Demographic processes in a narrow sense cover population reproduction: natural population movement (fertility, mortality, marriages, widowhoods, divorces) and migration.

Currently, the Russian Federation has an extremely unfavorable situation in the field of population reproduction, which can be characterized as a protracted demographic crisis leading to irreversible negative demographic consequences.

Indeed, since 1992 in Russia the mortality rate has exceeded the birth rate, i.e. The number of deaths exceeds the number of births, resulting in a natural population decline.

The most negative feature of the current demographic crisis in Russia is the unprecedentedly high mortality rate of the population, especially in working age. Moreover, the mortality rate of men of working age is 4 times higher than the mortality rate of women. And the first place was taken by mortality from unnatural causes: accidents, poisonings, injuries, murders, suicides.

The increase in mortality in working ages and the increased mortality of men lead to an increase in the number of widows and minor orphans in the population, and the predominance of single women in older age groups of the population.

Over the last decade, the incidence has more than doubled, and in all age groups of the population, including pregnant women and children. The rise in infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis, syphilis, and AIDS, as well as the rise in mental illness, is of deep concern. The consumption of alcohol, drugs and tobacco is increasing. Deteriorating health negatively affects the socialization opportunities of children, increases losses due to temporary disability at work, and leads to a joyless old age.

An equally unfavorable situation is observed in the area of ​​fertility.

The total fertility rate reached an all-time low of 8.3 in 1999 and then began to rise, reaching 10.2 in 2003 (that is, the number of live births in a calendar year per 1,000 average annual population). Now the government is pursuing an active policy that should increase the birth rate. Now many politicians and other figures are making various proposals on how to increase the birth rate in the country. Almost all of them are limited exclusively to various benefits and allowances to families as a reward for having children. At the same time, the obvious fact that having few children is inherent in rich countries and rich segments of the population is completely ignored.

The population decline is accompanied by its aging.

At the beginning of 2000, the share of the population of retirement age reached 20.%, increasing from 11% in 1960, i.e. increased by 1.8 times. At the same time, the share of children in the population decreased from 30% to 20%. The regions of Central Russia have the most unfavorable age structure of the population.

One of the negative consequences of population aging is the loss of demographic growth potential due to the fact that the generations of children are larger than the generations of parents. Since 1964, with the exception of the period 1986-1988, the combination of birth and death rates has not ensured that generations of parents are replaced by generations of children. However, due to the high proportion of children in the population, natural population growth was positive until 1992. Now this potential has been completely exhausted and there is a natural population decline.

Currently, the Russian Federation has a relatively favorable situation in the field of labor resources and employment.

However, starting in 2006, the number of working age people began to decline. In 2016, only 80.4 million people of working age will remain, i.e. in general, for the period from 2006 to 2016, the reduction will be a huge amount of 9.7 million people. Even more negative changes are expected in the population younger and older than working age. The number of children will constantly decline. The zones of the North and North-East of Russia have always been sparsely populated and lacked labor resources. With the closure of unprofitable enterprises and coal mines in these regions, unemployment increased and the standard of living decreased. This led to an outflow of labor resources from certain regions. Overall, the population continues to decline and by 2008 it amounted to 142 million people.

Positive population growth is observed only in a few regions of the population.

Expanded population reproduction is typical for the republics of the North Caucasus - Ingushetia, Dagestan, and, to a lesser extent, Kabardino-Balkaria.

In general, the share of regions that had positive natural growth in the total population of the Russian Federation in 2002 (population census) accounted for less than 5%. And the forecast for the development of the demographic situation in Russia shows that by 2015 the population will be 139 million people. The rapid decline in population gives UN experts reason to predict that by the middle of the 21st century the number of inhabitants will decrease to 80 million.

To maintain the required population size of the country, it will be necessary to carry out a socially oriented economic and active family and demographic policy aimed at reducing mortality, morbidity and increasing the duration of an active, creative human life, creating favorable conditions for improving the quality of life of families and the fullest realization of the needs of families for children, attracting labor immigration and creating conditions for migrants to stay in Russia.

Mingaleva Zhanna Arkadyevna, Head of the Department of National Economics and Economic Security, Perm State University, Russia

Igoshev Mikhail Vladislavovich, Senior Lecturer, Department of Physical Culture and Sports, State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education, Perm State University, Russia

Formation of the Modern Demographic Potential as the Basis for the Structural Economic Modernization

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Today, the issues of formation and development of demographic potential are becoming the most important within the framework of the policy of economic modernization and socio-economic development of the country and its regions. The work analyzes the factors of development of the demographic potential of Russia, and considers the system of their direct and reverse interactions in the process of forming the demographic potential.

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Recently, at all levels of government, there has been a growing awareness of the need to solve demographic problems, issues of human resource development, physical, spiritual and mental health of Russian citizens, the intellectual potential of the nation, and improve the instruments of demographic and family policy.

However, the main emphasis in solving demographic problems in domestic government programs is on healthcare. Although abroad there is no longer any doubt that the most important factor influencing the health of the population, its mental well-being, reducing mortality and extending creative longevity are actions within the framework of self-preservation behavior.

Unfortunately, in Russia the national health situation is deteriorating from year to year, which significantly complicates the implementation of economic and social reforms. This is due, among other things, to the absence in the theory and practice of socio-demographic regulation of unified basic concepts, including the concept of demographic potential, adequate to the requirements of modern socio-economic development of individual subjects of the national economy - regions.

Approaches to the interpretation of demographic potential

Until now, in the scientific literature there is no unified approach to the interpretation and understanding of the essence of demographic potential. As the analysis showed, there are currently four main approaches to the interpretation of demographic potential.

1. In demographic and statistical works, as well as in studies by socio-geographers, the demographic potential of a country is understood as the total number of its inhabitants. In the same context, a quantitative calculation of its volumes is carried out. This approach, while possessing undoubted simplicity and ease of quantitative calculations, nevertheless, from a qualitative point of view, identifying factors, reasons for the formation of certain trends, development conditions, and developing a set of measures to overcome negative trends does not correspond to the tasks of socio-economic analysis.

2. In a number of works, demographic potential is understood exclusively as the reproductive capabilities of a society, which are determined by the size of the reproductive contingent of active representatives in the community and their reproductive activity. The demographic potential is assessed based on the calculation of these indicators in the short, medium and long term (after 1–2 generations). In a broader interpretation, this approach is expressed in the definition of demographic potential as an indicator of potential population growth based on the already established sex-age structure and dynamics of fertility, marriage and other particular indicators.

3. The idea of ​​the demographic potential of society through the concept of life probabilistic potential, which is measured by the number of people taking into account the total time they have lived, is becoming widespread. Some researchers generally equate these concepts, treating demographic potential only as vital potential. This approach correlates with such a direction in demography as “potential demography”.

4. The interpretation of demographic potential in the context of the human potential of the territory is increasingly beginning to be used. In this context, demographic potential is interpreted as the quantitative and qualitative potential for population reproduction of a certain territory (state, region) and is determined by such indicators as the total population, its gender and age composition, dynamics of population growth (decrease), migration processes, etc. .

Demographic potential of the region

None of the listed approaches provides a reliable theoretical and methodological basis for the development and application of a set of measures to improve the demographic situation in the country and its regions, ensure demographic growth and a high quality of life of the population, which naturally requires additional theoretical elaboration of this concept. In addition, in Russian legislation, for example, in the Concept of demographic policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025, and other regulatory documents, the concept of demographic potential is completely absent.

In the process of the study, such a feature of the formation and development of demographic potential in modern conditions was revealed as a significantly increased dependence of its level and condition on regional specifics. This was clearly observed in the comparative analysis of demographic trends in our country, its individual regions, as well as in the comparison of Russia with other countries and foreign countries with each other.

In our opinion, the demographic potential of the region it is necessary to understand the totality of the activity abilities of the population, expressed in the specifics of the gender and age qualifications of the population, the educational and professional qualification structure of the population, the level of social mobility, the specifics of the mentality in a specific historical context.

In turn, demographic potential (primarily its constituent conditions for the realization of opportunities and the real involvement of resources, as well as the ability of the management system) depends on the socio-economic potential of society, but at the same time directly affects it. In addition, the state and development of demographic potential is greatly influenced by many different factors and conditions. In this case, the analysis of factors should be carried out in the context and relationship with the concept of self-preservation behavior.

Factors influencing the development of demographic potential

The importance of a clear distinction between various factors according to their essential characteristics and causes of occurrence is of fundamental importance from the point of view of developing mechanisms and tools for influencing various factors in order to form positive demographic trends and improve public health.

First group (socio-economic factors) includes the main systemic macroeconomic (country-wide, regional) factors influencing the demographic situation, population health and demographic potential of a particular territory. To a certain extent, they can be called environmental factors.

Second group (physiological factors) combines factors that shape demographic potential (reproductive health, the health of children and youth, as well as the health of people of working age). Particularly important in this context are indicators of the health of people of working age (mortality in working age from various causes), as well as the health of children and youth - that is, those groups of the population who, after some time, will enter working age and form the basis of labor potential and labor capital society.

Third group (behavioral factors) includes the main subjective factors that influence both the physical and mental health of the population, as well as reproductive trends and traditions. Traditionally, behavioral factors include a wide range of traditions and habits, most often including the nature of nutrition, leisure time, the procedure for using medications, the presence of bad habits, the regularity of physical education and sports, the nature of work, social mobility and activity of the population, etc. .

As numerous studies show, behavioral factors largely depend on environmental factors, as well as information factors. For example, the formation in society of an attitude towards one’s health as a vital value largely depends on the promotion of these behavioral attitudes, their widespread dissemination in society, and the full government encouragement of this type of behavior.

Fourth group (information factors) has a special impact on the socio-demographic development of society and public health. Information has a direct and rapid impact on basic behavior patterns, on the mood of the population and its attitude towards a particular phenomenon, including reproductive attitudes.

Fifth group (institutional factors). Their allocation into a separate group is quite conditional and was done primarily with the aim of identifying the main conditions for the formation of effective management influences on other groups of factors (and individual factors) in the direction of the formation of positive demographic trends and changes in behavioral attitudes. This was written about in more detail in the work “Institutional conditions for the formation of a regional strategy for improving public health.”

As for groups of socio-economic and physiological factors, the influence on them and the role of institutional factors is manifested through formal rules (institutions) and, above all, the legislative system. However, the scope and degree of impact are different here. The socio-economic conditions of society are affected by the entire system of legislation, starting with the constitution and the most fundamental laws on human rights and ending with individual regulations in a specific area (ecology, housing, healthcare, education, labor relations, etc.).

