning of the 70s, the banner of the struggle for an independent Tibet finally passed to the Dalai Lama, who, with the consent of the Indian authorities, moved to northwestern India, to the town of Dharamsala. Upon his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama announced the creation of a democratic government with representation from each province, and with the participation of women. Every 5 years, elections are held to the parliament located in Dharamsala, 46 members are elected by 130 thousand Tibetans around the world.

In Tibet itself, the Panchen Lama was made the main one, who tried through political methods to achieve changes in the situation of the Tibetans, which was becoming very unenviable in the light of the unfolding “cultural revolution”. In 1962, the Panchen Lama presented a 70,000-word report to the Chinese, in which he described the deplorable situation of Tibet, mentioned 10,000 killed in each province of Tibet during the conquest, and after the report spent 14 of the next 15 years in prison. During the “cultural revolution”, 98% of the monasteries were destroyed (i.e. 6,000 objects in Tibet alone), and many things were done that were included in the list of excesses of the party published in 1976. In 1979, as a reversal of previous affairs, the Yokhang Temple in Lhasa was opened to believers, and since 1980, a strategically sound policy towards Tibet had already emerged; in May of this year, Huu Yaobang, then Secretary General of the CPC, came to the autonomous region at the head of the working committee of the Central Committee On his return, he proposed economic reforms with a local bias, the replacement of administrative positions with local personnel, and real cultural autonomy. There were six points in total and they were accompanied by repentance for mistakes made during the reign of Mao Zedong. They have now introduced such things as mandatory dubbing of all inscriptions in Tibetan, administrators were instructed to use only Tibetan when communicating with the local population, and the very balance of locals and non-locals in the administration shifted in favor of the former, the most avid conservatives were transferred to other regions, improvements were made in educational sphere, trips to relatives abroad are allowed. The website of supporters of an independent Tibet says that after Yaobang's removal, Chinese party members in Tibet celebrated with fireworks, exclaiming that the main defender of the Tibetan separatists had passed away, and suggest that Yaobang's final fate was influenced by the 1987 riots in Tibet.

The political activity of Tibetans increased towards the end of the 80s, and major unrest coincided with an unprecedented event - an invitation to the Dalai Lama to speak before the Human Rights Committee of the US Congress, from which the Chinese authorities drew very definite conclusions. On September 27, 1987, monks from Drepung Monastery (just west of Lhasa) organized an event in support of the Dalai Lama's initiatives and the ideas of Tibetan independence, first walking along a circular route around the central sanctuary of Lhasa and the Tibetan market, i.e. literally two blocks from the Potala and the building of the people's government of the TAR, and after several circles made without hindrance, they went to the city center, where they were dispersed. On October 1, from 30 to 40 monks went to a demonstration with the same wishes plus a demand to release those arrested, the participants of the action were arrested and began to beat, sympathizers gathered, and the event quickly turned into riots, shops and cars were damaged, in the process of dispersal from 6 to 20 dead . After this, for quite a long time it was possible to contain discontent within the framework of small and quickly dissolving demonstrations, mainly conceived as a way to gain publicity. Typically the protests focused on the issue of Tibetan independence, but a large demonstration was also reported on May 19, 1989, expressing solidarity with the "pro-democracy movement" whose activists were then based in Tiananmen. In total, 21 cases of mass riots were recorded in 1987-89. In the midst of the crisis, the Panchen Lama, who called for moderation, the most authoritative supporter of the peace strategy with the PRC, died, and the Chinese authorities had no choice but to declare martial law in March 1989, which was in effect until May 1, 1990.

Since 1984, systematic attempts to economically develop the region began, and, contrary to the strategy proposed by Yaobang, it was decided to rely on activities that required attracting a large number of personnel and specialists from other regions; 42 major projects were approved, although there were estimates that their implementation would lead to migration of non-Tibetans to the region, and therefore exacerbate interethnic contradictions. Since the beginning of the 90s, they have been trying to intensively develop the region economically, and it is argued that it was the Khan who benefited from economic development (4-5% stable growth in all industries in the 1990s), since, in contrast to the conservative Tibetans, they were miners, administrators, etc. d. According to unverified reports, corruption and localism flourished; an administrator in Amdo once allegedly sold 200 positions, incl. post of head of the anti-corruption agency.

