Major battles of World War II. Major battles of World War II

This article will focus on the decisive battles of the bloodiest war in human history - World War II. And here will be named not only those battles that influenced the side of the victors, because one should not forget that at the beginning of the war the Germans had an advantage and they deserved a number of brilliant victories.
So, let's begin. What battles can be called the most significant and most decisive during the Second World War?
1. The capture of France.
After German troops took Poland, Hitler understood that he needed to get rid of the danger on the Western Front, this would ensure the German army did not unleash a war on two fronts. And for this it was necessary to capture France.
Hitler managed to capture France in just a few weeks. It was a real blitzkrieg. Lightning-fast tank strikes helped crush and encircle the most efficient armies of the French, Dutch and Belgians. However, this was not the main reason for the defeat for the Allies, their excessive self-confidence became a catastrophic mistake for them, which led to the surrender of France and the decisive victory of the Germans on the Western Front.
When attacking France, there were no huge battles, there were only local attempts of resistance in certain parts of the French army, and when Northern France fell, Germany's victory was not long in coming.
2. Battle of Britain.
After the French fell, it was necessary to destroy Great Britain, which was located on the islands well protected from direct attack.
Hitler was well aware that it would be possible to crush the British only after their air force was defeated. On initial stage air attacks on Britain were successful, German bombers bombed Largest cities... But when the British had a radar, they were able to intercept German planes while still approaching the islands.
The number of German military equipment in the air was greatly reduced, and a few months later began catastrophic shortage not only aircraft, but also personnel.
But the Royal Air Force, meanwhile, was gaining its strength and fully gained air superiority over Britain. This victory allowed the British not only to protect themselves from the attacks of the Germans, but also gave time to restore their military potential after the defeat in the Battle of France. In addition, the British victory gave way to an operation called "Overlord", which will be discussed later.
3. Battle of Stalingrad.
Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, the successful offensive of the Wehrmacht armies continued, which had already completely occupied Ukraine and are now ready to take the most important cities for the USSR, including Stalingrad. However, they had to stop here.
Having practically captured the city, the Germans met decisive resistance from the Red Army, which could not be broken due to the numerical advantage of the enemy, problems with supplies and weapons, as well as severe frosts.
The battle for Stalingrad began in July 1941 and developed successfully for the Germans until November of the same year. But already with the onset of winter, the forces of the Union launched a powerful counterattack, which forced the Germans to retreat. Thus, one of the best armies of the Wehrmacht under the command of Pauls was surrounded and defeated.
In total, during the battle at Stalingrad, the Germans lost about 1 million soldiers, as well as a huge number of weapons and military equipment. The morale of the Germans was undermined to such an extent that it was already impossible to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. A radical turning point came not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also during the Second World War.
4. Battle of Kursk.
This battle can be safely called the last attempt of the Germans to launch a counterattack on the Eastern Front. The Germans decided to carry out a lightning-fast attack along the line of defense of the USSR on the Kursk Bulge, but their plan was undermined and the offensive ended in complete failure. After that, huge forces The Red Army launched a counteroffensive, and thanks to their numerical superiority, they managed to break the German defense, which meant one thing - the defeat of Germany was already a foregone conclusion. The best armies were defeated, and the number of soldiers of the Wehrmacht was already inferior to the forces of the Red Army several times, and this is not to mention the fact that the forces of the allies began to put pressure on the Western Front.
During the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle- the battle of Prokhorovka, where they won Soviet tanks, albeit with huge losses.
5. Battle of Leyte Gulf.
This battle can be called the last decisive attempt by the Japanese to seize the initiative in the war in the Pacific. The Japanese navy attacked the US navy in hopes of crushing it and launching a counteroffensive. This battle lasted from 23 to 26 October 1944 and ended with the complete victory of the Americans. The Japanese fought so desperately that they sacrificed themselves for the destruction of the enemy - we are talking about the so-called "kamikaze". But this did not help them, they lost their most powerful ships and no longer made a decisive attempt to stop the US fleet.
6. "Overlord".
In 1944 Germany was already on the brink of defeat, but it had to be accelerated, for this the Western Front was opened - Operation Overlord.
In June 1944, huge US and Allied forces landed in Northern France. Already two months later, Paris was liberated, and after two more Allied forces approached western borders Germany. In order to restrain the offensive on the Western Front, the Germans greatly stretched their forces and further weakened their positions on the Eastern Front, which accelerated the advance of the Red Army.
The opening of the Second Front was a decisive blow to the military strength of Germany, followed only by the occupation and fall of Berlin.
7. Battle of Berlin.
Despite the fact that Germany had already lost, Berlin continued to stand. The city was encircled, and there was no place to wait for help, but the Germans stood by.
The battle for Berlin, which continued throughout the spring of 1945, was completed by 8 May. During the defense of Berlin, the Germans put up the most powerful pockets of resistance, because of which a huge number of Red Army soldiers died, but their fate was decided anyway.
After Hitler shot himself, the morale of the Wehrmacht was completely destroyed and Germany surrendered - the victory was won. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the United States had almost subdued Japan - World War II was coming to an end.
These were the decisive battles of World War II. Of course, this list could be supplemented with a dozen more important battles, but nevertheless these battles and operations were key.

The heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers displayed during the battles of the Great Patriotic War deserve eternal memory. The wisdom of military leaders, which has become one of the most important components of a common victory, never ceases to amaze us today.

Over the long years of the war, there have been so many battles that even some historians disagree on the meaning of certain battles. And yet, the largest battles, which have a significant impact on the further course of hostilities, are known to almost everyone. It is about these battles that will be discussed in our article.

