When it was the creation of a random of the Supreme Command. The rate of the Supreme Command

The bid of the Supreme Commander is the highest body of the strategic leadership by the Soviet Armed Forces during the war.

It was formed in accordance with the decision of the USSR SCC and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on June 23, 1941 and was first called the bet of the Main Command. It includes: the drug defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko (Chairman), Head of the General Staff General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, Chairman of the Sovnarkom of the USSR I.V. Stalin, his first deputy V.M. Molotov, Marshals K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyanny and Narcar N.G. N.G. Kuznetsov.

On July 10, 1941, it was transformed into the supreme command rate, and it was introduced by B.M. Shaposhnikov. After I.V. Stalin on August 8, 1941 became the Supreme Commander, the rate began to be called the bid of the Supreme Command (VGK). During the war years, it was reformed several times, in accordance with the solid tasks, its composition changed, was replenished with prominent state and military leaders.

In mid-February 1945, members of the TGK rate were: I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, N.A. Bulganin, N.G. Kuznetsov. The TGC rate gave a fundamental assessment of the military-political and strategic environment due to the situation in the fronts; accepted strategic and operational and strategic solutions for the conduct of combat operations, created for the group of troops; I solved the issues of interaction of groups of fronts, fronts and individual armies, between the active army and partisans. The competence rate included issues of creating and preparing strategic reserves, logistical support for troops and many other, more private issues related to the organization of military operations. The preparation of recommendations on the strategic leadership of the troops considered and approved by the bid was subordinate to the general headquarters. It turned into a working body of the bet: supplied the necessary information, processed it and prepared proposals, on the basis of which the rate gave its directives. Preparation of proposals for military campaigns, strategic operations and discussion of them at meetings of the rates were carried out in close contact with the commander of fronts, major military leaders, state and party leaders, heads of the most important addicts (solved the problems of the material support of the troops). Approve of operations plans, tagged strategic tasks and providing them with the necessary human and material forces and resources, the rate directly led the fronts, fleets, long-range aviation. Communication with them rates of AGC and the General Staff was carried out both by technical means and through personal contacts. Commander Fronts (Fleets) were called at the rate meeting; Her own representatives - G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, S.K. Tymoshenko, N.G. Kuznetsov and others - have repeatedly leaving the place of hostilities to provide direct assistance in managing operations, control over their preparation and conduct, solving issues of coordination of major compounds. Bet, leaning on the central headquarters partisan traffic, carried out a strategic leadership of the actions of folk avengers in the rear of the enemy. Teso, tightly linking the tasks of the tasks of the Soviet people with the achievement of military political and strategic goals in the war, it carried out its work in close cooperation with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPP (B) and the State Defense Committee.

Speaking about the style of work stakes, A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: "Understand the body, constantly meeting the literal sense of the word in the Supreme Commander in the composition, in which it was approved, it is impossible. After all, most of her members were performed at the same time responsible responsibilities, often being far beyond Moscow, mainly on the front ... But that was what was constantly: each of the members of the rate held with the Supreme Commander Command. "

Historical sources:

Russian Archive: Great Patriotic: General Staff during the Great Patriotic War: Doc. and materials 1941 t.23 (12-1). M., 1997;.

Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War: General Staff during the Great Patriotic War: Documents and materials 1944-1945. T.23 (12-4). M., 2001.

The bid of the Supreme Commander (TGK, SVGK) is an extraordinary body of the highest military administration, which, during the Great Patriotic War, the strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Since the beginning of war, the Soviet state was in a difficult situation. He had to almost simultaneously solve a number of hard tasks, including:

- suspend the rapid offensive of German troops;

- to conduct universal mobilization of military-ridicated and compensate for the loss in the live strength, incurred in the first days of the war;

- evacuate the East industrial, primarily defense, enterprises, as well as the population and the most important property from the areas that threatened the German occupation;

- organize the production of weapons and ammunition in the amount of quantity necessary for the armed forces.

The solution of these and other issues demanded a cardinal change of the entire system of political, state and military leadership.

June 23, 1941, the main military council of the Red Army is abolished. The decision of the USSR SCC and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on June 23, 1941, a new army management body was formed, he was originally called the bid of the Main Command. It was included in its composition: S. K. Tymoshenko (Chairman), K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyanny, N. G. Kuznetsov.

The first meetings of the head of the General Command of the Armed Forces in June were held without Stalin.

On July 10, 1941, in connection with the formation of the chief commands of the directions (North-West, Western and South-West), was transformed into the supreme command rate. I. V. Stalin became the chairman, and B. M. Shaposhnikov was introduced into its composition.

On August 8, 1941, the body was renamed at the Supreme Command rate. She carried out its activities under the leadership of GKO.

