Peace of Brest post. Peace of Brest-Litovsk - Betrayal or Salvation of the Country? From the statement of L

Peace of Brest Peace of Brest

March 3, 1918, a peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey. Germany annexed Poland, the Baltic states, part of Belarus and the Transcaucasus, and received an indemnity of 6 billion marks. V. I. Lenin considered it necessary to conclude the Brest Peace Treaty in order to preserve Soviet power. The conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty caused an acute crisis in the leadership of Soviet Russia. A group of "left communists" headed by NI Bukharin opposed the Brest-Litovsk Peace and was ready "to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power" in the name of the interests of the world revolution. Nevertheless, in the conditions of the offensive of the German troops, the treaty was ratified by the 4th Congress of Soviets. Canceled by the government of the RSFSR on November 13, 1918 after the defeat of Germany in the 1st World War.

BREST WORLD

BREST WORLD, a peace treaty concluded on March 3, 1918 between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the states of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria) on the other, ending Russia's participation in the First World War (cm. FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-18).
Peace negotiations
The issue of withdrawing from the First World War was one of the key issues in Russian policy in 1917-1918. Bolsheviks (cm. BOLSHEVIKI) stated that since the war is imperialist and predatory, an early peace is necessary, even if it is separate (cm. SEPARATE WORLD)... But this peace should be honorable for Russia and not provide for annexations. (cm. ANNEXATION) and contributions (cm. CONTRIBUTION)... During the October Revolution of 1917 (cm. OCTOBER REVOLUTION 1917) the "Decree on Peace (cm. DECREE ABOUT THE WORLD)", Which suggested that all participants in the war immediately conclude peace without annexations and indemnities. Only Germany and its allies responded to this proposal, whose military and economic situation, like Russia, was extremely difficult. In December 1917, an armistice was concluded, the Russian-German (with the participation of Germany's allies) negotiations began in Brest-Litovsk (cm. BREST (in Belarus))... They quickly showed that the German side does not take seriously the slogans of peace without annexations and indemnities, considering Russia's desire to conclude a separate peace as evidence of its defeat. The German side acted from a position of strength and dictated conditions that presuppose both annexations and indemnities. German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy also took advantage of the fact that Soviet Russia granted the formal right to self-determination to Poland, Finland, Ukraine, the Baltic countries and the Transcaucasus, while supporting, however, the communist struggle for power in these countries. The states of the Quadruple Alliance demanded non-interference in the affairs of these countries, hoping to use their resources necessary to win the war against the Entente. But Russia also badly needed these resources to restore the economy.
At the same time, the Central Rada (cm. CENTRAL RADA)- the governing body of the Ukrainian People's Republic - signed a separate peace with Germany and its allies, according to which German troops were invited to Ukraine to protect its government from the Bolsheviks, and Ukraine supplied food to Germany and its allies. Soviet Russia did not recognize the power of the Central Rada in Ukraine, and considered the Soviet Ukrainian government in Kharkov to be the legal representative of the Ukrainian people. Soviet troops took Kiev on February 9, 1918. But Germany, continuing to recognize the Central Rada, forced L.D. Trotsky to reckon with this (cm. TROTSKY Lev Davidovich), who served as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It became obvious that the conclusion of peace would lead to the occupation of Ukraine by the Germans.
The humiliating agreement with the imperialists was unacceptable for the revolutionaries both from the point of view of the Bolshevik communists and from the point of view of their partners in the government of the Left SRs. (cm. LEFT ESERS)... As a result, in the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), it was decided that Trotsky should drag out the negotiations as long as possible, in the expectation that the revolution would embrace Germany, which was also exhausted by the war. As subsequent events showed, a revolution was indeed brewing in Germany, only not a "proletarian", but a democratic one.
Ultimatum
On February 10, Germany presented an ultimatum to the Soviet delegation that it was impossible to endlessly drag out the peace negotiations. Germany demanded that Russia renounce its rights to Poland, Transcaucasia, the Baltic States and Ukraine, the fate of which would be decided by Germany and its allies, from supporting revolutionary actions in these countries, paying indemnities by Russia, etc. Without changing the principles with which the Bolsheviks came to power, they could not sign such a peace. Trotsky protested against the ultimatum, broke off negotiations, declared the state of war ended, and left for Petrograd, leaving the German representatives perplexed.
Heated discussions broke out among the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. I. Lenin (cm. LENIN Vladimir Ilyich), who believed that in the conditions of the disintegration of the old army, a wide striving for peace and at the same time, with the threat of civil war, it was impossible to wage war with Germany. Recognizing that the world is difficult and shameful ("obscene"), Lenin demanded to accept the ultimatum in order to provide the Soviet power with a respite. He accused Trotsky of violating discipline with dire consequences: the Germans would resume the offensive and force Russia to accept an even harder peace. Trotsky put forward the slogan: "No peace, no war, but dissolve the army," that is, refusal to sign a peace and end the state of war, the dissolution of the old decayed army. Delaying the signing of the peace, Trotsky hoped that Germany would transfer troops to the West and would not attack Russia. In this case, the signing of the shameful peace would become unnecessary. Trotsky's calculations were based on the fact that Germany did not have the strength to occupy Russia along with Ukraine. Germany and Austria were on the brink of revolution. In addition, without concluding peace, the Bolsheviks did not compromise themselves by betraying the interests of the Motherland and compromising with the enemy. By disbanding the army, they strengthened their influence among the soldier mass, tired of the war.
Left communists (cm. LEFT COMMUNISTS) headed by N.I.Bukharin (cm. BUKHARIN Nikolay Ivanovich) and the majority of the Left SRs believed that other peoples should not be left under German rule, that they would have to wage a revolutionary, primarily partisan, war against German imperialism. They believed that the Germans, in any case, even when the peace was signed, would continue to put pressure on Soviet Russia, trying to turn it into their vassal, and therefore war was inevitable, and peace would demoralize the supporters of Soviet power. Such a peace provided Germany with additional resources to overcome the social crisis; the revolution in Germany will not take place.
But Lenin considered the calculations of Trotsky and Bukharin to be erroneous, fearing that under the conditions of the German offensive, the Soviet government would not remain in power. Lenin, for whom the issue of power was “the key issue of every revolution,” understood that successful resistance to the German invasion was impossible without broad support in the country. And the social support of the Bolshevik regime was limited, especially after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly (cm. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY)... This meant that the continuation of the war would lead to a "power shift" from the Bolsheviks and Left SRs to a wider coalition, where the Bolsheviks could lose their dominant positions. Therefore, for Lenin, the continuation of the war with a retreat into the interior of Russia was unacceptable. The majority of the Central Committee initially supported Trotsky and Bukharin. The position of the left received the support of the Moscow and Petrograd party organizations of the RSDLP (b), as well as about half of the country's party organizations.
The socialist fatherland is in danger
While there were heated disputes in the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), the Germans went on the offensive on February 18 and captured Estonia. An attempt was made to resist them. Near Pskov, units of the retreating Russian army encountered a German detachment that had already occupied the city. Breaking through the city and blowing up an ammunition depot, the Russians took up positions near Pskov. Detachments of sailors and workers headed by P.E.Dybenko were sent to Narva (cm. DYBENKO Pavel Efimovich)... But the workers' detachments were militias that did not represent a serious military force, the sailors were poorly disciplined and did not know how to fight on land. Near Narva, the Germans scattered the Red Guards, Dybenko hastily retreated. By February 23, the Germans had threatened Petrograd. True, due to the stretching of communications, the Germans did not have the opportunity to attack deep into Russia. Lenin wrote an appeal "The socialist fatherland is in danger!", Where he called for the mobilization of all revolutionary forces to repulse the enemy. But the Bolsheviks did not yet have an army that could defend Petrograd.
Faced with resistance in his party, Lenin threatened to resign (which in these conditions meant a split in the Bolshevik party) if the "obscene" peace terms were not accepted. Trotsky understood that in the event of a split in the Bolsheviks, it would be impossible to organize resistance to the German invasion. In the face of such threats, Trotsky yielded and abstained from the peace vote. Left-wing communists were in the minority in the Central Committee. This allowed Lenin to obtain a majority and predetermined the conclusion of peace on March 3, 1918. According to its terms, which were worsened even in comparison with the ultimatum on February 10, Russia renounced the rights to Finland, Ukraine, the Baltic States and Transcaucasia, part of Belarus, and had to pay an indemnity.
A struggle unfolded for the ratification of the peace treaty. At the VII Congress of the Bolshevik Party on March 6-8, the positions of Lenin and Bukharin clashed. The outcome of the congress was decided by the authority of Lenin - his resolution was adopted by 30 votes to 12, with 4 abstentions. Trotsky's compromise proposals to make peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance as the last concession and to prohibit the Central Committee from making peace with the Central Rada of Ukraine were rejected. The controversy continued at the IV Congress of Soviets, where the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Anarchists opposed the ratification, while the Left Communists abstained. But thanks to the existing system of representation, the Bolsheviks had an obvious majority at the Congress of Soviets. If the left-wing communists had gone to split the party, the peace treaty would have failed, but Bukharin did not dare to do so. On the night of March 16, the peace was ratified.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had many adverse consequences. A coalition with the Left SRs became impossible (on March 15, they left the government in protest, not wanting to compromise themselves by surrendering to Germany). The occupation of Ukraine by Germany (with subsequent expansion to the Don) disrupted the ties between the center of the country and the grain and raw material regions. At the same time, the Entente countries began to intervene in Russia, seeking to reduce the possible costs associated with its surrender. The occupation of Ukraine aggravated the food problem and further exacerbated relations between the townspeople and the peasantry. Its representatives in the Soviets, the Left Social Revolutionaries, launched an agitation campaign against the Bolsheviks. The capitulation to Germany became a challenge to the national feelings of the Russian people, millions of people, regardless of their social origin, were opposed to the Bolsheviks. Only a very tough dictatorship could resist such sentiments.
Peace with Germany did not mean that the Bolsheviks abandoned the idea of ​​a world revolution as such. The Bolshevik leadership believed that without a revolution in Germany, isolated Russia would not be able to move on to building socialism. After the start of the November Revolution (cm. NOVEMBER REVOLUTION 1918 in Germany) in Germany, the Council of People's Commissars annulled the Peace of Brest-Litovsk on November 13, 1918. However, its consequences have already made themselves felt, becoming one of the factors in the outbreak of a large-scale Civil War (cm. CIVIL WAR in Russia) in Russia. Post-war relations between Russia and Germany were settled by the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 (cm. RAPAL TREATY 1922), according to which the parties abandoned mutual claims and territorial disputes, especially since by that time they did not even have a common border.