Battle name	Warlords who took part in the battle	The outcome of the battle
	Aviation Major Ionov A.P., Major General Aviation T.F. Kutsevalov, F.I. Kuznetsov, V.F. Tributs.	Despite the stubborn struggle of Soviet soldiers, the operation ended on July 9 after the Germans broke through the defenses in the area of the Velikaya River. This military operation smoothly turned into a struggle for the Leningrad region.
	G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev, M.F. Lukin, P.A. Kurochkin, K.K. Rokossovsky	This battle is considered one of the bloodiest in the history of the Second World War. At the cost of multi-million dollar losses Soviet army managed to delay the offensive of Hitler's army on Moscow.
	Popov M.M., Frolov V.A., Voroshilov K.E., Zhukov G.K., Meretskov K.A.	After the blockade of Leningrad began, local residents and military leaders had to fight fierce battles for several years. As a result, the blockade was lifted, the city was liberated. However, Leningrad itself suffered terrible destruction, and the death toll of local residents exceeded several hundred thousand.
	I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, S.M. Budyonny, A.A. Vlasov.	In spite of huge losses, the Soviet troops managed to win. The Germans were thrown back 150-200 kilometers, and the Soviet troops managed to liberate the Tula, Ryazan and Moscow regions.
	I.S. Konev, G.K. Zhukov.	The Germans managed to be thrown back another 200 kilometers. Soviet troops completed the liberation of the Tula and Moscow regions, liberated some areas of the Smolensk region
	A.M. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, A.I. Eremenko, S.K. Timoshenko, V.I. Chuikov	It is the victory at Stalingrad that many historians call one of the most important turning points during the Second World War. The Red Army managed to win a strong-willed victory, throwing the Germans far back, and proving that the fascist army also has its own vulnerabilities.
	CM. Budyonny, I.E. Petrov, I.I. Maslennikov, F.S. October	Soviet troops were able to win a landslide victory, liberating Checheno-Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Territory and Rostov Region.
	Georgy Zhukov, Ivan Konev, Konstantin Rokossovsky	The Kursk Bulge became one of the bloodiest battles, but ensured the end of the turning point during the Second World War. The Soviet troops managed to push the Germans back even further, practically to the border of the country.
	V.D. Sokolovsky, I.Kh. Baghramyan	On the one hand, the operation was unsuccessful, because the Soviet troops failed to reach Minsk and capture Vitebsk. However, the forces of the fascists were severely wounded, and the tank reserves as a result of the battle were practically at the end.
	Konstantin Rokossovsky, Alexey Antonov, Ivan Bagramyan, Georgy Zhukov	Operation Bagration turned out to be incredibly successful, because the territories of Belarus, part of the Baltic States and regions of Eastern Poland were recaptured.
	Georgy Zhukov, Ivan Konev	Soviet troops managed to defeat 35 enemy divisions and go directly to Berlin for the final battle.
	I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.S. Konev	After prolonged resistance, Soviet troops managed to take the capital of Germany. With the capture of Berlin, the Great Patriotic War officially ended.

Since the 1920s, France has been at the forefront of world tank building: it was the first to build tanks with anti-cannon armor, and the first to bring them into tank divisions. In May 1940, it was time to test the fighting efficiency of the French armored forces in practice. Such a case presented itself already during the battles for Belgium.

Horseless cavalry

When planning to move troops into Belgium in accordance with the Dill plan, the allied command decided that the most vulnerable area was the area between the cities of Wavre and Namur. Here, between the rivers Dyle and Meuse, the Gembloux plateau stretches - flat, dry, convenient for tank operations. To cover this gap, the French command sent here the 1st Cavalry Corps of the 1st Army under the command of Lieutenant General Rene Priou. The general recently turned 61 years old, he studied at the military academy of Saint-Cyr, and finished World War I as commander of the 5th Dragoon regiment. From February 1939, Priou was the inspector general of the cavalry.

The commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General Rene-Jacques-Adolphe Priou.
alamy.com

Priu's corps was called cavalry only by tradition and consisted of two light mechanized divisions. Initially, they were cavalry, but at the beginning of the 30s, at the initiative of the cavalry inspector General Flavigny, part of the cavalry divisions began to be reorganized into light mechanized ones - DLM (Division Legere Mecanisee). They were reinforced with tanks and armored vehicles, horses were replaced by Renault UE and Lorraine vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

The first such formation was the 4th Cavalry Division. Back in the early 1930s, it became an experimental training ground for the interaction of cavalry with tanks, and in July 1935 it was renamed the 1st Light Mechanized Division. Such a division of the 1935 model was supposed to include:

reconnaissance regiment of two motorcycle squadrons and two armored car squadrons (AMD - Automitrailleuse de Decouverte);
a combat brigade, consisting of two regiments, each with two squadrons of cavalry tanks - cannon AMC (Auto-mitrailleuse de Combat) or machine-gun AMR (Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance);
a motorized brigade, consisting of two motorized dragoon regiments of two battalions each (one regiment was to be transported on tracked transporters, the other on ordinary trucks);
motorized artillery regiment.

The re-equipment of the 4th Cavalry Division was slow: the cavalry wanted to equip their battle brigade with only SOMA S35 medium tanks, but due to their shortage they had to use light Hotchkiss H35 tanks. As a result, the number of tanks in the compound became less than planned, but the equipment with vehicles increased.

Medium tank "Somua" S35 from the exposition of the museum in Aberdeen (USA).
sfw.so

The motorized brigade was reduced to one motorized dragoon regiment of three battalions equipped with Lorraine and Luffley tracked tractors. Squadrons of AMR machine-gun tanks were transferred to the motorized dragoon regiment, and the combat regiments, in addition to the S35, were equipped with light H35 vehicles. Over time, they were replaced by medium tanks, but this replacement was not completed until the start of the war. The reconnaissance regiment was armed with powerful Panar-178 armored vehicles with a 25-mm anti-tank gun.

German soldiers inspect the Panar-178 (AMD-35) cannon armored vehicle, abandoned near Le Pannet (Dunkirk region).
waralbum.ru

In 1936, General Flavigny took command of his brainchild, the 1st Light Mechanized Division. In 1937, the creation of a second similar division under the command of General Altmaier began on the basis of the 5th Cavalry Division. The 3rd Light Mechanized Division began to form already during the "Strange War" in February 1940 - this unit was another step in the mechanization of cavalry, as the AMR machine gun tanks in it were replaced by the newest Hotchkiss H39 machines.

