The offensive of the Russian army in 1914. Russian offensive

East Prussian Operation 1914

East Prussian operation 4 (17) August - 2 (15) September 1914 - an offensive operation of Russian troops, before which the task of defeating the 8th German army and mastering East Prussia for the development of the offensive directly into the departure of Germany is raised.

"Do you have a plan, Mr. Fix?"

According to the majority of domestic and foreign researchers in the history of the First World War, the future war plans were actively developed by the General Stations of all participating countries long before the start of hostilities. The German General Staff led the preparations for the new war almost from the 1870s and 1980s, then, the France and Belgium and Belgium were concerned about this issue - in the 1910s and Russia. However, by the beginning of the First World War, no single, agreed plan of conducting hostilities was not at the holding of the Entente, nor in Germany and its allies. Everyone was preparing for a quick, lightning-offensive war, seeking, first of all, to realize their own developments to seize the strategic initiative at the front.

The German Plan of War, developed by the head of the German General Staff by Alfred von Schliffen, prescribed a quick defeat of France in six to eight weeks, and then transfer strike to the East and as quickly defeat Russia. This plan after Schlöffen's resignation was modified by the new head of the General Staff Helmut Background Moltke, but the essence of the German Blitzkrieg remained the same: split France and promptly transfer all the forces on the Eastern Front to deal with Russia. With the initial deployment of the troops, Germany focused 79% of his forces in the West, and against Russia 21%.

The Franco-Russian Military Convention and the minutes of the meeting of the headquarters of General Headquarters of Generals Joffre and Zhilinsky in 1913 set the task to avoid defeating France and force Germany to fight simultaneously at the two theaters of hostilities. For this, Russia promised to start immediate offensive against Germany by the 15th day of mobilization. Russian mobilization schedules No. 19 and No. 20 were prescribed by the North-Western and South-Western fronts to the offensive and transfer of war to the territory of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The direction of the main strike against Germany - from Nareva to Allenstein - was determined back in 1912 at the negotiations of Zhilinsky and Joffre.

However, in the works of the prominent Russian historians of the First World War (N. N. Golovin, A.M. Zayonchkovsky, etc.) refer to the fact that initially the plans of the Russian General Staff did not work out by the development of a large-scale occurrence against the German troops in a more than fortified area Eastern Prussia. Russia planned to conduct offensive actions against Austria-Hungary troops on South-West FrontWhere and were the basic strengths. Anti-Western and Western fortified areas were planned against Germany, for which the Novogorgievsk - Ivangorod - Warsaw - Brest-Lithuansk since 1910 was created a new line of fortifications, which by 1914 was only at the stage of unfinished construction.

The French General Staff, in turn, perfectly understood that while their mighty ally Russia would deal with the Austrians in the southwest, and then with the Ottoman Empire in the south, the Germans would be great in Paris. Therefore, the French commander-in-chief Joffre and Dubyl at all coalition meetings frankly inspired by the head of the Russian General Staff General Yaz. Zilinsky desired for them is the course of operations of Russian troops, trying to maintain their real plans for offensive operations in the West. They assured that you need to first spend a large-scale offensive operation by the Russian North-Western Front to break Germany. Then Austro-Hungary quickly capitulates, and the war in Europe will end even before the first leaf fall.

At an operational-strategic game held by the Russian Military Ministry and the General Staff in April 1914, the invasion of the Eastern Prussia by the forces of the two armies of the North-Western Front from the East and South was worked out. It was assumed that closed "ticks" will lead to the defeat of the German army, eliminating the threat of a flank strike upon an occurrence in the main direction through Poznan on Berlin from Warsaw.

Y.G. Zilinsky, General from Cavalry

In August 1914, the North-West Front (Commander - General Ya.G. Zhilinsky) included the 1st Army (Commander - General P.K. von Rennencipf), deployed east of East Prussia (Nemanskaya), and 2- I am an army (commander - General A.V. Samsonov). Samsonov's army was deployed to the south of Eastern Prussia (Nareva district) and included 12.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions at 720 guns. In the 1st Army, RennencPFA included 6.5 infantry and 5.5 cavalry divisions at 492 guns. In total, there were more than 250 thousand fighters, 1104 guns, 54 aircraft.

The German 8th Army opposing the German 8th Army in the front section included three army and one reserve corps, two reserve divisions, one cavalry division, one litter division, three landscaming brigades, two fortific erzazbrigada, 9.5 erzantarland battalions, total 14.5 infantry (4.5 liter) and one cavalry division or 173 thousand fighters. According to various data, the number of guns in the 8th army is determined in 774 (without serfs) - 1044 (with serfs).

Numerical superiority over the enemy, a magnificent plan of surgery, the promises of the allies - all this was promincing the victorious prospects and gave rise to the general hatching attractive mood in the leadership of the Russian army. Almost everything - from the monarch itself to the last infantry officer - were confident in lightning success. Those who believed that the war will delay until winter, in St. Petersburg, called panicoers and margins.

In the Directive dated August 13, 1914, the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich set the task to the North-Western Front, immediately go to the offensive and defeat the enemy. The relevant directive of the commanders of the armies sent the general Zhilinsky on the same day.

The 1st Army (RennencPF) was prescribed to speak on August 14, to move the border on August 17, bypassing the Mazur Lakes from the north and cut off the Germans from Konigsberg. The 2nd Army (Samsonov) was supposed to speak on August 16, to move the border on August 19, to bypass the Mazur Ozere from the West and prevent the departure of the German troops for Wovel.

Today, almost everything, both domestic and foreign historians, in one voice, assure that with a clear interaction of the two armies, the Russian side had all the chances of implementing this plan and put a crushing defeat to the Hermann.

Nevertheless, the East Prussian offensive operation of 1914 ended with a grand failure, which began the beginning of a whole chain of Russia's military failures in the First World War. Why? Let's try to figure out.

I stage of operation: Goldapsky Battle

The East Prussian Operation of the Russian troops began 4 (17) by the onset of the 1st Russian Army (Commander Rennenkopf), during which, on August 20, 1914, Humbinenen had crushing defeat to the enemy.

The battle occurred at the front of 50 km from the city of Humbnin to Goldap. The ratio of forces before the battle was not in favor of the Russian army, which had 6.5 infantry and 1.5 cavalry divisions. The German troops had 8.5 infantry and 1 cavalry division.

PC. Rennencampf, General from Cavalry

The Commander of the 1st Army General Rennencup was prescribed by the direction of his impact and indicated the binds that he had to occupy. To fill the front of 50 km, he had insufficient forces, which led to spraying forces on a wide front without reserves and deprived the commander of maneuvering, i.e. Personally influence the events.

The first strike of the Germans fell on the 28th Infantry Division. Cavalry parts went into the rear of Russian troops, melted the sumports, but they did not allow the Russians to go deep into their rears. Division, carrying big losses, organizedly retreated under the protection of his artillery. By the middle of the day, the 29th came to the rescue of the 28th division, the Russian divisions were applied to Constur, and the parts of the German corps began to retreat. During the battle, the Russians completely defeated the 17th Corps of General Makenzen. The Germans in disorder retreated, Russian troops captured 12 abandoned guns. Under Goldap, on the southern flank, the German 1st reserve corps of General Belov also retreated, but the result of the battle was still hung in the hairs. The Germans could attack the next day.

The entourage of the commander of the 8th Army General of the General of the Privacium advised him to resume the battle and finish the Russians, while Rennencup's headquarters, taking into account the losses and the overall tightness of the troops, urged him to interrupt the battle and move to the arrival of reinforcements.

In the end, the outcome of the battle was solved solely by the "martial arts" of the generals. Russian was irrevocably decided to hold on, and the German, depressed by the flight of his best 17-go of the Corps and concerned about the appearance of a new threat from General Samsonov, recognized himself defeated and ordered to go to the Wist.

RennencPf gave an order to pursue the running enemy, but due to the lag of the rear, stretching communications and the general fatigue of troops, this order was canceled.

Netsev's plan

The defeat with Gumbinnene created a real threat to the defeat of the 8th German army. The general of the Provers decided to retreat for the Wisp, but the rate, contrary to the Schlöffen plan, which suggested with the unfavorable development of events on the Eastern Front to retreat deep into Germany, but in no way remove the troops from the Western Front, did not take the decision of Eastern Prussia. In the help of the 8th Army, troops from the Western Front were transferred (2 buildings and equestrian division). The German command was made decision, leaving 2.5 divisions against the 1st Russian Rennenkpf Army, quickly, on the Rockada Railway through Konigsberg, to transfer the main forces of the 8th Army against the 2nd Russian Samsonov Army and try to defeat it before It connects with the parts of the 1st Army.

The implementation of the German plan was entirely dependent on the actions of the Rennencup Army, whose rapid promotion to the West would make the maneuver unthinkable.

Meanwhile, the command of the North-Western Front after success under Gumbinin considered the East Prussian operation already completed. The Zelilinsky team changed the strategic task of the 1st Army, ordered Rennencupffu to move not to connect to Samsonov's army, but to go to Königsberg, where, according to his assumptions, the main part of the 8th enemy army was hidden.

The commander of the 2nd Army Samsonov, in turn, decided to intercept the Germans "receding to the Wisle" and insisted himself before the command of the front on the transfer of the main strike of his army from the northern direction to the North-West. This led to the fact that the Russian army began to step on the divergent directions. Between them formed a huge breach of 125 km than did not slow down to take advantage of the enemy.

The new command of the 8th Army (Hindenburg and Ludendorf) decided to apply advanced flank strikes on the 2nd army, surround it and destroy it.