SVGK made changes and refinement to the structure and organization of the Armed Forces, carried out the planning of campaigns and strategic operations, set the tasks of the fronts and fleets and managed their combat activities, agreed the efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Army of Allied States, organized interaction between strategic groups and operational associations of various species The armed forces and partisans, distributed between the fronts the reserve compounds and material resources between the fronts, carried out control over the progress of the tasks set, was led by studying and summarizing the experience of war. The working bodies of the SVGC were the General Staff, the Office of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy. The most appropriate methods of the strategic leadership of SVGK produced gradually, as combat experience and the growth of military art accumulates at the highest links of the command and headquarters.

The most important issues of strategic plans and operations plans were discussed at its meetings, in some cases there were commanders and members of the military councils of fronts, commander of the types of armed forces and labor of troops. The final decision on the issues discussed by the Supreme Commander formulated personally. An important role in the guidance of the fighting activities of fronts and fleets was played by the CHGK directives, in which the goals and objectives of the troops were usually indicated in operations, the main directions where it was necessary to focus the main efforts, ways to use mobile troops, the necessary artillery density and tanks in the breakthrough sites. The presence at the disposal of CFGs of large reserves allowed it to actively influence the course of operations. Wide distribution during the war received the Institute of Representatives of SVGK. Knowing the intentions and plans of the SVGK and possessing powers in solving operational and tactical issues, they provided great assistance to commander of operational associations in the preparation and conduct of operations, coordinated the actions of the fronts, coordinated their efforts on the purpose, place and time. Representatives of the SVGK at the fronts in different time were: Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. K. Tymoshenko, K. E. Voroshilov, Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, Generals A. I. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko other.

The rate of the Supreme Command (SVGK)

the Emergency Authority of the Higher Military Office, which carried out in the years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, the strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. Created by the Decree of the USSR SCC and the Central Committee of the WCP (b) on June 23, 1941 and was originally called the bid of the chief command of the Armed Forces of the USSR. It was included in its composition: S. K. Tymoshenko (Chairman), K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyanny, N. G. Kuznetsov. Subsequently, the name and composition of SVGK have undergone some changes. On July 10, 1941, in connection with the formation of the chief commands of the directions (North-West, Western and South-Western), the head of the chief command was renamed to the Supreme Command rate, and on August 8, 1941 - at the Supreme Command Rate. From July 10, 1941, I. V. Stalin became his chairman, and B. M. Shaposhnikov was introduced into members. February 17, 1945 by the Debutuation of the State Committee of Defense (see the State Defense Committee) SVGK was determined as part of: I. V. Stalin (Chairman), K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov, N. A . Bulganin, N. G. Kuznetsov. At the rate there was an institution of regular advisers, which at different times were N. F. Vatutin, N. A. Voznesensky, N. N. Voronov, A. A. Zhdanov, P. F. Zhigarev, K. A. Meretkov, A. I. Mikoyan, B. M. Shaposhnikov and others. Military, party and government figures.

SVGK made changes and clarification into the structure and organization of the Armed Forces, carried out the planning of campaigns and strategic operations, put the tasks of the fronts and fleets and managed their combat activities, coordinated the efforts of the owls. The armed forces and the armies of the Allied States, organized the interaction between strategic groups and operational associations of various types of armed forces and partisans, distributed backup compounds and material tools between the fronts, carried out control over the completion of the tasks set, led the study and generalization of war experience. The working bodies of the SVGC were the General Staff, the Office of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy. The most appropriate methods of the strategic leadership of SVGK produced gradually, as combat experience and the growth of military art accumulates at the highest links of the command and headquarters. During the war, the currently established two-way control system was fully met: SVGK - Front (fleet). In some periods of war, especially at its beginning, this system was replaced by three-shielded: intermediate links of strategic leadership were created between SVGK and fronts, but they existed long (North-West Directions from July 10 to August 29, 1941, Western Direction with 10 July to September 11, 1941 and from February 1 to May 3, 1942, southwestern directions from July 10, 1941 to 21 June 1942; North Caucasian directions from April 21 to May 19, 1942) and were abolished as the front and improved leadership from the commander of the fronts. In 1945, at the final stage of war, the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was established Far East, leaving actions against Militarist Japan. The commander-in-chief had broad powers to lead the front-line, fleet and flotilla, and in specific conditions of hostilities in the Far East, the experience of creating a three-letter system of strategic leadership was justified.

