Afghanistan Palace. Assault on the palace of Amin: the most spectacular foreign special operation of the USSR
In the late 70s, Afghanistan was in a severe fever. The country entered a period of coups, successful and unsuccessful uprisings, and political upheavals.
In 1973 Mohammed Daoud brought down the old Afghan monarchy. Daoud tried to maneuver between the interests of the USSR and the states of the Middle East, during his reign there is a period of difficult relations with the Soviet Union.
Since the time of Khrushchev, the USSR has maintained rather warm relations with this country, Soviet technical and military specialists worked in Afghanistan, and the country was provided with all kinds of support. However, the USSR was inevitably drawn into the internal intricacies of local politics.
Afghan Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud (center) with his wife (right).
Photo: © RIA Novosti / Yuri Abramochkin
Daoud sat on bayonets and fought simultaneously with Islamic fundamentalists and left-wing radicals from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
Moscow did not put all its eggs in one basket and, in addition to official contacts, secretly cooperated with the PDPA. Against the backdrop of general instability in the country, the PDPA decided to take power in the same way as Daoud - through a coup.
In April 1978, the "People's Democrats" staged a coup. Daoud died in a brief but bloody clash, and the left took over the country. It was then that the future dictator Hafizullah Amin came to the fore. In the new government, he received the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.
First casualties
The USSR officially supported the revolution, but in reality Moscow was not so clear-cut about what was happening. First, the development of events took Soviet diplomats and statesmen by surprise. Even Brezhnev learned about what had happened from the press.
Secondly, and much worse, the PDPA was internally divided into two warring factions, and in addition, the members of the PDPA were with the fervor of neophytes regarding the teachings of Marx. Reforms, even reasonable in concept, were carried out rudely, uncompromisingly, without taking into account local traditions.
In the spring of 1979, an anti-government rebellion took place in Herat, and at least two Soviet citizens were killed.
The first Soviet officer to die in Afghanistan in the 1970s was Nikolai Bizyukov, a military adviser. The crowd tore him apart. There could have been more victims, but the local officer Shahnavaz Tanai and the Soviet military Stanislav Katichev sent a detachment of government troops to protect Soviet citizens. Although the Herat rebellion was the first time Soviet citizens were killed, it was only the first of a series of performances.
In Afghanistan, a civil war broke out between the opposition and the government. After that, there was talk of involving Soviet troops in ensuring security in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Afghan leader Taraki offered to use Soviet troops with Afghan signs on their equipment to help the government.
The Afghan government went into a panic. Then the Politburo refused to send troops, the Afghans received only weapons. However, already in the spring, the formation of the famous military unit of the Afghan war, the Muslim battalion of the GRU, began.
Soviet troops in the mountains of Afghanistan.
Photo: © RIA Novosti / Vladimir Vyatkin
Musbat was formed from the natives of the Asian republics of the USSR. Many Tajiks and Uzbeks live in Afghanistan, so that during operations "across the river" the soldiers of this battalion would not be conspicuous.
At the same time, a special forces group of the KGB "Zenit" arrived in Afghanistan to perform particularly delicate tasks to ensure security. Both units were to play a huge role in the events of 1979.
A battalion of paratroopers also arrived in Afghanistan to guard the key Bagram airport. The Soviet Union gradually moved towards direct intervention in local affairs. However, so far the activities of the military have not been advertised.
Meanwhile, the situation in the Afghan government has escalated to the limit. Internal squabbles led to a quarrel between two key figures of the PDPA: Nur Mohammad Taraki, the head of state, and Amin, who gradually came to the fore. On September 14, 1979, the bodyguards of Taraki and Amin started a shootout. Attempts by the Soviet embassy to reconcile these figures failed.
Amin accused Taraki - and at the same time the Soviet ambassador - of an attempt on his person. Then, on the orders of Amin, Taraki was arrested and soon killed, and Amin himself proclaimed himself the leader of the PDPA and the head of Afghanistan. Several of Taraki's associates were evacuated by KGB officers.
From left to right: Nur Muhammad Taraki and Amin Hafizullah.
After that, events developed rapidly. Amin showed himself to be an unreliable and uncontrollable partner. In addition, he immediately got in touch with Washington and began some negotiations with the United States. The Soviet secret services were sure that, of course, the CIA itself did not confirm or deny anything about Amin's work for the CIA, and for obvious reasons it was no longer possible to ask Amin.
Be that as it may, in the USSR, the threat of Afghanistan moving into the enemy camp was taken more than seriously. Moreover, the new foreign minister directly accused the Soviet secret services of attempting to assassinate Amin.
Contacts between the USSR and Afghanistan had not yet been severed, but such grave and absurd public accusations infuriated Moscow incredibly. Moreover, Taraki was appreciated, he had a warm relationship with Brezhnev personally, and such a turn made Amin an enemy of the USSR. Amin simply yelled at the Soviet diplomats who came to protest.
In addition, opposition detachments, tacitly supported by the United States, quickly increased their zone of influence. Therefore, in Moscow they decided that it was necessary to hurry. Thus began the preparation of one of the most famous special operations of the Soviet Union.
Amin's Palace
The final decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979. After that, Amin was doomed, but, oddly enough, he himself did not know about it. Probably, Amin still assumed the opportunity to receive additional preferences from the USSR and retain power. Even before that, army and KGB officers went to Afghanistan to develop the operation.
The destruction of Amin was only part of a larger plan - the Soviet troops were to take control of all of Kabul.
Soviet troops on the street of Kabul, Afghanistan
The Muslim battalion of the GRU flew into the city. He was to act in conjunction with the KGB detachment "Zenith" (later it will become widely known as "Vympel"). At that time, an armada of a combined arms army was unfolding on Soviet territory.
The entry into the territory of Afghanistan was scheduled for December 25. By the time the main forces arrived in Afghanistan, Amin should have already been neutralized.
Reconnaissance and sabotage unit of the KGB "Vympel".
Photo: © Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
Meanwhile, Amin seemed to sense that the clouds were gathering. The dictator moved the residence from a building in the center of Kabul to the outskirts, to the Taj Beck Palace. This capital building, if necessary, was not easy to destroy even with artillery fire.
In total, Amin's security was provided by more than two thousand people. The roads leading to the building, except for one, were mined, guns, machine guns and even several dug-in tanks were included in the defensive perimeter.
Taj Beck Palace before shelling.
Photo: © Wikipedia.org
The nerves of all participants in the events were heated to the limit. Airborne paratroopers were already landing in Kabul. In addition, another KGB unit appeared on the scene, assigned to the role of Amin's gravediggers: the Thunder squad. Under this name, the officers of the Alpha unit were hiding.
In general, they planned to storm the palace with the forces of Grom, Zenith (a total of 54 people), the Muslim battalion and the airborne company.
Anti-aircraft self-propelled gun "Shilka".
Photo: © Wikipedia.org
The attackers were armed with Shilka installations - quadruple self-propelled automatic guns. Actually, the main task - the direct capture of the palace - was carried out by KGB special groups led by Colonel Grigory Boyarinov.
Shortly before the assault, Yuri Drozdov, a high-ranking KGB intelligence officer, visited the palace. Drozdov sketched the floor plans. At this time, the KGB officers who lodged in the building left the palace under a plausible pretext. Meanwhile, the "anti-aircraft gunners" did not waste time: two commanders conducted reconnaissance.