Note that until the end of the 30s, "real" cavalry divisions (DC - Divisions de Cavalerie) remained in the French army. In the summer of 1939, at the initiative of the cavalry inspector, supported by General Gamelin, they began to be reorganized into the new state. It was decided that in open terrain, cavalry was powerless against modern infantry weapons and too vulnerable to air attacks. The new light cavalry divisions (DLC - Division Legere de Cavalerie) were to be used in mountainous or wooded areas, where horses provided them with the best passability. First of all, such areas were the Ardennes and the Swiss border, where new formations were deployed.

The light cavalry division consisted of two brigades - a light motorized and a cavalry; the first had a dragoon (tank) regiment and an armored car regiment, the second was partially motorized, but still numbered about 1200 horses. Initially, the Dragoon regiment was also planned to be equipped with SOMA S35 medium tanks, but due to their slow production, light Hotchkiss H35s began to enter service - well-armored, but relatively slow-moving and with a weak 37-mm cannon 18 caliber long.

The light tank "Hotchkiss" H35 is the main vehicle of the Priou cavalry corps.
waralbum.ru

Priu body composition

The Priou Cavalry Corps was formed in September 1939 from the 1st and 2nd Light Mechanized Divisions. But in March 1940, the 1st Division was transferred as a motorized reinforcement to the left-flank 7th Army, and in its place Priou received the newly formed 3rd DLM. The 4th DLM was never formed, at the end of May part of it was transferred to the 4th armored (cuirassier) division of the reserve, and the other part was sent to the 7th army as the "Group de Langle".

The light mechanized division turned out to be a very successful combat formation - more mobile than the heavy tank division (DCr - Division Cuirassée), and at the same time more balanced. It is believed that the first two divisions were best prepared, although the actions of the 1st DLM in Holland as part of the 7th Army showed that this was not the case. At the same time, the 3rd DLM, which replaced it, began to form only during the war, the personnel of this unit were recruited mainly from reservists, and officers were allocated from other mechanized divisions.

Light French tank AMR-35.
militaryimages.net

By May 1940, each light mechanized division consisted of three motorized infantry battalions, about 10,400 fighters and 3,400 Vehicle... The number of vehicles in them varied greatly:

2ndDLM:

light tanks "Hotchkiss" H35 - 84;
light machine gun tanks AMR33 and AMR35 ZT1 - 67;
105 mm field guns - 12;

3rdDLM:

medium tanks "Somua" S35 - 88;
light tanks "Hotchkiss" H39 - 129 (of which 60 - with a 37-mm long-barreled gun in 38 calibers);
light tanks "Hotchkiss" H35 - 22;
cannon armored vehicles "Panar-178" - 40;
105 mm field guns - 12;
75 mm field guns (model 1897) - 24;
47 mm anti-tank guns SA37 L / 53 - 8;
25 mm anti-tank guns SA34 / 37 L / 72 - 12;
25-mm anti-aircraft guns "Hotchkiss" - 6.

In total, the Priu cavalry corps had 478 tanks (including 411 cannon tanks) and 80 cannon armored vehicles. Half of the tanks (236 units) had 47-mm or long-barreled 37-mm cannons, capable of fighting almost any armored vehicle of that time.

The Hotchkiss H39 with a 38-caliber cannon is the best French light tank. Photo of the exhibition of the tank museum in Saumur, France.

Enemy: Wehrmacht 16th Motorized Corps

While the Priu divisions were advancing to the intended defensive line, the vanguard of the 6th German army - the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, united under the command of Lieutenant General Erich Göpner in the 16th Motorized Corps, was walking towards them. To the left, the 20th Motorized Division was moving with a great lag, whose task was to cover Göpner's flank from possible counterattacks from the direction of Namur.

General course of hostilities in northeastern Belgium from 10 to 17 May 1940.
D. M. Proektor. War in Europe. 1939-1941

On May 11, both panzer divisions crossed the Albert Canal and overthrew parts of the 2nd and 3rd Belgian army corps near Tirlemont. On the night of May 11-12, the Belgians withdrew to the line of the Diehl River, where it was planned to leave the allied forces - the 1st French Army of General Georges Blanchard and the British Expeditionary Force of General John Gort.

V 3rd Panzer Division General Horst Stumpf included two tank regiments (5th and 6th), united in the 3rd tank brigade under the command of Colonel Kühn. In addition, the division included the 3rd motorized infantry brigade (3rd motorized infantry regiment and 3rd motorcycle battalion), 75th artillery regiment, 39th anti-tank destroyer battalion, 3rd reconnaissance battalion, 39th engineer battalion, 39th communications battalion and 83rd supply detachment.

The German Pz.I light tank is the most massive vehicle in the 16th Motorized Corps.
tank2.ru

In total, the 3rd Panzer Division had:

command tanks - 27;
light machine gun tanks Pz.I - 117;
light tanks Pz.II - 129;
medium tanks Pz.III - 42;
medium support tanks Pz.IV - 26;
armored vehicles - 56 (including 23 vehicles with a 20-mm cannon).

German light tank Pz.II - main cannon tank of the 16th Motorized Corps.
Osprey Publishing

4th Panzer Division Major General Johannes Stever had two tank regiments (35th and 36th), united in the 5th tank brigade. In addition, the division included the 4th motorized infantry brigade (12th and 33rd motorized infantry regiments, as well as the 34th motorcycle battalion, 103rd artillery regiment, 49th anti-tank destroyer battalion, 7th reconnaissance battalion , 79th engineer battalion, 79th communications battalion and 84th supply detachment.

command tanks - 10;
light machine gun tanks Pz.I - 135;
light tanks Pz.II - 105;
medium tanks Pz.III - 40;
Pz.IV medium support tanks - 24.

Each German panzer division had a significant artillery component:

150 mm howitzers - 12;
105 mm howitzers - 14;
75 mm infantry guns - 24;
88 mm anti-aircraft guns - 9;
37 mm anti-tank guns - 51;
20 mm anti-aircraft guns - 24.

In addition, divisions were assigned two anti-tank battalions (12 37-mm anti-tank guns in each).