During the war, the methods of the strategic leadership of CHGK continuously developed and improved. The most important issues of strategic plans and plans of operations were discussed at its meetings, at some cases, commanders and members of the military councils of fronts were present, commander of the forces of the Armed Forces and Childbies of Troops. The final decision on the issues discussed by the Supreme Commander formulated personally. The Directives of the SVGK were an important role in managing the combat activities of fronts and fleeces, in which the goals and tasks of troops in operations were usually indicated, the main directions, where it was necessary to focus the main efforts, ways to use mobile troops, the necessary density of artillery and tanks in the breakthrough sites, etc. . The presence at the disposal of CFGs of large reserves allowed it to actively influence the course of operations. Wide distribution during the war received the Institute of Representatives of SVGK. Knowing the intentions and plans of the SVGK and possessing powers in solving operational and tactical issues, they provided great assistance to commander of operational associations in the preparation and conduct of operations, coordinated the actions of the fronts, coordinated their efforts on the purpose, place and time. Representatives of the SVGK at the fronts at different times were: Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. K. Tymoshenko, K. E. Voroshilov, Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, Generals A. I. Antonov, S. M. Shtemenko et al.

I. G. Pavlenko.

Big soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

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• Time. Hot winter 1941/42. Collection of memoirs of veterans of the 54th Army, I. A. Ivanova. December 1941. Leningrad is still in siege. The first two attempts in September and October break through the blockade by Lenfront with the Nevsky "Pigchka" to connect to the Sinyavinsk group not ...

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany rudely violating the terms of the contract with the USSR, attacked the Soviet country. 153 German divisions were thrown against the USSR, pre-mulled, armed with the newest military equipment.

Together with Hitler's Germany, Romania, Hungary and Finland were performed against the Council of the Union, which put 37 divisions on the first days.

He opposed the USSR and the fascist Italy. Germany assisted Bulgaria and Spain. Imperialist Japan waited a convenient moment to attack the USSR. To this end, she kept from Soviet Far Eastern borders in combat readiness Millionnaya Kwantung Army.

The enemy invasion began at 4 am on June 22. Large connections of infantry and tank troops on a wide, front crossed soviet border. At the same time, German aircraft subjected to brutal bombing border, points, airfields, railway stations, big cities. After an hour and a half after the start of the invasion, the German ambassador in Moscow made a statement to the Soviet rule on German entry into the war with the Soviet Union of Ivanov. G.P. During the years of harsh tests. Krasnodar, KN. Publishing House, 1997. P. 112

Above the Soviet country hung a deadly danger. In his statement made on the radio on June 22 in 12 chanes, the Soviet government called on the whole soviet people And his armed forces to the Patriotic War against the German fascist invaders, to the Holy War for their homeland, for honor and freedom. "Our business is right. The gate will be broken. The victory will be behind us "- these words of government governance expressed a deep confidence of all Soviet people in victory over the enemy.

On the same day, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the mobilization of military-ridden history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union was announced 1941-1945. T.4. M., 1962, S.50 in 14 Military Districts, was introduced martial law in the European Union of the USSR.

The treacherous attack of Hitler's Germany in the USSR interrupted peaceful construction in our country. Soviet Union Entered during the period of liberation war.

Soviet people, as one, rose to the defense of their homeland, to the sacred nationwide war. Workers, peasants and intelligentsia were covered by a huge patriotic lift; They expressed their unshakable determination from-to-facilitate each of the native land, fight the last drop of blood, to the complete defeat fascist Germany. The co-wind people cluttered around the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Fascist Germany unleashed the war robber, designed to capture our lands and the conquest of the peoples of the USSR. The Nazis was aimed at destroying the Council state, to restore capitalist construction in the USSR, to destroy millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors to turn into slaves of German landowners and capital-stov.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascist Germany and its accomplices was a fair, liberation war.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union merged with the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples of other countries against the F-Shisti aggressors. She was in the interest of all progress-silent humanity.

The armed forces of fascist Germany acted on a predetermined plan, which received the name "Barbarossa Plan". German team-giving extended to the full-thunder of the Soviet Union during the short-term campaign. The main strategic task was to defeat the Soviet Armed Forces, to seize the territory of the USSR to the turn of Arkhangelsk-- Volga - Astrakhan. At the same time, the Ural industrial district of the German team suggested to destroy aviation forces after the release of the German fascist troops to the Volga.

In accordance with the "Barbarossa Plan", German team-giving in advance focused its forces at our borders. A group of enemy troops, which carried Norva-Gia's name, was intended to strike at Murmansk and Kandalakshu. The Army Group "North" fell on the Baltic States and Leningrad, in cooperation with this grouping was the Finnish troops, who launched their actions in the Lake Ladoga area. In the central direction, the most stronger group of the German-fascist armies "Center", which had its task to seize Minsk, and then step on SMO-Lensk and Moscow. In the south, on the front from the hill to the Black Sea, the group of army "South" was operating, the left wing of which was hit in the direction of Kiev.

The German command intended to carry out a deep breakthrough to the location of the troops of our border military districts, not to give them the opportunity to move away to the country and destroy them in western regions. In the event of the complete success of this plan, the enemy would have the opportunity to capture the most important life centers of the USSR - Moscow, Leningrad and the southern industrial areas.