From left to right: USSR Major General Yury Drozdov and KGB colonel, Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Boyarinov.
Photo: © Wikipedia.org Creative Commons
Interestingly, the KGB hoped to eliminate Amin in some simpler way. However, the attempt to poison the ruler failed: the Soviet doctors, who did not know anything about intelligence plans, managed to pump out Amin and everyone who had tasted the poison. The only thing left to do was to act fast and hard.
On the evening of the 27th, the Soviet military advanced to their cherished goal. The Soviet military were dressed in unmarked Afghan uniforms. The first victims were sentries, who were shot by snipers. The Zenith subgroup blew up the communication center. Then the Shilka opened fire. However, the fire on the thick walls did not bring almost any benefit.
Much more effective was the fire of automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 and two more "shilok". The grenade launchers and anti-aircraft gunners did not try to destroy the palace, but barracks cut off the barracks from heavy weapons that could be used by the guards.
On the way, one of the assault groups stumbled upon Afghans from the security battalion who were building. The officer in charge of the battalion was rounded up, after which the disorganized soldiers were scattered.
At this time, a specially assigned small group of soldiers captured the tanks. Crews were never able to get to the cars. However, the guards quickly came to their senses and now desperately fought back.
The armored personnel carriers of the assault groups came under heavy machine gun fire. Two vehicles were seriously damaged, one armored personnel carrier overturned into a ditch. Because of this, the already small strike group under the walls of the palace was even smaller.
However, the "shilki" continued to shoot, and their support was unexpectedly effective. One of the installations hit the machine gun, which prevented them from breaking into the building, so the soldiers made their way to the first floor and began to sweep. By this time, many were already wounded, including Colonel Boyarinov, who commanded the assault.
The palace from the right wing after the assault on December 27, 1979.
Photo: © Wikipedia.org
Because of the darkness and stone chips, the white bandages that were supposed to help identification could no longer be useful. The only "friend or foe" system was a furious mate.
At this time, another group made its way to the palace along the serpentine. Due to poor coordination of communications, their own did not recognize their own, and the “shila” of fire support, along with the Afghans, burned down a friendly infantry fighting vehicle. However, both detachments of KGB special forces eventually rushed into the building.
The commandos of the Muslim battalion of the GRU and the paratroopers blocked and captured the guard barracks. Agees and "shilki" drove the soldiers inside, did not let them out, and the assault groups captured the stunned Afghans. Resistance was weak: the enemy was completely stunned. The number of prisoners exceeded the number of soldiers in the assault groups.
The tank column that appeared on the road was shot with anti-tank missiles and the crews were captured. More dangerous was the situation with the anti-aircraft division. Some gunners broke through to the guns, and the special forces took the battery literally from the wheels, breaking into it in armored vehicles.
How Amin himself died is not exactly known. The body was found at the bar. According to one version, he ran out to meet the special forces in civilian clothes, but with a pistol in his hands - and was immediately shot dead. According to another - he just sat on the floor, waiting for his fate, and was hit by a grenade fragment.
Interestingly, Taraki's dignitaries also arrived in the armored personnel carrier of the assault group, who now assumed heroic poses over the body of the dictator.
Let's not forget these dead soldiers from the 345th Opdp and the 154th OoSpN ("Muslim Battalion"), together with the KGB officers of the USSR 21 people: !!!
They were the first to die in this war. On December 27, 1979, the Dar-ul-Aman (Taj-Bek) palace, also known as "Amin's Palace", was stormed.
Eternal memory to them!
345th OPDP (separate airborne regiment):
GOLOVNYA Oleg Pavlovich
(01.01.1960 - 27.12.1979)
Corporal, ATGM operator. Born on 01/01/1960. on the farm Bolshoi Log, Aksakay district, Rostov region. He worked as a repairman at the Rosselmash plant in Rostov-on-Don. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/11/1978. Aksakay RVC.
Buried at home.
DVOYNIKOV Alexey Sergeevich
(13.03.1960 - 27.12.1979)
Junior sergeant, squad leader. Born on 03/13/1960. in the city of Sterlitamak, Bashkri Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. He worked at the plant named after Lenin in Serlitamak. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 04/23/1978. Sterlitamak RVC.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried at home.
KALMAGAMBETOV Amandelgi Shamshitovich
(17.06.1960 - 27.12.1979)
Corporal, grenade launcher. Born on 06/17/1960. in Karaganda. He worked as a miner at the Sarnaskaya mine. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/02/1978. Soviet RVC of Karaganda.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
He was buried in the cemetery of Karaganda-sorting station.
KASHKIN Valery Yurievich
(24.04.1959 - 27.12.1979)
Private, senior shooter. Born on 04/24/1959. in the city of Jalala-Abad Osh, Kirghiz SSR. He worked as a carpenter. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on May 9, 1978. Jalalabad GVK.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried at home.
OCHKIN Vladimir Ivanovich
(15.01.1961 - 27.12.1979)
Private, shooter. Born on 01/15/1961. in the village of Maiskoye, Pervomaisky district, Altai Territory. He worked as an electrician in the Khimvolokno Production Association in Barnaul. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on May 10, 1979. Oktyabrsky RVC in Barnaul.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried at home.
POVOROZNYUK Vladimir Vasilievich
Data on the All-Union Book of Memory is not available
SAVOSKIN Vladimir Vasilievich
(01.04.1960 - 27.12.1979)
Private, anti-aircraft gunner. Born on 04/01/1960. in the village of Ust-Lukovka, Ordynsky district, Novosibirsk region. He worked as a turner at the Altai Tractor Equipment Plant in Rubtsovsk. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 04/23/1979. Rubtsovsky GVK.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried at home.
SHELESTOV Mikhail Vasilievich
(25.11.1960 - 27.12.1979)
Private, senior radiotelegraph operator. Born on 11/25/1960. in the village of Zimari, Kalmansky district, Altai Territory. He worked as a grinder at a hardware and mechanical plant in Barnaul. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on May 10, 1979. Central RVC of Barnaul.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried in Barnaul.
154th OoSpN ("Muslim battalion"):
Kurbanov Khojanenes
(25.04.1959 - 27.12.1979)
Soldier, grenade launcher. Born on 04/25/1959. in the village of Kum-Dag, Krasnovodsk region, Turkmen SSR. He worked in the city of Kizil-Arvat at a car repair plant. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/02/1978. Kizil-Arvatsky RVC of the Krasnovodsk region.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
He was buried at the Turkmen cemetery in Kizil-Arvat.
MAMAJANOV Abdunabi Gaidzhanovich
(05.08.1958 - 27.12.1979)
Private, shooter. Born on 08/05/1958. in the city of Osh, Kirghiz SSR. He studied at the trade technical school in Osh. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on May 9, 1978. Osh GVK.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
He was buried in the village of Kashgar-Kyshtak, Karasu district, Osh region.