All of the above requires increased attention to the formation and development of the demographic potential of territories in the context of the tasks of structural modernization of the economy. + 7 495 648 6241

Sources:

1. Vishnevsky A.G., Vasin S.A., Zayonchkovskaya Zh.A. Demographic and labor potential of Russia // Path to the 21st century (strategic problems and prospects of the Russian economy) / Ed. D.S. Lvov. – M.: Economics, 1999.
2. Zhuravleva I.V. Attitude to health as a sociocultural phenomenon: Diss. ... Doctor of Sociol. Sci. – M.: Institute of Sociology, 2005.
3. Igoshev M.V., Mingaleva Zh.A. Institutional conditions for the formation of a regional strategy for improving the health of the population // Scientific and Technical Journal of St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University. – 2010. – No. 2 (96). – pp. 40–45.
4. Igoshev M.V., Mingaleva Zh.A. On the issue of overcoming negative trends in the formation of qualitative characteristics of the population // Russian Entrepreneurship. – 2010. – No. 4, issue 1. – P. 22–26.
5. Concepts of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020. Approved by Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated November 17, 2008 No. 1662-r (as amended by the Government of the Russian Federation dated August 8, 2009 No. 1121-r).
6. Petrakov Yu.N. Microanalysis of the demographic potential of the rural population of the Brest region as a significant factor in regional development // Materials of the international forum “Innovative Technologies and Systems”. – Minsk: State Institution “BelISA”, 2006. – 156 p.
7. Fedotovskaya T.A. Demographic potential of Russia // Problems of development of human potential in the activities of the Federation Council / Information and analytical department of the apparatus of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. – M., 2001.
8. Filimonova N., Krasnoslobodtsev V. Demographic potential and economic prospects of the municipality // Practice of municipal management. – 2010. – No. 4.
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Povetiev P.V., Head of the analytical department of NIRSI

PEOPLE AS NATIONAL WEALTH

Unfortunately, due to frequent use, these words have become worn out and become a kind of spell. The person who utters these words no longer always thinks about the meaning behind them. Sometimes the meaning completely eludes, thereby turning one of the provisions that define the foundations of the country’s constitutional system into a demagogic word form.

But even with a fully conscious consideration of this provision, it is not always possible to cover the entire range of meanings hidden in it. For example, lawyers will probably interpret it primarily as a priority of human rights and freedoms over the interests of the state and society. Indeed, this is the most obvious meaning lying on the surface. However, we will not talk about it here, firstly, precisely because it is self-evident, and secondly, because we are interested in a slightly different aspect of this situation.

Let's ask ourselves: what makes up a country's national wealth? Somewhere in the 14th-15th centuries we would have been answered with all conviction that the country’s wealth consists of gold and silver money and reserves of precious metals - the same gold and silver. Since the middle of the 16th century, wealth, in addition to money, would also be called goods. In the 18th century, Adam Smith included the means of production in the concept of wealth, and called labor the main source of wealth. Following him, Karl Marx proposed to consider the productive abilities of people as “real wealth”, and all material material wealth as a “fleeting moment of social production”. As we see, over time, views on what is considered the wealth of a country have expanded to include the human factor. And recently, many scientists are of the opinion that national wealth, along with financial assets, production and natural resources, etc., should include the so-called human capital.

In other words, the recognition that a person is a value has received not only a humanistic, but also a purely economic meaning.

The example of other countries only confirms that for the success and prosperity of a country, the human factor is even more important than rich mineral resources or industrial potential. Thus, Japan, which was in a dire state after the Second World War, managed, without possessing any significant fossil resources, to become one of the world's economic leaders. And this was done only by relying on the human potential of the Japanese nation, on its development and skillful use.

The idea of ​​the quality of human potential as the main characteristic of the state of the people was formulated back in the 1920s by the outstanding sociologist Pitirim Sorokin: “the fate of any society depends primarily on the properties of its members.” “A careful study of the phenomena of the flourishing and death of entire nations shows that one of their main reasons was precisely the sharp qualitative change in the composition of their population in one direction or another,” he noted. According to P. Sorokin, only the talent of Russian ancestors made it possible to create “a powerful state and a number of great universal values.”

In the modern world, human potential acts as the most important factor of economic growth, since the use of all other development resources depends on its condition. Among all the components of the national wealth of any state, it is human potential that plays the leading role. According to the World Bank, in developed countries, human capital, as the economic expression of a country's human potential, accounts for 68% to 76% of total national wealth. That is, the main share of national wealth lies in people.

The specific dual feature of national wealth as an economic category is expressed in the fact that it simultaneously acts as both a result and a resource of socio-economic development, in the process of which material and spiritual values ​​are created.

Today, when the global financial and economic crisis is on everyone’s lips, the topic of Russia’s sustainable development is somewhat forgotten. But the crisis will end, but the need for sustainable development will remain. And, as is known, from the point of view of the concept of sustainable development, which originated in the late 1980s and has now become widespread, in the modern world a successfully developing society simultaneously uses and increases three types of its main assets: economic potential, natural potential and human potential. To be sustainable, development must ensure growth, or at least non-decrease, in all of these assets. It follows from this that based on the sale of natural resources alone, there can be no talk of any sustainable development in Russia. It will also require a significant increase in attention to the preservation, development and use of the country's human potential.

CONCEPT OF HUMAN POTENTIAL

The human potential of a country is the totality of the physical and spiritual forces of its inhabitants, which can be used to achieve individual and social goals - both instrumental, related to providing the necessary conditions for life, and existential, including the expansion of a person’s very potential and the possibilities of his self-realization.

As such, human potential is a qualitative characteristic of the population. It is determined by such factors as the level of physical and mental health, life expectancy, level of education, work motivation, material and spiritual needs, and social activity of people.

The basis of human potential is demographic potential, determined by quantitative indicators of the population and their dynamics.

Depending on the context, human potential can be represented by:

• in social and organizational terms - as a human resource;
• in economic terms - as human capital;
• in technological terms - as intellectual potential;
• in spiritual, psychological terms - as personal potential.

The concept of human potential promotes the basic idea that the real wealth of a nation is its people. The development of the concept of human potential has been greatly facilitated by the fact that, since 1990, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been publishing annual global “Human Development Reports”. As part of research conducted by UNDP, the so-called Human Development Index (HDI) was developed, which is a system of three indicators:

• health and longevity, determined by life expectancy;
• education, determined by a combination of two indicators - adult literacy and population coverage at three levels of education (primary, secondary and higher);
• material standard of living, determined by the value of real GDP per capita, i.e. value converted into dollars using purchasing power parity.

Achievements in each of these three areas are first assessed as a percentage of some ideal situation that has not yet been achieved in any country:

• life expectancy equal to 85 years;
• literacy and population coverage at all three levels of education at 100%;
• real GDP per capita at $40,000/year.

The simple average of these three indices is then calculated. The HDI thus reflects the average level of a country's provision of basic human potential and indicates how much the country still has to do in this direction.

Despite the fact that the HDI has been repeatedly criticized for a certain simplification of the concept of human potential, it should be recognized that its undoubted advantage is the operationalization of this concept. This allows, on the one hand, to evaluate the effectiveness of the state’s social policy efforts, and, on the other hand, to adjust this policy.

A number of domestic researchers note that Russia (as, indeed, any other country) requires special adjustments to the UN basic principles and methods for studying human development. In Russia, over the course of a number of years, the concept of human potential was developed at the Institute of Humanity of the Russian Academy of Sciences (which ceased to exist in 2004), as well as at the Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Population (ISEPP) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where similar research began in the 1980s. Scientists at this institute use three components to assess human potential:

• physical, mental and social health, affecting not only the physical capacity of citizens, but also the nature of the processes of demographic reproduction and the very existence of the population;
• professional and educational resource and intellectual potential, including the training of highly qualified specialists, as well as the basis for creative and innovative activity that is being formed in the depths of science;
• the sociocultural activity of citizens and their spiritual and moral values, the depth of their internal assimilation, on which how other qualitative characteristics will be used largely depends.

Here we see that two of the three listed components have something in common with the main HDI indicators. Also, it seems promising to introduce population reproduction factors as a carrier of human potential into the first component.

So, human potential is an integral indicator of the quality of the country's population. Its main components are indicators of the health of the nation, as well as the level and quality of education. At the same time, the quantitative basis of human potential is the demographic indicators of the population.

In this regard, it is advisable to begin considering the state of the human potential of the Russian Federation with an analysis of the demographic situation in the country, with a description of the trends and threats existing in this area.

WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND THE RUSSIAN SITUATION

In a world where 21 people are born and 18 die every second, the world's population is increasing by two hundred and fifty thousand people every day, and almost all of this growth is occurring in developing countries. The rate of growth is so great - approaching ninety million a year - that it has come to be seen as a population explosion that could shake the planet.

Let us repeat: this growth is due to the increase in the population of developing countries. But in developed countries of Europe, North America and Southeast Asia the situation is somewhat different. In all countries of the so-called “golden billion” there is currently a decline in the birth rate, in which the population ceases to renew itself and is rapidly aging. The demographic weight of developed countries is also falling; the share of their population is rapidly declining. In 2000, they “weighed” less than 20%, and by 2050 this share will drop below 15% (See Fig. 1).

Western scientists explain this dynamics using the concept of demographic transition, which asserts that during the transition from a “traditional” society to an industrial society, changes in population reproduction naturally occur: high birth rates with high mortality are replaced by low birth rates and deaths, and population growth stops .

This is the global situation. Now consider the situation in Russia.

Since the first half of the 1990s, the population of Russia has been declining. At the same time, since 1992, the trends in the natural movement of the population (fertility and mortality) have acquired a crisis character: mortality exceeded the birth rate, forming the so-called “Russian cross” (See Fig. 2).

From 1992 to 2009, the natural decline in the country's population reached 12.6 million people (See Fig. 3). Moreover, the migration increase over these years compensated for only 5.5 million people.

At the moment, further population decline is to a certain extent restrained by the favorable gender and age structure formed as a result of the high birth rate of the eighties. The latter circumstance has contributed to the emergence of numerous marriage groups these days, which explains the small automatic increase in the birth rate in recent years. However, this demographic strength is running out: according to some estimates, its influence will last no further than 2012, after which the population will rapidly decline. Thus, according to the Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the population of the Russian Federation, while maintaining current levels of fertility and mortality, may by 2025 decrease from today’s 141.9 million people to 122 million people. At the same time, this forecast notes that with a further increase in mortality and a decrease in the birth rate, the number of Russians will decrease even more and by the end of this period will amount to 113.9 million people.