Hitlerian Germany before the start of the war against the USSR translated the country's economy to military rails, the troops, and thoroughly prepared the strong invasion army carefully. This army possessed almost two-year experience of venation of large combat operations in Europe. It was equipped with all kinds of newest military equipment, consisted of selected soldiers and officers brought up in the spirit of robber, fascist ideology, national and racial hatred for Slavic and other peoples.

Despite heroic resistance soviet troopsThe decor at the front at the beginning of the war was extremely unfavorable for our army.

Numerous, technically well-equipped and experienced experience of modern war The German-fascist di-vision, using the treachery of the attack, put the Council-sky troops of the border districts, where the knowledge forces of the personnel army were located, in extremely severe position. Not being quite focused and deployed for hostilities, Soviet troops could not resist the enemy's numerically superior forces, which acted on the main directions. The strike groups of the enemy (tank and motorized divisions) dispelled the combat rows of Soviet troops and moved into the departure of our territory-Rii. As a result, the management of Soviet military units was extremely difficult. Strong blows of enemy aviation for troops and strategically important objects were struck by the loss of Soviet troops, hung huge damage to reasons and communications. The enemy quickly achieved treason in the ratio of forces in its favor. Soviet troops you needed to retreat, leading heavy battles and carrying big losses.

By the beginning of July 1941, the enemy was able to seize Lithuania, the knowledge of Latvia, the western parts of Belarus and the UK Raine, to go to Western Dvin.

The failures of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war explained a number of reasons. Among these reasons, first of all, it seems to mention the late translation of the industry Pa Military Lad.

Our country's industry is the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. T.4. M., 1962, p. 61, which was on high level Development in which she could fully ensure the Soviet Army with everything necessary, was not on time and truly mobilized in order to produce the maximum number of all types of weapons and combat supply. This was not allowed to complete the re-equipment of the Soviet troops in a new technique before the war, replenish the losses and provide weapons new formations at the beginning of the war. Large mistakes were allowed in the construction of mechanized troops. In 1937, Mesenized Corps were disbanded Soviet army. The highest organizational unit was adopted tank Brigadethat did not meet the requirements of the modern war. Only in 1940, taking into account the experience of World War II, in the Soviet Army, mechanized cases began to be formed. However, before the beginning of the war, their formation was not fully completed.

The disadvantage in the creation of the mechanized troops was aggravated by the fact that, while the magazine tanks were removed from production, the mass production of new T-34 tanks and heavy tanks "KV" was not yet deployed. As a result, a large noncomplex of tanks was formed. Mechanized housings deployed in border areas were not fully equipped with the material part.

Many artillery parts have not yet been translated into mechanized traction, lacked anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery.

Approximately the same position was also in the construction of our air force. Although, by the beginning of the war, the Soviet aviation had no less aircraft in their arms than the enemy, but these aircraft were outdated and inferior to German in their combat qualities. True, at that time, the Soviet designers gave new shapes of aircraft who were superior to German.

But the re-equipment of the air force was carried out slowly. By the beginning of the war, new aircraft in the aviation park were only a minor part. In addition, the new material part of the pilots did not have time to truly master.

The preparation of new defensive frontiers was not preferred, and weapons were removed from the old long-term construction. The network of aero-drills was not developed enough in border areas. In poor condition, highways and smart roads For the movement of troops.

One of the reasons for insufficient preparedness of the Soviet Army to the Enemy's disadvantage was an incorrect score of I. V. Stalin the military-political situation directly on the eve of the war the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. T.4. M., 1962, p. 65. Stalin believed that Germany in Blue Time would not be decided to attack the USSR. Therefore, he was slow with the holding of defensive events, believing that these actions can give the Nazis reason for the attack on our country. I. V. Stalin also underestimated the military capabilities of Hitler's Germany.

The underestimation of the threat of a fascist attack on the USSR was reflected, in particular, in the report of the TASS dated June 14, 1941, this statement was indicated for the groundlessness of the hens on the mobilization of Germany and the preparation of the War against the USSR. The report said that "according to the USSR. Germany also steadily complies with the conditions of the Soviet-German Covenant on non-fire, as well as the Soviet Union, in view of which, according to Soviet circles, rumors about the German intention to break the pact and take an attack on the USSR deprived of all the soil. "

In the border military districts, the creation and concentration on the threatening directions of sufficient forces were in a timely manner, which could be opposed to major strategic groups of the enemy. It should be taken into account that in the pre-war years, a significant number of experienced commanders and political workers, especially in the highest link, was repressed as a result of the actions of hostile elements that broke into state security bodies. Families who came to the leadership and connections, young personnel often did not have even sufficient knowledge and experience. It also adversely affected the course of hostilities of Soviet troops in the first period of war.