RASULMETOV Kurbantai Muradovich
(08.06.1959 - 27.12.1979)
Private, senior shooter. Born on 06/08/1959. in the city of Chimkent, Kazakh SSR. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/09/1978. Chimkent GVK.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Sulaimanov Shokirzhon Sultanovich
(25.08.1959 - 27.12.1979)
Private, radiotelegrapher. Born on 08/25/1959. in the city of Chimkent, Kazakh SSR. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/09/1978. Chimkent GVK.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
He was buried in the Muslim cemetery of Chimkent.
Khusanov Sabirjon Kamilovich
(22.10.1959 - 27.12.1979)
Private, driver-mechanic. Born on 10/22/1959. in Tashkent. He worked as a mechanic in the village of Yanga-Sariy, Tashkent region. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/16/1978. Aklmal-Ikramovsky RVC of Tashkent.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried in Tashkent.
SHERBEKOV Mirkasym Abrashimovich
(29.09.1958 - 27.12.1979)
Junior sergeant, BMP commander. Born on 09/29/1958. in the collective farm named after Sverdlov, Galabinsky district, Tashkent region. He was drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR on 11/03/1978. Galabinsky RVC of Tashkent.
In the Republic of Afghanistan since December 1979.
Died 12/27/1979. during the storming of the Taj Beck Palace.
For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously).
Buried at home.
However, this evening is wrong to consider the first episode of the epic that began. Rather, it was the culmination of events that happened much earlier. For many years, I asked about these events of people directly involved in them. So before you, if you like, some experience of exclusive political investigation.
CIA agent?
In the autumn of that memorable year, the power structures and special services of the Soviet Union in Kabul were more than widely represented. Even then, long before the introduction of troops, KGB and MVD offices openly worked there, and our military advisers looked after almost every Afghan major. Afghanistan was regularly visited by the largest generals from the Ministry of Defense, from the Lubyanka, as well as the highest party ranks from the Old Square. In addition, the foreign intelligence and GRU residencies, which had reliable sources in all structures of Afghan society, at all levels of power, had been actively swindling there for a long time.
That is, Moscow did not experience a shortage of information about what was happening beyond Pyanj, and could well influence the situation.
The coup that took place in April 1978 brought to power the People's Democratic Party, which was under the strong influence of the CPSU. On the one hand, this pleased our leaders, on the other hand, it gave them a headache, because the Afghan comrades immediately began to literally bite each other to death, a fierce factional struggle unfolded in the party, while both groups swore a race of love and loyalty to "Soviet friends" . Who among them is closer to true Marxism, who is right, whom to bet on? The most interesting thing is that our responsible persons from different departments, who oversaw Afghan affairs, gradually disengaged: many military men began to sympathize with the "Khalkists" (Taraki, Amin), and the officers of the Lubyanka liked the wing of the "Parchams" (Karmal, Najibullah).
Things got very complicated in September, when Prime Minister Amin first isolated and then killed the Secretary General and Head of State Taraki. Now Amin himself has become the chief in Afghanistan. After that, repressions against "apostates" within the party became even more fierce. And another misfortune made itself felt more and more clearly: detachments of Islamic partisans - still poorly armed and scattered - now and then attacked the authorities on the ground, approaching Kabul. A serious danger hung over the April Revolution.
Boris Ponomarev,
then Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo:
Our Chekists suspected Amin of having links with American intelligence. Perhaps they were alarmed by the fact that he had once studied in the United States. In the summer and autumn of 1979, we increasingly began to receive information that Amin was mercilessly cracking down on "Parchamists" and generally objectionable people. Because of this, the revolution was presented in some unsightly light. Our leadership decided that this was not possible.
A. K. Misak,
then Minister of Finance of Afghanistan:
No, Amin was never a CIA agent. He was a communist. He loved Stalin very much and even tried to imitate him. I cannot deny him the talent of a major organizer, however, I will make a reservation that he sought to achieve progress in everything very quickly, right now. He was vain: for example, he starred in a feature film, playing the role of an underground hero in it, that is, himself.
Sh.Jauzjani,
then a member of the Politburo Central Committee of the PDPA:
Amin's portrait cannot be painted with just one paint. He was a man of courage, full of energy, very sociable and popular. In politics, he occupied extreme left positions. Dogmatist. In every possible way he contributed to his cult and was absolutely intolerant of dissent, eradicated it mercilessly. He bowed to his teacher Taraki, but as soon as he was an obstacle in his path, he destroyed the teacher without delay. He offered to organize Afghanistan according to the Soviet model, insisted on including in our constitution the thesis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Your advisers managed to dissuade him from such obvious stupidity.
Alexander Puzanov,
then Soviet ambassador in Kabul:
Amin... This, I'll tell you, was a smart man. Energetic, exceptionally efficient. I knew him as a military, state and political figure. From May 1978 to November 1979 hardly a day went by that we didn't meet. Taraki considered him the most capable and devoted student, was in love with him. And with all this, he is a cruel and merciless executioner. When we realized that Amin's repressions could no longer be stopped, we sent an extremely frank cipher telegram to the Center about this.
Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky,
then an officer of the General Staff:
I once asked the former director of the CIA, Admiral Turner, "Was Amin your agent?" He, as it should be according to the rules of the game, evaded a direct answer, saying only that "the Americans are credited with so many things that they are simply not able to do." As for my opinion, I doubt the direct work of the Afghan leader for American intelligence.
Yes, if Amin was someone's agent, he most likely collaborated with the KGB, as, indeed, all other prominent figures in the PDPA. In the card index of our foreign intelligence, he appears under the operational pseudonym Kazem. But the clouds over him - especially after the murder of Taraki - were gathering. Brezhnev was not only annoyed by the sudden change of power in Kabul, he was furious. Leonid Ilyich quite recently, in September, received the Afghan Secretary General in Moscow, hugged him, discussed plans for building a brighter future, and then some adventurer Amin appears, and now it will be necessary to kiss him and discuss plans. No, that's not good enough. Brezhnev, of course, sent a telegram of congratulations to the new leader (oh, the crafty rules of apparatus life!), but plans were already ripening in Moscow for a decisive "improvement of the situation."
Killing can't be forgiven
On November 12, 1979, the top Soviet leaders (only members of the Politburo and one candidate - B.N. Ponomarev) held a secret meeting at which they approved Andropov's plan to eliminate Amin. Cautious leaders, understanding the delicacy of the moment, instructed Comrade Chernenko, Secretary of the Central Committee, to keep the minutes of their meeting. This is the only case when a truly fateful decision is recorded by hand, in one copy and mysteriously titled "To the position in "A".
This paper did not talk about the introduction of troops, they were initially supposed to be pushed to the border and deployed there just in case. The very same operation to change power was planned to be carried out with the forces and means available in Afghanistan. From that time on, Amin's days were numbered.
But first, the clearing had to be cleared.
Alexander Puzanov:
Suddenly I received a telegram signed by Gromyko: "Given your repeated requests to be relieved of the post of ambassador in Kabul, you are being transferred to another job." Strange, I didn't make any requests. Well, what can I say... Everything was clear. November 21 flew to the Union.
***
Most likely, Puzanov's unexpected recall was a purely distracting maneuver, since Amin, who considered him a friend of the "Parchamists", asked many times to replace our diplomat with another, more accommodating one. So we went to meet him in order to lull, dispel suspicions. And the embassy is now headed by the former secretary of the Tatar regional committee F.A. Tabeev, who, having handed over his credentials to Amin, immediately began to discuss with the Afghan leader the details of his upcoming official visit to Moscow. Amin had been asking for such a visit for a long time, and now the Soviet side has agreed (another red herring).