So, both divisions of the 16th Panzer Corps had 655 vehicles, including 50 "fours", 82 "troikas", 234 "twos", 252 machine-gun "ones" and 37 command tanks, which also had only machine-gun armament (some historians call the figure 632 tanks). Of these vehicles, only 366 were cannon, and only medium-sized German vehicles could fight the bulk of enemy tanks, and even then not all - the S35 with its inclined 36-mm hull armor and 56-mm turret was in the teeth of the German 37-mm cannon. only from short distances. At the same time, the 47-mm French cannon penetrated the armor of German medium tanks at a distance of over 2 km.

Some researchers, describing the battle on the Gembloux plateau, claim the superiority of Göpner's 16th Panzer Corps over the Priou Cavalry Corps in terms of the number and quality of tanks. Outwardly, this really was so (the Germans had 655 tanks against 478 French ones), but 40% of them were machine-gun Pz.Is, capable of fighting only with infantry. For 366 German cannon tanks there were 411 French cannon vehicles, and the 20-mm cannons of the German "two" could only cause damage to the French machine-gun AMR tanks.

The Germans had 132 units (“troikas” and “fours”) capable of effectively fighting enemy tanks, while the French had almost twice as many - 236 vehicles, even if we do not count Renault and Hotchkiss with short-barreled 37-mm cannons.

The commander of the 16th Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Erich Göpner.
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1971-068-10 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

True, the German tank division had significantly more anti-tank weapons: up to one and a half hundred 37-mm cannons, and most importantly - 18 heavy 88-mm anti-aircraft guns on mechanical traction, capable of destroying any tank in its line of sight. And this is against 40 anti-tank guns in the entire Priu corps! However, due to the rapid advance of the Germans, most of their artillery lagged behind and did not take part in the first stage of the battle. In fact, on May 12-13, 1940, a real battle of machines unfolded near the town of Anne northeast of the town of Gembloux: tanks against tanks.

May 12: Encounter Battle

The 3rd light mechanized division was the first to come into contact with the enemy. Its section east of Gembloux was divided into two sectors: in the north there were 44 tanks and 40 armored vehicles; in the south - 196 medium and light tanks, as well as the bulk of the artillery. The first line of defense was in the area of Anu and the village of Kreen. The 2nd division was supposed to take positions on the right flank of the 3rd from Kreen to the coast of the Meuse, but by this time it was only moving towards the intended line with its forward detachments- three infantry battalions and 67 AMR light tanks. The natural dividing line between the divisions was a hilly ridge that stretched from Anna through Kreen and Murdorp. Thus, the direction of the German attack was quite obvious: along the water obstacles through the "corridor" formed by the rivers Meen and Grand Gette and leading directly to Gembloux.

Early in the morning on May 12, the "Eberbach Panzer Group" (the vanguard of the 4th German Panzer Division) reached the town of Anna in the very center of the line, which was to be occupied by Priu's troops. Here the Germans encountered reconnaissance patrols of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division. A little north of Anna, French tanks, machine gunners and motorcyclists occupied Creen.

From 9 a.m. to noon, tank and anti-tank artillery on both sides engaged in fierce gunfire. The French tried to counterattack with the advance detachments of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, but light German Pz.II tanks advanced all the way to the center of Anna. 21 light "Hotchkiss" H35s took part in the new counterattack, but they were unlucky - they came under fire from German Pz.III and Pz.IV. Thick armor did not help the French: in close street battles at a distance of a hundred meters, it was easily penetrated by 37-mm German cannons, while short-barreled French guns were powerless against medium German tanks. As a result, the French lost 11 "Hotchkiss", the Germans - 5 cars. The remaining French tanks left the city. After a short battle, the French withdrew to the west - to the line Wavre-Gembloux (part of the previously planned "Diehl Position"). It was here that the main battle broke out on May 13-14.

The tanks of the 1st Battalion of the 35th German Tank Regiment tried to pursue the enemy and reached the city of Tignes, where they destroyed four Hotchkiss, but were forced to return, as they were left unaccompanied by motorized infantry. By nightfall, silence settled on the positions. As a result of the battle, each side considered that the enemy's losses were significantly higher than their own.

Battle of Anna May 12-14, 1940.
Ernest R. May. Strange Victory: Hitler "s Conquest of France

May 13: difficult German success

The morning of that day was quiet, only towards 9 o'clock a German reconnaissance plane appeared in the sky. After that, as it is said in the memoirs of Priu himself, "The battle began with renewed vigor along the entire front from Tirlemont to Guy"... By this time, the main forces of the German 16th Panzer and French Cavalry Corps had entered here; south of Anna, the lagging units of the 3rd German Panzer Division were deployed. Both sides mustered all their armored forces for battle. A large-scale tank battle broke out - it was a counter, since both sides were trying to attack.

The actions of Göpner's tank divisions were supported by nearly two hundred dive bombers of the 8th Air Corps of the 2nd Air Fleet. Air support for the French was weaker and consisted mainly of fighter cover. But Priu had superiority in artillery: he managed to pull up his 75- and 105-mm guns, which opened effective fire on German positions and advancing tanks. As one of the German tankmen, Captain Ernst von Jungenfeld, wrote a year and a half later, the French artillery literally arranged for the Germans "Volcano of fire", the density and efficiency of which resembled worst times First World War. At the same time, the artillery of the German tank divisions lagged behind, the main part of it had not yet managed to catch up to the battlefield.

The French were the first to attack that day - six S35s from the 2nd Light Mechanized Division, which had not previously participated in the battle, attacked the southern flank of the 4th Panzer Division. Alas, the Germans managed to deploy 88-mm guns here and met the enemy with fire. At 9 o'clock in the morning, after an attack by dive bombers, German tanks attacked the village of Gendrenouille in the center of the French position (in the zone of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division), concentrating a large number of tanks on a narrow five-kilometer front.

The French tankers suffered significant losses from the attack of the dive bombers, but did not flinch. Moreover, they decided to counterattack the enemy - but not head-on, but from the flank. Having deployed north of Gendrenouille, two squadrons of Somua tanks of the fresh 1st Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd Light Mechanized Division (42 combat vehicles) inflicted a flank attack on the unfolding battle formations of the 4th Panzer Division.

This blow thwarted the German plans and turned the battle into an oncoming one. According to French data, about 50 German tanks were destroyed. True, from the two French squadrons by the evening, only 16 combat-ready vehicles remained - the rest either died or required lengthy repairs. The tank of the commander of one of the platoons left the battle, having used up all the shells and having traces of 29 hits, but did not receive serious damage.