As a result of all these mistakes and disadvantages, Soviet troops, being captured by surprise, in the first days of the war they suffered large losses in the lively strength and technique.

Soviet aviation, which suffered great losses from the sustained strikes of the enemy on the very first day of the war, was not able to properly fulfill its tasks in order to prevent the operations of terrestrial enemy's troops. Due to the rapid promotion of enemy troops into the depths of the country.

The Soviet Union has lost the possibility of using industrial enterprises in Western regions for the production of military products. Part of the enterprises was evacuated, and non-part of the part remained at the captured territory. It further aggravated the difficulties of war for the Soviet state.

The retreat of Soviet troops was forced. The time of the loss of a number of territories of the USSR acute pain responded in the hearts of all Soviet people. The actions of the enemy inflicted great damage to the Soviet state. Therefore, the statement is incorrect that the Soviet troops acted on a previously developed plan of "active strategic defense" that the retreat of Soviet troops in the first period of the war was supposedly calculated to urge the enemy, and then proceed to counteroffensive.

The huge difficulties and failures of the initial period of war were not broken by the combat spirit of the Soviet army. Connections of the Council-sky forces, despite the solely complex and difficult situation, moved away with stubborn battles. In dozens of large battles and hundreds of fights, Soviet warriors beat unparalleled courage. A whole month after the German invasion lasted the heroic struggle of a small garrison Brest Fortress With the upcoming enemy forces.

The defense of the fortress was led by people of wonderful courage, selflessly loyal by the Soviet Motherland - Captain I. N. Zubachev, the regimental commissioner E. M. Fomin, Major P. M. Gavrilov and others. Resistance ended only when not a single defender remains in the ranks. At the BUGA ZASE Lieutenant Monina, the whole day could fight against the battalion of the Nazis. Having received information that Gitle-Rovers forced the Prut, took the railway bridge and began to do it on it to pass the tanks, the pichanas of the fifth outpost A. K. Konstantinov, V. F. Mikhalkov and I. D. Buseitkov penetrated the rear The enemy, killed him guard and blew up the bridge. The promotion of German tanks in this direction was delayed. For this feat, A. K. Konstan-Tinov, V. F. Mikhalkovo and I. D. Buzitskosu was awarded the title of heroes of the Soviet Union. An unforgettable feat committed on June 26, 1941. Captain N. F. Gastello and the crew of its aircraft as part of A. A. Burdenyuk, N. Skorobogoye and A. A, Kalinin. When the enemy shell fell into a gasoline tank of their aircraft, Captain N. F, Gastello led the burning ma-tire on the column (enemy tanks and tanks. Together with the heroic crew aircraft exploded german tanks and tanks.

Already in the first battles at the fronts of the Patriotic War, many thousands of Soviet soldiers made unparalleled feats, not sparing their lives to protect their homeland.

The head of the chief command was created on June 23, 1941. Its composition differed somewhat different from the project, a defense addict. It included: People's Commier Sar Defense S. K. Tymoshenko (Chairman), Head of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M . Budyanny, N. G. Kuznetsov. It was also suggested that the rate includes the first deputy head of the General Staff N. F. Vatutina. But I. V. Stalin did not agree great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Encyclopedia. M., 1985, p.680.

At the rate, a group of advisers on various issues was formed. Practically, the group played a nominal role, since all the advisers soon received other appointments, and they did not take place.

Throughout the war, the rate was in Moscow. It had a great moral value. In connection with the threat of enemy blows from the air in early July from the Kremlin, it was transferred to the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kirov gate to a small mansion with a reliable work premises and a connection, and in a month in vicinity, at the perrone of the Metro station Kirov, and operators of the General Staff - Working body rates.

June 30, 1941 according to the approximate model of the Leninsky Council of Working in the Peasant Defense during the period of foreign military intervention and civil War By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Emergency Body was created - the State Defense Committee at the head of I. V. Stalin.

GKO has become an authoritative body of the leadership of the country's defense, focusing in his hands all the complete power. Civilian, party soviet organizations They were obliged to fulfill all his decisions and orders. To control their execution in the edges and regions, military-industrial addicts, at the main enterprises and gko lines had its representatives.

At the meetings of the GKO, which took place at any time of the day, as a rule, in the Kremlin or in Duc., I. V. Stalin, discussed and resolved the most important questions. Military plans were considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Committee of Defense. The meeting was invited to popular commissars who had to take part in ensuring operations. This allowed when it appeared the opportunity to focus enormous material forces at the most important areas, to conduct a single line in the field of strategic leadership and supporting it with an organized rear, link the combat activities of troops with the efforts of the whole country.