The Russian rate, in turn, also found the operation in Eastern Prussia mainly completed and worked on the plan of attack on Germany, to Poznan, in connection with which com. Front Zhilinsky was denied the strengthening of the 2nd Samsonov Army by the Guards Corps.

Stage II: Battle of Tannenberg

The death of the army of General Samsonov

A.V. Samsonov, General from Cavalry

As planned, parts of the 8th German army, depicting an organized retreat, left the RennenKampf's army and already on August 26, they made an attack on the right flank of Samsonov army. The 6th Corps of General Blagoveshchensky was discarded to Orelsburg, two corps divisions lost more than 7, 5 thousand people were killed, and retreated in full disarray. General Blagoveshchensky himself escaped to the rear, and Commander Samsonov did not receive any information about this incident. Therefore, on August 27, he ordered his army to fulfill the task: to go ahead, pursuing the Germans, allegedly retreated to the Wist.

On August 27, the enemy launched a successful attack on the left flank of the Samsonov army. The blow was inflicted on the 1st corpus of General Artamonov and threw him south of Soldau. The 23rd Corps of General Kondratovich was lossed and retreated to Nenydenburg.

Samsonov received incorrect information about the situation from Artamonov, and decided that nothing terrible happened. On August 28, the teamar has planned a blow to the forces of the 13th Corps of General Klyuev and the 15th Corps of General Martos in the western German group flank. For the leadership of Samson's fight with the operational part of the headquarters of the army in the morning of August 28, arrived at the headquarters of the corps.

The command of the North-Western Front at that moment did not completely imagine, where exactly the 2nd Army and General Samsonov himself. The order of the headquarters of the front on the discharge of the buildings of the 2nd army on the line of Orelsburg-Mlav to the troops never reached. Communication with the front headquarters and flanking corps of the Samsonov army was lost, and the management of the army is disorganized. Nothing knowing about the defeat of their flanks, the central parts of the 2nd Army continued to step, thereby getting into the bag beautifully organized by the Germans.

Realizing that the case is bad, the headquarters of the front ordered the 1st army to move forward levoflanging corps and cavalry to assist the 2nd army, but on the evening of August 29, the offensive was stopped.

According to the official version, the commander of the front of Zilinsky, referring to the lack of communication, decided that the 2nd Samsonov Army, according to his order of August 28, has already moved to the border, and the assistance of the 1st army is not required. The troops of Rennencup at that time were 50-60 km from the retreating divisions of Samsonov's army, which were under the main German strike.

On August 29, the retreat of five Russian divisions of the 13th and 15th buildings, which occupied the center of the Front took place under the growing flank pressure of the 1st Corps of Francois and the 1st Reserve Body of Belov. On the flanks of the 2nd Army, German attacks were repulsed, but in the center, the Russian retreat took a random character. Five divisions of the 13th and 15th buildings (about 30 thousand people with 200 guns) were surrounded in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Komusinsky forest. On the night of August 30, the Samsonov General, which was among the surrounded parts, shot himself. General Martos was captured, General Klyuev tried to bring troops from the surroundings of three columns, but two columns were broken, and Klyulev gave an order to pass.

The total losses of the 2nd army killed, wounded and prisoners amounted to 56 thousand people. 10 generals were killed, 13 were captured, 230 guns were captured. German losses (killed and wounded) amounted to 30 thousand people.

The 2nd Army (1st, 6th, 23rd Corps and the remains of the surroundings of the 13th and 15th buildings) retreated behind the Narev River. The part-in part continued to resist until August 31. In Western historiography, this battle is known as the battle of Tannenberg.

The main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd army became a completely unsatisfactory command from the headquarters of the North-Western Front, who failed to correctly assess the operational situation in the period 20-26 August, as well as the mistakes of the Army Commander of General Samsonov, unreasonably expanded the army's offensive and failed to ensure the operational Management of army compounds during the counter battle. Separately, it should be noted the disgusting work of Russian army intelligence, who failed to open the focus of the main forces of the 8th German army against Samsonov's flanks, and complete disregard in the headquarters of the 2nd Russian army by the Rules of Front Radiocommunication. The day before the transition to the offensive, the German consensters intercepted the posts of the 2nd army headquarters transmitted by open text (Claire) to one of the buildings with a detailed disposition of the forces of the army and an indication of its nearest tasks, which immediately affected the commissioning of the 8th German Army Hindenburg Tasks of the upcoming troops.

End of the operation

Having finished with Samsonov's army, the 8th Army attacked the troops of General Rennenkpf from the south, on the part of the Mazur lakes. Since the main forces of the 1st Army were focused in the north, near Konigsberg, german command She planned to break through the defense in the south, and in the meantime to surround the army, pressed it to the Neman swamps, where to completely destroy. The 1st Army had every chance to repeat the fate of the 2nd Samsonov army, being an next trap in the German placed. But General RenhenKampf solved the enemy bypass maneuver on time. He promptly transfers the troops, ensuring the strengthening of the southern flank. With desperate battles of the flank parts, the main forces of the 1st army were able to move away to the east in time, connect with the 2nd army remaining after the defeat and avoid the environment.

East Prussian Operation, 1914

In the final battles with the Germans both Russian army (1st and 2nd) suffered huge losses - About 100 thousand people and more than 50 guns. By September 15, our troops were literally squeezed from East Prussia.

Causes of defeat and importance of the East Prussian operation

In the historiography of the First World War, the opinion was found that the defeat in Eastern Prussia in the summer of 1914 was dictated by a whole near, both quite objective and purely subjective reasons.

One of the first reasons is usually called the unaware of Russia to war. But does Russia ever be ready for anything else? .. in this case It can only be about the universalness of Russia to offensive actions on the site of the North-Western Front, because all the main forces turned out to be concentrated in the south-west. But if you take wider, then Russia, as it turned out, in 1914 was not ready for the war on European war. Recall that the Russian army did not fought in the territories of Western Europe from 1813-1814. Since then, network has already built in European countries railways, the mobility of the troops increased, the rate of supply of ammunition increased significantly, the means of communication, coordination of the management of troops, etc. were improved.

Russian command still believed that the "victory in the legs" of the Russian soldier, and his courage and resistance in battle - a full replacement modern methods waging war.

By August 1914, the opponents of Russia Germany and Austria-Hungary had completely completed mobilization. The Germans managed to win some time to quickly transfer to the eastern Prussia part of the best troops from the Western Front. While to some territories of the extensive Russian empire, the news of the universal mobilization and the beginning of the war went only in September-October.

Hence the second, in our opinion, the most good reason for the failure of the East Prussian campaign. The Rennenkopf and Samsonov army, sent to the campaign two weeks after the start of mobilization, were not fully equipped with an ordinary and officer composition; The supply of ammunition and food were not debugged. In the first days, from the moment the border crossing in both armies began interruptions with supply, hunger and desperate ladders, especially in the Cossack units.

Divisions of the 1st Army of the Rennencup also did not have any other means of rapid detection of the opposition (airships, balloons, airplanes, etc.). The headquarters of the corps and divisions, in most cases, they acted blindly or relying on the untested data that had already become irrelevant: the exploration of infantry did not sleep behind the enemy moving on trains, cars and bicycles.

Small supply of shells, ammunition, food, lack of transport communications in the form of a network of railways, debugged communication between armies and command, fuzzy actions (and often and inaction) of front-line intelligence turned into a Russian troops in a hungry nerdish bear. He is lying to kosti on the way of the upcoming Germans, blocking them the way to quick victory, but to fulfill their strategic task (to develop their own offensive, to surround and destroy the mobile, well-armed 8-year-old army) and could not.

The East Prussian operation had severe consequences for Russians in tactical and especially in moral terms. Many contemporaries called defeat with Tannenberg the cause of antimylitarian and antimonarchic speeches, the forerunner of all revolutionary events in Russia of the XX century. It was the first in the history of such a major defeat of the Russian army in battles with the Germans.

However, the Germans won tactically, this operation strategically meant the failure of a plan of lightning war. To save Eastern Prussia, they had to transfer considerable strength from the Western Theater of Military Action. This saved France from defeat and forced Germany to get into the disastrous struggle for her on two fronts, to abandon the blitzkrig developed by Schliffen, go to the protracted positional war.

From the subjective reasons for the defeat of Russian troops in Eastern Prussia, both domestic and foreign historians, the versions of the fatal errors of the command of the North-Western Front in the face of General Yaz are often moved. Zilinsky.

Wilhelm Gregner - one of the best German generals of the I World War I was assessed by the reasons for the failure of the Russian offensive:

"The trip to Eastern Prussia could end for the Germans very bad if the commander of the North-Western Front, General Zhilinsky, was at the height of the task - a solid hand to implement the unity of leadership over the armies entrusted to him in operations against Eastern Prussia. Although he was already in peacetime, the head of the Russian army headquarters, but during the war still did not find the abilities that are necessary for driving armies. As well as the younger Moltke, he relied on the prudence and independence of the commanders of the armies and therefore did not show his own initiative. "

Modern British historian N. Stone also gives quite interesting characteristic The main cause of the catastrophe:

"The main difficulty was not the fact that the army were" not ready "; And the fact that they were ready as I understood Zilinsky - that is, they absolutely did not prepare for what had to happen. "

Rennenkampf and Samsonov: Development myth

In the Soviet historiography of the First World War, the version of the personal conflict of Samsonov generals and Rennenkpfa, which allegedly became one of the main reasons for the defeat of Russian armies in Eastern Prussia in the summer of 1914.