Particularly successful was the S35 medium tank squadron of the 2nd Light Mechanized Division on the right flank - in Kreen, through which the Germans tried to bypass the French positions from the south. Here Lieutenant Lociski's platoon was able to destroy 4 German tanks, a battery of anti-tank guns and several trucks. It turned out that German tanks are powerless against medium French tanks - their 37-mm cannons can penetrate the Somua's armor only from a very short distance, while the French 47-mm cannons can hit German vehicles at any distance.

A Pz.III from the 4th Panzer Division overcomes a stone fence blown up by sappers. Photo taken on May 13, 1940 in the Anu area.
Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen

In the town of Tignes, a couple of kilometers west of Anna, the French again succeeded in stopping the German advance. The tank of the commander of the 35th Panzer Regiment, Colonel Eberbach (who later became the commander of the 4th Panzer Division) was also destroyed here. Until the end of the day, the S35 destroyed several more German tanks, but by the evening the French were forced to leave Tignes and Kreen under the pressure of the approaching German infantry. French tanks and infantry withdrew 5 km to the west, to the second line of defense (Merdorp, Zhandrenuy and Gendren), covered by the Or-Zhosh river.

Already at 8 o'clock in the evening the Germans tried to attack in the direction of Murdorp, but their artillery preparation turned out to be very weak and only warned the enemy. The firefight between tanks at a long distance (about a kilometer) had no effect, although the Germans noted hits from the short-barreled 75-mm guns of their Pz.IV. German tanks passed north of Murdorp, the French first met them with tank and anti-tank cannon fire, and then counterattacked the flank of the Somua squadron. The report of the 35th German Tank Regiment reported:

“… 11 enemy tanks left Murdorp and attacked the motorized infantry. The 1st Battalion immediately turned around and opened fire on enemy tanks from a distance of 400 to 600 meters. Eight enemy tanks remained motionless, three more managed to escape. "

On the contrary, French sources write about the success of this attack and that the French medium tanks turned out to be completely invulnerable to German vehicles: they left the battle, having from two to four dozen direct hits from 20- and 37-mm shells, but without breaking through the armor.

However, the Germans learned quickly. Immediately after the battle, an instruction appeared prohibiting light German Pz.IIs from engaging in battle with enemy medium tanks. S35s were to be destroyed primarily with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and 105-mm direct-fire howitzers, as well as medium tanks and anti-tank guns.

Late in the evening, the Germans went on the offensive again. On the southern flank of the 3rd light mechanized division, the 2nd cuirassier regiment, already battered the day before, was forced to defend against parts of the 3rd Panzer Division with its last forces - ten surviving Somua and the same number of Hotchkiss. As a result, by midnight the 3rd division had to withdraw another 2-3 km, taking up defensive positions on the Josh-Ramiyi line. The 2nd Light Mechanized Division retreated much further, on the night of May 13-14, retreating south of Perve beyond the Belgian anti-tank ditch prepared for the Dill line. Only then did the Germans stop their advance in anticipation of the approach of the rear with ammunition and fuel. To Gembloux there was still 15 km from here.

To be continued

Literature:

D. M. Proektor. War in Europe. 1939-1941 Moscow: Military Publishing, 1963
Ernest R. May. Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. New York, Hill & Wang, 2000
Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. 1933-1942. Schiffer Military History, Atglen PA, 1996
Jonathan F. Keiler. The 1940 Battle of Gembloux (http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-1940-battle-of-gembloux/)

In Stalingrad, the course of the world took a sharp turn

In Russian military history, the Battle of Stalingrad has always been considered the most outstanding and significant event of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. Modern world historiography also gives the highest assessment of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad. “At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as the decisive battle not only of the Second World War, but of the era as a whole,” emphasizes the British historian J. Roberts.

During the Great Patriotic War there were other, no less brilliant Soviet victories - both in their strategic results and in the level of military art. So why does Stalingrad stand out among them? In connection with the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, I would like to reflect on this.

The interests of historical science, the development of cooperation between peoples demand the liberation military history from the spirit of confrontation, to subordinate the research of scientists to the interests of deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of World War II, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that some people want to falsify the history of World War II, to “re-fight” the war on paper.

O Stalingrad battle much has been written. Therefore, there is no need to retell its course in detail. Historians and the military rightly wrote that its outcome was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the fall of 1942, high level her military leadership command personnel, the massive heroism of Soviet soldiers, the unity and dedication of all Soviet people... It was emphasized that our strategy, operational art and tactics in the course of this battle made a new major step forward in their development, were enriched with new provisions.

PLANS OF THE PARTIES FOR 1942

When discussed at the Headquarters The Supreme Command(VGK) in March 1942 of plans for a summer campaign, the General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov suggested that the main method of action should be considered the transition to strategic defense.

Zhukov considered it possible to undertake private offensive actions only in the zone of the Western Front. Semyon Tymoshenko suggested, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. In response to Zhukov and Shaposhnikov's objections to this proposal, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin said: “We cannot sit idly by in defense, wait for the Germans to strike first! We must ourselves inflict a series of preemptive strikes on a broad front and feel the enemy's readiness. "

As a result, it was decided to undertake a number of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, in the Lgov and Smolensk directions, in the regions of Leningrad and Demyansk.

As for the plans of the German command, at one time it was believed that it set its main goal to capture Moscow by a deep detour from the south. But in reality, according to the directive of the Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces Hitler No. 41 of April 5, 1942, the main goal of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was to seize the Donbass, the Caucasian oil and by disrupting communications in the interior of the country to deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these districts.

First, when delivering a strike in the south, conditions were created for achieving surprise and more favorable opportunities for achieving success, because in 1942 our High Command was again awaiting the main enemy attack in the Moscow direction, and the main forces and reserves were concentrated here. Was not solved and german plan disinformation "Kremlin".