Very often, GKO sessions broke out sharp disputes at the same time, opinions were expressed definitely and sharply. If they did not come to a single opinion, the commission and representatives of the extremes were immediately created, which was prescribed to report agreed proposals at the next meeting.

In total, during the war, the State Defense Committee adopted about ten thousand decisions and orders of military and economic nature. These decisions and orders were strictly and vigorously performed, the work began around them, which ensured a single party line in the leadership of the country at a difficult and difficult time.

On July 10, 1941, in order to improve the management of the armed forces, the decision of the State Defense Committee, the main command rate was transformed into the Supreme Command rate, and on August 8, it was transformed into the Supreme Command Rate. Since then, until the end of the war, I. V. Stalin, he was the Supreme Commander.

With the formation of the State Committee for Defense and the creation of the Supreme Command Committee, at the head of which was the same person - the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPP (b) and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissar was completed the creation of the structure of state and military leadership. Central Committee of the Party Providing the Unity of Action of All Party, State, Military and Economic Bodies1. Vehicle Story Ed. Munchaeva S.M.-m., Thought 1994, p. 38

July 19, 1941 by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR I. V. Stalin was appointed and people's Commissar Defense.

I must say that with the appointment of I. V. Stalin, the Chair-television of the State Committee for Defense, the Supreme Chamber of Commerce and the People's Commissar of Defense in the General Staff, the Central Administs of the Defense People's Commissariat, state of the USSR and in other government and national economy authorities immediately hand.

Each member of the GCO received a specific task and strictly answered the implementation of the plans of the national economy. One of them was responsible for the release of tanks, on other artillery weapons, on the third - self-tv, on the fourth - supply of ammunition, food and uniforms, etc. Commander of the Russian Commons . Stalin personally ordered to connect to members of the GCO and in the work of them in the work on the implementation of a program of production of certain military products precisely at the appointed time and necessary quality.

Under the influence of party-political work, improving the art of the management of troops, the accumulated experience of the armed struggle increased by the enemy. Warriors of all types and genera of weapons acted in battles of heroically and self-cure. Military dish ziplin rose in the troops.

However, despite the energetic rates and commands of the fronts, the position on the fronts continued to sharpen. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, our troops went deep into the country. In the conditions of the NEAL-Events for us, the development of military events was also the strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was distinguished by very active forms and persistence of struggle.

The Central Committee of WCP (b) and the GCO showed a serious concern about the state of the country's war-ended defense, as the German-fascist aircraft acted very actively. The enemy Wu-ladied high hopes on the Luftwaffe. He counted the UD-RAMI of the mass of aircraft to rip the mobilization in the Western Raio-na of our country, to disorganize the work of the nearest rear, transport and state apparatus, to undermine the will of the people to resist. Hitler crouched the air robbery and their leader Goering Milutions and awards,

Analyzing the established situation and taking into account unfinished predictions regarding protection from the air of the main objects of the state, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an Energy Himself took up the strengthening of anti-air defense combat capability. He invited a group of leadership workers to himself and strictly demanded that a two-day period to submit fundamental considerations to enhance the anti-airflow and funds, improving their organizational structure and management. His advice, the head of the artillery of the Red Army, General N. N. Voronov, General M. S. Gromadin, D. A. Zhuravlev, P. F. Zhigarev, N. Yakovlev and others were provided to him.

The main task of the air defense was then - the cover of Mosk-you, Leningrad and other large industrial centers, where tanks, aircraft, artillery weapons were made, oil was mined and were the most important rail-related communications, energy and communication facilities.

The most powerful grouping of forces and air defense facilities was created for the defense of Moscow. In July, she has already numbered more than 600 fighter aircraft prepared for flights under nightlife, over 1000 anti-aircraft guns, 370 anti-aircraft pulleys, up to 1000 spotlights and a large number of balloon's balloon.

This organizational structure of air defense is entirely op-rafal. Fascist aviation, taking massive actions, carried enormous losses, but it was still unable to break through great forces to Moscow. In total, many thousands of bombers participated in the raids, but only a read of them (two or three percent) managed to entered the city, and they were forced to dump their sulfuless cargo.

Of course, the process of creating the bodies of the Soviet strategic leadership took a certain time And has undergone a number of fundamental changes dictated by the progress of war and the nature of the military-strategic environment. But gradually the Soviet military science, guided by the experience of armed struggle, accumulated even to the Great Patriotic War, reached on the management of troops of considerable success.

However, the lack of the USSR of the highest body of military manual, which was supposed to be a bet at the time of the attack of fascist Germany, naturally, could not first not be reflected in the management of troops, the results of the first operations and the overall operational strategic environment. Moreover, the enemy has already received a considerable experience of organizing war and sudden intrusions by impact forces in Europe. We must, if you know that the Commandments of the directions and the commands of the fronts at the beginning of the war allowed significant shortcomings in the management of the troops. It also had a negative impact on the results of the armed struggle.