Some Soviet historians did the main emphasis on the overall ascertainment of Russian generals, bets and commands with the North-Western Front, others pinned all the blames exclusively to General Rennenkpf, treacherously leaving the Samsonov army to die in the Komusinsky forest.

The beginning of the legendary conflict between the commander of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies is usually associated with a half-phyphic presenter of generals at the station in Mukden in 1904. According to a very common version in the literature, the troops of General Rennenkpfa during the battle under Liaoyan did not support the offensive of Samsonov's Cossacks on the Entai coal mines, which led to numerous victims and leaving Samsonian employed positions. After the battle of Samsonov, allegedly caught up with rennencppfa on the Mukden railway station and he glanced with his sweatshirt (in some versions - he beat Nagayk right on the platform).

All authors mentioning this episode bind the emergence of the legend with the figure of the officer of the German General Staff Max Hoffman, who witnessed the quarrel and the ugly fight between Rennencipf and Samsonov. For more than a hundred years, the story of Mukden Slashchina has covered the mass of fantastic details, finding his reflection as in literary worksAnd in the works of some very distinguished historians of the First World War.

In fact, during the Russian-Japanese war, 1904-1905, Max Hoffman was not in Russian as a seconded foreign observer, but in the Japanese General Staff. To become a direct eyewitness of the conflict between Russian generals in Mukden, he could not, that, in fact, is confirmed by his memories:

"I heard from the words of witnesses (!) On a sharp collision between both commanders after Liaoyan battle at the Mukden railway station. I remember that during the battle near Tannenberg we spoke to General Ludendorf about the conflict between both enemy generals. "

It turns out that a foreign observer just heard someone somewhere from someone, and then, with German pedantherap, he reported to his superiors (suddenly the information would come in handy in the future war?). And these rumors have formed the basis of the whole mass of speculations and mystifications of both Soviet and foreign authors, and after the bright artistic incarnation of V. Pikulom, in one of his historical miniatures, found the status of immutable truth in the public consciousness.

IN modern studiesspecially dedicated to the study of the biography of General PK Rennenkampfa, thoroughly proved that there was no explicit, especially a public conflict between generals in Mukden and could not be. In the battle of Liaoyan (August 1904), during the battle of the village of Fanzia Tuzzy, General Rennenkopf received a serious wound in his leg. Up until October 1904, he was healing in the hospital of the city of Harbin, which there are indisputable documentary evidence. Archery with Samsonov on the Mukden railway station, and even more so get to him under the hot hand, the general could not physically. In addition, after Liaoyan, Samsonov had no reason to rush at Rennencup with Nagaika, preventing him so serious claims.

Theoretically, the quarrel of two generals could occur after failure on the Shahe River in October 1904. Then, indeed, a successful offensive was illuminated exclusively due to the inconsistency of the actions of Russian troops, and both military leaders had every reason for mutual accusations. Here are just the immediate participants of those events (in the number of Baron P.N. Wrangel) in their memoirs argue that nothing like this happened. After the battle, Samsonov's generals and Rennenkoppf were peacefully advised and drove in their troops.

The version of the conflict of Rennencampf-Samsonov, of course, was born much later, and not in the military, but in liberal-democratic public circles. The revolutionary public public was not able to forgive the Rennenkopfu General of his hard and decisive action during the revolution of 1905-1907, his faithful service of the king and the Fatherland, his right-monarchist looks.

In 1914, Rennenkopfu did not forgave Rennenkopfu to Rennencouffu, nor (most importantly) defeat near Tannenberg, in which his troops, to the word, did not even participate.

In an environment of long-standing unfriendliers and envious Rennenkpfa, who wanted to find the perpetrator, the idea of \u200b\u200b"inaction" of General at the decisive moment of battle was born instantly. "Inaction" and "notionlessness" of the commander of the 1st Army were explained by the fantastic reasons: from the information of personal accounts up to direct betrayal and a conspiracy with the enemy.

This is what the Admiral Bubnov admiral was written at the time:

"The inaction of General Rennencpp has a public opinion called criminal and discouraged in it even signs of treason, for, mainly due to this inaction, the Germans managed to apply such a serious defeat of Samsonov's army. The share of faults fell on the gene. Zilinsky did not exempt the gene. Rennencampfa from liability for misappropriation of initiative, passivity, inability to assess the situation and insufficient desire to establish operational communications with Samsonov. "

What was this "inaction"?

Some "writers" argue that RennencPF remained on the battlefield, in full inaction for three days (from 20 to 23 August), and there are also Western historians who assure us that he did not move anymore, waiting for the death of Samsonov, his supposedly personal enemy.

In fact, the stop of the 1st Russian Army after the battle near Humbinnen lasted according to one 48 data, and on others - only 36 hours.

The immediate head of the Rennencup - the Complete Zilinsky - clearly denoted the direction of the onset of the 1st Army to Königsberg, and not to connect to Samsonov. About Samsonov RennencPF did not know anything at all. Since. The direct link between 1 and 2 army was not: they could only contact the front headquarters. In the telegrams of Zilinsky for August 20-28, sent by Rennencup, there is not a word about Samsonov and his army. Rennencampf, like any military, was obliged to fulfill the orders of the higher authority, that is, to pursue a retreating opponent.

From 21 to 23 August, the RennenKampf's army in essence did not stand in place, as they are trying to present his prosecutors. She was all the time in close contact with the German troops, which covered the waste of the main part of the 8th army with strong departments.

In the absence of army equestrian intelligence, RennencPF could not even assume that the Germans would drive him out, depressing the retreat in this area, and they themselves are preparing to attack the flanks of Samsonov's army in the north-west.

It was necessary to know about this by the Complete Zilinsky, but he also knew nothing on August 23, he appointed the beginning of the 1st Army to Königsberg.

The actual state of affairs was revealed only after the work of a special government commission appointed by the state truck, which conducted an investigation into the causes of the death of the 2nd army of General Samsonov. In its conclusions there is not a single word of reproach at General Rennencupf.

Thoroughly investigating this operation in emigration, a well-known military historian Professor General N.N. Golovin wrote:

"In the actions of the 1st Army, it is impossible to find the fault of the failure of our 1st operation in East Prussia. And the troops, and the Army Commander himself, fully performed all that they demanded the commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front. "

Meanwhile, the conclusions of the Government Commission did not convince public opinion nor Military Guidelines in the innocence of General Rennencup.

The military leaders of Zilinsky and Samsonov, much more guilty of a strategic mistake, which caused the death of the 2nd Army, was never subjected to such a sharp attack on the part of public opinion, as PK RennencPf.

Y.G. Zilinsky was shifted from the post of commander of the front and the position of the Warsaw Governor General. In 1915-1916, he represented the Russian command in the Union Council in France. In 1917, dismissed with the uniform and pension. After the October coup, he tried to go abroad, but was captured by security officers and shot.

Monument on the site of the death of A.V. Samsonova, established in 1918 by his opponent, General Paul Hindenburg (district of Velbark, Warmign-Mazur Voivodeship, Poland).

The inscription on the board: " General Samsonov, the enemy of Hindenburg in the battle near Tannenberg, August 30, 1914".

General Samsonov voluntarily left life. The act of suicide, he would seek his guilt, and later acquired the tragic halo of the martyr and the victims of betrayal.

General Rennenkopfu, who did not allow the surroundings and the possible death of his 1st Army under Königsberg and successfully completed the operation of the Russian troops from East Prussia, got the role of a traitor and the burden.

After the Lodz Operation (November 1914), Rennenkopf was dismissed from the army without an explanation of the reasons. The general himself explained his dismissal exclusively by the intrigues of the Military Minister Sukhomlinov and his environments.

Memories of one of the former subordinate rennencppfa V. N. Druier, who met his retired chief in Petrograd in 1915 were preserved.

"We sat in the directorial bed, ate, drank, looked at the scene, listened to the choir. Rennenkampf sat sad, he was apparently not so fun. And even the combat number of Cafe-Shantana Rode could not bring Rennencipf from the state of the depression, noticed by everyone. He drank a lot and not suddenly began to talk about how unfairly did it.

I was removed from the command of the army completely nothing for anything; And all this in the coach of Sukhomlinov. I asked me to give me any appointment, I was ready to accept even a squadron just to not stay here, without any benefit, without anything; I did not even answer.

And suddenly to our horror and confusion, this strong, courageous and brave general flooded with flammable tears ... ".

The death of General Rennencupfa

Not surprisingly, in the first days of the February revolution, General P.K. Rennenkopf fell among the "enemies of the people" arrested by the new government. He was remembered in 1905, and retired military leader spent several months in Petropavlovsk Fortress. However, there was no evidence in favor of his accusation, and after October 1917, Rennenkopf was released.

He left for his wife's relatives in Taganrog, where he lived under the name of Meshanina Smokovnikov. When capturing the city, Bolsheviks disappeared under the name of the Greek citizen of Mandusakis. In the spring of 1918, RennencPF was isolated by security officers and arrested.

According to the act of a special commission to investigate the atrocities of the Bolsheviks, held at the Commander-in-Chief of the German AI. Denikin, General from Cavalry Pavel Karlovich Rennencup from March 3 to April 1, 1918, was located as an arrested at the headquarters of the Taganrog Military Commissioner Rodionova.

According to a special commission, the general of three times was offered to serve in the Red Army, but RennencPF sharply rejected all offers.

At the end of March, the Commander of the South Front of Antonov-Ovseenko arrived in Taganrog. Having learned that General Rennencipf is still alive, he ordered him to immediately shoot.