Secondly, in an offensive in the Moscow direction, German troops would have to break through a prepared, in-depth defense with the prospect of waging protracted hostilities. If in 1941 near Moscow the German Wehrmacht did not manage to overcome the resistance of the retreating Red Army with heavy losses, then in 1942 it was all the more difficult for the Germans to count on the capture of Moscow. At that time in the south, in the region of Kharkov, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops, the German army was opposed by our significantly weakened forces; it was here that the most vulnerable sector of the Soviet front was.

Thirdly, when the German army delivered the main blow in the Moscow direction and even, at worst, the capture of Moscow (which was unlikely), the retention of economically important areas in the south by Soviet troops created conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.

All this suggests that the strategic plans of the Hitlerite command basically took into account the prevailing situation correctly. But even under this condition, the troops of Germany and its satellites would not have been able to advance so far and reach the Volga, if not for the major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of a possible enemy strike, inconsistency and indecision in choosing the method of action. On the one hand, in principle, it was supposed to go over to strategic defense, on the other, a number of unprepared and unsecured material offensive operations were undertaken. This led to a dispersion of forces, and our army was unprepared for either defense or offensive. Oddly enough, but the Soviet troops again found themselves in the same uncertain position as in 1941.

And in 1942, despite the defeat of 1941, the ideologized cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so much, underestimation of defense, its false understanding was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet command that it was embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and was not fully resolved. apply.

In the light of the plans of the parties discussed above, it is clearly clear important aspect: The Stalingrad strategic operation was an interconnected part of the entire system of strategic actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military-historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in isolation from other operations carried out in the western direction. This also applies to Operation Mars in 1942, the essence of which is most distorted, especially in American historiography.

The main remark boils down to the fact that the main, decisive strategic operation in the fall and winter of 1942-1943 was not operations in the southwest, but offensive operations carried out in the western strategic direction. The reason for this conclusion is the fact that less manpower and resources were allocated to solve problems in the south than in the west. But in reality this is not entirely true, because the southern strategic direction should be taken as a whole, and not only the troops at Stalingrad, including the troops in the North Caucasus and the troops of the Voronezh direction, which were practically directed to the southern direction. In addition, one must take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the west did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were located southeast of Moscow and could be transferred to the south.

DEFENSE OPERATIONS AT THE APPROACHES TO STALINGRAD

The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and stems from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the outskirts of Stalingrad. During this period, there were most of the omissions and shortcomings in the actions of our command and troops. Military-theoretical thought has yet to clarify how our army, in catastrophically difficult conditions, managed to restore in the summer of 1942 an almost completely disrupted strategic front in the southwestern direction. It is known that only from July 17 to September 30, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades, including 24 tank brigades, to strengthen the Stalingrad direction.

At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan and did not set the task of the troops to stop the advancing enemy only after the withdrawal to the Volga. It repeatedly demanded that the enemy be stopped at a number of lines still on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why did it not succeed, despite the large number of reserves, the courage and mass heroism of officers and soldiers, the skillful actions of a number of formations and units? There were, of course, many cases of confusion and panic, especially after the heavy defeats and heavy losses of our troops in May – June 1942. A serious shake-up was needed for a psychological turn in the troops to come. And in this respect, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 played a generally positive role, giving a sharp and truthful assessment of the situation and imbued with the main demand - "Not a step back!" It was a very harsh and extremely tough document, but forced and necessary in the conditions then prevailing.

Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus chose captivity over suicide.

The main reason for the failure of a number of defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad was that the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941 in organizing strategic defense.

After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and making a decision on defense at one or another advantageous line, where retreating troops would retreat with battles and fresh formations from the depths would be pulled up in advance, orders were given to hold the occupied lines at any cost, even when it was impossible ... Reserve formations and incoming reinforcements on the move were sent into battle, as a rule, to deliver ill-prepared counterattacks and counterattacks. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them in parts, and the Soviet troops were deprived of the opportunity to properly gain a foothold and organize defense on new lines.

The nervous reaction to each retreat further aggravated the already difficult, difficult situation and doomed the troops to new retreats.

It should also be recognized that the German troops were quite skillful in offensive operations, extensively maneuvering and massively using tank and motorized formations in open, tank-accessible terrain. Having met resistance in one sector or another, they quickly changed the direction of their attacks, trying to reach the flank and rear of the Soviet troops, whose maneuverability was much lower.

The setting of unrealistic tasks, the appointment of the dates for the start of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum time required to prepare for their conduct made themselves felt even when many counterattacks and counterattacks were made during defensive operations. For example, on September 3, 1942, in connection with the difficult situation in the Stalingrad front zone, Stalin sent a telegram to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters: "Demand the commander of the troops, standing north and north-west of Stalingrad, to immediately strike at the enemy and come to the aid of the Stalingradites."

There were many such telegrams and demands. It is not difficult for a person who knows even a little about military affairs to understand their absurdity: how can troops, without minimal training and organization, take and "strike" and go on the offensive. Defense activity had great importance for exhausting the enemy, disrupting and delaying his offensive actions. But counterstrikes could be more effective with more careful preparation and material support.

During the defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad, the air defense was extremely weak, and therefore it was necessary to act in conditions of a significant superiority of the enemy's aviation, which made it especially difficult for the troops to maneuver.

If at the beginning of the war the inexperience of personnel also affected, then after heavy losses in 1941 and in the spring of 1942 the problem of personnel was even more acute, although there were many commanders who had time to temper and gain combat experience. There were many mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility on the part of the commanders of fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units. In their totality, they also seriously complicated the situation, but were not as decisive as the miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters. Not to mention the fact that the too frequent change of commanders, commanders (only in July-August 1942, three commanders of the Stalingrad Front were replaced) did not allow them to get used to the situation.

The fear of encirclement negatively affected the stability of the troops. A disastrous role in this regard was played by political mistrust and repression against the military, who, during the retreats in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, were surrounded. And after the war, officers who were surrounded were not accepted to study at military academies. It seemed to the military-political organs and the bosses of the NKVD that such an attitude towards the “encircled people” could increase the resistance of the troops. But everything was the other way around - the fear of encirclement reduced the stubbornness of the troops in defense. At the same time, it was not taken into account that, as a rule, the most staunchly defended troops fell into the encirclement, often as a result of the retreat of neighbors. It was this most selfless part of the military that was persecuted. No one was held responsible for this wild and criminal incompetence.