It is also necessary to recognize that a certain share of responsibility for the shortcomings in the preparation of the Armed Forces to the beginning of the hostilities is carried by the drug defense and responsible work-nickname of the defense addict. As the former head of the General Staff and the nearest assistant of the People's Commissar, I can not remove the guilt for these shortcomings.

Finally, the fact that I. V. Stalin was played an important role. last moment - The beginning of the Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union - did not leave the hope that the war would be able to delay. This is to some extent also related to the Commissar of Defense, which was not solved to enter I. V. Stalin with a project to create a bet until spring 1941.

In the late spring G. K. Zhukov had once again, already in the urgent form, to ask the People's Commissar, to consider I. V. Stalin about the need to consider the project plan developed by the General Staff, the draft layout of the Main Command rate and to allow its practical verification on large command-staff learning . This time, the report took place and I. V. Stalin agreed to hold such a doctrine, but away from the border, somewhere at the turn of Valdai - Orsha - Gomel - R. Psёl, and then pre-put a project organization project, its functional duties and working bodies.

Recognition of the turn of the exercise was carried out in May 1941, but the doctrine failed. Due to the lack of time and for other circumstances, measures were not considered on practical preparation rate of the chief command and its bodies.

Upstairs, at the rate, it was particularly clearly seen that in the war errors - Returns: Some of them are corrected, others are difficult to fix. It all depends on the nature of errors and their scale. Errors tactical, as the experience testified, the higher command could have to liquidate. Operational scale miscalculations are immeasurably harder, especially if there is no command of the necessary forces, tools or time to introduce these forces in the case there and when it is the needs of G.V. Small land. Stories and essays. Krasnodar, 1999. P. 33

To correct operational strategic errors, up to lacking and commanding some fronts in the summer of 1942 (which gave the opportunity for Hitler's troops to go to the Stalingrad district and on North Caucasus), I needed the extraordinary efforts of the country.

As you know, the strategy is completely dependent on politics, and the mistake of the military-political nature of a national scale is difficult to correct. Only the country, which leads a fair war, can cope with them and dispelled for this necessary military-material possibilities. Conversely, when the goals of the war do not meet the life interests of the people, the errors of this kind, as a rule, lead to disastrous consequences.

But there are incorrigible miscalculations. Such a miscalculation made the fascist leadership of Hitler Germany, having risked to attack the Soviet Union. This miscalculation referred to from an incredible revaluation of his forces and means and underestimation of the potential capabilities of the USSR - countries where there is a socialist system, where the armed forces, the people, the party and the government are one.

Pastured previous light victories, Hitler and his political and military entourage believed that their war-ska victorious march would be held in the country of advice just as it was in Western Europe. The way around. Guided by the adventuristic, nationalist ideology of fascism, the Nazis turned out to be incapable to correctly deal with the decisive outcome of the war issues, which, when preparing for war, you need to know and decide without emotions based on the science of society and war.

Soberly hiding the causes of our unsuccessful operations of 1942, the Communist Party. The Soviet government, relying on the undeniable advantages of the socialist public and state system, was able to mobilize all the forces of the country for new efforts to dismiss the enemy. Thanks to self-rejected support of the people, the Soviet Supreme Command has found the most acceptable methods in this situation and the struggle forms, ultimately avoided the opposite initiative, and then turned the course of the war in its favor.

During the war, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government paid great attention to the leadership of the armed forces. During the war years, more than 200 meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CSP (b), the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party were held. Decisions made on issues foreign Policy, Economics and strategies were carried out in life, respectively, through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Sovnarkkom, GKO or the bid of the Supreme Command.

The basis of the stakes were laid by Lenini principles of centralized management of troops. The rate of the armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air, has grown up the strategic efforts during the struggle through reserves and the use of partisan movement forces. The working body, as already gave, was the General Headquarters.

As a result of the reorganization, the General Staff has become a more work-capable, operational body and was able to carry out the tasks assigned to him throughout the warrior. Of course, it happened to be flawed and after the reorganization, but only in some cases and for some comprehensive issues.

To improve front control management on July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed Three General Commands in the Directions:

North-West (Commander-in-Chief - Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council - A. A. Zhdanov, on-Challnik Staff - General M. V. Zakharov);

West (Commander-in-Chief - Marshal S. K. Timo-Shehenko, member of the Military Council - N. A. Bulganin, Head of Staff - General G. K. Malandin);

South-West (Commander-in-Chief - Marshal S. M. Bu-Denny, Member of the Military Council - N. S. Khrushchev (from August 5, 1941), Head of Staff - A. P. Pokrovsky District of History. Collection of articles. M ., Knowledge, 1971. 80 p.