On the night of April 1, 1918, General Rennencipf was taken by car for the city and was shot there at the Baltic railway branch, in two versts from the Baltic Plant.

Subsequently, the family was reburied on the old cemetery of Taganrog.

We will analyze the general combat losses of the parties (in this article - Russian armies), attracting authoritative sources and opinions of large specialists, as well as participants in this one of the most important battles of the First World War, who contributed to the collapse of German pre-war strategic planning and the appeared prerequisite for the victorious end of the war for the Entente.

Connection of the 1st and 2nd armies (and interacting with the 1st Cavalry Division of the 5th Rifle Brigade) from July 20 to August 1 (Belzonen, Soldau-Neidenburg, Stalpenennen, Marcbrods) lost about 500 people [Collection of documents. P. 117; 122-123; Rogwold V. Strengthened intelligence of MarcGrabov August 14/19 1914 M., 1926. P. 29; Evseev N. Avgustovsky Battle. P. 69].

In battle, 7467 people are lost in the steel army (619 killed, 2382 - wounded, 4466 - missing, which were generally captured). Reichsarchive noted over 1000 prisoners from the 27th PD of the 3rd AK. ReichSarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. VD. 2. S. 75. The Germans themselves evaluated the loss of the 25th, 27th infantry divisions of the 3rd corps and the 29th PD of the 20th AC equal to 6,600 people. S. 76.). Kaushen cost Russian cavalry 396 people (and from 3 to 6 August, the equestrian group lost killed and injured 45 officers and 429 ordinary) [Rogwold V. Connection of the 1st Army in Eastern Prussia (August-September 1914). M., 1926. P. 63].

Head 27 PD Lieutenant General A.-k.-m. M. Adaridi

Humbinnensky's fatal for Germany led to the loss of 16,500 people (mainly due to the 3rd and 20th army corps). So, the loss of the 28th Infantry Division is 104 officers, 6945 ordinary, 23 machine guns, 8 guns [ Valentis I. I. Martialctions In Eastern Prussia. P. 41]. The eyewitness recalled that he saw entire chains of dead infantry on the gombnensky field - the company and battalions were lying along with their officers, including battalion commanders, and fighters were frozen in those poses in which their death fell [Radus-Zenkovich L. Decree. cit. P. 53]. The 3rd Army Corps, which played the main role in the battle (25th and 27th PD), lost 87 officers and 6117 lower ranks [Watietis I. I. Operations on eastern border Germany. C. 130]. The 40th Infantry Division of the 4th Army Corps lost 2050 people.

Field Lazare in SledgeValki

Attempt to establish contact with the army A. V. Samsonov Equestrian group August 18-19 lost about 70 people [Rogwold V. Decree. cit. P. 101].

The first battle of the Mazur Lakes, which was unsuccessful for the 1st Army, led to a loss (with some parts of the 10th Army) 19,000 killed and wounded and 43,000 missing (mostly prisoners), 150 guns. General E. Ludendorf wrote about 45,000 Russian prisoners . British Military Agent A. Knox confirmed these figures, leading to German estimates of common Russian losses in the Mazury battle - up to 60,000 people and 150 guns . General G. von François after the war wrote: "Military prey in this battle, according to Gindenburg's report, was expressed in 30,000 prisoners and 150 guns" Temples F. Decree. cit. P. 94].

Head of 30 PD Lieutenant General E. Kolykovsky

N. N. Golovin, comparing the number of fighters in the army K.-G. Rennenkampfa to the beginning of the invasion of Eastern Prussia and remaining in these compounds after departing from it by September 1 (commissioning during this period did not receive the army, only secondary compounds and parts were introduced), estimated (including the study of objective German data) The loss of the 1st Army for the East Prussian campaign and the battle of the Mazury lakes - up to 100 thousand people, of which - 30 thousand prisoners, noting among the prisoners a high percentage of wounded and non-confused [ Golovin N. N. From the campaign of 1914 in the Russian Front - the beginning of the war and operation in Eastern Prussia. Prague, 1926. P. 408].

Russian prisoners of war in East Prussia

T about., Total losses of the 1st Army for July-August amounted to not less than 90,000 people. The largest losses were (ascending) for battles at Stalpenenna, Humbinenne and the first battle of the Mazur lakes. Moreover, the loss in the latter was two thirds of the army loss and more than 2 times exceeded the other losses of the operational association together were taken together - and became mainly on not enough war secondary divisions for the first time in battle, and army rear structures (who fell during the retreat from Eastern Prussia Under the hit of the advancing Germans).

At the front of the 2nd Army during a victorious combat in Orlau-Frankena, the 15th Army Corps lost up to 3,000 people. This is the average digit of those specified in sources and studies. In the materials of the Commission, General Panteleyev indicates the number 2500 of the lower ranks and 50 officers [Cm. Collection of documents. P. 581]. The same digit gives N. Evseev [Evseev N. Decree. cit. P. 103 - 104]. In the memoirs of General N. N. Martos, cited by N. N. Golovny, was referred to the loss of many officers and 3000 ordinary. In notes to work A. A. Kershnovsky, a figure of losses of the 15th AK - 4067 wounded and killed, but the source is not named [Kershnovsky A. A. History of the Russian Army. T. 3. M., 1994. P. 340]. Probably, these materials of Rekhsarhiva (in it, general Russian losses were estimated at 4,000 people, of which 2900 people are in the 2nd Brigade of the 6th Infantry Division in Frankenau. ReichSarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. VD. 2. S. 129.). Considering that the Russians were defeated in these battles (respectively, the battlefield remained for them), we will take the basis of the weighted average of the loss of the 15th building, designated by domestic specialists and the above.

The losses of the 2nd Infantry Division of the 23rd Corps participating in the battle of the 23rd Corps participating in Mülen. It is known that the 2nd battalion of the 5th Infantry Kaluga Regiment, which was part of the 2nd division, lost 6 officers and 300 lower ranks [Cm. Bogdanovich P. N. The invasion of Eastern Prussia in August 1914. Memories of the Officer of the General Staff of the Army of General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964. P. 172; Buchinsky Yu. F. Tannenberg catastrophe. Sofia, 1939. P. 33]. The evidence of the Samsonovsky catastrophe "Lieutenant Colonel - the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment Yu. F. Buchinsky loss of his shelf per day on August 14, estimated at about 25%, which is about 1000 people [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. cit. P. 25]. The loss of the shelf in battle on August 15, in his opinion, was 40%. Suffered losses and parts of the 15th ak. So, 215 fixed graves belonged to the share of the fighters of the 29th and 30th infantry regiments of the 8th Infantry Division [ Bogdanovich P. N. Decree. cit. Pp. 163. The total loss of the 30th Infantry Regiment was 34 officers and more than 1,500 lower ranks. Collection of documents. P. 584].

The total losses of the 2nd PD and the parts of the 15th AK in victorious battles on August 15 at Vaplitsa - Mülen amounted to at least 2,000 people.

In unsuccessful battles of flank buildings (Zuduu-Soldau, Gross Bessau, Bishoffsburg), which ended with the waste of these compounds, which allowed the Germans to begin to surround the central core of the 2nd army, the Russians lost at least 13,000 people.

Thus, the 6th Army Corps in battle on August 13, with Bishoffsburg, lost in the 4th Infantry Division 73 officers and 5283 lower ranks [Up to 1.7 thousand prisoners - trophies of the 1st backup housing.ReichSarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. VD. 2. S. 174.], 18 machine guns and 16 guns [Collection of documents. P. 290]. The total decline in the 16th Infantry Division in the period August 13-18 - 523 people (including on August 16 and 18, the division lost wounded, killed and missing 381 people [Ibid. P. 570]. According to German sources, the 1st reserve corps buried on the battlefield 310 German and 220 Russian soldiers, and the 17th Army Corps - another 116 Russian soldiers.

Field Military Sanitary Train for First Aid

According to the report of General P. I. Postovsky at the headquarters of Front of September 3, the loss of the 1st Army Corps is as follows: the 24th Infantry Division - 4374 people; 22nd Infantry Division - 1852 people; 1st Rifle Brigade - 1970 people; Morty and heavy artillery divisions and sapper battalions - 212 people [Collection of documents. P. 320. But not mentioned the loss of regiments of the 3rd Guards Infantry Division, which also participated in the battles]. T about., The total losses of this building amounted to 8408 people.

In the breakthrough and surrounded by the Russian troops of the central buildings of the 2nd army suffered large losses. Information on loss of environment is always distinguished by inconsistency. So, the Russian military agent in France Count A. A. Ignatiev mentioned the German radiogram intercepted by the French, which said about the defeat of the 2nd Army and the capture of 60,000 Russian soldiers [Ignatiev A. A. Decree. cit. P. 48]. Austrian V. Rauscher wrote about 60,000 prisoners and 300,000 dead and missing fighters of the 2nd Army [Rausher V. Gindenburg. Feldmarshal and Reich Sprosident. M., 2003. P. 48, 49]. Etc.

HTML) We touched on the situation with losses in the Tannenberg Cotelet, which fell 5 divisions, and the incomplete composition (13th and 15th corps, the 2nd division of the 23rd corps). Rekhsarhiva map indicates 44,000 fighters fighting in Tannenberg "Boiler" and mostly captive . As the historian General N. Golovin noted [Decree. cit. P. 337], Among the prisoners, the big percentage was given loopholes and unfortunates - after all, the hands of the Germans were deposited at once by 3 buildings at once, and the most decisive fighters who wanted to get out of the environment - broke through their own.