FEATURES OF THE STALINGRAD OFFENSIVE OPERATION

From the experience of the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943), when the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out a counteroffensive, important conclusions and lessons follow on the preparation and conduct of offensive operations to encircle and destroy the enemy.

The strategic plan of this counteroffensive was to encircle and destroy the group of German fascist troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Long-range aviation and the Volga flotilla also took part in the operation.

Various points of view are expressed as to who the initial idea of the counteroffensive with the encirclement and destruction of the main forces of the enemy belongs to. Khrushchev, Eremenko, and many others claimed this. Objectively speaking, this idea in general form, as many participants in the war recall, was literally "hovering in the air", because the very configuration of the front already suggested the need to strike at the flanks of the enemy grouping under the command of Friedrich Paulus.

But the main, most difficult task was how to concretize and implement this idea, taking into account the current situation, how to collect and concentrate the necessary forces and means in time and organize their actions, where to specifically direct the strikes and with what tasks. It can be considered an established fact that the main idea of this plan, of course, belongs to the Supreme Command Headquarters, and above all to Georgy Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that it was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and officers of the fronts.

In general, it must be said that the level of military art of command personnel and staffs, the combat skill of all personnel in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many methods of preparing and conducting combat operations, having appeared here for the first time (not always in their finished form), were then used with great success in the operations of 1943-1945.

At Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and assets in the directions chosen for the offensive was carried out with great success, although not yet to the same extent as in the operations of 1944-1945. Thus, on the Southwestern Front, in the 22 km breakthrough sector (9% of the entire width of the strip), of 18 rifle divisions, 9 were concentrated; on the Stalingrad front in the 40 km sector (9%) of 12 divisions - 8; in addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% of artillery were concentrated in these sectors. However, the density of artillery was only 56 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area, while in subsequent operations it was 200–250 and more. In general, the secrecy of preparation and the surprise of going over to the offensive were achieved.

In fact, for the first time during the war, not only was a thorough planning of operations carried out, but also painstaking work on the ground with commanders of all levels was carried out to prepare for combat operations, organize interaction, combat, logistic and technical support... Reconnaissance succeeded, albeit incompletely, in exposing the enemy's fire system, which made it possible to carry out his more reliable fire defeat than was the case in previous offensive operations.

For the first time, an artillery and air offensive was used in full, although in the methods of artillery preparation and support for the attack, not everything was still quite clearly worked out.

For the first time before an offensive on a wide front, in the bands of all armies, reconnaissance by force was carried out by forward subunits in order to clarify the location of the forward edge and the enemy's fire system. But in the bands of some armies it was carried out for two or three days, and in the 21st and 57th armies - five days before the start of the offensive, which under other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the data obtained about the enemy's fire system would become significantly outdated ...

At Stalingrad, for the first time during a major offensive operation, new infantry battle formations were used in accordance with the requirements of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 306 - with a one-echelon formation of not only subunits, units, but also formations. This arrangement reduced the losses of troops, made it possible to more fully use the infantry's firepower. But at the same time, the absence of second echelons made it difficult to build up efforts in a timely manner to develop the offensive in depth. This was one of the reasons why the first echelon rifle divisions failed to break through the enemy's defenses; already at a depth of 3-4 km, tank corps had to be brought into battle, which, given the situation then forced measure... The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations has shown that in regiments and divisions, whenever possible, it is imperative to create second echelons.

The volume of material and technical support for the troops increased significantly. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated on three fronts. For example: in 1914, the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.

But if we compare it with the requirements for effective engagement, then the November offensive operations of 1942 were comparatively insufficiently provided with ammunition - an average of 1.7–3.7 ammunition; Southwestern Front - 3.4; Donskoy - 1.7; Stalingrad - 2. For example, in the Belorussian or Vistula-Oder operations, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was up to 4.5 ammunition.

On the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, associated with the actions of the troops to destroy the encircled enemy grouping and the development of the offensive on the external front, two questions arise on which different opinions are expressed.

Firstly, some historians and military experts believe that the fact that there was a large gap between the encirclement of the enemy group and its destruction is a serious flaw in the Soviet counteroffensive operation at Stalingrad, while the classical provision of military art says that the encirclement and destruction of the enemy should be a single a continuous process, which was subsequently achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev and some other operations. But what they managed to do near Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if we remember that in the offensive near Moscow, near Demyansk and in other areas it was not even possible to encircle the enemy, and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, Soviet troops encircling the enemy, they themselves were surrounded and defeated.

During the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, on the one hand, all the necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy during his encirclement, although one must take into account the large size of the territory on which the encircled enemy was located and the high density of his groupings. On the other hand, the presence of large enemy forces on the external front, striving to release the encircled 6th Army of Paulus, did not make it possible to concentrate sufficient forces to quickly eliminate the enemy troops encircled at Stalingrad.

In Stalingrad, a battle was fought for every house.

The Supreme Command headquarters belatedly made a decision to unite the command and control of all the troops engaged in the destruction of the encircled grouping in the hands of one front. Only in mid-December 1942, a directive was received to transfer all the troops involved in Stalingrad to the Don Front.

Secondly, how legitimate was the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the direction of the 2nd guards army Rodion Malinovsky to defeat Erich Manstein's group in the Kotelnikov direction. As you know, originally the 2nd Guards Army was intended for operations as part of Southwestern Front, then, with a change in the situation, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping. But with the appearance on the Kotelnikovsky direction of the enemy army group "Don" under the command of Manstein, the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the request of General Eremenko, made a new decision - to transfer the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front for operations in the Kotelnikovsky direction. This proposal was supported by Vasilevsky, who was at that time at the command post of the Don Front. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Don Front in order to accelerate the destruction of the encircled enemy grouping. Nikolai Voronov also opposed the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front. After the war, he called this decision a "terrible miscalculation" of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

But a careful analysis of the situation at that time with the involvement of the enemy documents that became known to us after the war shows that the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2nd Guards Army to defeat Manstein was apparently more expedient. There was no guarantee that with the addition of the 2nd Guards Army to the Don Front, it would be possible to quickly deal with the encircled group of Paulus. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult it was to destroy 22 enemy divisions, numbering up to 250 thousand people. There was a large, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough of Manstein's grouping and a strike against it by Paulus's army could lead to the release of the encircled enemy grouping and disruption further offensive troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD FOR THE PROGRESS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In world historiography, there is no common understanding of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for the course and outcome of World War II. After the end of the war, Western literature asserted that not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the victory of the Allied forces at El Alamein, was the most significant turning point in the course of World War II. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, it must be admitted that a major victory was won by the Allies at El Alamein, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of the common enemy. But still, the battle of El Alamein cannot be compared with the Battle of Stalingrad.