All four versions of the forecast developed by UN specialists do not promise the best prospects. According to its authors, by 2025 the quantitative potential of the Russian population may be reduced to the following values:

• according to the upper option - up to 136.6 million people;
• according to the average option - up to 129.2 million people;
• according to the lower option - up to 121.7 million people;
• according to the option with a constant (non-decreasing) birth rate - up to 125.6 million people.

With the further development of depopulation processes, the population of Russia by the middle of the 21st century will be reduced, according to various estimates, by 30-60 million people, that is, by an amount ranging from 20 to 40 percent of its current number.

In this regard, many demographers declare an inevitable demographic catastrophe threatening our country. But, oddly enough, there is another point of view that considers the demographic decline to be a good thing for Russia: supposedly, the deeper it is, the fewer people the national wealth will be divided into, and, therefore, the wealthier they will become. Here is what Anatoly Vishnevsky, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, Director of the Institute of Demography at the State University Higher School of Economics, answered to supporters of this position:

“If you look at national wealth as a resource given by nature that can only be consumed (and we seem to be increasingly accustomed to this view), then you are certainly right. A small population is especially convenient when the main buyers of our wealth are outside the country.

But if you think not about eating, but about the reproduction of wealth, then, on the contrary, the larger the population, the better. A large - and growing - population is a huge domestic market that stimulates investment, it is a labor force that allows us to solve large economic problems, it is a path from wealth to even greater wealth.

A country with a declining population is a falling asleep country. And with such a colossal territory as ours, it is also a country in which more and more lands are falling out of economic and social circulation. Even now we are already seeing an excessive concentration of the population towards the European center of the country. In the Central Federal District, more than a quarter of Russians live on 4 percent of Russia's territory, and in the Far East, less than 5 percent of the country's population must live on over 36 percent of its territory. A population decline for Russia is like death.”

Increasing fertility/decrease in mortality - or migration? Demographers know only three ways to overcome depopulation: a) increasing the birth rate, b) decreasing the mortality rate, and c) replacement migration. Most experts, both in our country and in Europe and the USA, consider depopulation irreversible, and an increase in the birth rate to a level that ensures at least simple replacement of generations is unlikely. Therefore, it is proposed to stop the population decline through immigration and/or reduction in mortality.

Thus, specialists from the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences propose to focus on reducing mortality in the fight against the demographic crisis. In turn, the authors of the UN report on human development in Russia argue that for our country one of the main sources of replenishing the shortage of labor resources caused by demographic decline is internal and external migration, and only a competent migration policy will allow Russia to avoid the harmful consequences of depopulation.

Less represented, but also there is a different, alternative, view on ways to solve the demographic problem.

Its supporters believe that, despite the importance of reducing the mortality rate, it alone, without increasing the birth rate, will not lead to stabilization of the population in the long term. As for the influence of external migration on overcoming depopulation processes, this group of researchers is even more skeptical. From the point of view of demography, supporters of this approach note, the population is a collection of people with the ability to reproduce themselves; and this means that from the English the English are born, from the French - the French, from the Russians - the Russians. And if in a given population of people the birth rate is very low and the generation of children is numerically much smaller than the generation of parents, then the vacant place usually does not remain empty. In most countries with natural population decline, the vacuum created by this decline is fully or partially filled by migrants. If there are relatively few of them and (or) they do not stay apart, then over time their children and grandchildren dissolve into the indigenous population of the country. When they are not completely assimilated, they form relatively small national minorities that integrate with the state-forming ethnic group, and do not replace it. However, in our time, millions of migrants are moving to Western Europe and North America (USA and Canada), as well as to Russia, from countries characterized by low living standards, high birth rates and general youth unemployment. They form closed communities, maintain close ties with the country of origin, entice relatives from there, and obtain brides for themselves and their children from their former homeland. Thus, in countries receiving immigrants, they gradually replace the dying indigenous population. In this regard, researchers believe, migration processes should no longer be discussed from the point of view of the reproduction of the indigenous population, but only from the point of view of its gradual replacement. This means that this way of solving demographic problems cannot be considered acceptable for Russia.

However, a more detailed consideration of the problems of migration and migration policy of the Russian Federation is not included in the scope of our review, but is the topic of separate studies. Therefore, let us dwell on the consideration of fertility and mortality factors.

ULTRA-HIGH MORTALITY AS A FACTOR OF DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS

By European standards, the birth rate in Russia cannot be called unprecedentedly low; equally low birth rates are observed in many developed Western countries (and not only the West, in Hong Kong it is, for example, 7.1‰ [births per 1000 people per year] and in modern Russia - 10.5‰). However, the mortality rate in Russia (and some other Eastern European countries) is indeed abnormally high. Similar mortality rates (more than 15‰) are found only in HIV-affected countries of Tropical Africa. High mortality is the primary source of depopulation in Russia. Let's look at Figure 4, which shows the birth and death rates in Russia and the European Union in 2002. We see that the birth rate in both cases is approximately the same. However, in the EU in 2002, low fertility was offset by equally low mortality. In Russia, it is the catastrophic mortality rate of the population that creates a gap between the birth rate and mortality rate, which results in the depopulation of the country.

Two main groups of hypotheses can be distinguished regarding the reasons for such a high mortality rate in our country.

• The extremely high mortality rate in Russia is the result of a deterioration in living standards after the collapse of the Soviet Union: the collapse of the economy, the low level of medicine, an unfavorable environmental situation, dissatisfaction with life, social stress, etc.
• The main factor in the excess mortality rate among Russians is the high level of consumption of alcohol and hard drugs.

It is reasonable to assume that both groups of factors contributed, however, to successfully combat the extremely high mortality rate of Russians, it is necessary to understand which of the reasons had a decisive impact.

Domestic researchers analyzed both hypotheses. Let's consider the scientists' findings.

"Crisis hypothesis". A detailed analysis leads to the conclusion that the economic crisis is not the main cause of high mortality in Russia. Firstly, in the early 1990s, the excess mortality crisis erupted not only in the Russian Federation, but also in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries - i.e. economically more prosperous parts of the former USSR. While in the poorest countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, where the economic crisis was unusually severe even by post-Soviet standards, the increase in mortality was significantly less. Secondly, in Russia, the crisis of excess mortality has suffered most not from the poorest age and gender groups - children and women - but from the economically wealthiest middle-aged men. Finally, among all regions of the Russian Federation, the poorest and politically unstable regions such as Ingushetia and Dagestan are characterized by the highest life expectancy.

The assumption that the economic situation in the country indirectly influenced the sharp increase in mortality is also untenable, since it had a strong impact on the state of medicine and the health care system as a whole. After all, the state of medicine in Russia is hardly worse than in the countries of Transcaucasia or Central Asia, where the situation with mortality and life expectancy is noticeably more favorable.

It is a common assumption that the decisive contribution to the phenomenon of excess mortality among Russians was made by the social stress caused by the collapse of the USSR and the dissatisfaction of citizens with the post-Soviet reality. However, data from cross-national socio-psychological research World Values ​​Survey show that residents of a number of post-Soviet republics in the 1990s were no more, and often less, satisfied with life, happy and optimistic than Russians. But this did not prevent them from having significantly lower mortality rates and longer life expectancies. Consequently, pessimism and dissatisfaction with life cannot be considered determining factors in the crisis of excess mortality in Russia.

"Alcohol Hypothesis". The main characteristics of Russian mortality point to alcohol as its most important factor. The very distribution of demographic indicators indicates the importance of this factor, since Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia and other post-Soviet European states, unlike Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the North Caucasus, have severe alcohol problems. Within Russia itself, the longest life expectancy of the population is characterized by the most economically poor, but deeply Islamized and therefore low-drinking Ingushetia and Dagestan. Another confirmation of the determining influence of the alcohol factor is that excess mortality in Russia is concentrated in the most heavy-drinking social and demographic groups of the population, namely among persons with secondary, incomplete secondary and primary education, persons engaged in manual labor, as well as men of working age in in general.

An important contribution to the study of the effect of alcohol on mortality rates was made by a study of the consequences of the anti-alcohol campaign in the Soviet Union in 1985–1987. (which, according to a VTsIOM survey, 58% of Russians have a positive attitude towards). Then, actual alcohol consumption fell by approximately 27%, leading to a 12% drop in mortality among men and 7% among women. Mortality from alcohol poisoning decreased by 56%. Mortality among men from accidents and violence fell by 36%, from pneumonia by 40%, from other respiratory diseases by 20%, from infectious diseases by 20%, and from cardiovascular diseases by 9%. After the winding down of the anti-alcohol campaign, mortality rates, especially among men, rose sharply.

Research conducted in various regions of Russia allows us to conclude that every fourth Russian who dies from diseases of the circulatory system dies while intoxicated. Under the guise of a significant part of such diagnoses is alcohol poisoning, since the doses of alcohol found in the blood of a number of the deceased are incompatible with life. The contribution of alcohol to mortality from external causes is much higher; the share of alcohol-related deaths in this category is approximately 60%. Also, more than 80% of murderers and 60% of those killed are drunk at the time of the murder. More than half of suicides also die while intoxicated, a significant portion of whom would not have taken the fatal step if not for their state of intoxication.

In order to imagine the scale of the problem, it is enough to compare the scale of mortality from alcohol-related causes in Russia and in the EU countries. In Russia, this level is 6 times higher than the European level for men and 5 times for women. Even in the early 1980s, when the high level of alcoholization of the population provoked an anti-alcohol campaign in the USSR, this gap did not exceed 2 times.

Alcohol-related mortality, which has taken on the character of a humanitarian catastrophe, coexists in Russia with another threat: hard drugs. In terms of lethality, drugs are divided into injectables and all others. Although all drugs damage a person's body in one way or another and increase their chances of dying early, the death rate from injecting drugs is especially high. The average life expectancy of a heroin addict does not exceed 7 years from the beginning of drug addiction, and the mortality rate among injecting drug addicts in general seriously exceeds 90%. And if in terms of drug consumption in general Russia, fortunately, lags behind Western countries, then in terms of consumption of the most lethal injectable drugs the country occupies a sad lead (according to the UN, 2004). According to survey data, 13.9% of young people aged 11–24 regularly use drugs, which is lower than the average in the West. However, at least 4.2% use heroin more than twice a month, 0.6% use pervitin, and 0.2% use ephedrine. It is worth keeping in mind that not all drug addicts are willing to admit during a survey that they take drugs.