By creating the main command of the areas, the State Defense Committee expecting to help the rate to ensure the possibility of better management of troops, organize the interaction of fronts, air-air and naval forces. It was assumed that military councils of directions in the majority of the degree than the front commands will be able to use local forces and funds in the interests of armed struggle.

However, the first months of the main team of the main teams have shown that they do not justify hopes. The rate continued directly led the fronts. According to the practice of the Commander of the areas that existed then did not have reserves of troops and material tools at their disposal to influence the course of hostilities. They could not without the Soggy Lasia of the Supreme Commander, to enforce any fundamental solutions and, thus, exceeded in simple gear stations. As a result, in 1942, the main commands of the directions were liquidated.

The rate had to re-lead the actions of a large number of fronts deployed in a huge space. This inevitably was associated with significant difficulties, especially in the area of \u200b\u200bcoordination of the efforts of the troops of several fronts operating next. The search for new methods of management, which ultimately led to warnia effective form Direct influence of strategic leadership on the work of fronts. Thus, a very peculiar Institute of Strategic Rouseground appeared - representatives of the rates of the Supreme Commander, which were sent to the most important sites.

Summer short outcome This paragraph, we note that the treacherous attack of Hitler's Germany in the USSR interrupted peaceful construction in our country. The Soviet Union entered into the period of the liberation war, and the head of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme Commander became the main body that leads this struggle.

SVGK) in 1941-45 - organ sustain. military. Management carried out in the years led. Fatherland Wars 1941-45 Strategic. Manual owls. Army. Forces. A post was created. SCC of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on June 23, 1941 and was originally called the host of the Master Command. USSR forces; July 10, 1941 In connection with the formation of the chief commands of the North-West (discounted on 29 Aug. 1941), Western (there was up to 11 Sep. 1941, restored on Feb. 1942, disbanded May 3, 1942) and South West (disbanded June 21, 1942) Directions The head of the chief command was transformed into the Supreme Command rate, and the 8 Aug. 1941 in SVGK. Previous The rates were originally S. K. Tymoshenko, members - I. V. Stalin, B. M. Shaposhnikov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budenan. From July 10, 1941 to the end of the war before SVGK was I. V. Stalin, appointed 8 Aug. 1941 Supreme Commander. CHL SVGK from July 10, 1941 to 17 Feb. 1945 were V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. M. Budyanny, G. K. Zhukov, from 17 Feb. 1945 - K. Zhukov (deputy. Pred.), A. I. Antonov, A. M. Vasilevsky, N. G. Kuznetsov, N. A. Bulganin. SVGK defined the overall strategy. The goal on one or another stage of the war, K-paradium dismeteed to a number of consecutive tasks, each of the reasons was the basis for the development of military plans. Campaigns and operations. The intention of the SVGK determined the methods of strategic. Action army. Forces in different parts of the front. The presence at the disposal of the SFGK reserves allowed it to renderately. The impact on the course of operations by entering into the battle of the new forces, the coordination of the operational efforts of the fronts, the reimbursement of their actions, a change in their composition, formulation of new tasks, a change in previous tasks, etc. In the directives of the CFG to prepare operations to the fronts, as a rule, was indicated For what purpose, where, when the forces, the front should prepare an operation, in which direction to focus its main efforts, what additional forces and material and technical resources are provided to the front for the operation and to which deadline it should submit an operation plan to SVGK. The most important instructions of the commander of the fronts of the fronts were given personally with the challenge of them in CFGK or by departure to the fronts of the representatives of the SVGK. In order to approach Strategic. Guidelines for troops and coordination of the efforts of several fronts who solved one general task, SVGK often allocated its representative. Having large powers, comprehensive orientation in plans and plans, the top. Commanding, the representative of the SVGC provided the command of the fronts to help quickly resolve issues that demanded the competence of the SVGK. As representatives of the SVGK at different times and in various directions were Marshals of owls. Union A. M. Vasilevsky, K. E. Voroshilov, G. K. Zhukov, S. K. Tymoshenko, Ch. Marshal Artillery H. H. Voronov and others. The working body of the Svgk was the General Headquarters of Army. USSR forces. Its functions included: preparation for CFGA of all necessary materials on operational and strategic. atmosphere; Development of plans Strategic. operations, their comprehensive provision and control over their conduct; Development of army organization issues. Forces; control over the formation and restoration of compounds and associations; Organization of operational strategic. transportation; Studying and summarizing the experience of war, etc. Svgk also carried out the guidance of the parties. Movement in the rear of the enemy through the center. Headquarters Parts. Movement and rep. Headquarters partis. Movement with military. Council of Front Associations. J. M. Gorelik. Moscow. - *** - *** - *** - OVG organs formed after the October revolution %%%