Fikryat Tabeev:
Amin had a clear dislike for our Central Asian republics, where, in his opinion, the construction of socialism was too long. He said: "We will manage in ten years." One day, he could not resist a poorly concealed threat: "I hope you will learn the right lessons from the activities of your predecessor." In almost a month of my new job, nothing special happened. We were preparing Amin's visit to Moscow. All our departments, represented at that time in Afghanistan, supported Amin's leadership.
***
Moreover, many supported not just formally, but with obvious sympathy for the new Afghan leader. Among them were - the chief military adviser, Lieutenant General L.N. Gorelov and Advisor to the Glavpur, Major General V.P. Zaplatin.
Lev Gorelov:
When Andropov asked about my opinion about Amin, I said this: “Very strong-willed, efficient, but at the same time cunning and treacherous. He carried out a series of repressions. He repeatedly asked to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan, including for personal protection. He really wants to meet with Brezhnev ". Apparently they didn't like my grades. In early December, I was recalled to Moscow. Other military leaders also fell out of favor, who did not share the opinion of the leadership - especially regarding the possible introduction of our contingent: Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, Commander of the Ground Forces Pavlovsky.
Vasily Zaplatin:
At a meeting with Minister of Defense Ustinov in October, we reported that Amin respects the Soviet Union, that we must keep in mind its great potential and use them in our interests. There was no talk of bringing in troops. We have confirmed that the Afghan army is itself capable of resisting the rebel forces. And on December 10, I was again summoned to Moscow, and, one might say, I was tricked out of Kabul by deceit. A general from the General Staff calls on a closed connection and says: "Your daughter has asked the Central Committee of the CPSU to meet with her father, that is, with you. Her request has been granted. You should immediately fly to Moscow. The plane has already been sent for you." I never returned to Afghanistan.
***
Now only those of our people remained in the Afghan capital who would not hesitate to carry out any order of the Center. The "first violins" were undoubtedly representatives of the Lubyanka: the chairman's adviser, General B.S. Ivanov, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) - General V.A. Kirpichenko, head of the KGB representation in the DRA - General L.P. Bogdanov, resident V.I. Osadchiy. A little later, they will be joined by the chief of the Office of Illegal Intelligence and Special Operations, General Yu.I. Drozdov. From the Ministry of Defense, the operation was prepared by the new chief military adviser S.K. Magometov, Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces N.N. Guskov and representative of the General Staff E.S. Kuzmin.
The very "forces and means available in Afghanistan", which were supposed to eliminate the objectionable regime, were based in the capital and at the Bagram airbase and consisted of a GRU special forces detachment (the famous "Muslim battalion"), a paratrooper battalion, KGB special forces groups and about fifty border guards guarding our embassy. True, in early December another battalion of paratroopers landed.
December 10 at the board of the Ministry of Defense D.F. Ustinov instructed the General Staff to form a new army group - the future 40th Army, or, as it was first called for disguise, "limited contingent." At the same time, Babrak Karmal and his team were being prepared for the ascension to the throne, the core of which was the "Parchamists". A special person from Lubyanka was hastily sent to Czechoslovakia, where Karmal was hiding from the killers of Hafizullah Amin. In November, the entire backbone of the future new leadership of Afghanistan was brought to Moscow from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
Tightly surrounded by Soviet comrades - advisers, security guards, cooks, doctors, Amin was actively preparing for a visit to Moscow and a long-awaited meeting with Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. He could not imagine even in a nightmare that other Soviet comrades imagine the immediate future of the Afghan leader in a completely different way. The verdict had already been passed, only a few hours remained before the execution.
History of poisoning
Alexander Lyakhovsky:
Amin and his nephew Asadullah, who headed the KAM security service, were planned to be neutralized with the help of an agent introduced into their environment in advance. He had to mix a special agent into their food. It was hoped that when it began to operate, panic would rise in the palace, our units would move out of Bagram and quietly do their job. At noon on December 13, an event using special equipment was held. The units were given the command to capture the "Oak" object (the Ark Palace in the center of Kabul, where the residence of the head of state was then). But soon the command "Hang out" followed. The fact is that the poison did not affect Amin at all, and his nephew felt ill only the next morning. Asadullah was sent to the USSR for treatment. After the change of power, he first ended up in the Lefortovo prison, and then was deported to Afghanistan and shot by "parchamists". As for Amin, the experts later explained that the poison was neutralized by Coca-Cola. By the way, when General Bogdanov reported to Andropov about the embarrassment that had happened, he called his deputy, who was in charge of science and technology, and ordered that the matter be urgently corrected with these so-called "special means".
***
Perhaps that failure then saved the lives of not only two Afghans, but also many of our officers and soldiers. After all, literally a handful of paratroopers and special forces were aimed at the palace, which was guarded by two thousand selected guardsmen. A telegram was sent to Moscow from representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of Defense stating that it was impossible to eliminate Amin with the available forces. Requires military support.
B. Karmal and his associates were secretly sent back to the USSR. Until better times. The next attempt was scheduled for December 27th.
By that time, Amin had moved to the outskirts of the capital to the Taj Beck Palace, which had just been renovated by the Germans especially for him, standing on the top of a low hill. Our paratroopers, the "Muslim battalion" and special forces were pulled up to the palace in advance under the guise of its protection. Forces this time was provided much more. But the scenario now remained the same: first - poison, then - assault.
shah wali,
then member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Minister of Foreign Affairs:
On December 27, Amin invited all the top leadership of the country to dinner. The formal reason was the return from Moscow of the secretary of the Central Committee, Panjsheri, who reported that the Soviet comrades had promised to provide extensive military assistance to Afghanistan. At the same time, Amin triumphantly looked around at the guests: "Everything is going fine. I am constantly in touch with Comrade Gromyko by phone, and we are discussing together the question of how best to formulate information for the world about the provision of military support to us." After the second courses, the guests moved to the next room, where a tea table was laid. And then the inexplicable happened: almost at the same time, everyone felt bad: people fell down and literally passed out.
A.K. Misak:
I also remember that I asked Amin anxiously: "Maybe they put something in our food? By the way, who is your cook?" - "Don't worry," the owner replied. "Both the cook and the guards are Soviet." But Amin himself also looked very pale. Only Panjsheri looked with surprise at our torment: he was the only one of all who ate almost nothing, because he was then on a diet.
Alexander Shkirando,
then the interpreter in the group military advisers:
That day I was with the Afghans in the palace. We talked and drank tea. After lunch, already at the exit, I meet my housemate Misha Shkvaryuk - he is a military doctor, served as an adviser to the head of the Kabul hospital. "Misha, where are you?" - "Yes, they invited Comrade Amin. Something is not good for him." And with Misha there are two more Soviet doctors and our nurses. They actually saved Amin then: they washed his stomach, made droppers, and injected him with saline. But this "special tool", apparently, somehow hurt me: in the evening the temperature rose to 40 degrees, they barely pumped it out. Then he lay in hospitals for more than three months.