Thus, at least 5% of Russian youth are doomed to die at a young age, leaving no children, only as a result of drug addiction. In reality, the losses are higher, because Not only injecting drugs, but also all others, contribute to drug-related mortality. And although an order of magnitude more people in Russia die from vodka than from drugs (more than 700 thousand versus more than 70 thousand per year), drug addiction kills a noticeable part of the youth, i.e. precisely that part of society that has the greatest reproductive potential, and therefore drug addiction is also one of the main threats to the demographic development of Russia.

Thus, at the moment we can say that alcohol and drug mortality have taken on an abnormal scale in Russia and together make a decisive contribution to the modern demographic catastrophe.

Possible ways to overcome excess mortality in Russia. Increasing funding for medicine is not enough to solve the demographic crisis in Russia. Of course, this area definitely needs to be developed; it will add several years to the lives of Russians, especially non-drinkers. However, expensive measures of this kind will be ineffective until the main “black holes” into which the Russian population is “moving” at enormous speed are eliminated: alcoholic beverages and hard drugs. As the history of Hungary in the 1970s and 80s shows. and Northern Europe of the 19th century, economic growth in itself is also not a panacea for demographic problems. Solving the demographic problem requires a radical reduction in the consumption of strong alcoholic beverages and injectable drugs by Russians, preferably in combination with a reduction in the level of alcohol and drug consumption in general. This would make it possible to immediately stop the extinction of Russia.

As global experience shows, there are the following measures that help effectively reduce the consumption of alcoholic beverages:

• increase in the price of alcohol, decrease in the physical availability of alcohol;
• reducing demand: working with public opinion, informing consumers about the real dangers of alcohol;
• prevention and treatment of alcoholism.

One of the most effective measures that has reduced the level of alcoholic mortality in many countries is the regulation of the price of alcohol in general, and strong alcoholic drinks in particular. Econometric studies show that the demand for alcohol, like most goods, is price elastic (i.e., an increase in the price of alcoholic beverages leads to a decrease in their consumption).

Since the main factor in the excess mortality rate of Russians is strong alcoholic drinks, it is necessary to increase the cost of vodka compared to weaker drinks, fortified wine compared to unfortified, fortified beer compared to natural beer. In this case, the best option is not to collect excise tax separately for each type of drink, but to collect it generally, depending on the alcohol content of alcoholic products. In the meantime, the current alcohol price system in Russia stimulates the excess mortality of Russians. If in Russia the cost of a bottle of vodka is only 4–6 times higher than the cost of a can of beer, then in developed countries strong alcoholic drinks are 10–20 times more expensive than beer.

Prohibiting the sale of alcohol during certain hours and days (for example, after hours, on Sundays, etc.) is also an effective means of combating alcohol-related deaths. A huge number of deaths occur after drinkers decide to “catch up”, go to the nearest convenience store and buy more alcohol. There is no doubt that introducing a complete ban on the retail sale of alcoholic beverages at night would help to significantly reduce the mortality rate in Russia.

The state monopoly on the retail sale of alcohol has proven to be an extremely effective means of regulating both the cost of alcoholic beverages and its physical availability. This system has proven itself well in Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Canada, some states of the USA, etc. Considering the severity of the alcohol situation in Russia, the introduction of such a monopoly is the best option.

FERTILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PRONATALIST POLICIES

The birth rate in Russia declined throughout the 20th century and by the second half of the 1960s. reached a level insufficient to ensure simple reproduction of the population - the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.14 (births per woman) with the minimum required for simple reproduction being 2.15. Until the end of the 1980s, the process of decline in the birth rate was gradual, and then it took on a landslide character. In 2002, the birth rate in Russia ensured population reproduction by only 62%. In 2006, the total fertility rate in the country was only 1.3.

Subsequently, the process of decline in the birth rate slowed down somewhat, and then a slight increase was noted. However, this growth still remained within the framework of a low birth rate, and therefore today any reports of success in the field of demography are either populist in nature or due to a lack of demographic literacy. There has been no real turning point in demographic trends, despite the increase in birth rates. The modern reproductive effect can be explained by the entry into the fertile phase of a relatively large generation born in the second half of the eighties. Considering that the marriageable age of the female population in Russia is 21–23 years, it is not difficult to trace the correlation of the current rise in the birth rate with the surge in reproductive activity during the perestroika period.

It should be noted that the TFR is approximately the same as in Russia, or even lower in Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Croatia, Czech Republic, South Korea, Japan. Most of these countries have experienced a period of significant social transformation in the last 15-20 years. In general, since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia has remained in the cohort of countries with ultra-low birth rates. To be fair, it should be noted that although in most developed countries the birth rate is higher, even there, with the exception of the United States, it does not ensure simple reproduction of the population. Among the European countries, France came closest to the threshold of simple reproduction, where for several decades a state policy was pursued to stimulate the birth rate.

French experience of pronatalist policy. Increasing the birth rate of the country's indigenous population is considered by some experts as the most suitable (sometimes the only correct) way to solve the problem of depopulation. However, this requires the state to take a set of targeted measures in the field of social and, in particular, family policy. Such measures must be long-term and will always be associated with significant financial costs. Moreover, the effect of these measures may only appear in the long term and will not necessarily lead to a significant increase in the birth rate. The latter is supported by the experience of some developed countries, but not by the experience of France, where government pronatalist policies seem to be working. At least since it began, the birth rate has actually increased.

But here it is necessary to emphasize that the French experience is unique in many ways. France is considered the first country in the world to face the problem of depopulation, and the first country to begin pursuing a targeted pronatalist policy. At the same time, France is one of the few countries (if not the only one) where pronatalist policies are believed to have led to a real improvement in the situation. The latter is still controversial, and some demographers tend to attribute the improvement in the demographic situation in France to factors other than the state policy aimed at it. However, the results of a number of studies show the presence of a strong direct statistical connection between the introduction of measures in a country aimed at increasing the birth rate and the actual increase in this level.

The main measures of pronatalist demographic policy in France have always been economic. Firstly, benefits were paid to families with at least one child, and increased with the birth of each subsequent child. Secondly, the birth of children of high order (3+) was encouraged by additional benefits and benefits. Finally, there were benefits received by childless couples during the first few years of marriage. But families with children were and are still receiving much more generous benefits. Some of them are provided to all families, regardless of their income, while some depend on income. The more children, the greater the number of benefits and their size, the lower the taxes, the longer the maternity leave. By providing families with such privileges, the state takes on most of the costs of maintaining and raising children.

In modern France, there are a number of ways to help families, including 15 different types of benefits, most of which do not depend on family income, as well as tax privileges that increase with family size. Among the benefits in modern France are the following:

• benefits for large families (more than two children);
• benefits for mothers (from the 5th month of pregnancy until the child is three months old);
• parental benefit (for families with three or more children, if one of them is under 3 years old);
• nanny allowance (for working parents whose children are under 3 years old);
• another allowance for a nanny (for parents whose children are under 6 years old);
• support allowance for large families (for poor families with 3 or more children);
• allowance for a single parent (up to 3 years of age);
• allowance for preparing a child for school (only for poor families), etc.

In addition, the fight against discrimination against women by employers is being carried out. Many researchers even believe that it is not so much material support as measures to protect mothers in the labor market that play a key role in the success of French demographic policy.

Assessment of Russian pronatalist policy. The concern of Russian society and its political elite about the situation with the birth rate in the country stimulated preparations in 2006-2007. a new version of the state concept of demographic policy, called the “Concept of demographic policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025”. Obviously, the new concept is intended to replace the previous one, which is far from expired.

With regard to fertility, the new Concept differs from the previous one in two features: a) the appearance of targets expressed in specific TFR values: increase by 1.3 times compared to 2006 by 2016 and one and a half times by 2026 ( respectively, up to 1.7 in 2015 and up to 1.95 in 2025); and b) emphasizing the importance of “strengthening the institution of family, reviving and preserving the spiritual and moral traditions of family relations.”

In addition, among the measures aimed at solving the problem of increasing the birth rate and boiling down to some improvement and increasing the financial support of the system of benefits and benefits that developed in the 1980s, is the development of a system of benefits in connection with the birth and raising of children, meeting the needs of families in preschool education services, housing availability for families with children, etc. (as discussed in the previous concept), a new one has appeared, considered as perhaps the central measure of the adopted strategy of “stimulating the birth rate” - the provision of maternal (family) capital.

In the Report on Human Development in Russia, published in the spring of 2009, which was prepared under the auspices of the UN by well-known domestic scientists, an attempt was made to assess the effectiveness of the listed measures.

The first conclusion is that even with the most favorable development of events, only generations of women born no earlier than the last five years of the last century, whose reproductive cycle will begin around 2015, will be able to approach the level of final fertility that ensures simple population reproduction. years of birth will enter a period of active family formation after 2015, and, with favorable developments, the level of their final fertility will exceed 1.8 or even 1.9 children per woman. But this is only possible if demographic policy, which aims to increase the number of children in families, will be highly effective for at least two decades and will be focused on measures that are attractive, first of all, to women over the age of 25 and especially over 30 years old.

The expected results of the family-oriented demographic policy, updated in 2007, can be looked at from the other side - from the side of public opinion and its readiness to react in some way to new policy measures. A survey was conducted in 2007, the results of which indicate high public support for measures to strengthen family policy. Approximately half of those surveyed believe that the introduction of “maternity capital” and an increase in payments for all types of benefits is important for making decisions about having children. Equally popular are measures to expand the network of preschool institutions and improve the work schedule of school institutions. Respondents consider it less important to work part-time or on a flexible schedule, and use nanny services, taking into account their increased availability. These measures were noted as important by 30 to 40% of respondents.

However, in contrast to the high praise for the policy overall, responses to the question: “How will these measures introduced in 2007 affect your behavior regarding childbearing?” The same study, unfortunately, does not provide grounds for increased optimism. Few respondents are ready to respond positively to the government’s policy of stimulating the birth rate. The answer “they will definitely have more children than they planned” was given by only 1% of respondents. Another 8% are considering this opportunity. At the same time, 81% believe that the proposed measures will not affect their personal behavior in any way, and they will follow their previous plans. Finally, 10% of respondents intend to have children earlier than planned, with the same expected final offspring size. This confirms the high probability of shifts in the birth calendar in real generations without a significant increase in the final number of children in families, as a result of which an inevitable compensatory decline in the annual number of births should be expected after the short-term “baby boom”.

Even more alarming is a comparison of the results of surveys on respondents’ intentions to have a child (another child) in the next three years, conducted in 2004 and 2007. There are no significant shifts in intentions that can be attributed to optimistic perceptions of the additional policies introduced in 2007.

It is quite possible, experts believe, that after some time, with the state’s consistently high attention to family matters, people’s expectations will become more optimistic, but so far no changes in the procreative attitudes of the population in connection with the new demographic policy have been observed, and a significant demographic effect can be expected from there is no particular reason for it.