encyclopedic Dictionary. 2009 .

See what "Peace of Brest" is in other dictionaries:

    3.3.1918, peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey. Germany annexed Poland, the Baltic states, parts of Belarus and the Caucasus, and received an indemnity of 6 billion marks. Soviet Russia went to ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

    BREST WORLD, 3.3.1918, a separate peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey. Germany annexed Poland, the Baltic states, part of Belarus and the Caucasus, received an indemnity of 6 billion marks. ... ... Russian history

    The peace treaty concluded on March 3, 1918 between Soviet Russia on the one hand and the states of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria) on the other, which ended Russia's participation in the First World War. ... ... Political science. Dictionary.

    Brest Peace- BREST WORLD, 3.3.1918, a peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey. According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany, having annexed Poland, the Baltic states, parts of Belarus and the Transcaucasus, was to receive an indemnity of 6 ... ... Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary

    This article is about the peace treaty between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. For a peace treaty between the UPR and the Central Powers, see Peace of Brest (Ukraine Central Powers). Wikisource has texts on the topic ... Wikipedia

Peaceful delegation led by Ioffe and Kamenev, defended the principle of self-determination in relation to Ukraine and the Baltic peoples, which was only in the hands of the Germans, who saw in this position of the Bolsheviks a convenient form for their predatory plans. In addition, General Hoffmann demanded that this principle should not apply to either Poland or the occupied part of the Baltic states, which were considered by the Germans as already separated from Russia.

At this, the negotiations ended. The Germans agreed only to extend the truce for a month, until January 15th.

On January 9, 1918, negotiations resumed. It was clear to everyone that the Germans would resolutely insist on their own terms - the seizure of the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine under the guise of "the will of their governments", which, according to General Hoffmann, was understood by the German government as "a policy of self-determination."

The head of the new Soviet delegation, Trotsky, with Lenin's consent, dragged out the negotiations in Brest. At the same time, hasty negotiations for assistance were carried out in secret with the British representative Bruce Lockhart and the American Colonel Robins. B. Lockhart has already informed even his government that a renewal of the war on the German front is inevitable.

Not only B. Lockhart, but also many Bolsheviks did not see the two main points why Lenin, no matter what, on any terms, wanted to conclude a peace treaty with the Germans. First, he knew that the Germans would never forgive him for violating a secret agreement and could easily find another, more convenient protégé, at least of the type left SR Kamkova, who also collaborated with them during the war, back in Switzerland. German support was associated with the receipt of significant monetary subsidies, without which, with the complete collapse of the old state body, it was hardly possible to maintain the party and the new Soviet apparatus of power. Secondly, the resumption of the war with Germany, at least for the sake of the "socialist fatherland", at the beginning of 1918 meant the inevitable loss of power in the country by the Bolsheviks and its transfer into the hands of the national democratic parties, first of all, into the hands of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and Cadets.

After the German peace terms became known, open indignation arose in the party. A majority was formed, which considered it impossible to sign a peace treaty that led to the complete dismemberment of Russia - moreover, which henceforth made the country completely dependent on Germany. This majority, which became known as " left communists”, Threw out the slogan of“ defending the socialist fatherland ”, proving that since the proletariat seized power, it must defend its state from German imperialism.

On January 10, a plenary meeting of the Moscow regional bureau of the party spoke in favor of ending peace negotiations with Germany. Here they acted as "left communists" Bukharin, Lomov, Osinsky (Obolensky), Y. Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Bubnov, Muralov and V.M.Smirnov.

The Moscow Regional Bureau, demanding the convocation of a party congress, thereby expressed its distrust of the Central Committee. The Ural Party Committee took the side of the "left communists". The Petrograd Committee split. Central Committee members Uritsky and Spoonde took the side of the opponents of "peace at any cost", and the journal Kommunist, published in Petrograd not only as an organ of the Petrograd Committee, but also as a theoretical organ of the Central Committee, became the organ of the "Left Communists". The "Left Communists" actually had a majority in the party. In his theses, drawn up Radek, they argued that the Leninist point of view is a reflection of the peasant populist ideology, "sliding onto a petty-bourgeois track ...". It is impossible to build socialism on the basis of the peasantry, the theses argued, the proletariat is the main support, and it should not make concessions to German imperialism ...

These reproaches of the "left communists" against Lenin reflected reality, for he, as the main argument for the need to conclude peace, in his theses of January 20, highlighted the idea that the overwhelming majority of the peasantry would undoubtedly vote even "for an aggressive peace." ... Moreover, if the war is resumed, the peasantry will overthrow the socialist government. Lenin denied that he had ever spoken of a "revolutionary war" and, as always in acute moments, with surprising composure, "did not hold on to the letter," as he put it, to what he had previously said.

The Left Social Revolutionaries who were part of the Council of People's Commissars believed that the Germans would not dare to go on the offensive, and if they did, they would cause a strong revolutionary upsurge in the country to defend the fatherland.

Trotsky and Lenin agreed with this and feared the continuation of the war, not so much in terms of the deep advance of the Germans, but because of the impossibility of hindering the mobilization of national, patriotic forces under war conditions. They foresaw the inevitable rallying of these forces around the Right SRs and Cadets, around the idea of ​​a Constituent Assembly and, as a result, the overthrow of the communist dictatorship and the establishment in Russia of a national democratic government based on the majority of the population.