Colonel General Valery Vostrotin,
then the commander of the landing company:
Somewhere in mid-December, our 9th company, along with the "Muslim battalion", was transferred closer to the Taj-Bek Palace, ostensibly to protect Amin. On December 27, General Drozdov from the KGB gathered us. "Amin is a CIA agent," he said. "Your task is to destroy him and prevent forces loyal to him from approaching the palace." We splashed a little bit of vodka. Time "H" was postponed several times. Finally, at 19.30 I heard the signal "Storm-333". They got into combat vehicles and began to advance towards the object.
Shah Vali:
By the time of the assault, in addition to the Afghans, there were your doctors, translators, as well as advisers from the KGB who were responsible for Amin's security. As far as I know, one doctor was killed. My wife died. Amin's little sons were killed, and his daughter was wounded. Many more were killed too. But after all, all these people, as well as Amin himself and his entourage, could surrender without firing a shot. At night, Kabul radio reported that, by decision of the revolutionary court, Amin was sentenced to death and the sentence was carried out. And in the morning I was arrested.
Alexander Lyakhovsky:
The Soviet doctors who were in the palace hid wherever they could. At first they thought that the Mujahideen or supporters of Taraki attacked. Only later, when they heard a Russian mate, did they realize that they were acting on their own. The doctors saw Amin, who was walking along the corridor, all in the reflections of the fire. He was in shorts and a T-shirt, holding vials of saline in his hands, entwined with tubes, like grenades. The military doctor - Colonel Alekseev, having run out of hiding, first of all pulled out the needles, pressed the veins with his fingers so that blood would not ooze, then brought Amin to the bar. But then a child's cry was heard, from somewhere in the side room, smearing tears, the five-year-old son of the Secretary General came out. Seeing his father, he rushed to him, grabbed his legs. Amin pressed his head to him, and the two of them sat down against the wall.
***
Here, at this wall, the dictator found his death. The doctors hid in the conference room. Alekseev survived, but another colonel, Kuznechenkov, was unlucky: some commando, having jumped into the hall, fired a blind burst from a machine gun and struck the doctor on the spot.
The battle in the palace lasted 43 minutes. Groups "Zenith" and "Thunder" lost four killed, "Muslim battalion" and paratroopers - fourteen people. By the way, most of them died due to a misunderstanding: the 103rd division, which came to the rescue, without understanding the situation, opened fire on its own. It all ended when General Drozdov was told on the radio: "The main thing is the end."
However, everything was just beginning. But we didn't know that yet.
Andrey Alexandrov-Agentov,
then assistant L.I. Brezhnev:
On the morning of December 28, I call Andropov: "Yuri Vladimirovich, how will we respond to the latest requests from the Afghan leadership? What will we answer Amin?" And he told me: "What Amin? Karmal has already been there since yesterday night. And our troops are in Kabul."
Amin's widow and their daughter, after serving several years in a Kabul prison, then left for the USSR. They wanted to live only in this country, which their husband and father idolized so much. The daughter graduated from the Rostov Medical Institute.
After its overhaul, the headquarters of our 40th Army was located in the Taj Beck Palace. Then he suffered greatly during the internecine fighting in Kabul and especially during the Taliban. Now the palace is in the area of responsibility of the Canadian troops, who promise to restore it.
“I don’t want to, but I have to”
Y. Andropov
W The tour of Amin's palace (Dar-ul-Aman) was held under the code name "Agat".
The operation was developed by Department 8 of Directorate "C" (illegal intelligence) of the KGB of the USSR (the head of the department was Major General of the KGB V. A. Kirpichenko). It was this operation that preceded the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan (opration "Storm-333"). Amin was guarded very seriously, but the Alpha team, Zenit and paratroopers destroyed Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and his numerous Afghan guards.
Amin's coming to power occurred after, in September 1979, the leader of the PDPA, N. Taraki, was arrested and then killed on his orders. An illegal anti-constitutional coup took place. Then terror unfolded in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, former supporters of Taraki. The repressions also affected the army.
The Soviet leadership was afraid that further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Information was received through the KGB about Amin's connection with the CIA.
The operation was not decided until the end of November, but when Amin demanded the replacement of the Soviet ambassador A.M. Puzanov, KGB chairman Andropov and Defense Minister Ustinov insisted on the need to replace Amin with a leader more loyal to the USSR.
When developing an operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin's own requests for Soviet military assistance (in total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such requests).
In early December 1979, a "Muslim battalion" was sent to Bagram - a GRU special-purpose detachment, specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to protect Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan.
The officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev conducted a reconnaissance of the area. Not far from the palace was a restaurant (casino), where the highest officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. It was higher than the palace and from there the Taj Beck was visible at a glance. Under the pretext that it is required to order places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the commandos examined the approaches and firing points.
The palace is a well-defended structure. Its thick walls were able to withstand the impact of artillery. The area around was targeted by tanks and heavy machine guns.
On December 16, an imitation of an assassination attempt on Amin was carried out. He survived, but the guards were reinforced by a "Muslim battalion" from the USSR.
On December 25, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed the landing method by noon on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. The GRU special forces were also in the division.
Other units of this division concentrated in the designated areas of Kabul, where they received the task of blocking the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. The 357th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Airborne Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield after a skirmish with Afghan servicemen. They also provided protection for B. Karmal, who was taken to Afghanistan on December 23 with a group of close supporters.
The direct leadership of the assault and elimination of Amin was carried out by KGB colonel Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov. Oversight of the Agat operation was carried out by the head of Department 8 of the KGB (sabotage and intelligence of foreign special forces units), Vladimir Krasovsky, who flew to Kabul.
The participants of the assault were divided into two groups: "Thunder" - 24 people. (fighters of the Alpha group, commander - deputy head of the Alpha group M. M. Romanov) and Zenit - 30 people. (officers of the special reserve of the KGB of the USSR, graduates of the KUOS; commander - Yakov Fedorovich Semyonov).
The attackers were wearing Afghan uniforms with no insignia and a white armband. The password for identifying their own was the shouting of "Yasha" - "Misha".
In order to sound mask the retractable armored personnel carriers, a few days before the assault, not far from the palace, they began to drive a tractor in a circle so that the guards got used to the noise of the engines.
STORM
Plan "A". On December 27, Amin and his guests were poisoned at a dinner party. If Amin had died, the operation would have been cancelled. All the poisoned lost consciousness. This was the result of a KGB special operation (the chief cook of the palace was Mikhail Talibov, an Azerbaijani, a KGB agent, served by two Soviet waitresses).
Products and juice were immediately sent for examination, and the chefs were detained. A group of Soviet doctors and an Afghan doctor arrived at the palace. Doctors, not aware of the special operation, pumped out Amin.
We went to plan "B". At 19:10, a group of Soviet saboteurs in a car approached the hatch of the central distribution center of underground communication communications, drove over it and "stalled out". While the Afghan sentry was approaching them, a mine was lowered into the hatch and after 5 minutes an explosion thundered, leaving Kabul without a telephone connection. This explosion was also the signal for the start of the assault.
Fifteen minutes before the start of the assault, the fighters of one of the groups of the "Muslim" battalion saw that Amin's guards were on alert, the commander and his deputies were in the center of the parade ground, and the personnel received weapons and ammunition. Taking advantage of the situation, the scouts captured the Afghan officers, but the Afghans did not let them leave and opened fire to kill. The scouts took the fight. The Afghans lost more than two hundred people killed. Snipers, meanwhile, removed sentries from tanks dug into the ground next to the palace.