The innovation of Russian demographic policy - maternal capital - has now become part of the entire system of measures of domestic family policy. This is a typical form of a one-time bonus/bonus. Although in Russia they expect high demographic returns, from the point of view of long-term impact on fertility, such measures are considered by the international expert community to be among the least effective. Usually they cause short-term surges, shifts in the birth calendar, the more significant the higher the premium size, but they do not have prospects for maintaining increased rates of family formation and increasing the desired number of children at the mass level. Regular increases in the effective size of the premium to maintain its attractiveness sooner or later encounter the limited economic capabilities of the state. In addition, experts emphasize that bonuses of this kind cause a response in the form of increased birth rates, primarily in low social strata, which further complicates the solution to the problem of poverty. Therefore, while giving a positive assessment to plans to increase government spending to support families with children, one can hardly count on the fact that the implementation of these plans will ensure the desired increase in the birth rate.

So, we can expect that the Russian “fertility stimulation” policy declared today will not be very effective in the long term.

Approaches to increasing fertility. The theoretical basis of demographic policy throughout the world, including our country, is the concept of “interference with the birth of children.” According to this concept, it is believed that the birth rate is too low due to difficult material living conditions that prevent the birth of children. Hence the conclusion is drawn that it is necessary to alleviate these conditions by providing families with a small child or several children with various benefits and allowances, which will naturally increase the birth rate.

However, there is, although much less widespread, another point of view. Its supporters (among them, for example, A.I. Antonov, V.N. Arkhangelsky, A.B. Sinelnikov, etc.) are critical of the significance of the connection between economic conditions and fertility. Indeed, a low birth rate, which does not ensure simple replacement of generations, as mentioned above, is observed in all economically prosperous Western countries. Moreover, two centuries ago, demographers discovered the so-called “feedback paradox”: contrary to popular belief, rich families have, on average, fewer children than poor ones. On this basis, proponents of an alternative point of view argue that attempts to radically improve the demographic situation through the economic component cannot produce lasting positive results.

On the contrary, it is argued that the root of the problems lies in the very way of life of modern society, which gives great advantages to small and childless families compared to families with three or more children. While, based on the goal of simple generation replacement, it is necessary that the average number of children per full family be at least 2.5 children, since not all women are married and not all married couples can have children. This means that approximately half of the families that have completed their reproductive formation are expected to have three or more children (say, 10% with one child, 40% with two, 40% with three, 10% with four children).

According to the 2002 census data published on the Rosstat website, it is easy to calculate that among families with minor children, only 7% have three or more such children. Of course, not all families have completed their formation and some of them may still have children. In addition, many families also have adult children who are not included in this 7%. In addition, the census does not take into account those children who live separately from their parents. However, despite all this, the difference between the actual figure (7%) and the figure required for simple population replacement (50%) is too great to be entirely attributed to incomparability of data.

The demographic conclusion about the need for such a significant number of families with 3-4 children for population growth is often perceived as the “obligation” of almost every family to have three or more children. It is clear that today such standards for children are unlikely to meet with understanding from the vast majority of Russians. Almost all demographic and sociological studies on the problem of the number of children in a family showed the same picture. Most families actually have one or two children, but theoretically a family with two children is considered best. The most typical situation is the following: for most families it is necessary to have at least one child, two children are enough, but a third child is simply superfluous. And the reasons here are not only economic, although, of course, the birth of each subsequent child inevitably reduces the standard of living of the family, distributing income over a larger number of its members.

Given the widespread norms of small children, a person does not experience inconvenience due to the fact that there are no three children in the family; on the contrary, inconvenience appears precisely with the third child. In this regard, the policy of material stimulation of the birth rate was unable to stop the spread of small children.

Proponents of the described approach, in fact, argue that the reason for the low birth rate in modern developed countries should be sought not in the economic sphere, but in the value orientations of society. First of all, this reason is the spread of the philosophy of individualism and consumerism. Modern man values ​​personal freedom and independence most of all, and puts his own interests above the interests of other people and society as a whole. Also, one of his main aspirations becomes personal success, and the measure of success is the possession of certain material benefits. In such a picture of the world, children, even if there is a need for them, are in any case identified with additional expenses and worries, which are perceived as factors limiting an adult. Therefore, to satisfy the need for children, it becomes sufficient to have one, maximum two children. Naturally, in this picture of the world, where the individual and his interests are placed on a pedestal, there can be no talk of a person’s responsibility to society for the reproduction of generations.

If in a traditional society the interests of the individual were always subordinated to the interests of the family, and family interests to the public, then in the modern world these priorities have changed exactly the opposite. Family interests are placed above public ones, and personal interests above family ones.

Proponents of this concept, generally correctly describing the situation in the value sphere of modern society, recognizing its objectivity and systemic nature, nevertheless believe that it can be changed through targeted influences at the state level. Thus, it is argued that the promotion of family values ​​and the introduction of large families into the public consciousness as a norm can significantly increase the birth rate in the long term.

The logic in such proposals is clearly violated, since since the dominant values ​​in society are determined by the very way of life of modern societies, it is not possible to change the attitude towards the family and children while preserving the way of life itself and its fundamental principles.

Does this mean that the problem of increasing the birth rate has no solution? I think not. Reasonable, targeted and consistent measures to support families with children can lead to a slight increase in the birth rate due to a more complete realization of the needs of families for children: those who have, for example, one child, would like to have a second, but postpone its birth due to economic and related reasons. their considerations. Yes, in this case the birth rate will still not increase even to the level of simple reproduction, but this is the reality of the modern post-industrial world. Of course, we should not forget about the influence of the religious factor. Families of believers, as a rule, have a large number of children. However, the total number of such families is not so significant as to significantly affect the birth rate, and the secular nature of the Russian state does not give official demographic policy the opportunity to appeal to the factor of religion.

Also, one should not give up promoting family values, the values ​​of motherhood and childhood in society. Although we should not absolutize the role of such propaganda in increasing the birth rate.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

The 2008 UN report on human development in the Russian Federation notes that:

“Despite the official recognition of the severity of demographic problems and a number of measures aimed at mitigating them, it will not be possible to overcome the negative trends in demographic development in the foreseeable future. This is explained by the great inertia of the demographic system: its future development is largely predetermined by what happened at its previous stages.”

This disappointing conclusion means that in the coming years Russia will have to solve a unique task that has no historical analogues - to ensure economic growth in the face of population decline. In the foreseeable future, the demographic component of Russian human potential will not be able to act as the main resource for the country’s socio-economic development. Consequently, Russia’s only and main competitive advantage may be not the quantity, but the quality of its population. And priority attention must be given to him.

Even if the TFR of developing countries falls to replacement levels (which is highly unlikely), their populations will continue to grow for some time before stabilizing. This should happen because even with an “ideal” TFR = 2.0, today’s generation of children under 15 years of age will in the future produce a number of descendants equal to their number, and this will significantly exceed the number of deaths among the relatively small groups of older people. This situation will continue for another 60–70 years, until today’s youth begin to die when they reach old age. Then the numbers of young people and old people will be approximately equal and the age-sex pyramid will take the form of a column. With such a population structure, the mortality of older people will be balanced by the birth rate. But by this time the entire population will have increased two to three times (Fig. 5.7-A).

Thus, the population of developing countries has demographic potential thanks to the current high proportion of young people, which will lead to a doubling of the population in the near future, even if the birth rate falls significantly. The whole difference is that with a low level of TFR, the population will stabilize in 60 years, and if the TFR remains high, it will repeatedly double until such limiting factors as hunger, disease and social upheaval take over to regulate it.

Worldwide family planning efforts have led to a significant reduction in TFR in recent decades. Assuming that this trend continues into the future, developing countries will approach simple replacement fertility levels by about 2025 (Figure 5.8). But given the current demographic potential, their population will continue to grow significantly until 2080.

Rice. 5.8. Fertility rates in developing countries have declined in recent years. If this trend continues, then by about 2020 the world population will simply reproduce without increasing

Consequently, in 50 to 70 years we will be faced with rapid population growth in developing countries, while in highly developed countries it will be slow or stop altogether (Fig. 5.9). The share of their population will become an ever smaller percentage of the global population and in 50 years it will decrease to 10% compared to the current 25%. Moreover, the rich will likely continue to get richer, and the poor will continue to get poorer.

Rice. 5.9. A. High birth rates in developing countries mean that their populations are growing much faster than in developed countries. B. As a result, 90% of the world's population will eventually live in developing countries, mainly in poverty (according to Nebel, 1993)

Population growth is eroding economic growth and exacerbating the debt crisis of developing countries. One of the indicators of the average standard of living is the gross national (domestic) product per capita, calculated by dividing the country's gross national product (the total value of material goods and services sold) by its population. It is obvious that the economic success of highly developed countries, where the population is not growing, directly affects the increase in the standard of living of their citizens, while in less developed countries the goods produced must be distributed among more and more people, so that the standard of living in them often falls.

In other words, the real economic development of a nation in terms of providing people with everything they need is the difference between economic growth and population growth:

Economic Growth - Population Growth = Real Economic Growth.

For example, if both the United States and the poor African country of Kenya are growing their economies at 2.5% per year, then in the United States, where the population growth rate is 0.7%, real economic growth will be approximately 1.8% per year (2, 5 – 0.7 = 1.8), and in Kenya, where the population increases annually by 4%, the economy lags behind its growth (2.5 – 4.0 = -1.5).

A serious obstacle to the economic development of developing countries is the debt crisis. In the 1960s - 1970s. they financed the growth of their economy mainly by borrowing from industrial nations, and achieved considerable success. But now their total debt exceeds $1 trillion, and they have already passed the purchasing phase and entered the inevitable payment phase. Many developing countries now pay most of their income towards interest on debt, leaving too little for further development. Moreover, creditors are reluctant to renew loans because they doubt the repayment of even existing debts, let alone new ones. In an effort to raise funds for payments, many developing countries are experiencing an economic crisis with high unemployment and inflation rates reaching 100% per year; Housing construction, schools, hospitals, and consumer services are falling into ever greater decline there.

It is easy to understand that with such a high birth rate and the payment of most of the income to pay off debts, the poor nations will not soon catch up with the rich ones. It is for this reason that rich countries get richer and poor countries get poorer.

Growing populations in developing countries, for their daily survival, are depleting pastures and soils, clearing forests for firewood, and committing many other environmentally insane actions that threaten not only poor nations, but all of humanity.