This argument, which raised the question not of war or peace, but of the preservation of power, Lenin put forward later, on February 24, when he bluntly wrote that "risking war" means giving an opportunity to overthrow Soviet power.

While Trotsky was dragging out the negotiations (he returned to Petrograd on January 18), a conference of the most prominent party workers was prepared, convened on January 21. It could call itself a party congress with much more reason than the 7th congress gathered in a hurry in March 1918.

The meeting was attended by 65 delegates, including members of the Central Committee. Bukharin, Trotsky and Lenin delivered reports on peace and war. Each with its own point of view. Trotsky, like Lenin, understood the danger of the slogan of the "left communists" about "revolutionary war" (from the point of view of retaining power at that moment) and at the same time, trying to isolate himself from a separate peace with the Germans, put forward the formula "no peace, no war ! " This formula, directed primarily against the supporters of the war, helped Lenin at that stage to fight for peace, because the decision on war, on which the majority stood, if adopted, would have dealt a mortal blow to Lenin's policy and to Lenin himself. At first glance, Trotsky's somewhat anarchist formula was nothing more than a temporary bridge between Lenin and his opponents, who had a majority behind them.

On January 25, in the Council of People's Commissars, with the participation of the Left Social Revolutionaries, the overwhelming majority also passed Trotsky's formula - "No peace, no war."

That is why Trotsky's accusations, so noisy later that he "treacherously", allegedly acting against the majority of the Central Committee, "arbitrarily" broke off the negotiations with the Germans on February 10, are devoid of any foundation. In this case, Trotsky acted on the basis of the decision of the majority both in the Central Committee and in the Council of People's Commissars. These accusations, brought forward in 1924-1925, mainly by Zinoviev and Stalin during the internal party fight against Trotsky, even then, little took into account the historical reality.

The tense week after the break in the negotiations passed in almost continuous sessions of the Central Committee. Lenin, remaining in the minority, strove in every possible way to find a “formulation of the question” of a “revolutionary war” that would show its impossibility - putting, for example, on February 17, even before the German offensive, the question of “should a revolutionary war be declared? Germany? " Bukharin and Lomov refused to vote on such an "unqualifiedly posed" question, for the essence of revolutionary defencism was in response to the German offensive, and not in their own initiative, the disastrousness of which was beyond doubt.

On February 18, the Germans launched an offensive. The remnants of the demoralized and, after the assassination of General Dukhonin, deprived of the leadership of the army ("Commander-in-Chief" Krylenko devoted himself to eliminating the headquarters and command still remaining on certain sectors of the front) could not offer any resistance, and very soon Dvinsk, with its huge warehouses of weapons and supplies, and followed by Pskov, were occupied by the Germans. In the center and especially in the south, the Germans moved quickly forward, meeting scattered resistance from the remnants of the cadre of some units and volunteers Czechoslovak Corps.

On the evening of February 18, Lenin won a majority of 7 against 6 on the issue of sending a radio telegram to the Germans with a proposal for peace. Lenin owed his success entirely to Trotsky. Trotsky's buffer position was revealed at the moment of an immediate threat to the power itself: he went over to Lenin's camp, and his vote was given by the majority. (For the proposal to the Germans of the world they voted: Lenin, Smilga, Zinoviev, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Sverdlov, Trotsky; against - Uritsky, Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky, Lomov and Ioffe).

The peace proposal was to be sent on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, where 7 People's Commissars were Left SRs. Probably, the decision of the Left SRs would have been different if they had known that Lenin received the majority with just one vote and, moreover, with the voice of the author of the formula "no peace, no war." But not knowing the results of the vote in the Bolshevik Central Committee and also afraid of losing power, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary People's Commissars voted for the peace proposal with 4 votes to 3.

The German command saw that it could quickly advance deep into Russia and easily occupy Petrograd and even Moscow. However, it did not take this step, limiting itself to the occupation of Ukraine, where a fake "hetman" government was created. As points out Ludendorff, the German command feared most of all an explosion of patriotism in Russia. Even during the Tarnopol breakthrough in July 1917, Ludendorff gave the order not to develop the offensive, so as not to cause the threat of a deep German invasion to improve the health of the Russian army. A deep invasion now, in 1918, the occupation of Petrograd and access to Moscow could lead to the overthrow of the Bolshevik government, could justify the efforts of the generals Alekseeva and Kornilov collecting volunteer army in Rostov-on-Don.

The first two pages of the Brest Peace Treaty in German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Russian

Thus, the German strategy and policy towards Russia completely coincided with the Leninist policy of peace at all costs.

It is interesting to note that in his report on peace and war at the 7th Party Congress in March 1918, Lenin argued the need for peace by the collapse of the army, devoting a significant part of his report to characterizing the army as a "sick part of the body" capable only of "flight", "panic" , “Selling our own guns to the Germans for a pittance,” etc. Lenin nowhere now says that the main blame for the disintegration of the army under the slogan of an immediate peace “without annexations and indemnities” lay with the Bolshevik party itself. Having deceived the soldiers with the chimera of the possibility of such a world ( Peace decree), Lenin now shifted the blame to them for the conditions of the German peace, shameful for Russia.

Lenin, speaking of the army, deliberately concealed the facts; the demobilization conference in December showed that those units that retained the best fighting efficiency were the most anti-Bolshevik. That is why Krylenko did absolutely nothing for two months, did not want to, and could not do anything, despite the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on measures to organize and strengthen the army. In the days of the February crisis, the regimental committee of the Preobrazhensky regiment proposed on behalf of the regiment already stationed in Petrograd to go to the Pskov front, but after negotiations with Smolny, it received not only a refusal to do so, but also an order for demobilization.

At the call of Lenin, Krylenko and Raskolnikov made reports to the Central Executive Committee "e on the state of the army and navy, giving the Left SR Steinberg the impression that both are deliberately exaggerating and dramatizing the situation in the army and navy. A decree was issued on the organization of the Red Army, but this army was not intended by Lenin to fight the Germans : already on February 22, a German response was received about the agreement to sign the peace, but on even more difficult conditions. The borders of Russia were thrown back to Pskov and Smolensk. Russia.

When the conditions for peace became known, Bukharin, Lomov, V.M.Smirnov, Yu. Pyatakov and Bubnov in Moscow, and Uritsky in Petrograd, resigned from all the responsible posts they held and demanded the right to free agitation in the Party and outside of it against peace with Germans (Lomov, Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov were members of the Central Committee). On February 23, after a discussion of German terms, a decisive vote took place. Lenin won again only thanks to Trotsky and his supporters, who abstained — these were Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe, Krestinsky. Voted against: Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov, Lomov. For the immediate signing of the peace: Lenin, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Stalin, Smilga, Sokolnikov and Stasova, who was the secretary. Thus, Lenin had 7 votes in favor (in fact, if not counting Stasova's vote - 6) against 4, with 4 abstentions.

During the discussion, Stalin tried to propose not to sign the peace, dragging out the negotiations, for which he was cut short by Lenin:

“Stalin is wrong when he says that we can not sign. These conditions must be signed. If they are not signed, it means a death sentence to the Soviet government "...

Once again, Trotsky played a decisive role, breaking in half the majority that was against the signing of the treaty.

Lenin's concession was the decision to convene the Seventh Party Congress, since, according to the Central Committee's decision to convene the congress, "there was no unanimity in the Central Committee on the signing of a peace treaty."