At the same time, two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" of the "Muslim" battalion opened fire on Amin's palace and on the location of the Afghan tank guard battalion (in order to prevent its personnel from reaching the tanks).
Four armored personnel carriers went to break through, but two vehicles were hit. The density of fire was such that triplexes were smashed on all BMPs, and the bulwarks were pierced on every square centimeter.
The special forces were saved by bulletproof vests (although almost all were injured) and the skill of the drivers, who brought the cars as close as possible to the doors to the building. Having burst into the palace, the attackers "cleaned" floor after floor, using grenades in the premises and firing from machine guns.
Viktor Karpukhin recalls: “I didn’t run up the stairs, I crawled there, like everyone else. It was simply impossible to run there, and I would have been killed three times if I ran there. Each step was won there, just like in the Reichstag. Compare We probably could. We moved from one cover to another, shot through all the space around, and then - to the next cover."
In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100 - 150 people) staunchly and bravely resisted, but the God of War was not on their side.
When Amin found out about the attack on the palace, he ordered his adjutant to inform the Soviet military advisers about this, saying: "The Soviets will help."
When the adjutant reported that it was the Soviets who were attacking, Amin furiously threw an ashtray at him and shouted "You're lying, it can't be!"
Amin himself was shot during the storming of the palace. According to the recollections of the participants in the assault, he was lying near the bar in Adidas shorts and a T-shirt (according to other sources, he was taken alive and then shot dead on orders from Moscow). Also, during the assault, two of his young sons were killed by stray bullets.
Although a significant part of the soldiers of the guard brigade surrendered (about 1700 people were captured in total), part of the brigade units continued to resist. In particular, the “Muslim” battalion fought with the remnants of the third battalion of the brigade for another day, after which the Afghans went to the mountains.
Simultaneously with the assault on the Taj-Bek Palace, KGB special forces, with the support of paratroopers of the 345th parachute regiment, as well as the 317th and 350th regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, captured the general headquarters of the Afghan army, a communications center, buildings of the KhAD and Ministry of Internal Affairs, radio and television. The Afghan units stationed in Kabul were blockaded (in some places armed resistance had to be suppressed).
Amin's palace and the Alpha team return to the USSR after the operation.
During the assault on the Taj Beg, 5 officers of the KGB special forces, 6 people from the "Muslim battalion" and 9 paratroopers were killed. The head of the operation, Colonel Boyarinov, also died (from a stray bullet when the danger seemed to have passed). Boyarinov seemed to have a premonition of death, before the operation he was depressed, which was noted by his subordinates. Almost all participants in the operation had injuries of varying severity.
On the opposite side, H. Amin, his two young sons and about 200 Afghan guards and servicemen were killed. The wife of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh. Vali, who was in the palace, also died. Amin's widow and their daughter, wounded during the assault, after serving several years in a Kabul prison, left for the USSR.
The killed Afghans, including Amin's two young sons, were buried in a mass grave not far from the palace. Amin was buried there, but separately from the rest. No tombstone was placed on the grave.
The KGB operation was included in the textbooks of the special services of many countries of the world. As a result, four servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (one posthumously). In total, about four hundred people were awarded orders and medals.
The Pravda newspaper wrote on December 30 that "as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, along with his henchmen, appeared before a fair people's court and was executed" ...
Info and photo (C) internet
Storming of Amin's Palace
In 1978, a coup d'etat took place in Afghanistan, after which the People's Democratic Party led by Taraki came to power. But very soon a civil war broke out in the country. The opponents of the authorities loyal to Moscow, the radical Islamist Mujahideen, who enjoy the support of a considerable number of the population, were rapidly advancing towards Kabul. In the situation that had arisen, Taraki conjured the entry of Soviet troops into his country. Otherwise, he blackmailed Moscow with the fall of his regime, which would unequivocally lead the USSR to the loss of all positions in Afghanistan.
However, in September, Taraki was unexpectedly overthrown by his colleague Amin, dangerous for Moscow because he was an unprincipled usurper of power, ready to easily change his external patrons.
At the same time, the political situation around Afghanistan was heating up. In the late 1970s, during the Cold War, the CIA made active efforts to create a "New Great Ottoman Empire" with the inclusion of the southern republics of the USSR. According to some reports, the Americans even intended to deploy the Basmachi movement in Central Asia in order to later gain access to the uranium of the Pamirs. In the south of the Soviet Union, there was no reliable air defense system, which, if American Pershing missiles were deployed in Afghanistan, would endanger many vital facilities, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Afghan uranium deposits could be used by Pakistan and Iran to create nuclear weapons. And? In addition, the Kremlin received information that the President of Afghanistan, Amin, may be collaborating with the CIA ...
Even before the final decision was made - and it took place in early December 1979 - to eliminate the president of Afghanistan, the so-called "Muslim" battalion of 700 people had already arrived in Kabul in November. It was formed a few months earlier from special forces soldiers who were of Asian origin or simply looked like Asians. Soldiers and officers of the battalion wore Afghan military uniforms. Officially, their goal was to protect the Afghan dictator Hafizullah Amin, whose residence was in the Taj Beck Palace in the southwestern part of Kabul. Amin, on whose life several attempts had already been made, feared only his fellow tribesmen. Therefore, the Soviet soldiers seemed to him the most reliable support. They were placed near the palace.
Afghan Mujahideen
In addition to the "Muslim" battalion, special groups of the KGB of the USSR, subordinate to foreign intelligence, and a detachment of the GRU of the General Staff were transferred to Afghanistan. At the request of Amin, it was planned to bring a "limited contingent" of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The Afghan army already had Soviet military advisers. Amin was treated exclusively by Soviet doctors. All this gave a special character to the event to overthrow and eliminate him.
The security system of the Taj Beck Palace was - with the help of our advisers - organized carefully and thoughtfully, taking into account all its engineering features and the nature of the surrounding area, which made it difficult for attackers. Inside the palace, the guards of X. Amin, consisting of his relatives and especially trusted people, served. In their free time from service in the palace, they lived in the immediate vicinity of the palace, in an adobe house, and were constantly on alert. The second line consisted of seven posts, each of which had four sentries armed with machine guns, grenade launchers and machine guns. The outer ring of protection was provided by three motorized rifle and tank battalions of the security brigade. On one of the dominant heights, two T-54 tanks were dug in, which could shoot through the area adjacent to the palace with direct fire. There were two and a half thousand people in the security brigade. In addition, anti-aircraft and construction regiments were located nearby.
The operation to eliminate Amin itself was code-named "Storm-333". The scenario of the coup looked like this: on day X, the fighters of the Muslim battalion, taking advantage of the fact that outwardly they are indistinguishable from the Afghan military, capture the general headquarters, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Puli-Charkhi prison, where thousands of Amin’s opponents were kept, a radio station and telephone nodes, some other objects. At the same time, an assault group of 50 people, staffed by KGB foreign intelligence special forces officers (Grom and Zenit groups), breaks into Amin's palace and eliminates the latter. At the same time, two divisions of the Airborne Forces (103rd and 104th) landed at the Bagram airfield, which is the main base of the Afghan Air Force, which completely took control of the base and sent several battalions to Kabul to help the Muslim battalion. At the same time, tanks and armored personnel carriers of the Soviet army begin an invasion of Afghanistan across the state border.