In 1991-94, minor incidents constantly occurred on essentially economic grounds, Tibetans always used them as an opportunity to protest against the occupation of Tibet. In June 1993, a mission from the European Union arrived, riots took place, the Khans' stores in the downtown area were stoned, and the riots lasted four days. Beginning in 1994, when the “Third Forum on Working with Tibet” was held and an ambitious economic development program was announced, the screws began to be tightened, instructions were given to expose and remove from affairs those found to sympathize with nationalism, specific instructions were given, and the next round of confrontation began when Chinese by decree of 20.3. They demanded that photographs of the Dalai Lama not be publicly displayed except in temples, that the number of monks be limited, and that language schools be banned. By that time there were 1643 monasteries in Tibet, i.e. more than populated areas, but they blamed that “now, to enter a monastery, you need not so much to know the canons and sacred texts, but rather the speeches of Jiang Zemin and the position of the CCP on various issues.” The tightening of the screws did not have much effect: in September 1995 and the previous months, in connection with the approaching celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the creation of the Tibet Autonomous Region, a silent demonstration (with gags), a hunger strike, and two bomb attacks took place. In Lhasa, explosions occur from time to time, such as, for example, the one carried out in 1996 at a stele erected in honor of the builders of the highway from the “main” PRC to Lhasa. HRV reported that in 1998-2002 there was a new campaign of explosions, eight to ten in number, as a result of the most serious, in October 2001, a traffic cop was killed. In the second half of the 90s, a big scandal was caused by the issue of the appointment of a new Panchen Lama; a special search commission of the Dalai Lama identified him by signs in sacred lakes and other traditional methods, and the leadership of the PRC insisted on the need to resort to the usual lottery procedures for complex cases using the “golden urn”, and, in the end, announced “their” candidate in the present Panchen Lama, and neglected the traditional ritual of confirmation of the Panchen Lama's powers by the Dalai Lama, which caused a storm of anger and even mass protests, so that then a “campaign of political additional education of the wavering and unstable” was carried out. There are discrepancies regarding the fate of the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama - according to the PRC, for his own safety and privacy, the government provided him and his family with new documents and moved him to a new place of residence, and according to supporters of Tibetan independence and various human rights activists, he became the youngest political prisoners of the planet.

The question of negotiations regarding the status of Tibet between the Dalai Lama and the leaders of the PRC has arisen several times. It is interesting that until 1978, the Dalai Lama began his annual speeches on March 10 with issues of independence and freedom of Tibet, and after that he omitted the issue of independence, and spoke only about the “happiness of the Tibetan people.” In 1979, according to separatist reports, the PRC expressed interest in discussions for the first time in 20 years, Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's elder brother to discuss the issue of resolving the Tibetan problem, promising that everything except independence was subject to discussion, and Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama to return . In 1982, visits of Tibetan cadres to the PRC began for preliminary discussions, but the Chinese refused to apply the option prepared for Taiwan to Tibet as having no basis, and the Tibetans believed that, on the contrary, Tibetan autonomy should be a class higher than Taiwanese, since they are not related to the Han people. The separatists claim that they have several times put forward proposals to ease the border crossing regime for Tibetans, send teachers, and expand cultural contacts of Tibetan communities, but to no avail. In 1987, the Dalai Lama put forward a “5-point settlement plan,” but there were only general words and good wishes, and very little specificity. In 1988, China agreed to the return of the Dalai Lama if he abandoned the idea of ​​independence; in June, the Dalai Lama put forward the Strasbourg Proposal, in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg: complete Chinese control over foreign policy and defense and complete independence for Tibet in all internal affairs . . The Dalai Lama was invited to the funeral and subsequent rituals on the occasion of the death of the Panchen Lama, implying that this would be accompanied by discussions on the issue of autonomy, but on sound reflection the Tibetans demanded the Dalai Lama the right to visit at least one region of Tibet and to ensure a personal meeting with Xiaoping , and things didn’t work out, and then a political crisis began in Tibet and in the PRC as a whole, and supporters of the negotiations, along with other reformist supporters of Zhao Ziyang, were removed from the top circles of the PRC and the CCP. In 1994 and 1998, preliminary negotiations were held again, but did not lead to anything. Another round of discussions took place in 2001-2003, leading to two visits by a team of the Dalai Lama’s associates to Beijing and the autonomous region, but again there were no results.