Population explosion: its causes and possible solutions to the problems associated with it

Fertility and mortality are influenced by many factors: disease, war, family and national traditions, economics, religion, moral ideals, etc. If you do not take into account immigration and emigration, changes in population size are reduced to the difference between the number of births and deaths. Let's look at the population explosion in terms of how and why birth rates and deaths change over time.

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• Introduction
• 1. Demographic potential
• 2. Labor resources
• Conclusion

Introduction

Issues of population in general and the reproduction of the labor force are attracting the growing attention of specialists, politicians and the public. The reasons for this are that the demographic situation, the situation with the use of labor, developing in specific countries and regions, largely influence the state and prospects of their economic and social development, the alignment of economic and political forces on a regional and global scale.

Population growth is strongly influenced by, and is itself significantly affected by, social, cultural and economic factors.

1. Demographic potential

The concept of “demographic potential” was first introduced by the English demographer R. Fisher in the 1920s. He viewed the birth of a person as receiving his life “on credit,” and the subsequent birth of his own children as “repaying a debt.” However, the proposed concept in demography has not found an accurate measure.

P. Vincent proposed the term “growth potential,” which defines the increase in the size of the entire population over a certain period. But this only exacerbated the problem of measuring “demographic potential”, because growth potential is a relative indicator, while “potential” is a basic concept that determines the possibilities of something and should be measured in both relative and absolute terms.

There is a well-known proposal to evaluate the demographic potential in person-years based on their numbers and life expectancy. This proposal is borrowed from the concept of “labor potential”, where labor refers to the very existence of a person. The disadvantage of this definition is the contradiction with the well-known conceptual basis of demography.

The demographic potential (DP) of an ethnic group or community is its reproductive capabilities. It is determined by: a) the number of reproductively active representatives in the community and b) their childbearing activity (children - the number of children in families, total CR, etc.); Moreover, indicators “a” and “b” are in the short, medium and long term (after 1-2 generations).

This definition most objectively reflects the reproductive capacity of the population of a country or territory, but requires clarification in terms of units of measurement and comparability with other demographic parameters.

demographic potential labor resource

The attempts made to define the concept of demographic potential and the units of its measurement were unsuccessful, since they did not reflect real processes and did not provide accurate measures of the demographic “health” of the people.

Based on the above, determining demographic potential is an urgent problem and requires a solution.

The purpose of the study is to eliminate the conceptual uncertainty of demographic potential and give it new characteristics that ensure its measurability and combination with other types of potentials in the economy.

Hypothesis development. It should be noted that the concept of demographic potential, like many other potentials in the economy, reflects the “stock” - the number of population of a given territory and its ability to reproduce. The output of the demographic process is the birth of children, and the potential that provides this output is the population’s ability to reproduce. It is clear that only persons of fertile age have this ability (15-45 years, according to the accepted age classification). The center of gravity of the distribution of childbearing at fertile age corresponds to approximately 28 years, the age of a generation. In recent years, the age of the generation has tended to increase.

It follows from this that the quantitative characteristics of the demographic potential correspond to the size of the population of fertile age in the time period under consideration. Demographers use the number of women for these estimates, but it should be noted that at fertile age the number of men and women is approximately equal, which makes it possible to apply a single generalized age structure.

The qualitative characteristic of demographic potential determines the productivity of the population reproduction process, that is, the number of children born per woman, naturally, of fertile age. In demography, this parameter is determined by the birth rate.

Then the entire demographic potential can be assessed as the product of the number of women of fertile age (half of the population in a given age group) by the birth rate during the time period under study.

Based on the analysis of a number of population censuses of age-sex pyramids (population structures) separated by time, the following was noted:

Demographic potential is quantitatively assessed by the size of the population of fertile age, represented by groups of 15-45 years. The indicated number can be used as an indicator of the social health of the nation;

the population size in the age groups 15-45 years depends significantly on socio-economic history, takes into account demographic ups and downs in the population in past periods;

demographic potential should take into account the balance of population migration in the age groups 15-45 years, and at the same time reflect separate data for the indigenous population and for migrants;

the number of male and female populations in groups 15-45 years old is approximately equal, which makes it possible to consider the demographic potential in a consolidated manner, without taking into account gender;

qualitatively, the demographic potential is determined by the birth rate per woman of fertile age, which in turn depends on the socio-economic living conditions of the population aged 15-45 years.

As a result of the study, a refined scientific hypothesis and method for assessing demographic potential was proposed, by which the population size of fertile age groups is determined for different periods of time in such a way that the selected groups constitute a time-continuous function of the size of the fertile population. The formula of the proposed hypothesis is as follows.

The essence of demographic potential is clarified, which is reflected by its quantitative and qualitative characteristics; the quantitative characteristic is determined by a cumulative curve made up of the number of generations of population groups of fertile ages (15-45 years) in the study period, and the qualitative one is determined by the birth rate in the specified groups of fertile ages, and the number The fertile population is determined based on the number of people born in the past, shifted by the age of the generation; these characteristics are multiplied, which makes it possible to determine population reproduction in the past and present periods and make forecasts.

According to this hypothesis, from the population structures (age-sex pyramids) for different generations in the period under study, groups of fertile ages are distinguished in such a way that the end of one group coincides in time with the beginning of the next group, and the end of the next group with the beginning of the next, etc. As a result, a continuous curve is formed reflecting the number of fertile population of the country or territory (the quantitative component of the demographic potential).

The fertility rate determines the qualitative component of the demographic potential and is calculated relative to the number of women in the fertile population, which is obtained from the quantitative component. Then the demographic potential is defined as the product of a quantitative characteristic (half the size of the entire fertile population) by its qualitative characteristic (fertility rate per woman), which makes it possible to determine the reproduction of the population at any given point in time.

It is necessary to point out the error that occurs, which attributes the number of elderly people to demographic potential. In this regard, it should be noted that the increase in the life expectancy of the population and the number of older people does not affect the process of its reproduction, and therefore should be taken into account in another type of potential, for example, in gerontological potential.

Demographic potential characterizes the possibilities of population reproduction and human development. Demographic potential is determined by:

1. Population size.

2. Fertility.

3. Mortality.

4. Life expectancy at birth.

5. Sex and age structure.

6. Distribution of the population into urban and rural.

1.1 World population

The world population is currently about 6 billion people.

Countries around the world vary dramatically in the number of inhabitants. More than half the world's population is concentrated in six countries:

China - 1 billion 221 million people;

India - 936 million people;

USA - 263 million people;

Indonesia - 198 million people;

Brazil - 162 million people;

Russia - 147 million people.

Along with such “giants” there are countries whose population is 20-30 thousand people. (For example, the “dwarf” states of Foreign Europe: Monaco, Liechtenstein, Andorra.)

For most of human history, population growth has been low, but population growth has increased dramatically in the last two centuries. Thus, during the 19th century, the population increased by 710 million people, and during the 20th century - by 4590 million people. Moreover, the highest rates of population growth occurred in the 60-80s of the 20th century, when the number of inhabitants of the planet increased by more than 1.5 times.

This sharp jump in population is called the “demographic explosion.” It was the result of a sharp decrease in mortality in all age groups due to improved medical care and the development of methods to combat epidemics (primarily in developing countries). Currently, the world population is increasing annually by 90 million people, with 90% of the increase occurring in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Population dynamics are determined by the process of population reproduction. This is the ratio of fertility and mortality, ensuring the continuous renewal and change of human generations. Fertility and mortality are the number of births or deaths per year per 1000 inhabitants.

The difference between the birth rate and death rate is called natural increase. Thus, the “reproduction formula” can be written as:

R-S=EP,

where P is the birth rate, C is the mortality rate, EP is the natural increase.

Natural increase can be positive or negative. It changes from year to year

In modern demography, the historically determined change in types of population reproduction is explained by the concept of demographic transition.

Natural growth depends on a number of factors. These include:

· standard of living, including the material living conditions of people, the level of healthcare, nutrition, working and living conditions of people, etc.;

· population structure (gender, age, marriage);

· lifestyle (urban and rural);

· employment of women in social production;

· national and religious traditions.

Wars, which lead to human losses, as well as the spread of hunger and disease have a negative impact on population reproduction.

There are four phases of the demographic transition:

· Phase I. High birth rate with a sharp reduction in mortality. Very high natural growth

· Phase II. A further decrease in mortality with a greater decrease in the birth rate (due to the transition from a large to a small family). Slowing down of natural growth

· Phase III. A slight increase in the mortality rate (due to the “aging” of the population) with a slow decline in the birth rate. Weakly expanded reproduction

· IV phase. Birth and death rates are leveling out. Stopping population growth

The demographic transition first began in Europe in the 18th century. Currently, most countries in this region are in the third phase. In most developing countries in Africa, the demographic situation corresponds to the first phase of transition, and in Asia and Latin America - to the second. That is why developing countries have had and in the near future will have a decisive impact on the dynamics of the world population.

The world average natural increase is 17 people. per 1000 people population (17%). However, it differs significantly in regions and countries of the world:

1. Very high natural increase of more than 30% - Africa (Niger, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Libya, Nigeria)

2. High natural increase of 20-30% - Africa and Foreign Asia (Mongolia, Philippines, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Egypt)

3. Average natural increase 10-20% - Foreign Asia, Latin America (China, India, Turkey, Cuba, Brazil)

4. Low natural growth 2-10% - Foreign Europe, North America (Poland, France, Czech Republic, UK, USA)

5. Very low natural growth of less than 2% - Foreign Europe, CIS (Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, Austria, Italy, Russia).

Due to the rapid growth of population in developing countries, problems related to the need to provide people with work, housing, etc. are becoming very acute. But the main problem of these countries has become the food problem, since the productivity of small-scale agriculture, characteristic of most developing countries, is low.

In developed countries with low population growth, problems arise associated with the “aging of the nation.” In countries such as Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, there is a constant decline in population (that is, mortality exceeds birth rate).

Most states strive to manage population reproduction in order to achieve the most optimal demographic situation, that is, they pursue demographic policy.

1.2 Fertility of the world population

Fertility in demography is a central problem. In modern conditions of relatively low mortality, the reproduction of the population as a whole is determined solely by the level and dynamics of the birth rate. The severity of the problem of fertility is also due to the fact that if in relation to mortality (to death) there is a negative unanimity of all people, no matter what place in society they occupy, then in relation to fertility there is now a great difference of opinions, sometimes reaching the point of heated controversy.

But first, about concepts and indicators. Fertility in demography is the frequency of births in a certain social environment. Now we should already know that fertility and the number of births are not at all the same thing, that the number of births is not at all the same as fertility (fertility is a concept expressing intensity, the number of births is an extensive concept). In order to have a correct judgment about the height of the birth rate and its changes, the choice of statistical indicators suitable for each specific case is very important.