Preparations for hostilities to capture the palace were headed by V.V. Kolesnik, E.G. Kozlov, O.L. Shvets, Yu.M. Drozdov. The matter was complicated by the lack of a plan for the palace, which our advisers had not bothered to draw up. In addition, they could not weaken its defenses for reasons of secrecy, but on December 26 they managed to lead scouts-saboteurs into the palace, who carefully examined everything and made up its floor plan. Special Forces officers conducted reconnaissance of firing points at the nearest heights. Scouts conducted round-the-clock surveillance of the Taj Beck Palace.
By the way, while a detailed plan for storming the palace was being developed, units of the Soviet 40th Army crossed the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This happened at 3:00 pm on December 25, 1979.
It was impossible to launch an assault without capturing the dug-in tanks, which held all the approaches to the palace at gunpoint. To capture them, 15 people and two snipers from the KGB were allocated.
In order not to arouse suspicion ahead of time, the "Muslim" battalion began to carry out diversionary actions: firing, going out on alarm and occupying established defense sectors, deployment, etc. At night, they launched flares. Because of the severe frost, the engines of armored personnel carriers and military vehicles were warmed up so that they could be started immediately on a signal. At first, this caused concern to the command of the palace guard brigade. But they were reassured, explaining that the usual training was going on, and rockets were being launched to exclude the possibility of a surprise attack by the Mujahideen on the palace. The "exercises" continued on the 25th, 26th and the first half of the day on December 27th.
On December 26, in order to establish closer relations in the “Muslim” battalion, a reception was held for the command of the Afghan brigade. They ate and drank a lot, toasts were proclaimed for military commonwealth, for Soviet-Afghan friendship ...
Immediately before the storming of the palace, a special group of the KGB blew up the so-called "well" - the central node of the palace's secret connection with the most important military and civilian facilities in Afghanistan.
The advisers who were in the Afghan units received different tasks: some had to stay in the units for the night, organize a dinner for the commanders (for this they were given alcohol and food) and in no case prevent the Afghan troops from speaking out against the Soviet ones. Others, on the contrary, were ordered not to stay in the units for a long time. Only specially trained people remained.
Unsuspecting Amin expressed his joy at the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and ordered the Chief of General Staff Mohammed Yakub to establish cooperation with their command. Amin arranged a dinner for members of the Politburo and ministers. Later he was going to appear on television.
However, this was prevented by one strange circumstance. Some participants of the dinner were suddenly drawn to sleep, some lost consciousness. "Disconnected" and Amin himself. His wife raised the alarm. Doctors were called from the Afghan hospital and from the clinic of the Soviet embassy. Products and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for examination, Uzbek chefs were arrested. What was it? Most likely a strong, but not a lethal dose of sleeping pills, in order to literally "lull" the vigilance of Amin and his entourage. Although who knows….
Perhaps this was the first, but failed attempt to eliminate Amin. Then there would be no need to storm the palace and dozens and hundreds of lives would be saved. But one way or another, Soviet doctors prevented this. There was a whole group of them - five men and two women. They immediately diagnosed "mass poisoning" and immediately began to provide assistance to the victims. Doctors, colonels of the medical service V. Kuznechenkov and A. Alekseev, fulfilling the Hippocratic oath and not knowing that they were violating someone's plans, set about saving the president.
The one who sent the doctors did not know that they were not needed there.
The palace guards immediately took additional security measures: they set up external posts, tried to contact the tank brigade. The brigade was brought to a state of combat readiness, but did not receive an order to march, because the special communications well had already been blown up.
The coup began at 19:30 on December 27, 1979, when two special forces - the GRU of the General Staff and the KGB? - began a special operation in close cooperation. With a dashing "cavalry" raid on a GAZ-66 car, a group led by Captain Satarov managed to capture dug-in tanks, take them out of the trenches and headed towards the palace.
Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns began to hit the palace with direct fire. Subdivisions of the "Muslim" battalion advanced to the destination areas. A company of infantry fighting vehicles moved towards the palace. On ten infantry fighting vehicles, two KGB groups were deployed as landing troops. The general management of them was carried out by Colonel G.I. Boyarinov. The infantry fighting vehicles shot down the outer guard posts and rushed to the Taj Beck along a narrow mountain road, serpentine rising up. The first BMP was hit. The crew members and the landing force left it and began to climb the mountain with the help of assault ladders. The second BMP pushed the wrecked car into the abyss and cleared the way for the rest. Soon they were on a level ground in front of the palace. A group of Colonel Boyarinov who jumped out of one car rushed into the palace. The fighting immediately took on a fierce character.
The commandos rushed forward, frightening the enemy with shots, wild cries and loud Russian obscenities. By the way, it was by this last sign that they recognized their own in the dark, and not by the white armbands on the sleeves, which were not visible. If they did not leave any room with their hands up, then the door was broken open and grenades flew into the room. So the fighters moved up the corridors and labyrinths of the palace. When the assault groups of reconnaissance saboteurs broke into the palace, the special forces of the “Muslim” battalion who participated in the battle created a ring of fire, destroying everything alive around and protecting the attackers. The officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard and his personal bodyguards desperately resisted without surrendering: they mistook the attackers for their own rebellious part, from which no mercy could be expected. But, having heard Russian shouts and obscenities, they began to raise their hands - after all, many of them were trained at the landing school in Ryazan. And they surrendered to the Russians because they considered them the highest and just power.
The battle was not only in the palace. One of the units managed to cut off the personnel of the tank battalion from the tanks, and then capture these tanks. The special group took an entire anti-aircraft regiment and its weapons. Almost without a fight, the building of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan was captured. Only the chief of the general staff, Mohammad Yakub, barricaded himself in one of the offices and began to call for help on the radio. But, making sure that no one was in a hurry to help him, he gave up. The Afghan, who accompanied the Soviet paratroopers, immediately read out the death sentence to him and shot him on the spot.
Meanwhile, strings of released opponents of the regime of the overthrown dictator were already stretching out of prison.
What was happening at that time with Amin and the Soviet doctors? Here is what Yu.I. Drozdov in his documentary book "Fiction is excluded":
“Soviet doctors hid wherever they could. At first they thought that the Mujahideen attacked, then N.M.'s supporters. Taraki. Only later, upon hearing a Russian swear word, did they realize that Soviet servicemen were operating.
A. Alekseev and V. Kuznechenkov, who were supposed to go to help the daughter of X. Amin (she had a baby), after the start of the assault, found "shelter" at the bar. Some time later, they saw Amin walking along the corridor, all in the reflections of the fire. He was in white shorts and a T-shirt, holding vials of saline solution in his hands, entwined with tubes, raised high, like grenades. One could only imagine how much effort it cost him and how they pricked the needles inserted into the cubital veins.
A. Alekseev, running out of hiding, first of all pulled out the needles, pressing the veins with his fingers so that blood would not ooze, and then brought him to the bar. X. Amin leaned against the wall, but then a child's cry was heard - from somewhere in the side room, Amin's five-year-old son was walking, smearing his tears with his fists. Seeing his father, he rushed to him, grabbed his legs. X. Amin pressed his head to him, and the two of them sat down against the wall.