If we talk about the military-strategic side of the matter, the Battle of Stalingrad took place on a vast territory, almost 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation at El Alamein - on a relatively narrow African coast.

At Stalingrad, more than 2.1 million people, over 26 thousand guns and mortars, 2.1 thousand tanks and over 2.5 thousand combat aircraft took part on both sides at certain stages of the battle. The German command for the battles at Stalingrad attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10,290 guns, 675 tanks and 1,216 aircraft. While at El Alamein, Rommel's African corps had only 80 thousand people, 540 tanks, 1200 guns and 350 aircraft.

The Battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943), and the battle of El Alamein lasted 11 days (from October 23 to November 4, 1942), not to mention the incomparability of the tension and bitterness of the two these battles. If at El Alamein the fascist bloc lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns, then at Stalingrad the losses of Germany and its satellites were 10-15 times greater. About 144 thousand people were taken prisoner. The 330,000-strong group of troops was destroyed. The losses of the Soviet troops were also very large - the irrecoverable losses amounted to 478,741 people. Many of the soldiers' lives could have been saved. Yet our sacrifices were not in vain.

The military-political significance of the events that took place is incomparable. The Battle of Stalingrad took place in the main European theater of operations, where the fate of the war was being decided. The El Alamein operation took place in North Africa in a secondary theater of operations; its influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then focused not on El-Alamein, but on Stalingrad.

The victory at Stalingrad had a huge impact on liberation movement peoples of the whole world. A powerful wave of the national liberation movement swept through all countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.

In turn, major defeats and huge losses of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad sharply worsened the military-political and economic situation in Germany, put it in front of a deep crisis. The damage of enemy tanks and vehicles in the Battle of Stalingrad equaled, for example, six months of their production by German factories, guns - four months, and mortars and small arms - two months. And in order to make up for such large losses, the German military industry was forced to work with extremely high voltage. The crisis of human reserves has sharply aggravated.

The disaster on the Volga left its noticeable imprint on the morale of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience to commanders increased, and military crimes became more frequent. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences imposed by Hitler's justice on German servicemen increased significantly. German soldiers began to fight with less stubbornness, began to fear attacks from the flanks and encirclement. Among some politicians and representatives of senior officers, sentiments that were opposed to Hitler appeared.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad shook the fascist military bloc, had a depressing effect on the satellites of Germany, caused panic and insoluble contradictions in their camp. The ruling leaders of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, in order to save themselves from the impending catastrophe, began to look for pretexts to exit the war, ignoring Hitler's orders to send troops to the Soviet-German front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers, but also entire units and units of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies surrendered to the Red Army. The relationship between the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the allied armies has become aggravated.

The crushing defeat of the fascist hordes at Stalingrad had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They abandoned their intentions to go to war against the USSR.

Under the influence of the successes achieved by the Red Army at Stalingrad and in the subsequent operations of the winter campaign of 1942–1943, Germany's isolation in the international arena intensified and at the same time the international prestige of the USSR increased. In 1942–1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and resumed diplomatic ties that had been interrupted earlier with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay. Relations with the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland in London improved. On the territory of the USSR, the formation of military units and formations of a number of countries of the anti-Hitler coalition began - the French Normandy aviation squadron, the 1st Czechoslovak infantry brigade, the 1st Polish division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko. All of them were subsequently included in the struggle against the German-fascist troops on the Soviet-German front.

All this suggests that it was the battle of Stalingrad, and not the operation at El Alamein, that broke the back of the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a radical turning point in World War II in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this radical change.

Major battles of World War II, which were of great importance for the history of the USSR, are:

Battle of Stalingrad July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943, which marked a radical turning point in the war;

Battle of Kursk, July 5 - August 23, 1943, during which the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place - near the village of Prokhorovka;

Battle of Berlin - leading to the surrender of Germany.

But events important for the course of World War II took place not only on the fronts of the USSR. Among the operations carried out by the allies, it is worth noting: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which caused the United States to enter the Second world war; the opening of the second front and the landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944; application nuclear weapons 6 and 9 August 1945 to strike at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The end of World War II was September 2, 1945. Japan signed an act of surrender only after the defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops. The battles of the Second World War, according to the most rough estimates, carried away 65 million people on both sides. The Soviet Union suffered the greatest losses in World War II - 27 million citizens of the country were killed. It was he who took the brunt of the blow. This figure is also approximate and, according to some researchers, underestimated. Exactly stubborn resistance The Red Army became the main cause of the defeat of the Reich.

Results of World War II

Outcomes World War II horrified everyone. Military actions have brought the very existence of civilization to the brink. During the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, fascist ideology was condemned, and many war criminals were punished. In order to prevent such a possibility of a new world war in the future, at the Yalta conference in 1945, it was decided to create the United Nations Organization (UN), which still exists today. The results of the nuclear bombardment of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the signing of pacts on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a ban on their production and use. It must be said that the consequences of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are being felt today.

The economic consequences of the Second World War were also serious. For Western European countries, it turned into a real economic disaster. The influence of Western European countries has diminished significantly. At the same time, the United States managed to maintain and strengthen its position.

Significance of World War II

Meaning World War II for the Soviet Union is enormous. The defeat of the fascists determined the future history of the country. As a result of the conclusion of the peace treaties that followed the defeat of Germany, the USSR significantly expanded its borders. At the same time, the totalitarian system was strengthened in the Union. In some European countries, communist regimes were established. The victory in the war did not save the USSR from the massive repressions that followed in the 50s.