In the period 16 - 18 August ("Samsonovskaya catastrophe" in the Gruneflis forest - battles, attempts by breakthrough and death of the central group of the 2nd Army), the Germans and up to 7,000 killed Russian warriors. That is, the total losses of the 2nd army core surrounded 50,000 people.

The bodies of Russian fighters of the fallen in Ariergard battle during the departure from Eastern Prussia

The document recorded that from the composition of the 13th and 15th corps a 171 officer and 10,300 ordinary (not counting the fighters from the 2nd Infantry Division - there is no information on it) [Tsikhovich, Ya. K. Operation of the 2nd Army in Eastern Prussia in August 1914 // Military Historical Collection. Vol. 3. M., 1919. P. 159]. But the Combat of the 5th regiment of the 2nd division Y. Buchinsky noted that only from the soldiers of his brigade, which came out of the environment, managed to form a whole battalion (2 companies of the 5th and 6th regiments) - i.e. 1/8 brigade. Lieutenant Colonel recalled that the fighters continued to go out from the environment later. He also noted that personal composition His brigades after exiting East Prussia to such an extent was replenished with people (as those who came out of the environment and former before surgery in different business trips - noncompliance due to the distraction of people to foreign tasks was very large) that the shelves had already had a personnel team composition and began To the teachings [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. cit. P. 50]. In total of the 23rd corps (and this is mostly 2nd Division) out of the environment of up to 3,000 soldiers and officers [Valentis I. I. Decree. cit. P. 213]. It is necessary to add to 20,000 wounded fighters that were evacuated after the previous battles.

As F. Khramov noted, the Germans of August 16-18 were able to form about 30,000 people, while they themselves call the figure in the 90,000 prisoners. The latter, as the colonel noted, absolutely not corresponded to reality - after all, in the 13th, 15th buildings and the 2nd division, everything was up to 80,000 people - and from them until 20,000 broke out of the environment, to 6,000 died and until 20,000 wounded remained Fields of battles. If, as F. Khramov noted, surrounded by the troops headed a more courageous general than the keys, they would have been able to break through the ring and step out to the south - the testimony of which is a number of wonderful tactical victories that won Russian troops in the East Prussian operation [Temples F. Decree. cit. P. 69].

T about., The total losses of the 2nd army in the operation (fighting offensive - defensive and loss surrounded) make up up to 70,000 people (3000 and 2000 Orlau-Frankenau and Waplice, respectively, 13000 - the loss of flanking buildings and 500,000 - "Samsonovskaya catastrophe") - and more than two thirds of this figure come to fights surrounded, that is, the Samsonovsky catastrophe of the core 2- th army.

We see that the East Prussian operation (incl. The first battle of the Mazur lakes) inflicted the total loss of approximately 160,000 people in the North-Western Front (the main mass is the wounded and captive, and some of them returned to operation in the future). Or 64% of the initial number of front troops.

The most difficult losses were incurred during the fighting in retreat and fighting surrounded (the first battle of the Mazur Lakes and the Samsonovsky catastrophe). The main losses in the first case fell into secondary parts and the rear divisions of the 1st Army, in the second case, on the personnel shelves of the 15th, the 13th Army buildings and the 2nd Infantry Division. That is, suffered in last case First-class troops, a shock group of the 2nd army, and therefore the resonance from the Samsonovsky catastrophe exceeded the defeat of the 1st Army, although the figures are comparable.

The 2nd army who lost up to 70,000 people immediately lost half of the initial composition (half of the army - 2.5 corps - did not get into the environment). The 1st Army is the most difficult losses (60,000 people, two-thirds of all losses of the operational association) suffered in the first battle in the Mazury lakes, fighting with the superior enemy's forces, and then rapidly retreat from East Prussia - their main mass, as noted, came to the fact Insufficiently combat federal divisions.

With the damage of the 2nd Army in the Samsonovsky catastrophe or Tannenberg, they compare only the damage of the 1st Army in the first battle among the Mazur lakes.

Counter and offensive battles cost the front much cheaper. The losses of opponents in these battles are comparable - for example, the British agent in the Russian army A. Knox assessed in battle in Orlau - Frankenau Russian losses in 4,000 people, and German - in 6,000, etc. - What says, among other things, about equal combat qualities of the troops of opponents.

East Prussian Operation 1914 4 (17) August - 2 (15) of September. Offensive Russian troops faced by the task of applying defeat of the 8th German army and mastering East Prussia for the development of the offensive directly into the departure of the territory Germany . First Russian Army (General RennencPf ) It was supposed to be held around the Mazur Lakes from the north, cutting off the Germans from Koenigsberg. The second army (General Samsonova) had to host the offensive bypassing these lakes from the West. The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe operation was covered by the German army grouping with both flanks.

As part of the Russian Northwestern Front, there were 17.5 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, 1104 guns, 54 aircraft. The German 8th Army had 15 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1044 guns, 56 aircraft, 2 airships.

The operation began 4 (17) August by the onset of the 1st Russian Army, during which Humbinenen was defeated by the enemy. The German command decided to leaving Eastern Prussia. However, instead of developing the operation and the completion of the defeat of the German troops, General Rennencipf was given an order for the departure of Russian parts. Under these conditions, the Germans changed their plans and attacked the 2nd Army of General Samsonov . The unsatisfactory leadership of the North-Western Front (Commander-in-Chief of General Ya.Zhilinsky) and the inaction of General Rennencup led in the end to the defeat of Russian troops, the death and capture of 50 thousand soldiers (the general of Samsonov) and the departure of Russian parts from East Prussia. At the same time, the Germans were forced to transfer from France In the Russian front 2 army corps and 1 cavalry division, which ensured the victory of the French in the battle on Marne and saved Paris from passing Germans.

The East Prussian Operation of 1914, the offensive operation of the Russian North-Western Troops (teams, gene. Ya. G. Zhilinsky), conducted 4 (17) Aug. - 2 (15) Saint. 1914 at the beginning of the 1st World War. At the insistence of Anglo Franz. The command was undertaken until the end of mobilization and focus Rus. Army with the aim of disrupting the offensive ch. German forces against France. The immediate goal of the operation was to defeat the 8th of him. Army and seize Vost. Prussia. According to the arms of the command, the front is 1st Rus. Army gene. P. K. Rennenkampfa (6.5 pekh. Divisions, 5.5 kav. Divisions, 492 or.) It was supposed to be hit bypassing the Mazur Lakes with S., 2nd Army under the command of the gene. A. V. Samsonova (11.5 pekh. And 3 Kav. Divisions, 720 or.) Bypass these lakes from the West. The offensive began 4 (17) Aug. invasion to the east Prussia for three army buildings of the 1st Army. 6 (19) AG. In battle, Pthatlupönna suffered a defeat and retreated the 1st of him. The hull, on the trail, day at the front of Humbnin - Goldap turned on the counter battle between the ch. Forces 1st Rus. And the 8th of him. armies. It. The troops were defeated and the departure was launched at 3. The favorable conditions were created to organize the persecution and complete defeat of the 8th Germ, army, but 8-9 (21-22) Aug. The 1st Army was inactive. Her further offensive It was slow and not to connect from the 2nd army, and towards Koenigsberg, which allowed the troops of the pr-ka from under the blow. Taking advantage of the gap between rus. Army and knowing from the intercepted Rus. Radiograms about their action plan, GEM, command 8 (21) Aug. Suspended the retreat and sent against the 2nd r r. Army, which passed the border 7 (20) Aug., almost all the forces of the 8th army. Pr-k using the developed J.-D. The network, made regrouping of troops and, leaving against the 1st Army, the barrier of 2 divisions, focused in the ch. Forces on the flanks of the 2nd Army, operating the Zap. Mazur lakes. Definable assistance and assistance of the 1st Army, the 2nd Army suffered a defeat and 17 (30) Aug. was forced to move away for p. Naren. For 25 Aug. (7 Sep.) - 2 (15) Saint. 8th it. The army launched an offensive against the 1st Rus. Army, throwing it to 9 (22) Saint. For p. Not man. An attempt to surround the 1st Rus. The army failed. Offensive Operation Sev.-Zap. Front to Vost. Prussia ended in failure. Russians lost approx. 250 thousand soldiers and a large amount of weapons. The reasons for this were the unsatisfactory management of the Zhilinsky and the actual betrayal of the RSNPenkampp. Despite this, the operation had an important strategist, the results: it. The command was forced to transfer with Franz. Front to Vost. Prussia 2 housings and 1 kav. Division. In addition, 1 Corpus, which was in the district of Metsa, was also prepared for the transfer, which weakened the shock grouping of the German troops in the West and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the GEM. Army in the battle on Marne at the beginning of Saint. 1914 (see Marn Battle 1914). Active actions Rus. The troops in the initial period of war threw the plan for him. Command - beat the allies in one way.

M. A. Alekseev.

Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2.

First major defeat

East Prussian Operation (first world War, 1914-1918) - Fighting in Eastern Prussia August 4 - September 2, 1914. 1st (General P.K. Rennenkopf) and 2nd (General A.V. Samsonov) Russian armies against the 8th German army (Generals M. Proves, then P. Hindenburg). On August 4, 1914, Russians, without completing mobilization, transferred to the offensive in Eastern Prussia. Such a hasty was explained by persistent requests for the help of the Allied France, tolerating the strong Natik of the Germans.