According to the testimony of the participants in the assault, a doctor, Colonel Kuznechenkov, was hit by a fragment of a grenade in the conference room. However, Alekseev, who was next to him all the time, claims that when the two of them were hiding in the conference room, some submachine gunner, having jumped in there, fired a line into the darkness just in case. One of the bullets hit Kuznechenkov. He screamed and died immediately...
Meanwhile, a KGB special group broke through to the premises where Hafizullah Amin was, and during the shootout he was killed by an officer of this group. Amin's corpse was wrapped in a carpet and taken out.
The number of Afghans killed has never been established. They, along with Amin's two young sons, were buried in a mass grave near the Taj Beck Palace. The corpse of X. Amin, wrapped in a carpet, was buried there that same night, but separately from the others. No tombstone was placed.
The surviving members of Amin's family were imprisoned by the new Afghan authorities in Puli-Charkhi prison, where they replaced N.M.'s family. Taraki. Even Amin's daughter, whose legs were broken during the battle, ended up in a cell with a cold concrete floor. But mercy was alien to people whose relatives and friends were destroyed by order of Amin. Now they took revenge.
The battle in the courtyard did not last long - only 43 minutes. When everything was quiet, V.V. Kolesnik and Yu.I. Drozdov moved the command post to the palace.
That evening, the losses of the special forces (according to Yu.I. Drozdov) amounted to four killed and 17 wounded. Colonel G.I., the general head of the KGB special groups, was killed. Boyarinov. In the "Muslim" battalion, 5 people were killed, 35 were wounded, of which 23 remained in the ranks.
It is likely that in the turmoil of the night battle, some people suffered from their own. The next morning, the special forces disarmed the remnants of the guard brigade. More than 1,400 people surrendered. However, even after the white flag was raised from the roof of the building, shots were fired, one Russian officer and two soldiers died.
The wounded and surviving KGB special forces were sent to Moscow just a couple of days after the assault. And on January 7, 1980, the “Muslim” battalion also left Kabul. All participants in the operation - living and dead - were awarded the Order of the Red Star.
“On that dramatic night in Kabul, there was not just another coup d'état,” an officer of the “Muslim” battalion later recalled, “in which power passed from the hands of the Khalqists into the hands of the Parchamists, supported by the Soviet side, but the beginning of a sharp intensification of civil war in Afghanistan. A tragic page was opened both in Afghan history and in the history of the Soviet Union. Soldiers and officers - participants in the December events - sincerely believed in the justice of their mission, that they were helping the Afghan people to get rid of Amin's tyranny and, having fulfilled their international duty, would return to their home.
Soviet strategists, even in a nightmare, could not foresee what awaited them: 20 million highlanders, proud and warlike, fanatically believing in the tenets of Islam, would soon rise to fight against foreigners.
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From the book "Death to Spies!" [Military counterintelligence SMERSH during the Great Patriotic War] author Sever Alexander"Storm" It was carried out from 1943 to 1945 by Chekists of the Transcaucasian Front. In July 1943, a reconnaissance and sabotage group of six people was parachuted into the mountains in the vicinity of Tbilisi. Immediately after landing, they turned themselves in to the local
From the book I start a war! author Pikov Nikolai IlyichSeptember 14th. Attempt on Amin's life It was about noon. We came from lunch, I went out onto the balcony, my office was on the second floor, and Amin's office was on the first floor, he was in charge of the Ministry of Defense at that time. I look, Amin comes out, and there are two cars. First
From the book African Wars of Modernity author Konovalov Ivan PavlovichSTORM OF THE PALACE TAJ BEK (From the book "The War in Afghanistan") At this time, Amin himself, suspecting nothing, was in euphoria from the fact that he had succeeded in achieving his goal - Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. On the afternoon of December 27, he arranged a dinner, receiving in his luxurious palace members
From the book Afghan Trap the author Brylev OlegFall of Idi Amin Another major conflict in the region was the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978-1979). Ugandan dictator Idi Amin declared war on Tanzania on November 1, 1978, using Dar es Salaam's support for the Ugandan opposition as a pretext. Gone to Tanzania
From the book American Sniper by DeFelice JimHunt for Amin An episode about the kidnapping and murder of the US ambassador to Kabul, Adolf Dabs, was previously mentioned. On the morning of February 14, 1979, he was captured by unknown people under very mysterious circumstances - he stopped the car in an unforeseen place, unlocked it from the inside and opened
From the book Modern Africa Wars and Weapons 2nd Edition author Konovalov Ivan Pavlovich From the book How to Survive and Win in Afghanistan [GRU Special Forces Combat Experience] author Balenko Sergey ViktorovichFall of Idi Amin Another large-scale conflict in the region was the Ugandan-Tanzanian war (1978-1979). Ugandan dictator Idi Amin declared war on Tanzania on November 1, 1978, using Dar es Salaam's support for the Ugandan opposition as a pretext. Gone to Tanzania
From the book From the history of the Pacific Fleet author Shugaley Igor FedorovichHow Amin's palace was stormed The author of this essay, professional intelligence officer Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, during the operation "Storm-333" led the actions of the special forces of the KGB - the groups "Zenith" and "Thunder". His story, repeating the outline of events during the assault on Amin's palace, is already
From the book Russian Mata Hari. Secrets of the Petersburg court author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich1.6.8. Assault On land, meanwhile, things developed as follows. At three o'clock in the morning, the landing troops went on the attack. It was assumed that the detachments on the coast, having united, would wait for the end of the bombardment of the forts, after which they would attack the fortifications.
From the book Afghan: Russians at War author Braithwaite RodrikChapter 11 Construction of the palace and the continuation of behind-the-scenes battles During the Russo-Japanese War, it turned out that Russia did not have ... artillery. The Russian army was saved from complete defeat by the weakness of the Japanese artillery and cavalry, as well as the nature of the terrain, which prevented
From the book Afghan, again Afghan ... author Drozdov Yuri IvanovichChapter 4 Storming the Palace Surprisingly, Amin had no idea that Moscow had turned its back on him. Until the last moment, he continued to ask the USSR for troops to help him cope with the growing opposition. Preparations for his overthrow began even before
From the book From Beijing to Berlin. 1927–1945 author Chuikov Vasily IvanovichChapter 2. Assault on the Taj Beck Palace After the bath on December 27, 1979, V.V. and I Kolesnik at noon once again went to each of his leaders. B.S. Ivanov contacted the Center and reported that everything was ready. Then he handed the receiver of the radiotelephone to me. Yu.V. Andropov.- Will you go yourself? -
From the author's bookChapter 30. Amin's hands were untied ... Amin's hands were untied, and Taraki's supporters began to shoot openly, without embarrassment. Two ministers were killed right in their offices. One was shot with a sniper rifle from the roof of a neighboring house and at the same time
From the author's bookOn April 25, 1945, the assault on the capital of the Third Reich began. Even before the start of our assault, Berlin was destroyed by American and British aircraft. By the end of April, the Berlin garrison was covered by a steel ring of our troops. We understood that there, in the center of Berlin, they buried