The simplest of these is the total fertility rate, the advantages and disadvantages of which were already discussed in the previous chapter. If possible, it is better not to use it at all, and if necessary, exercise great caution in conclusions drawn on the basis of this indicator.

The total fertility rate is the number of births during a given period divided by the total number of person-years lived by the population during that period. The rate is expressed as the number of births per 1000 population.

According to the 2002 Population Census, the population of Russia decreased by 1.8 million from 1989 to 2002. The global trend was the opposite: the ratio of births to deaths was 2.6. The mortality rate is especially high among Russian men, whose average life expectancy is 61.4 years, which is associated, in particular, with a high level of consumption of strong alcoholic beverages, a large number of accidents, murders and suicides. The average life expectancy of women over the same period was 73.9 years.

In the 1990s, mortality was 1.5 times higher than the birth rate. By the end of the 1990s, the rate of natural population decline exceeded 900 thousand people. Since 2001, natural population decline has been almost constantly decreasing (from 959 thousand people in 2000 to 249 thousand people in 2009). Since 2004, a steady increase in the migration influx to Russia began, reaching 247 thousand people by 2009.

According to the UN Population Fund's annual report for 2004, the demographic crisis continued in Russia.

Until 2009, the population of Russia decreased by several hundred thousand people annually. In 2009, the natural population decline in Russia (248.9 thousand people) was 99% compensated by migration growth (247.4 thousand people), as a result of which the population decline practically stopped.

In 2010, the trend of decreasing mortality and increasing birth rates in Russia continued.

According to a forecast released in early October 2009 by the UN Development Programme, Russia will lose 11 million people by 2025.

According to a number of demographers, the rapid decline in the birth rate in the 1990s was natural and due to the second demographic transition. Similar 10-year periods of sharp decline in fertility were observed in almost all developed countries (see article, Fig. 3). However, this transition is absent in many countries with “not quite modern market economies,” as well as in the history of such a modern country as Israel, where the total fertility rate is 2.44, while in all EU countries it is noticeably less than two. In this regard, an alternative view of the demographic transition connects this transition with the overexploitation of the population under a developed market society; At the same time, the emerging labor shortage is covered by migration and the transfer of production to demographically prosperous countries. This point of view is supported by the complete coincidence of the period of demographic transition with periods of “shock therapy” in all European countries of the former socialist camp.

Since 1998, there has been a gradual improvement in the indicators of the natural movement of the country's population, as a result of which the migration increase compensated for an increasingly large share of the loss from natural decline. In certain months of 2009 and 2010, the population of Russia increased. In general, in 2011 the country's population increased significantly for the first time - by 188.9 thousand people. (or by 0.1%). Positive trends continued according to current data. statistics 2012.

In 2011, the birth rate growth slowed down and amounted to only 0.2%.

The permanent population of Russia as of July 1, 2012 was 143.1 million people and has increased by 85.6 thousand people since the beginning of the year.

On the corresponding date of the previous year, there was also an increase in the population by 5.1 thousand people.

In the first half of 2012 in Russia, the number of births increased in 79 regions of the country, and the number of deaths decreased in 69 regions. In just six months of 2012, 905.6 thousand people were born in the Russian Federation, and 842.6 thousand people died. Compared to the same period in 2011, the number of deaths in the Russian Federation decreased by 18.7 thousand people, and the number of births increased by 63.1 thousand people.

1.3 Mortality rate in the world

In demography, the ratio of the number of deaths to the total population. Particular attention is paid to child mortality. Mortality is primarily affected by the level of development of the healthcare system, the level of well-being of the population, and the age structure of residents.

The following types of causes of death are distinguished:

Endogenous (internal influences)

Exogenous (external influences)

· Quasi-endogenous (accumulated endogenous influences)

World mortality trends

· 1830-1930 - a demographic explosion closely associated with a radical reduction in mortality in developed European countries, including in Russia, mortality retreated to older ages;

· to the exogenous (external) causes of death were added endogenous and quasi-endogenous in all countries, in first place among the causes - cardiovascular diseases (together with oncology 70%);

· followed by respiratory diseases, diabetes, accidents (injuries, murders, suicide);

· a significant gap between male and female mortality (men are 27.9% more likely than women (9 men to 7 women))

Currently

· The lowest overall mortality rate is in the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait (~2% per year), where there is an extremely young population, a very high proportion of migrant workers in the population, a high level of healthcare and extremely low levels of alcohol consumption

· The highest rate (more than 25% per year) is in Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, i.e. in countries with very low living standards.

Infant mortality rates

Measured in ppm (%):

1. The largest - Angola - 180%, Sierra Leone - 154%, Afghanistan - 151%, Liberia - 138%

2. The smallest - Singapore - 2.31%,

3. Russia - 7.6% according to Rosstat data for the first half of 2010.

4. USA - 6.26%

5. Mexico - 18.42%

6. Cuba - 5.82%

7. World average - 44.13%

The infant mortality rate measures the mortality rate of children under 1 year of age. Infant mortality - from 0 to 1 year; children's - from 1 year to 15 years. The infant mortality rate stands out among other mortality indicators both in terms of its magnitude (the probability of death in the first year of life is approximately the same as for people over 55 years of age), its calculation methods, and its social significance. Along with other indicators, the infant mortality rate serves as an important characteristic of the living conditions and cultural level of the population.

Historical types of mortality

According to Khrushchev's report, mortality in the USSR in 1960 was the lowest in the world

· archaic, exogenous - very high mortality rate mainly due to external causes: epidemics, disasters, famine, accidents, etc. Very early death is typical. Life expectancy is 20-22 years. The infant mortality rate is 300-350%.

· traditional - characteristic of traditional societies, up to the 19th - early 20th centuries. Exogenous mortality factors dominate. Social control over mortality has increased - the development of medicine. Increasing life expectancy to 30-35 years. Normal mortality.

· modern - endogenous causes predominate: degenerative diseases, mortality moves to older ages. Life expectancy is greatly increasing and the infant mortality rate is falling.

In medicine, the ratio of the number of deaths from a certain disease to the average population.

Mortality should not be confused with case fatality rate - the frequency of deaths from a disease among all persons who suffered from this disease.

Statistics on causes of death provide an accurate picture of the portion of morbidity that causes irreversible losses. Studying the structure of causes of death helps to outline priority measures to fight to reduce mortality and prolong life. However, mortality statistics cannot directly reflect the dynamics of morbidity in the population, since an increase or decrease in mortality may be the result of changes not only in morbidity levels, but also in mortality. In addition, the causes of death do not reflect the large number of “non-fatal” diseases that worsen well-being, causing temporary and even permanent disability (diseases of the upper respiratory tract, visual organs, skin, neuropsychic disorders); This is especially true for young people with low mortality and mortality rates.

1.4 Life expectancy

Life expectancy (at birth) is one of the main indicators of the quality of the healthcare system in the assessment criteria of the World Health Organization (WHO). Has a direct correlation with the indicator of total health care expenditures.

Life expectancy is a value that shows how long, on average, a group of people born in the same year will live if mortality in each age group remains at the same level.

Global life expectancy is 67.2 years. (65.0 for men and 69.5 for women) according to the UN and 66, 57 years (64.52 for men and 68.76 for women) according to the CIA.

Many countries with low life expectancy, namely Swaziland, Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Central African Republic, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, have extremely high rates of HIV infection. The proportion of infected people among the adult population of these countries ranges from 10% to 26%. In countries with high infant mortality, life expectancy for newborns is lower and may not adequately reflect life expectancy for children over one year of age.

Newborns now have the greatest chance of becoming centenarians in Japan, Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore. And the lowest among those born in African countries. And the biggest difference between Japan (83 years) and Sierra Leone (41 years) is striking.

1.5 Sex and age structure of the world population

The age structure of the population corresponds to its distribution by age groups. Typically, demographics use one-year, five-year, or ten-year age groups. Taking into account the reproductive abilities of people, age groups are distinguished: up to 15 years - the generation of children, 15-49 years - the generation of parents, 50 years and older - the generation of grandparents; and based on people’s ability to work - the population in pre-working (0-14 years), working or working age (15-60 years) and post-working (over 60 years) age.

The current age structure of the Earth's population has the following proportions. The category of people under the age of 15 accounts for 30% of the total population, 15-60 years old - 60%, over 60 years old - 10%. Due to the increase in average life expectancy, the process of population aging occurs, i.e. an increase in the proportion of older people in the total population. Countries with low birth and death rates and high life expectancy are classified as “old nations.” There is a high proportion of people of working age and old age and a low proportion of children (Germany, Japan). In countries with high birth and death rates and low life expectancy, on the contrary, there is a higher percentage of children and a very small proportion of elderly people.

Sex composition of the population - distribution of people by gender. To characterize it, two indicators are usually used: the proportion of men (women) in the entire population or the number of men per 100 women. Nowadays there are 51 million more men on Earth than women, which is explained by their “excess” in the most populous countries of the world - China and India - in each case by more than 32 million people in 2000. The same situation is in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan , Egypt. One of the first countries in the world in terms of the proportion of men in the population structure is Kuwait (53%), a significant part of whose residents are immigrant workers. However, most countries in the world are dominated by women. The predominance of women is especially high in countries that suffered the most from World War II. For example, in Germany, Austria, Japan there are 96 men per 100 women, and in Russia - 88.

To display the age and sex structure of the population, the so-called. "sex and age pyramids". They clearly illustrate population losses caused by wars and “record” the decline in the birth rate during years of economic crises.

1.6 Distribution of population into urban and rural

Rural settlement arose with the development of agriculture. Currently, more than half the world's population lives in rural areas. There are 15-20 million rural settlements. They vary in size, shape, and economic specialization.

There are two forms of rural settlement:

· group (village) - most typical for the countries of Central and Southern Europe, Russia, Japan, as well as for most developing countries;

· scattered (farm) - most common in the USA, Canada, Australia, and Northern European countries.

Urban settlement. Cities arose in ancient times in the area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and then in the lower reaches and delta of the Nile as centers of administrative power, trade and craft. With the development of industry, industrial production was concentrated in them, infrastructure was formed, and transport connections were developed. Cities gradually became centers of attraction for the entire surrounding territory, and their role in the territorial organization of the economy increased. Today, the functions of large cities have expanded. They are industrial, cultural, scientific, administrative centers, and transport hubs. Most cities are multifunctional. However, there are cities that have a “specialization” - single-function ones. These include mining centers, resort cities, scientific centers, and some capitals.