In battles on August 4 and 7, with Ptumphanenene and Gumbinnen, the 1st Army inflicted the Germans defeat. At this time, from the south, bypassing the Mazur lakes, the 2nd Army put forward to cut the path of waste by German troops. Rennencampf did not pursue the Germans and stood on the spot for two days. This allowed the 8th Army to come out from under the blow and regroup forces. Without accurate information about finding the troops of the Flat, the commander of the 1st army moved it to K by Königsberg.

Meanwhile, the 8th German army moved into a different direction (south of Königsberg). While Rennenkampf has slowly advanced to Koenigsberg, the 8th Army, led by General Hindenburg, was able to conduct a successful operation that decided the outcome of the battle in Eastern Prussia. Despite the risk of getting a blow to the rear from the 1st Army, Hindenburg turned his forces south against Samsonov's army who did not know about such a maneuver. The Germans, thanks to the interception of radiograms, everyone knew about the plans of the Russians.

On August 9, the 2nd Army Samsonov crossed the East Prussian border and began movement in the north-west direction by 4 buildings. The offensive was carried out on a stretching of 120 km front without proper preparation and interaction of parts. In fact, there were no rear services, and the troops did not receive food for several days.

Meanwhile, Hindenburg, having transferring the main forces to this direction, inflicted on August 13, powerful blows on the flanking corps of the 2nd Army (1st and 6th). The central buildings of the 2nd Army (13th and 15th) due to the lack of a close connection between the Russian units did not know on time about the change of operational situation and continued to adopted, deepening in the prepared bag. Under the onslaught of German compounds of the 1-yib-th corps, the departure began, substituting the flanks and the rear of their neighbors in the center.

In battles on August 16-18, the central (13th and 15th) corps, which have lost contact with neighbors and each other, were surrounded and crushed. Samsonov, having lost control of the troops ,.Tened. According to German data, the damage of the 2nd Army amounted to 120 thousand people. (including more than 90 thousand prisoners). The Germans lost 15 thousand people in battles with her. They then attacked from the south, on the part of the Mazur Lakes, the 1st army. Fearing to be cut, she moved over Neman on September 2.

The East Prussian operation had severe consequences for Russians in tactical and especially in moral terms. It was their first in history such a major defeat in battles with the Germans. However, the Germans won tactically, this operation strategically meant the failure of a plan of lightning war. To save Eastern Prussia, they had to transfer considerable strength from the Western Theater of Military Activities, where the fate of the whole war was solved. It saved France from the defeat and forced Germany to get into the disastrous struggle for it on two fronts. The Russians, replenishing the strength with fresh reserves, soon again transferred to the offensive in Eastern Prussia (see the August operation).

Materials are used: Nikolay Chefov. Battle of Russia. Military historical library. M., 2002.

Literature:

East Prussian Operation (Collection of Documents). M., 1939;

The history of the First World War 1914-1918. T. 1. M., 1975, p. 316 - 329;

Verzhkhovsky D.V., Lyakhov V. F. World War II 1914-1918. Military.-East. feature article. M. 1964;

Zaisonovsky A. M. World War 1914 - 1918. Ed. 3rd T. 1-2. M., 1938;

Kolykovsky A. K. Maneuvera Period of the First World Imperialist War 1914 M., 1940

Talensky N. A. First World War 1914 - 1918. M., 1944.

Summer-autumn 1914 - the time of the fighting of the Russian army in Prussia and Galicia. Now we will talk about the details of the first onset of our army, but the general canvas of those events need to be reminded.

So, during the East Prussian operation, the 2nd Army of General Samsonov suffered a serious defeat, and the 1st renencampfa - retreated.

What tone usually talk about an unsuccessful operation in Prussia? Two approaches can be distinguished: direct dirty of the mud of our country and a more subtle, sophisticated mockery.

The first approach. The troops were thrown into the offensive without proper preparation, unparalleled, with a bad organization of the rear. Simple soldiers, of course, are courageous, but no heroism is enough to compensate for incompetence and especially the betrayal of the generals. So the collapse of Russian armies is natural. The conclusion from this follows more than obvious and repeatedly voiced: Russian empire I procoiled, neither the system as a whole nor the leadership of the army in particular did not go anywhere. In general, the "damned tsarism".

The second, more cunning approach is built as it were on patriotic positions. The essence of it is as follows. The Germans were tested by French to Paris, and Russia, faithful to allied debt, rushed to revenue. Germany, faced with our attack in the East, moves away from the Western Front part of their forces and causes Russian defeat. With akin not to prepared, without completing mobilization, the Russians saved their blood to their blood. Hurray to the Russian soldier and officer! Well, what conclusion from this can be done? Yes, almost exactly the same as in the first case.

Judge for yourself: Russia saves France, thinks about an ally, and his soldier throws into an unprepared offensive ended with the collapse. Russia leads war not for his interests, but for others. Well, who after that the leaders of the country? At best, idiots, in worst - traitors. And again we get a "damned tsarism." It seems to be another expensive, but still came there.

What is the objective side of the question? Plan command Hermann Empire Based on the ideas of Shliffene. Being at the head of the German General Staff, he developed a war strategy for two fronts. It was assumed to concentrate the maximum number of troops against France and first defeat it with a quick blow, and then, unfolding, to bring to Russia with all the power. It was believed that Russian mobilization would pass slowly, and our army would not have time to take advantage of the fact that the Germans leave a relatively minor barrier in the east.

But if the Schlindene plan works, then millions of German soldiers will move to Russia. In no case could not be allowed, and the Russian command did everything to disrupt the German blitzkrieg. In that situation, the account was literally for days: because the enemy proceeded from the fact that Paris would take for 39 days of war. The Russians needed to act as quickly as possible, and this is explained at first glance the mediocre preparation of the operation. I would like to ask a question to those who see here signs of "notching" and "damned tsarism": how should our supreme command did? Wait for full mobilization, tighten significant reserves, strengthen the rear and ... to be one on one with the entire colossal German army, transferred from the West to the East?

A prominent German commander Max Gofman later wrote that the performance of two russian armies Senmen expected between August 15 and 20, 1914. However, before August 14, they received information that large Russian forces were moved.

Having made an offensive in Prussia, Russia did not save France, but himself, fought for his interests, and not for others, and coped with his tasks just brilliantly. Blitzkrieg was Sunday. The Germans failed to appreciate France, banging in positional battles, and thus could not go to the second part of the plan of Schliffene, which provided for the blow by all the forces in Russia.

Nevertheless, it makes sense to understand and in the specific actions of our commanders, and here very strange things begin to emerge. According to the results of the defeat of Samsonov, King Nicholas II ordered General Panteleev to investigate events. Panteleev interviewed a number of ranks of the highest commander, who participated in the offensive, and in addition, studied the array of relevant documents: orders and reports. The results of their work Panteleev outlined in the Special Report Nikolai II. The text of the note was subsequently published and is now available to anyone.

So, according to plan, the 1st and 2nd Russian invasion armies were prescribed to embrace the enemy grouping from two flanks. Rennenkampf came to the north of the Mazur swallows, Samsonov managed them from the south-west. In case of success, the German troops located between the Vistula and Mazury lakes would fall into the ticks.

Rennenkopf acted exactly as indicated by the directive of the commander-in-chief of the front armies and defeated. In the first combat under the Stalpenennen, on August 17, 1914, the Russian parts of the 1st Army made the enemy retreat. On August 19, the Attack of the Equestrian Guard Wrangel decided the outcome of the second battle and again in our favor. On August 20, 74.4 thousand bayonets of the Germans agreed in the battle under Gumbinnin at 224-machine guns against 63.8 thousand bayonets of Russians at 252 machine guns; 408 Russian guns against 453 German guns. Germans again retreat.

The German commander of the Propolizers is in panic and decides to begin the general retreat of the entire 8th army for the Vistula. He is immediately sent to resign, and management moves to the famous Tandema Hindenburg-Ludendorf, however, the threat of a complete environment of the entire German group becomes more than real.
Rennenkopf did his job, now everything depended on Samsonov. And at this important moment of Samsonov unexpectedly left subordination. For no reason, he undertook to realize his own plan, which broke all the pre-war calculations. The general decided to carry out the deeper coverage of the Germans. Compared to the positions prescribed in the Directive, rejected parts of the 2nd army by more than 20 km to the west.

Such an obvious violation of the order immediately led to undesirable consequences. The 2nd Army strongly broke away from the 1st, there was a free space between them, which allowed the Germans to maneuver and apply strikes alternately on Rennencup and Samsonov.

The commander-in-chief of the army of the North-Western Front - General Zhilinsky demanded that Samsonov cease to stop polishingly and act, according to the plan developed earlier. And what do you think? Samsonov ignored the direct order of the authorities.

The RennenKampf's army successfully occurred and drove the Germans to the west, a blow to their rear of Samsonov was to slam the trap, but the 2nd army was late, although at first she was accompanied by success. In battle near Frankna, the Russian army Samsonova literally defeated the Germans. Nevertheless, the unauthorized improvisation of our commander ended up spoiled the case.

The violation of the directive led to an excessive stretching of the 2nd army, and its hulls were isolated from each other. Here, Zhilinsky had to repaint a general offensive plan on the go, since new circumstances made senseless calculations. The problem is that these "new circumstances" arose due to the evasion of Samsonov from the original directive, and the attempt of Zilinsky to force the general to act according to the developed scheme, failed. Samsonov did not listen to the commander-in-chief of the army of the North-Western Front.

Zilinsky did not leave attempts to form Samsonov and continued to send him orders on the telegraph. And what about Samsonov? He was tired of listening to criticism in his address, and he turned off the telegraph apparatus. I repeat, the connection was not disabled, just Samsonov unilaterally stopped communicating with the commander-in-chief. Zhilinsky tried to contact Samsonov and sent planes and cars to General. To no avail.