The next day, upon learning of the Central Committee's decision, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the Party announced that it considered the Central Committee’s decision on peace "absolutely unacceptable." The resolution of the Moscow Regional Bureau, adopted unanimously on February 24, read:

“Having discussed the activities of the Central Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the RSDLP expresses its distrust of the Central Committee, in view of its political line and composition, and will insist on its re-election at the first opportunity. Moreover, the Moscow Regional Bureau does not consider itself obliged to obey at all costs those decisions of the Central Committee, which will be associated with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria-Germany. "

This resolution was adopted unanimously. The members of the Moscow Regional Bureau - Lomov, Bukharin, Osinsky, Stukov, Maksimovsky, Safonov, Sapronov, Soloviev and others - believed that the split in the party "can hardly be eliminated in the near future." But at the same time, they avoided what the Stalinist "Short Course of the CPSU (b)" Stalinist "Short Course of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" accused them of — the collusion of the "left communists" with the left SRs. If such a conspiracy had taken place, then, without a doubt, the bloc of the Left SRs with the "Left Communists" had every chance of winning. The "left communists" were guided by a belief in the German revolution, without which they did not see an opportunity for the continued existence of socialist Russia. Lenin shared this view, which he repeatedly repeated in his report at the VII Congress, and only did not connect the issue of retaining power, as did, for example, Kollontai, with the German revolution within the next three months. He considered the time before the revolution only as a period during which it is necessary to strengthen power in every possible way, to use a respite. This orientation of the "left communists" towards the revolution in the West, ignoring the national problems of Russia was their main weakness. Lenin remained for them, for all their disagreements with him, the only possible ally. They did not look for support in the forces of national democracy, moreover, they made a start from it, and therefore, in the real balance of forces outside the party, they were not any significant factor.

On March 3, 1918, 95 years ago, a peace treaty was concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey.

A number of events preceded the conclusion of the agreement.
On November 19 (December 2), a delegation of the Soviet government, headed by A.A. Ioffe, arrived in the neutral zone and proceeded to Brest-Litovsk, where the Headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front was located, where it met with a delegation of the Austro-German bloc, which included also included representatives from Bulgaria and Turkey.

Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Arrival of Russian delegates. In the middle A. A. Ioffe, next to him secretary L. Karakhan, A. A. Bitsenko, on the right L. B. Kamenev


Arrival of the German delegation to Brest-Litovsk

On November 21 (December 4), the Soviet delegation outlined its conditions:
the truce is concluded for 6 months;
hostilities are suspended on all fronts;
German troops are withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;
any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.

An unpleasant surprise awaited Soviet diplomats in Brest. They hoped that Germany and her allies would gladly seize every opportunity for reconciliation. But it was not there. It turned out that the Germans and Austrians were not going to leave the occupied territories, and according to the right of nations to self-determination, Russia would lose Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Transcaucasia. A dispute began over this right. The Bolsheviks argued that the expression of the will of peoples under occupation would be undemocratic, while the Germans objected that under the Bolshevik terror it would be even less democratic.

As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:
the truce is concluded for the period from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17);
the troops remain in their positions;
all troop transfers cease, except for those that have already begun.


Officers of the Hindenburg headquarters meet on the platform of Brest the arriving delegation of the RSFSR at the beginning of 1918

Proceeding from the general principles of the Decree on Peace, the Soviet delegation, already at one of the first meetings, proposed that the following program be adopted as the basis for negotiations:
No violent annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.
The full political independence of the peoples, which were deprived of this independence during the war, is being restored.

National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide whether they belong to a state or their state independence through a free referendum.

Noting the joining of the German bloc to the Soviet formula of peace "without annexations and indemnities," the Soviet delegation proposed to declare a ten-day break, during which it would be possible to try to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.



Trotsky L.D., Ioffe A. and Rear Admiral Altfater V. go to the meeting. Brest-Litovsk.

During the break, however, it became clear that Germany understands the world without annexations differently than the Soviet delegation - for Germany it is not at all about the withdrawal of troops to the borders of 1914 and the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of the former Russian Empire, especially since, according to the statement Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Courland have already spoken out in favor of secession from Russia, so if these three countries now enter into negotiations with Germany about their future fate, then this will by no means be considered an annexation by Germany.

On December 14 (27), the Soviet delegation at the second meeting of the political commission made a proposal: “In full agreement with the open statement of both contracting parties that they have no plans of conquest and that they wish to conclude peace without annexations. Russia is withdrawing its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia it occupies, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. " Soviet Russia promised, in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations, to provide the population of these regions with the opportunity to decide on their own the question of their state existence - in the absence of any troops other than the national or local militia.

The German and Austro-Hungarian delegations, however, made a counter-proposal - the Russian state was asked to “take note of the statements expressing the will of the peoples inhabiting Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estonia and Livonia, about their desire for full state independence and from the Russian Federation "and recognize that" these statements under the present conditions should be considered as an expression of the people's will. " R. von Kühlmann asked if the Soviet government would agree to withdraw its troops from all of Livonia and from Estonia in order to give the local population the opportunity to unite with their fellow tribesmen living in the areas occupied by the Germans. The Soviet delegation was also informed that the Ukrainian Central Rada was sending its own delegation to Brest-Litovsk.

On December 15 (28), the Soviet delegation left for Petrograd. The current state of affairs was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), where by a majority vote it was decided to drag out the peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of an early revolution in Germany itself. In the future, the formula is refined and takes the following form: "We hold on until the German ultimatum, then we surrender." Lenin also offers the People's Commissar Trotsky to leave for Brest-Litovsk and personally lead the Soviet delegation. According to Trotsky's recollections, "the very prospect of negotiations with Baron Kuhlmann and General Hoffmann was not very attractive, but" in order to drag out the negotiations, you need a delayer, "as Lenin put it."


Further negotiations with the Germans hung in the air. The Soviet government could not accept the German conditions, fearing that it would be overthrown on the spot. Not only the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but also the majority of the Communists stood for the "revolutionary war." But there was no one to fight! The army has already fled to their homes. The Bolsheviks offered to move the negotiations to Stockholm. But this was refused by the Germans and their allies. Although they were desperately afraid - what if the Bolsheviks broke off the negotiations? It would be a disaster for them. They were already starting to starve, and food could only be obtained in the East.

At the union meeting, it sounded in panic: “Germany and Hungary are giving nothing more. In a few weeks, a general pestilence will begin without an outside supply in Austria. ”


At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky (leader), A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E. G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, Art. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altfater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky.

The head of the Austrian delegation, Ottokar von Czernin, wrote when the Bolsheviks returned to Brest: "It was curious to see what joy the Germans were overwhelmed with, and this unexpected and so violently manifested gaiety proved how hard it was for them to think that the Russians might not come."



The second composition of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Sitting, from left to right: Kamenev, Ioffe, Bitsenko. Standing, from left to right: V.V. Lipsky, Stuchka, L.D. Trotsky, L.M. Karakhan



During negotiations in Brest-Litovsk

The impressions of the head of the German delegation, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry Richard von Kühlmann, about Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation, were preserved: “not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical gaze. The look on his face clearly indicated that he [Trotsky] would have been better off completing the negotiations that were unsympathetic to him with a pair of grenades, throwing them across the green table, if this was somehow coordinated with the general political line ... sometimes I wondered if I had arrived he generally intends to conclude peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagandize the Bolshevik views. "


General Max Hoffmann, a member of the German delegation, ironically described the composition of the Soviet delegation: “I will never forget my first dinner with the Russians. I sat between Ioffe and Sokolnikov, the then Commissioner of Finance. Opposite me was a worker who, apparently, was greatly uncomfortable with the multitude of utensils and utensils. He grabbed at one thing or the other, but he used the fork exclusively for brushing his teeth. The terrorist Bizenko was sitting across from me next to Prince Hohenloe [sic], on the other side of her was a peasant, a real Russian phenomenon with long gray curls and a beard overgrown like a forest. He caused a kind of smile from the staff, when, when asked whether he prefers red or white wine for dinner, he answered: "Stronger" "


On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), German Chancellor H. von Gertling announced in his speech in the Reichstag that a delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada had arrived in Brest-Litovsk. Germany agreed to negotiate with the Ukrainian delegation, hoping to use this as a lever both against Soviet Russia and against its ally, Austria-Hungary.



Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, from left to right: Nikolai Lyubinsky, Vsevolod Golubovich, Nikolai Levitsky, Lussenti, Mikhail Polozov and Alexander Sevryuk.


The arriving Ukrainian delegation from the Central Rada behaved scandalously and arrogantly. The Ukrainians had bread, and they began to blackmail Germany and Austria-Hungary, demanding for food to recognize their independence and give Ukraine Galicia and Bukovina, which belonged to the Austrians.

The Central Rada did not want to know Trotsky. It was very good for the Germans. They huddled around the self-styled people this way and that. Other factors were superimposed. A famine strike broke out in Vienna, followed by a strike in Berlin. 500 thousand workers went on strike. The Ukrainians demanded more and more concessions for their bread. And Trotsky cheered up. It seemed that the Germans and Austrians were about to start a revolution, and they just had to wait for it.


Ukrainian diplomats, who were conducting preliminary negotiations with the German General M. Hoffmann, the chief of staff of the German armies on the Eastern Front, first announced claims to annex the Kholmshchyna (which was part of Poland) to Ukraine, as well as the Austro-Hungarian territories - Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. Hoffmann, however, insisted that they reduce their demands and confine themselves to one Kholmsk region, agreeing that Bukovina and Eastern Galicia form an independent Austro-Hungarian crown territory under the rule of the Habsburgs. It was these requirements that they defended in their further negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian delegation. Negotiations with the Ukrainians dragged on so that the opening of the conference had to be postponed until December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918).

Ukrainian delegates talk to German officers in Brest-Litovsk


At the next meeting, held on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Germans invited the Ukrainian delegation. Its chairman V.A.Golubovich announced the declaration of the Central Rada that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia does not extend to Ukraine, and therefore the Central Rada intends to independently conduct peace negotiations. R. von Kühlmann asked L.D. Trotsky whether he and his delegation intend to continue to be the only diplomatic representatives of all of Russia in Brest-Litovsk, and whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered a part of the Russian delegation or whether it represents an independent state. Trotsky knew that the Rada was actually at war with the RSFSR. Therefore, by agreeing to consider the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada as independent, he actually played into the hands of the representatives of the Central Powers and provided Germany and Austria-Hungary with the opportunity to continue contacts with the Ukrainian Central Rada, while negotiations with Soviet Russia stalled for two more days.

Signing of documents on the armistice in Brest-Litovsk


The January uprising in Kiev put Germany in a difficult position, and now the German delegation demanded a break in the meetings of the peace conference. On January 21 (February 3), von Kuehlmann and Chernin left for Berlin for a meeting with General Ludendorff, where they discussed the possibility of signing peace with the Central Rada government, which does not control the situation in Ukraine. A decisive role was played by the dire food situation in Austria-Hungary, which, without Ukrainian grain, was threatened with famine.

In Brest, in the third round of negotiations, the situation changed again. In Ukraine, the Reds smashed the Rada. Now Trotsky refused to recognize the Ukrainians as an independent delegation, calling Ukraine an integral part of Russia. The Bolsheviks, however, were clearly betting on the imminent revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary, trying to gain time. One fine day in Berlin, they intercepted a radio message from Petrograd to German soldiers, where they were called upon to kill the emperor, generals, and fraternize. Kaiser Wilhelm II was furious and ordered to break off the negotiations.


Signing a peace treaty with Ukraine. Sitting in the middle, from left to right: Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Hudenitz, General Max von Hoffmann, Richard von Kühlmann, Prime Minister V. Rodoslavov, Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat Pasha


The Ukrainians, in proportion to the success of the Red troops, sharply reduced their insolence and, flirting with the Germans, agreed to everything. On February 9, when the Bolsheviks entered Kiev, the Central Rada concluded a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary, saving them from the threat of hunger and riots ...

In exchange for military assistance against the Soviet troops, the UPR pledged to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary by July 31, 1918, one million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, up to 50 thousand tons of cattle meat, lard, sugar, hemp, manganese ore, etc. Austria-Hungary also pledged to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in Eastern Galicia.



The signing of a peace treaty between the UPR and the Central Powers on January 27 (February 9) 1918

On January 27 (February 9), at a meeting of the political commission, Chernin informed the Russian delegation about the signing of peace with Ukraine represented by the delegation of the Central Rada government.

Now the position of the Bolsheviks has become desperate. The Germans spoke to them in the language of ultimatums. The Reds were "asked" to leave Ukraine, as from the territory of a state friendly to Germany. And to the previous demands, new ones were added - to give up the unoccupied parts of Latvia and Estonia, to pay a huge indemnity.

At the insistence of General Ludendorff (even at a meeting in Berlin, he demanded that the head of the German delegation break off negotiations with the Russian delegation within 24 hours after the signing of peace with Ukraine) and on the direct order of Emperor Wilhelm II, von Kühlmann presented Soviet Russia in an ultimatum form a demand to accept the German conditions of peace.

On January 28, 1918 (February 10, 1918), at the request of the Soviet delegation how to resolve the issue, Lenin confirmed the previous instructions. Nevertheless, Trotsky, violating these instructions, rejected the German peace terms, putting forward the slogan "Neither peace, nor war: we do not sign peace, we end the war, and demobilize the army." The German side stated in response that Russia's failure to sign the peace treaty automatically entails the termination of the ceasefire.

In general, the Germans and Austrians received very clear advice. Take what you want - but yourself, without my signature and consent. After this statement, the Soviet delegation defiantly left the negotiations. On the same day, Trotsky gives the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Krylenko an order demanding to immediately issue an order to the army to end the state of war with Germany and on general demobilization(although he had no right to do so, since he was not yet people's commissar for military affairs, but for foreign affairs). Lenin canceled this order after 6 hours. Nevertheless, the order was received by all fronts on 11 February andfor some reason was accepted for execution. The last units still in positions flowed to the rear ...


On February 13, 1918, at a meeting in Homburg with the participation of Wilhelm II, the Reich Chancellor Gertling, the head of the German Foreign Office von Kühlmann, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Vice-Chancellor, it was decided to interrupt the truce and launch an offensive on the Eastern Front.

On the morning of February 19, the offensive of the German troops rapidly developed along the entire Northern Front. Troops of the German 8th Army (6 divisions), a separate Northern Corps stationed on the Moonsund Islands, as well as a special army unit operating from the south, from Dvinsk, moved through Livonia and Estonia to Revel, Pskov and Narva (the ultimate goal is Petrograd) ... In 5 days, German and Austrian troops advanced 200-300 km deep into Russian territory. “I have never seen such a ridiculous war,” wrote Hoffmann. “We drove it practically on trains and cars. You put a handful of infantry with machine guns and one cannon on the train and drive to the next station. You take the station, arrest the Bolsheviks, put more soldiers on the train and move on. " Zinoviev was forced to admit that "there is information that in some cases unarmed German soldiers dispersed hundreds of our soldiers." "The army rushed to run, abandoning everything, sweeping away in its path," writes the first Soviet commander-in-chief of the Russian front-line army NV Krylenko about these events in the same 1918.


On February 21, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger", but at the same time informed Germany that it was ready to resume negotiations. And the Germans decided to bang their fists on the table in such a way as to discourage the Bolsheviks from being stubborn in the future. On February 22, an ultimatum was dictated with a response time of 48 hours, and the conditions were even more difficult than before. Since the Red Guard showed absolute non-combat capability, on February 23, a decree was adopted on the creation of a regular Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. But on the same day, a stormy meeting of the Central Committee took place. Lenin persuaded his comrades-in-arms to peace, threatening with his resignation. And this did not stop many. Lomov declared: “If Lenin threatens to resign, then they are in vain to be frightened. We must take power without Lenin. " Nevertheless, some were embarrassed by the demarche of Vladimir Ilyich, others were sobered by the light march of the Germans to Petrograd. 7 members of the Central Committee voted for peace, 4 abstained against 4 and 4.