The definition of a city varies from country to country. For example, in the USA, a city is considered to be a settlement of over 2.5 thousand people, in India - over 5 thousand, the Netherlands - 20 thousand, Japan - 30 thousand, and in Sweden, Denmark, Finland - only more than 200 people. In Russia, not only the number of residents is taken into account, but also the employment rate (industry, service sector).

Currently, the distribution of the population is increasingly determined by the geography of cities; they are gradually becoming the main form of human settlement.

This is confirmed by the change in the ratio of urban and rural populations. Thus, during the 19th century, the urban population increased from 220 million to 2276 million people, and the share of urban residents in the entire population increased from 14% to 45%. At the same time, the share of the rural population fell accordingly from 86% to 55%.

The process of growing urban population, increasing the number of cities and their consolidation, the emergence of networks and systems of cities, as well as the increasing role of cities in the modern world is called urbanization. Urbanization is the most important socio-economic process of our time. There are three stages in its development:

1. initial stage - XIX century. The process of urbanization began in Europe and North America;

2. first half of the 20th century. This stage is characterized by accelerating urban population growth and the spread of urbanization to almost all regions of the world;

3. second half of the 20th century. This stage is characterized by an even greater acceleration of the growth rate of the urban population, the development of large cities, the transition from a pinpoint city to an agglomeration (territorial grouping of cities and rural settlements), as well as the formation of megalopolises (the merger of urban agglomerations), which leads to the spread of the urban lifestyle to the rural terrain.

Urbanization as a worldwide process has common features that are characteristic of most countries.

Features of urbanization (Examples of manifestation):

1. Rapid growth rates of the urban population (During the second half of the 20th century, the share of the urban population increased by 16% (at the same time, the urban population increases by 50 million people annually));

2. Concentration of the population mainly in large cities (At the beginning of the 20th century there were 360 ​​large cities (over 100 thousand people), to date - more than 2500. The number of millionaire cities has exceeded 200. 20 cities in the world have a population of more than 10 million people.) ;

3. “Sprawling” of cities, expansion of their territory (Formation of agglomerations. For example, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Tokyo, New York with a population of 16-20 million people. Formation of megalopolises: Boswash (45 million people), Tokaido (60 million people) etc.).

Although there are common features, the process of urbanization in different countries has its own characteristics, which are expressed in the level and pace of urbanization.

By level of urbanization we can distinguish:

1. Highly urbanized countries - the share of the urban population is more than 50% (Great Britain, Venezuela, Kuwait, Sweden, Australia and Japan);

2. Medium-urbanized countries - the share of the urban population is 20-50% (Algeria, Bolivia, Nigeria, India, Zaire, Egypt);

3. Slightly urbanized countries - the share of the urban population is less than 20% (Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger, Mali, Zambia).

The level of urbanization varies in different regions of the world. It is highest in North America, Foreign Europe, Latin America and Australia (71-75%); low level - in Foreign Asia (especially in South and Southeast) and Africa (27-34%).

Developed and developing countries differ sharply in the rate of urbanization. In developing countries, the urban population growth rate is 4.5 times higher than that of developed countries. They are highest in Africa and Western Asia, in countries where the level of urbanization today is the lowest. The high rate of growth in the number of city dwellers in developing countries is called the “urban explosion”. It is accompanied by an increase in the number of large cities and millionaire cities.

A feature of the urbanization process in developed countries has become the phenomenon of suburbanization - the movement of part of the urban population to the suburbs. In the United States, 60% of metropolitan area residents live in the suburbs. This is due to the deterioration of environmental conditions in large cities and the rise in infrastructure costs.

Environmental problems of cities are the main problems of urbanization. Cities account for 80% of all emissions into the atmosphere and E/4 of the total volume of all environmental pollution.

All cities in the world annually “throw out” up to 3 billion tons of solid waste, over 500 m3 of industrial and domestic wastewater, and about 1 billion tons of aerosols into the environment.

Large cities and agglomerations have a particularly strong impact on the environment; their polluting and thermal effects can be traced at a distance of 50 km.

In addition, cities change natural landscapes. Urban anthropogenic landscapes are formed in them.

Another problem of urbanization is that this process is spontaneous and difficult to manage. "Urban explosion" in developing countries leads to so-called "slum urbanization", associated with the influx of poor rural people into large cities.

In developed countries, efforts are being made to regulate the process of urbanization. Various measures are being taken to protect and improve the urban environment. This is an interdisciplinary problem, and its solution requires the participation of various specialists.

2. Labor resources

Labor resources are that part of the population that, thanks to the combination of physical abilities, special knowledge and experience, can participate in the process of reproduction, creation of material and intangible goods and services.

Labor resources are characterized by:

1. Number and dynamics.

2. Professional and educational level.

To characterize the country's labor potential, the employment structure of the population and its distribution among sectors of the national economy and types of activity are important. The share of people employed in agriculture, construction, industry, transport, and science decreased, while the share of people employed in forestry, communications, trade, housing and communal services, and service sectors increased.

To coordinate policies in the field of population and demographic security and develop coordinated actions of republican government bodies, the National Population Committee under the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus was created, which is a permanent body. To ensure stabilization of the demographic situation, a set of social policy measures is provided to improve the standard of living of the population, develop the social sphere and protect the environment, develop and implement a national program for demographic security of the Republic of Belarus.

2.1 Level of education of labor resources

Developed and most countries with economies in transition are characterized by a high percentage of the employed population who have received higher and secondary specialized education. Thus, the share of people with such education in Russia is 51% of the total number of employed.

Although developed countries are significantly inferior to developing countries in terms of the number of labor resources, they are ahead of the latter in the quality of the workforce - general educational level, the number of highly qualified specialists, and labor mobility.

In developing countries, the quality of labor resources is largely determined not so much by the presence of higher and secondary education, but simply by the level of literacy. In these countries, the literacy rate in the mid-2000s. amounted to % of the total adult population: men - 78.4 and women - 60.3. The proportion of illiterate people in the working population of the countries of South and West Asia and Tropical Africa is high. The low level of literacy of the population of many countries determines very low labor productivity, leads to the conservation of outdated forms of economic management, and blocks technical progress.

2.2 Labor efficiency

The use of labor resources is determined, in particular, by the number of working hours per year per employee. This figure reaches its highest level in newly industrialized countries: the Republic of Korea (2547 hours in the mid-2000s), Chile (2400 hours). The amount of time worked is slightly lower in developed countries: Japan (2017 hours), USA (1945 hours), Great Britain (1880 hours). In Russia, this figure was 1441 hours, which is largely due to high hidden unemployment.

Employment problem

According to the International Labor Organization, the unemployed include persons 15 years of age and older who did not have a job during the period under review, were looking for one, and were ready to start work. The unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the number of unemployed to the number of economically active population. The unemployment rate in industrialized countries was, % of the economically active population: in the USA - 4.5, Japan - 4.3, Great Britain - 6.2, Germany - 10.9, France - 11.8, Italy - 12.0 , Spain - 18.8.

In countries with transition economies in the 90s. unemployment appeared openly for the first time in several decades and reached high levels in a number of countries. So, in 2006 it amounted to, %: in Slovenia - 14.3, Slovakia - 13.5, Russia - 9.3, Romania - 8.7, Czech Republic - 6.1. At the same time, economic recovery allowed in 1997-1998. reduce the unemployment rate in Bulgaria from 14.2 to 11.4%, in Hungary from 10.3 to 9.1 and in Poland from 11.6 to 10%.

In developing countries, industrial development is undermining the labour-intensive traditional industries that support the livelihoods of a large part of the population. As a result, traditional structures push out a large number of bankrupt peasants and artisans from their production, forming an army of completely unemployed people, and at the same time do not provide full employment for the remaining workers. The constant unemployment of a significant part of the population, only due to the preservation of traditional ways of life, is perceived as overpopulation, without turning into open unemployment. In a number of developing countries, the impoverished peasantry is being pushed out of the overpopulated countryside into the cities, regardless of the demand for labor in non-agricultural sectors of the national economy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to briefly touch on the topic of labor force quality. The development of the economy of any country and the world economy as a whole depends decisively on labor resources. Their quality has a historically specific character and manifests itself in the form of definitely developed properties of individuals, which reflect the ability and readiness of the latter for one or another specific activity. They are embodied in activity, productive potential. The productive potential of the workforce, in addition to the psychological, physical qualities and health of workers, includes a number of characteristics that determine the level of general and special education, accumulated production experience, and the general cultural level of development, which depends on the entire complex of living conditions. They are largely determined by the socio-economic level of development of the subsystems of the world economy and individual countries.

Each of the characteristics is important in its own right. All of them are based on the physical qualities of a person, which determines his ability to work. Population reproduction processes and the quality of the labor force in a number of countries, in addition to insufficient food supplies, began to be influenced by mass infectious diseases. Thus, according to World Health Organization experts, by the end of the century at least 1/4 of the African workforce will be infected with AIDS. These countries cannot count on the full labor contribution during the working age of infected people. Moreover, they distract some of their family members from caring for them.

The quality of the labor force characterizes the population’s ability to activate the objective elements of the productive forces, as well as change them in accordance with the needs of society. Marx's idea that people, not machines, are the driving force of economic growth has become an axiom today and is increasingly supported by statistics.

Bibliography

1. Vishnevskaya N. Labor market - problem and solutions. // MEiMO. 1995. No. 4.

2. Lomakin V.K. World economy: Textbook for universities. - M.: UNITY, 2000. - 727 p.

3. World economy at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries: Textbook / Ed. B.P. Suprunovich. M.: Publishing house of the Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation. 1995. pp. 51-61.

4. Global labor market: a new reality. M.: Nauka, 1994.

5. Fundamentals of foreign economic knowledge / Ed. I.P. Faminsky. M.: International relations. 1994. Ch. 7.

6. Demographics. Large encyclopedic dictionary. Electronic source. Access mode - http://www.slovopedia.com/2/196/222236.html.

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Natural resource potential of Brazil. Characteristics of the country's population and labor resources. Analysis of territorial and sectoral features of the development of the Brazilian economy, its economic zoning. Features of foreign economic relations of Brazil.

course work, added 09/09/2014


The concept, the essence of population reproduction. Population history of China. Analysis of the demographic situation in China. Demographic development trends. Policy of control over the demographic situation. The need to adjust the demographic course.

course work, added 11/25/2010


Formation of immigration policy in Italy. Contents of the "laws of Martelli, Turco-Napoletano, Bossi-Fini". Fight against illegal immigration. Fertility and aging rates of the indigenous population. The influence of migration flows on the demographic situation.