Meanwhile, the East Prussian operation gradually approached the turning point. Russians won several victories, however, the hopes of Samsonov make a deep coverage of the enemy collapsed in their eyes. The Germans have increased their grouping, and against the center of Samsonov's troops from 5 divisions, 13 divisions of Germanians fought.

The rapid retreat could save the 2nd army, but Samsonov did not want to reconcile with the obvious failure of his plan. Purely psychologically, its reasoning is understood. Violation of binding orders can forgive if successful. The surroundings of Samsonov Hermansev, and "the winner do not judge," but the 2nd Army itself was on the verge of the environment. When Samsonov came to his senses almost late. The chance to retreat to Russia still remained, but now he depended on whether one infantry division of the Russians to keep the counterattack of the Germans, thereby covering the departure of two buildings.

Unfortunately, our division has not been kept in positions. The enemy cut off the comfortable pathways, as a result of which the Russian buildings (XV and XIII) came to the same roads, and their parts began to be mixed. The control of two buildings was difficult, and soon and lost. Ultimately, two buildings were surrounded by a defeat and the XXIII corps, most of our soldiers and officers surrendered. 10 thousand people came from the German ring.

I ignoring the directive, Samsonov substituted not only himself and his subordinates, but also the 1st Army of Renenkampp. Having overlooked, over Samsonov, the Germans turned their gaze to the north, intending to defeat Russians. Hindenburg received from the Western Front of Reinforcements, and the Germans exceeded ours not only in the number of guns (1146 implements against 724), but also lively. However, parts of the renencampfa stubborn resistance, Successful counterattacks were carried out, and in perfect order retreated to the border.

As for Samsonov, it is believed that he committed suicide. He also got into the environment, and among the small group of senior officers tried to make his way to his. His associates escaped from the German ring, but along the way "lost" the general. The survey of the survey came out of the environment showed that no officer saw himself shot his Samsonov. Moreover, no one really could explain how it happened that the general was behind his own and lost in the forests. Confused and unclear testimony caused a clear bewilderment from General Panteleev, who conducted an investigation. However, how much he tried, but to achieve a clear picture of the incident, Panteleev could not. What actually happened in Prussian forests, now it is impossible to determine exactly.

Samsonov was neither a mess, nor a coward. Participant russian-Japanese war, he already showed himself an excellent commander. There is a lot of certificates about his personal courage. It is unlikely that it is possible to formally find out what made the general ignore the orders of Zhilinsky, and replace the directive with their own action plan. We can only guess, and perhaps the most likely explanation is trite.

Vanity. Little rivalry with Rennencipf led Samsonov to a catastrophe. He wanted a loud victory, deep coverage of the Germans, with a total defeat of the enemy, but everything was different.

RennencPF was not a traitor, as it was sometimes called in journalism and in artistic literature on a military theme. He strictly performed the order, I achieved a number of victories, and with honor brought his troops from under the strike of a strong enemy. He is accused of what they say, Rennenkopf did not want to save Samsonov. These ridiculous arguments do not take into account the obvious thing: the army is built on subordination. Rennenkampf did not receive the order to merge Samsonov. Moreover, if you believe General Kurovu, Rennenkopf addressed the supreme superiors with a request to give him permission to come to the rescue of Samsonov, but he was denied.

Assessing the results of the East Prussian operation, it must be said that Germany although I have achieved a tactical victory, but suffered a strategic defeat. The Russian offensive broke blitzkrieg, the transformation of the German troops from the French front to Russian did not allow Germany to defeat France, and this meant the collapse of the entire strategic idea of \u200b\u200bthe German command.

The chances of winning the war in Germany were only provided if they managed to smash opponents by one way: crush France, and then ride Russia. This could not be done, thanks to the rapid promotion of Russian troops in Prussia. The Western Front became the main, and fastened the main forces of Germany, which retained millions of lives on the Eastern Front. Russia was not saved by France, but himself, and the East-Prussian operation - an example of strategic success, against the background of tactical defeat. The victory of Germany was Parrida, and it was not suiced to the German army.

Fighting schedule

Russian army

• 1st Army - Rennencup Commander, Pavel Karlovich, Head of Staff Mileant, Gabriel Georgievich, General-Starmester Baim, Konstantin Konstantinovich
  • II AK - Head of Sheideman, Sergey Mikhailovich
    • 26th Infantry Division - Head of Poretsky, Alexander Nikolaevich
    • 43th Infantry Division - Head of Slyusarenko, Vladimir Alekseevich
    • 76th Infantry Division - Head of Izofovich, Felix Dominicovich
    • 72nd Infantry Division (from August 27) - Head of Orlov, Dmitry Dmitrievich
    • Donskaya 31st Cossack Regiment (6 hundred)
  • III AK - Head of Eadancin, Nikolay Alekseevich, Head of Staff Chagin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich
    • 25th Infantry Division - Head of Bulgakov, Pavel Ilyich
    • 27th Infantry Division - Head of Adaridi, August-Karl-Mikhail Mikhailovich
    • Donskaya 34th Cossack Regiment
    • Donskaya 19th Separate Cossacks
  • IV AK - Head of Aliyev, Eris Khan Sultan Garyre, Chief of Staff Desino, Konstantin Nikolaevich
    • 30th Infantry Division - Head of Kolynkovsky, Eduard Arkadyevich
    • 40th Infantry Division - Head of Korotkhevich, Nikolay Nikolaevich
    • 57th Infantry Division - Head of Nezadepsky, Dmitry Nikolaevich
    • Donskaya 44th Cossack Regiment
    • Donskaya 26th Separate Cossacks
  • XX AK - Head of Smirnov, Vladimir Vasilyevich (General), Head of Staff Shemyakin, Konstantin Yakovlevich
    • 28th Infantry Division - Chief Lashkevich, Nikolay Alekseevich
    • 29th Infantry Division - Head Rosenshild von Pauline, Anatoly Nikolaevich
    • 54th Infantry Division (from September 9) - Head of Yerogin, Mikhail Grigorievich
    • Donskaya 46th Cossack Regiment
    • Donskaya 25th Separate Cossacks
    • 73rd Artillery Brigade from the 73rd Infantry Division
  • XXVI AK (since September) - Head of Georgross, Alexander Alekseevich
    • 53th Infantry Division - Head of Fedorov, Semen Ivanovich
    • 56th Infantry Division - Head Boldyrev, Nikolay Ksenofontovich
  • Army cavalry
    • 1st Guards Cavalry Division - Head of Kaznackov, Nikolai Nikolaevich
    • 2nd Guards Cavalry Division - Head of Ruhah, Georgy Ottonovich
    • 1st Cavalry Division - Head of Gurko, Vasily Iosifovich
    • 2nd Cavalry Division - Chief of Nakhichevan, Khan Hussein
    • 3rd Cavalry Division - Head Belgard, Vladimir Karlovich
  • 5th Rifle Brigade - Commander Schreder, Peter Dmitrievich
  • 1st Separate Cavalry Brigade - Oran Commander, Nikolay Aloizievich