But the Central Committee was only a party organ. The decision was to be made by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. It was still multi-party, and the factions of the Left SRs, Right SRs, Mensheviks, anarchists, a significant part of the Bolsheviks, stood for the war. The acceptance of the world was ensured by Yakov Sverdlov. He knew how to preside over meetings like no other. I very clearly used, for example, such a tool as regulations. I cut off an unwanted speaker - the time limit was out (and who is watching, is there still a minute left?). He knew how to play casuistry, procedural intricacies, manipulated, who to give the floor, and who "not to notice."

At a meeting of the Bolshevik faction, Sverdlov emphasized "party discipline." He pointed out that the Central Committee had already made a decision, the entire faction must comply with it, and if someone thinks differently, he must submit to the "majority." At 3 o'clock in the morning, the factions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee came together. If we counted all the opponents of the world - the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, "Left Communists", they would have accumulated a clear majority. Knowing this, the Left SR leaders demanded a roll-call vote. But ... the "left communists" were already bound by the decision of their faction. Vote only for peace. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the German ultimatum by 116 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions.

After the decision to accept peace on German terms was made by the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), and then passed through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the question arose about the new composition of the delegation. As noted by Richard Pipes, none of the Bolshevik leaders was eager to go down in history by putting their signature on the treaty shameful for Russia. Trotsky by this time had already submitted his resignation from the post of People's Commissar, G. Ya. Sokolnikov proposed the candidacy of G. Ye. Zinoviev. However, Zinoviev refused such an "honor," proposing in response the candidacy of Sokolnikov himself; Sokolnikov also refuses, promising to leave the Central Committee in the event of such an appointment. A.A. Joffe also flatly refused. After long negotiations, Sokolnikov nevertheless agreed to head the Soviet delegation, the new composition of which took the following form: Sokolnikov G. Ya., Petrovsky L.M., Chicherin G.V., Karakhan G.I. and a group of 8 consultants (among them the former chairman of the delegation Ioffe AA). The delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk on March 1, and two days later, without any discussion, signed an agreement.



Postcard depicting the signing of a ceasefire by the German representative, Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Russian delegation: A.A. Bitsenko, next to her A. A. Ioffe, as well as L. B. Kamenev. Behind Kamenev in the form of captain A. Lipsky, secretary of the Russian delegation L. Karakhan

The German-Austrian offensive, which began in February 1918, continued even when the Soviet delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk: on February 28, the Austrians occupied Berdichev, on March 1, the Germans occupied Gomel, Chernigov and Mogilev, on March 2, the bombing of Petrograd was carried out. On March 4, after the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was signed, German troops occupied Narva and stopped only on the Narova River and the western shore of Lake Peipsi, 170 km from Petrograd.




A photocopy of the first two pages of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, March 1918



Postcard with the image of the last page with the signatures on the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty

The annex to the treaty guaranteed the special economic status of Germany in Soviet Russia. Citizens and corporations of the Central Powers were removed from the action of the Bolshevik decrees on nationalization, and persons who had already lost their property were restored to their rights. Thus, German citizens were allowed to engage in private entrepreneurship in Russia against the background of the general nationalization of the economy taking place at that time. This state of affairs for some time created an opportunity for Russian owners of enterprises or securities to avoid nationalization by selling their assets to the Germans. Fears of Dzerzhinsky F.E. that "Having signed the conditions, we do not guarantee ourselves against new ultimatums" are partially confirmed: the advance of the German army was not limited to the limits of the zone of occupation defined by the peace treaty.

A struggle unfolded for the ratification of the peace treaty. At the VII Congress of the Bolshevik Party on March 6-8, the positions of Lenin and Bukharin clashed. The outcome of the congress was decided by the authority of Lenin - his resolution was adopted by 30 votes to 12, with 4 abstentions. Trotsky's compromise proposals to make peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance as the last concession and to prohibit the Central Committee from making peace with the Central Rada of Ukraine were rejected. The controversy continued at the IV Congress of Soviets, where the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Anarchists opposed the ratification, while the Left Communists abstained. But thanks to the existing system of representation, the Bolsheviks had an obvious majority at the Congress of Soviets. If the left-wing communists had gone to split the party, the peace treaty would have failed, but Bukharin did not dare to do so. On the night of March 16, the peace was ratified.

Austro-Hungarian troops enter the city of Kamenets-Podolsky after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty



German troops under the command of General Eichhorn occupied Kiev. March 1918.



Germans in Kiev



Odessa after the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Dredging works in the port of Odessa German troops captured Simferopol on April 22, 1918, Taganrog on May 1, and Rostov-on-Don on May 8, causing the fall of Soviet power on the Don. In April 1918, diplomatic relations were established between the RSFSR and Germany. On the whole, however, Germany's relations with the Bolsheviks were not ideal from the very beginning. According to N. N. Sukhanov, the German government feared "its" friends "and" agents "quite thoroughly: it knew perfectly well that these people were as" friends "to it as they were to Russian imperialism, to which the German authorities were trying to" slip "them keeping them at a respectful distance from their own loyal subjects. " Since April 1918, the Soviet ambassador A. A. Ioffe began active revolutionary propaganda already in Germany itself, which ends with the November Revolution. The Germans, for their part, are consistently liquidating Soviet power in the Baltic States and Ukraine, helping the "White Finns" and actively promoting the formation of the center of the White movement on the Don. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks, fearing a German offensive against Petrograd, moved the capital to Moscow; after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, they did not trust the Germans and did not cancel this decision.

Lübeckischen Anzeigen Special Edition


While the German General Staff came to the conclusion that the defeat of the Second Reich was inevitable, Germany managed to impose on the Soviet government, in the conditions of the growing civil war and the outbreak of the Entente intervention, additional agreements to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. On August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, the Russian-German additional treaty to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and the Russian-German financial agreement were signed, which on behalf of the RSFSR government was signed by Plenipotentiary A.A. Ioffe, and on behalf of Germany - von P. Hinze and I. Kriege. Under this agreement, Soviet Russia pledged to pay Germany, as compensation for damage and costs of maintaining Russian prisoners of war, a huge indemnity - 6 billion marks - in the form of "pure gold" and credit obligations. In September 1918, two "gold echelons" were sent to Germany, containing 93.5 tons of "pure gold" worth over 120 million gold rubles. It did not come to the next dispatch.

Extraction

Article I

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, declare that the state of war between them has ended; they decided to continue to live. among themselves in peace and harmony.

Article II

The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the governments or government and military institutions of the other party. Since this commitment concerns Russia, it also extends to the areas occupied by the powers of the quadruple alliance.

Article III

Areas lying to the west of the line established by the contracting parties and belonging before Russia will no longer be under her supreme authority ...

For the aforementioned regions, no obligations towards Russia will follow from their former belonging to Russia. Russia refuses any interference in the internal affairs of these areas. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of these regions in accordance with their populations.

Article IV

Germany is ready, as soon as a general peace is concluded and a completely Russian demobilization is carried out, to clear the areas lying to the east of the line indicated in paragraph 1 of Article III, since Article IV does not state otherwise. Russia will do everything, the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their lawful return to Turkey. The districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops.Russia will not interfere in the new organization of state-legal and international-legal relations of these districts, but will leave them to the population to establish a new system in agreement with neighboring states, especially Turkey.

Article V

Russia will immediately carry out a complete demobilization of its army, including the military units newly formed by its current government. In addition, Russia will either transfer its warships to Russian ports and leave there until a general peace is concluded, or it will immediately disarm. The military courts of states that are still in a state of war with the powers of the quadruple alliance, since these vessels are in the sphere of power of Russia, are equated to Russian military courts. ... In the Baltic Sea and in the parts of the Black Sea subject to Russia, the removal of minefields should begin immediately. Merchant shipping in these maritime areas is free and immediately resumes ...