• The 2nd Army is the commander of Samsonov, Alexander Vasilyevich, and Nach. Staff Postovsky, Peter Ivanovich (from August 19), General-Starmester Filimonov, Nikolay Grigorievich)
  • I AK - Head of Artamonov, Leonid Konstantinovich (August 27, was replaced by A. V. Duskevich), Head of Staff of the Lovers, Sergey Petrovich
    • The 22nd Infantry Division - Head Duskevich, Alexander Alexandrovich.
      • Vyborg 85th Infantry Regiment - Commander Freiman, Karl Vladimirovich
    • 24th Infantry Division - Head of Counters, Nikolai Petrovich
      • Irkutsk 93rd Infantry Regiment - Kopytinsky commander, Julian Julianovich
      • Krasnoyarsk 95th Infantry Regiment - commander Lohvitsky, Nikolay Alexandrovich
    • Donskaya 35 Cossack Regiment
  • VI AK - Head of Blagoveshchensky, Alexander Alexandrovich), Head of Staff Necashevich, Georgy Mikhailovich
    • 4th Infantry Division - Head of Komarov, Nikolai Nikolaevich
      • Belozersky 13th Infantry Regiment - Commander Jenseev, Dmitry Dmitrievich
      • Olonetsky 14th Infantry Regiment - Commander Shevelev, Vladimir Georgievich
      • Schlisselburg 15th Infantry Regiment - Commander Arapov, Nikolai Ivanovich
      • Ladoga Regiment - Commander Mikulin, Alexander Vladimirovich
    • 16th Infantry Division - Head Richter, Guido Casimirovich
      • Suzdal 62nd Infantry Regiment - Commander Golitsynsky, Alexander Nikolaevich
      • Kazan 64th Infantry Regiment - Commander Ivanov, Alexander Mikhailovich
    • Donskaya 22nd Cossack Regiment
  • XIII AK - Head Klyuev, Nikolai Alekseevich), Head of Pestley, Evgeny Filimonovich
    • 1st Infantry Division - Head of Ugryumov, Andrei Aleksandrovich
      • Nevsky 1st Infantry Regiment - Commander Pervishin, Mikhail Grigorievich
      • Sofia 2nd Infantry Regiment - Commander Grigorov, Alexander Mikhailovich
      • Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment - Commander Zagnev, Nikolay Grigorievich
    • The 36th Infantry Division - Head of Pretention, Alexander Bogdanovich
      • Zvenigorodsky 142th Infantry Regiment - commander Venetskaya, Georgy Nikolaevich
      • Doroborovsky 143rd Infantry Regiment - Kabanov commander, Vladimir Vasilyevich
      • Kashirsky 144th Infantry Regiment - Commander Kakhovsky, Boris Vsevolodovich
    • Detachment of the Border Guard (4 hundred)
    • Donskaya 40th Cossack Regiment (from August 29)
  • XV AK - Head of Martos, Nikolai Nikolaevich, Head of Staff Macchugovsky, Nikolai Ivanovich
    • 6th Infantry Division - Chief Torclus, Fedor Emily-Karl Ivanovich
      • Nizhny Novgorod 22nd Infantry Regiment - Commander Maipariani, Zakhariya Aleksandrovich
      • The 11th Infantry Regiment - Commander Danilov, Dmitry Evgrafovich
      • Symbirsk 24th Infantry Regiment - Sokolovsky, Andrei Frantseich
    • 8th Infantry Division - Head Fitingoof, Evgeny Emilevich
      • Chernigov 29th Infantry Regiment - Commander Alekseev, Alexander Pavlovich
      • Poltava 30th Infantry Regiment - Commander Gavrilitsa, Mikhail Ivanovich
      • Alexander Lebedev, Alexander Ivanovich, Alexander Ivanovich
      • Kremenchug's 32nd Infantry Regiment - Commander Ratko, Vasily Aleksandrovich
    • Orenburg 2nd Cossack Regiment (4 hundred)
  • XXIII AK - Chief Kondratovich, Cyprian Antonovich, Head of Staff Nordheim, Wilhelm-Karl Kaspersevich
    • 3rd Guards Infantry Division - Head of Sirelius, Leonid Otto Ottovich
      • Lithuanian Life Guard Regiment - Commander Shilydbach, Konstantin Konstantinovich
      • Kexgolm Lobe Guard Regiment - Commander Malinovsky, Alexander Mikhailovich
      • Volyn Life Guard Regiment - Commander Geraua, Alexander Vladimirovich
    • 2nd Infantry Division - Head of Mingin, Joseph Felixovich
      • Kaluga 5th Infantry Regiment - Commander Zinoviev, Nikolai Petrovich
      • Libava 6th Infantry Regiment - Commander Globachev, Nikolai Ivanovich
      • Revelsky 7th Infantry Regiment - MANUVICH-MEYDANO-CORDER, MIKHAIL ALEKLANDROVYCH
      • Estland 8th Infantry Regiment - Rupa commander, Herman Maximilianovich
  • 1st Rifle Brigade - Commander Vasilyev, Vladimir Mikhailovich
  • 2nd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade
  • Army cavalry
    • 4th Cavalry Division - Head of Mortary, Anton Aleksandrovich
    • 6th Cavalry Division - Head of Roop, Vladimir Khristorovich
      • Glukhovsky 6th Dragun Regiment
    • 15th Cavalry Division - Head of Lyubomirov, Pavel Petrovich

It should also be noted that by virtue of the very controversial orders of the bet and the north-western front, the structure of the army constantly changed, moreover, there was uncertainty in subordinate individual compounds. So, for example, I AK Artamonov since August 21, the order of the rate was subordinate to the 2 Army, but this order was not translated by the headquarters of the North-Western Front.

German army

The 8th Army (Commander Colonel-General Max Background of UN Gaffron, from August 23, 1914, the command was replaced by: Commander Paul von Hindenburg, beginning. Erich Staff Ludendorf, General-FarmSeister Hoffman)

• 1st AK (Commander Hermann Francesa)
  • 1st Infantry Division
  • 2nd Infantry Division.
• 1st Reserve AK (Commander of Belov)
  • 1st Reserve Infantry Division
  • 36th Reserve Infantry Division
• 17th AK (Commander August background Maenzen)
  • 35th Infantry Division
  • 36th Infantry Division
• 20 AK (Commander General Scholz)
  • 37th Infantry Division
  • 41th Infantry Division

• 3 Reserve Division
• 1 Ladder Division
• 6th Ladder Brigade
• 70th Ladder Brigade
• 1st Cavalry Division

Planning and preparation of the operation

The remains of the 2nd Army retreated behind the Narev River.

Departure of the 1st Russian Army from Eastern Prussia

At the South Face Warsaw protrusion, the Galician battle continued at this time, and Austria-Hungary demanded from Germany to move the 8th Army to the south, and to hit the Poland to the rear of Russian army, coming in Galicia.

However, the German General Staff found such an operation too risky and pretended to release Eastern Prussia, and on August 31 ordered the 8th Army to step against the 1st Russian army, released to Königsberg.

Having received 4 September 2.5 corps from the Western Front, Ludendorf regrouped the 8th Army: Covered from the South against the 2nd Russian Army of the Sheideman One-and-a half divisions (20,000 bayonets), deployed to the east of seven buildings and two cavdivia, 230,000 bayonets and Sabel at 1080 guns. They were opposed by five buildings and five cavdivias of the 1st Russian army of rennencup, 110,000 bayonets and a saber at 900 guns.

The main forces of rennencipf, aimed com. The front of Zhilinsky on the siege of Konigsberg, concentrated on the northern flank, and the Germans decided to hit the southern flank, where only one 2nd case and cavalry were located. It was planned to break through the front here, to reach the rear of the 1st army, push it to the sea and the swamps of Nizhny Neman and destroy there. Ludendorf sent three corps and two cavdivia through the lake disfel on Letzen by going around the Russian southern flank, and four corps - north of the lakes.

In Narev, the Russian bid replenished the 2nd army with two fresh buildings. The southeast of the Mazur lakes in the band between the 2nd and 1st armies was formed the 10th Army.

On September 7-9, the bypass German column hosted unimpeded with lake defile and dropped parts of the 2-building, leaving the rear of the 1st Russian army. Rennenkampf urgently transferred to the southern flank from the center two infantry and three cavalry divisions and from the North of the 20th Corps, and stopping the offensive of the Germans, began to remove the entire army to east. When on September 10, the bypass column of the 8th German army resumed the offensive to the north, the threat of the environment of the Russian troops had already passed.

On September 9, from the south of East Prussia inflicted the 2nd Russian Army, in all the relations of Ludendorf, allegedly, destroyed a week ago, and forced the Germans to turn part of the forces against her.

The departure of the 1st Army was covered mainly by the 2nd and 20th building, which in the terrigard battles were kept the superior forces of the Germans. By September 14, the 1st Army moved to the middle Neman, losing about 15 thousand people (killed, wounded and captive) and 180 guns (for the entire operation more than 30 thousand people). German troops lost about 10 thousand people (for the entire operation 25 thousand people). Although the 1st army has departed, the German plan of its environment and destruction failed, thanks to the timely decision of the RennencPF on the retreat and perseverance of the terrigard corps. The army was simply extruded from Eastern Prussia.

Results of the operation

According to the Directive of the North-West Front of September 16, the 1st Army ranked Defense on Neman, and the 2nd - on Narev, that is, where they were located before the operation. The total losses of the front (killed, injured and captive) amounted to more than 80 thousand people and about 500 guns. On September 16, General Zilinsky was fired from the post of commander of the North-Western Front, and General N. V. Ruzsky was appointed in his place.

The German losses amounted to 3,847 killed, 6,965 missing, 20 376 wounded, 23,168 patients.

The German 8th Army reflected the offensive of the superior forces of the two Russian armies to Eastern Prussia, defeated the 2nd Army and displaced the 1st Army from East Prussia, which became a noticeable operational success of Germany on a secondary TVD. The value of the German victory in the East Prussian operation consists of a temporary refusal of the Russian rate from the offensive from Warsaw protrusion through Poznan on Berlin.

At the same time, the fighting in Eastern Prussia was distracted by the 8th German army from the strike of the Northern Fasha of Warsaw speakers at the moment when Galician battle was on its southern faces, which allowed the Russian army to defeat the Austro-Hungarian troops.

The transfer of two buildings and the equestrian division (120 thousand bayonets and a saber) from the Western Front to Eastern Prussia seriously weakened the German army before the battle on Marne, the result of which was its defeat. Marshal Foca concluded:

If France was not a steer from the face of Europe, then, above all, we are obliged to Russia, since the Russian army has distracted part of the forces on their active interference, and that allowed us to win the march.

The tactical success of Germany in Eastern Prussia, due to the transfer of troops from the Western Front, turned into a failure of the operation against France by defeat strategic. Germany was forced to lead a protracted war on two fronts, which she had no chance to win.

Notes

Literature

Specially dedicated to the East Prussian operation

• Colonel Buchinsky Yu. F. Tannenberg catastrophe. The diary of the participant in the battle in East Prussia in August 1914, the commander of the 2nd battalion of 5 pekh. Kaluga emperor Wilhelm I-th regiment. - 1st. - Sofia, Bulgaria, 1939. - p. 52.
• Golovin N. N. From the history of the 1914 campaign in the Russian Front. The beginning of the war and the operation in the east. Prussia. Prague, 1926.
• Vátsietis I. I. Movie in Eastern Prussia in July, August and early September 1914 - M., 1923.
• Evseev N. Augustovsky Battle of the 2nd Russian Army in Eastern Prussia (Tannenberg) in 1914 M. 1936
• East Prussian operation. Collection of documents of the global imperialist war in the Russian front (1914-1917) M., 1939.
• Bogdanovich P. N. Invasion to Eastern Prussia in August 1914; Memories of the officer of the General Staff of the army of General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964.