Article VI

Russia undertakes to immediately conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the peace treaty between this state and the powers of the quadruple alliance. The territory of Ukraine is immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia stops all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Estland and Livonia are also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern border of Estonia runs generally along the Narva River. The eastern border of Livonia generally runs through Lake Peipsi and Lake Pskov to its southwestern corner, then across Lake Luban in the direction of Livengof on the Western Dvina. Estland and Livonia will be occupied by the German police power until public safety is ensured there by the country's own institutions and until state order is restored there. Russia will immediately release all the arrested or taken away inhabitants of Estland and Livonia and will ensure the safe return of all the taken away Estonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Aland Islands will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and the Finnish ports - of the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces ... the government or public institutions of Finland. The fortifications erected on the Aland Islands should be demolished as soon as possible.

Article VII

Based on the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties undertake to respect the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of Persia and Afghanistan.

Article VIII

Prisoners of war on both sides will be released home

Article IX

The contracting parties mutually refuse to reimburse their military expenses, that is, from state costs of waging a war, as well as from reimbursing military losses, that is, from those losses that were caused to them and their citizens in the war zone by military measures, including and all requisitions made in the enemy country ...

ORIGINAL

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is an agreement between Germany and the Soviet government, imposing an obligation on Russia to withdraw from the First World War. The Brest Peace Treaty was concluded on March 3, 1918 and came to an end after Germany's surrender in World War II.

Before the start of the war, all the countries of Western Europe knew what the position of the Russian Empire was like: the country was in a state of economic recovery.

This was evidenced not only by the rise in the standard of living of the population, but also by the rapprochement of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire with the advanced states of that time - Great Britain and France.

Changes in the economy gave impetus to changes in the social sphere, in particular, the number of the working class increased, but the majority of the population were still peasants.

It was the country's active foreign policy that led to the final formation of the Entente - an alliance of Russia, France and England. In turn, Germany and Austria-Hungary and Italy formed the main structure of the Triple Alliance, which opposed the Entente. The colonial contradictions of the great powers of that time led to the beginning

For a long time, the Russian Empire was in military decline, which intensified by the beginning of the world war. The reasons for this condition are obvious:

  • untimely completion of the military reform that began after the Russo-Japanese War;
  • slow implementation of the program for the formation of new armed associations;
  • lack of ammunition and provisions;
  • aging military doctrine, including an increased number of cavalry in the Russian troops;
  • the lack of automatic weapons and communications equipment in providing the army;
  • insufficient qualifications of the command staff.

These factors contributed to the low combat effectiveness of the Russian army and an increase in the number of deaths during military campaigns. In 1914, the Western and Eastern Fronts were formed - the main arenas of the First World War. During 1914-1916, Russia took part in three military campaigns of the Eastern Front.

The first campaign (1914) was marked by the Battle of Galicia, successful for the Russian state, during which the troops occupied Lvov, the capital of Galicia, as well as the defeat of the Turkish troops in the Caucasus.

The second campaign (1915) began with the breakthrough of German troops into Galicia, during which the Russian Empire suffered significant losses, but at the same time remained capable of providing military support to the Allied territories. At the same time, the Quadruple Alliance was formed on the territories of the Western Front (a coalition of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria).

During the Third Campaign (1916), Russia manages to improve the martial law of France, at which time the United States enters the war against Germany on the Western Front.

In July, the offensive in Galicia under the command of A.A. Brusilov intensified. The so-called Brusilov breakthrough was able to bring the army of Austria-Hungary to a critical state. Brusilov's troops occupy the territories of Galicia and Bukovina, but due to the lack of support from the allied countries, they are forced to go on the defensive.

In the course of the war, the attitude of soldiers to military service changes, discipline deteriorates, and a complete demoralization of the Russian army is observed. By the beginning of 1917, when Russia was overtaken by a national crisis, the country's economy was in a significant decline: the value of the ruble was falling, the financial system was disrupted, the work of about 80 enterprises was stopped due to a lack of fuel energy, and taxes were increased.

There is an active rise in the cost of living and the subsequent collapse of the economy. This served as the reasons for the introduction of compulsory grain appropriation and mass indignation of the civilian population. In the course of the development of economic problems, a revolutionary movement is brewing, which brings the Bolshevik faction to power, whose primary task was to withdraw Russia from the world war.

It is interesting! The main force of the October Revolution was the movement of soldiers, so the Bolsheviks' promise to end hostilities was obvious.

Negotiations between Germany and Russia on the coming peace began in 1917. They were handled by Trotsky, then People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

At that time, there were three main forces in the Bolshevik Party:

  • Lenin. He argued that a peace agreement must be signed on any terms.
  • Bukharin. He put forward the idea of ​​war at any cost.
  • Trotsky. Maintained uncertainty - the ideal alignment for Western European countries.

The idea of ​​signing a peace document was most supported by V.I. Lenin. He understood the need to accept the conditions of Germany and demanded that Trotsky sign the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, but the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was confident in the further development of the revolution on German territory, as well as in the absence of forces from the Triple Alliance for further offensives.

That is why Trotsky, an ardent left communist, delayed the moment of concluding a peace treaty. Contemporaries believe that such behavior of the People's Commissar gave impetus to toughening the terms of the peace document. Germany demanded the detachment of the Baltic and Polish territories and some Baltic islands from Russia. It was assumed that the Soviet state would lose up to 160 thousand km2 of territory.

The armistice was concluded in December 1917 and lasted until January 1918. In January, both sides were supposed to meet in negotiations, which, as a result, were urgently canceled by Trotsky. A peace agreement is signed between Germany and Ukraine (thus an attempt was made to play off the government of the UPR and Soviet power), and the RSFSR decides to announce its withdrawal from the world war without signing a peace treaty.

Germany launches a large-scale offensive on sectors of the Eastern Front, which leads to the threat of seizing the territories of the Bolshevik power. The result of this tactic was the signing of peace in the city of Brest-Litovsk.

Signing and conditions of the contract

The peace agreement was signed on March 3, 1918. The terms of the Brest Peace Treaty, as well as the supplementary agreement concluded in August of the same year, were as follows:

  1. Loss of territory by Russia with a total area of ​​about 790 thousand km2.
  2. Withdrawal of troops from the regions of the Baltic States, Finland, Poland, Belarus and Transcaucasia and the subsequent abandonment of these territories.
  3. Recognition by the Russian state of the independence of Ukraine, which came under the protectorate of Germany.
  4. Assignment to Turkey of the territories of Eastern Anatolia, Kars and Ardahan.
  5. Contribution from Germany in the amount of 6 billion marks (about 3 billion gold rubles).
  6. Entry into force of certain clauses of the 1904 trade agreement.
  7. Termination of revolutionary propaganda in Austria and Germany.
  8. The Black Sea Fleet departed under the command of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Also in the additional agreement there was a clause that obliged Russia to withdraw the Entente troops from its territories and, in the event of the defeat of the Russian army, this problem was to be eliminated by the German-Finnish troops.

Sokolnikov G. Ya. At the head of the delegation and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin G.V. signed the Brest Peace Treaty at 17.50 local time, thus, trying to correct the mistakes of the one who adhered to the principle of "no war, no peace" - L. D. Trotsky.

The Entente states took a separate peace with hostility. They openly declared their non-recognition of the Brest Treaty and began to land troops in different parts of Russia. Thus, the imperialist intervention in the Soviet country began.

Note! Despite the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Bolshevik government feared a repeated offensive by the German troops and moved the capital from Petrograd to Moscow.

Already in 1918, Germany was on the verge of collapse, under the influence of which an actively hostile policy towards the RSFSR was outlined.

Only the bourgeois-democratic revolution prevented Germany from joining the Entente and organizing the struggle against Soviet Russia.

The annulment of the peace treaty gave the Soviet authorities the opportunity not to pay indemnity and begin the liberation of the Russian regions occupied by the Germans.

Modern historians argue that the significance of the Brest Peace in the history of Russia can hardly be overestimated. The assessments of the Brest Peace Treaty are diametrically opposed. Many believe that the agreement served as a catalyst for the further development of the Russian state.

In the opinion of others, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty pushed the state towards an abyss, and the actions of the Bolsheviks should be perceived as a betrayal of the people. The Brest-Litovsk peace treaty had adverse consequences.

The occupation of Ukraine by Germany created a food problem, disrupted communications between the country and the regions of grain and raw materials production. The economic and economic devastation worsened, a split of Russian society took place at the political and social level. The results of the split were not long in coming - the civil war began (1917-1922).

Useful video

Output

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was a forced measure based on the economic and military decline of Russia, as well as the intensification of German and Allied forces on the Eastern Front.

The document did not last long - already in November 1918 it was annulled by both sides, but it was he who gave impetus to fundamental changes in the structures of power of the RSFSR. Historical assessments of the Brest-Litovsk Peace make it clear: the Russian state lost to the losing side, and this is a unique event in the history of mankind.

In contact with

Negotiations with Germany on an armistice began in Brest-Litovsk on November 20 (December 3) 1917. On the same day, N.V. Krylenko arrived at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army in Mogilev, who took over as Commander-in-Chief. November 21 (December 4) 1917 Soviet the delegation set out its terms:

the truce is concluded for 6 months;

hostilities are suspended on all fronts;

German troops are withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;

any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.

As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:

the troops remain in their positions;

all troop transfers cease, except for those that have already begun.

On December 2 (15), 1917, a new stage of negotiations ended with the conclusion of an armistice for 28 days, while, in the event of a break, the parties were obliged to warn the enemy 7 days in advance; an agreement was reached that new transfers of troops to the Western Front would not be allowed.

First step

Peace negotiations began on December 9 (22), 1917. The delegations of the states of the Quadruple Alliance were headed by: from Germany - State Secretary of the Foreign Office R. von Kuhlmann; from Austria-Hungary - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count O. Chernin; from Bulgaria - Popov; from Turkey - Talaat Bey.

The Soviet delegation proposed to adopt the following program as a basis for negotiations:

1) No forcible annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.

2) The full political independence of the peoples is restored, which were deprived of this independence during the war.

3) National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide the issue of belonging to any state or their state independence through a free referendum.

4) Cultural-national and, subject to certain conditions, administrative autonomy of national minorities is ensured.

5) Refusal of contributions.

6) Solving colonial issues on the basis of the above principles.

7) Avoiding indirect constraints on the freedom of weaker nations by stronger nations.

After a three-day discussion by the countries of the German bloc of Soviet proposals on the evening of December 12 (25), 1917, R. von Kuhlmann made a statement that Germany and its allies accept these proposals. At the same time, a reservation was made that nullified Germany's consent to a peace without annexations and indemnities: , without exception and without reservations, within a certain period of time, pledged to strictly observe the conditions common to all peoples. "

Noting the joining of the German bloc to the Soviet formula of peace "without annexations and indemnities," the Soviet delegation proposed to declare a ten-day break, during which it would be possible to try to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.

During a break in the work of the conference, the NKID again appealed to the Entente governments with an invitation to take part in the peace negotiations and again did not receive a response.

Second phase

At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky, A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, Art. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altfater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky.

Opening the conference, R. von Kuhlmann said that since during the break in the peace negotiations none of the main participants in the war had received an application to join them, the delegations of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance abandon their previously expressed intention to join the Soviet peace formula " without annexations and indemnities ”. Both von Kühlmann and the head of the Austro-Hungarian delegation, Czernin, spoke out against postponing the negotiations to Stockholm. In addition, since the allies of Russia did not respond to the offer to take part in the negotiations, now, in the opinion of the German bloc, it should not be about general peace, but about a separate peace between Russia and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), von Kühlmann turned to Leon Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation at the second stage of negotiations, with the question of whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered part of the Russian delegation or whether it represents an independent state. Trotsky actually followed the lead of the German bloc, recognizing the Ukrainian delegation as independent, which made it possible for Germany and Austria-Hungary to continue contacts with Ukraine, while negotiations with Russia were stagnating.

On January 30, 1918, negotiations in Brest were resumed. When the head of the delegation, Trotsky, left for Brest, there was a personal agreement between him and Lenin: to drag out the negotiations until Germany presented an ultimatum, and then immediately sign a peace. The negotiating environment was very difficult. On February 9-10, the German side conducted negotiations in an ultimatum tone. However, no official ultimatum was presented. On the evening of February 10, Trotsky, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, announced a declaration of withdrawal from the war and refusal to sign the annexation treaty. The lull at the front was short-lived. February 16 Germany announced the beginning of hostilities. On February 19, the Germans occupied Dvinsk and Polotsk and moved in the direction of Petrograd. The few detachments of the young Red Army fought heroically, but retreated under the onslaught of the 500,000-strong German army. Pskov and Narva were left. The enemy came close to Petrograd, advancing on Minsk and Kiev. On February 23, a new German ultimatum was delivered to Petrograd, containing even more stringent territorial, economic and military-political conditions on which the Germans agreed to sign a peace treaty. Not only Poland, Lithuania, Courland and part of Belarus, but also Estonia and Livonia were torn away from Russia. Russia was to immediately withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine and Finland. In total, the country of the Soviets lost about 1 million square meters. km (including Ukraine) .There were 48 hours to accept the ultimatum.

On February 3, a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) took place. Lenin demanded the immediate signing of the German peace terms, declaring that otherwise he would resign. As a result, Lenin's proposal was accepted (for-7, against-4, abstained - 4). On February 24, the German peace terms were accepted by the Central Executive Committee of the Council of People's Commissars. On March 3, 1918, the peace treaty was signed.

Terms of the Brest Peace Treaty

Consisted of 14 articles, various appendices, 2 final protocols and 4 According to the terms of the Brest Peace:

The Vistula provinces, Ukraine, the provinces with a predominantly Belarusian population, the Estland, Courland and Livonia provinces, the Grand Duchy of Finland were torn away from Russia. In the Caucasus: Kars region and Batumi region

The Soviet government ended the war with the Ukrainian Central Council (Rada) and the Ukrainian People's Republic and made peace with it.

The army and navy were demobilized.

The Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from its bases in Finland and the Baltic States.

The Black Sea Fleet with all the infrastructure was transferred to the Central Powers. Additional treaties (between Russia and each of the states of the Quadruple Alliance).

Russia paid 6 billion marks of reparations plus payment of losses incurred by Germany during the Russian revolution - 500 million gold rubles.

The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central Powers and allied states formed on the territory of the Russian Empire.

The victory of the Entente in the First World War and the signing of the Armistice of Compiegne on November 11, 1918, according to which all agreements previously concluded with Germany were declared invalid, allowed Soviet Russia to annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on November 13, 1918 and return most of the territories. German troops withdrew from the territory of Ukraine, the Baltic States, Belarus.

Effects

The Brest-Litovsk Peace, as a result of which vast territories were seized from Russia, consolidating the loss of a significant part of the country's agricultural and industrial base, caused opposition to the Bolsheviks from almost all political forces, both on the right and on the left. The treaty for betraying the national interests of Russia almost immediately got the name of the "obscene peace". The Left Social Revolutionaries, allied with the Bolsheviks and being part of the “red” government, as well as the formed faction of “left communists” within the RCP (b) spoke of “betrayal of the world revolution,” since the conclusion of peace on the Eastern Front objectively strengthened the conservative imperial regime in Germany ...

The Brest-Litovsk Peace not only allowed the Central Powers, which were on the verge of defeat in 1917, to continue the war, but also gave them a chance to win, allowing them to concentrate all their forces against the Entente forces in France and Italy, and the elimination of the Caucasian Front freed Turkey's hands for action against the British on The Middle East and Mesopotamia.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk served as a catalyst for the formation of a "democratic counter-revolution", expressed in the proclamation of Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik governments in Siberia and the Volga region, and the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in July 1918 in Moscow. The suppression of these uprisings, in turn, led to the formation of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship and a full-scale civil war.