Olga Torozova - a cookbook for a future mother. Stuffed pepper "Autumn"
Blitzkrieg rolled west
As we have already said, the Battle of Kursk was not only Germany's last attempt to wrest the strategic initiative from the Red Army. It became a turning point in the war in the sense that after it the Wehrmacht finally lost the ability to successfully act on a strategic scale. If earlier he could at least conduct large defensive operations such as Rzhev-Vyazemskaya, then by 1944 local operations of an operational scale became the ultimate dream of panzer generals. Yes, the German divisions could still successfully hold the city of N for a week or two. Yes, during the counterattack they could still throw back Soviet troops by 20-30 kilometers. But no more! The Germans could no longer hold the same city N for another two months, unless the Red Army, for strategic reasons, transferred the severity of the blow to another sector of the front. And the Germans did not manage to push back Soviet troops for 50 kilometers until the very end of the war. A reasonable question may arise: so why did the struggle drag on for so long? The first obvious answer: the Wehrmacht was too huge a structure, and the usual inertia force inherent in such a large mass worked. Stopping it in one moment is simply impossible. The second, no less important, reason was that the Soviet command had not yet fully mastered the changed situation and had not yet learned to act as a complete master of the situation. The lessons of 1941-1942 were also memorable, the education of a victorious instinct is a long and painful process. But when he appears, then the resistance of this army becomes useless, which was proved by the Red Army in 1945. But in 1944 things were a little different. We will consider only three operations that can be considered the most indicative in terms of compliance with the ideas of the big and small blitzkrieg.
Chronologically, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation was the first, by the way, the most controversial in terms of results. However, if you remember how General Vatutin commanded during the Battle of Kursk, this is not particularly surprising.
By January 1944, the general strategic situation had developed in such a way that the so-called Kanevsky ledge was formed on the southern sector of the front. The Germans stubbornly clung to the coast of the Dnieper in the Kanev region, although by this time the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front had bypassed them far from the west. There were 11 German divisions on the ledge, and their position inspired serious concerns, but Hitler was not going to withdraw them. It's not even about the propaganda slogan "German cooks continue to draw water from the Dnieper." There were also some military considerations. Manstein, of course, blames the Fuhrer for everything. But it seems that the OKH, having lost a sense of reality, still dreamed of a possible strike on the flank of the 1st Ukrainian in the direction of Bila Tserkva, although the Germans no longer had the strength for this.
Interesting feature this operation lies in the fact that the Soviet command decided to start it without a serious superiority in forces. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts had a total of about 250,000 men, 5300 guns and 670 tanks against the Germans' 170,000 men, 2600 guns and 250 tanks. However, not far from the area of the intended pocket, the Germans had several tank divisions in reserve, which had about 600 tanks.
2nd Ukrainian front launched an offensive on January 24, and on the very first day the tactical defense of the Germans was almost broken through. But General Konev acted too sluggishly and did not take advantage of the favorable situation. Only the next day, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov was introduced into the battle, which broke through the German positions. But the delay had an effect, as the enemy pulled up reserves and managed to slow down the offensive. Moreover, our 20th and 29th tank corps were themselves cut off. And then the front commander, General Konev, showed that we had already learned not to be afraid of the Germans. He makes a decision completely unthinkable just a year ago. The 20th corps continues its offensive towards the units of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 29th corps takes up defense with the front to the south, and the reserve units cut through the thin German arm. And so it happened! On January 28, the tanks of the 20th Corps in the village of Zvenigorodka met with the vanguard of the 6th Tank Army. And the German barriers in the offensive zone were overturned and destroyed, the formation of the external and internal fronts of the encirclement began.
Korsun-Shevchenko operation.
The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front began two days later and at first did not go so smoothly. Heavy fighting ensued in the intended area of the breakthrough, and progress was minimal. The commander of the front, General Vatutin, had to shift the point of application of forces, but in the end, after the 6th Panzer Army was brought into battle, the German defenses were broken through here too. But after the breakthrough, the offensive went on unhindered, and there were no problems until the meeting with Konev's 20th Panzer Corps.
So, we have a kind of classic blitzkrieg operation. A breakthrough of the front, large enemy forces are surrounded, tank units enter the operational space, a period of development of success begins ... But no! This is what Guderian would have done. This is what Manstein would have done. But the Soviet generals did not do that. Not yet. Yes, one reason lay literally on the surface. Panzer divisions suffered losses during the offensive, in addition, mud started, and not only cars, but even tanks got stuck in the mud. But, most likely, the very lack of a victorious instinct, which had already prevented us from developing the success of the breakthrough at Stalingrad and destroying the German troops in the North Caucasus, had an effect. In the same way, now it was still necessary to try to strike further. Indeed, before the combined forces of the two fronts, there was an excellent prospect of cutting off the entire Nikopol grouping, moreover, all German forces west of the Dnieper.
Apparently, the second time, when the success of the operation exceeded all expectations, the Soviet command was confused and did not show flexibility, reacting in accordance with the changed situation. On the other hand, if you look at the attracted forces, it becomes clear that big tasks were not set for the advancing armies from the very beginning. Defeating an entire army group with 700 tanks is more than difficult.
In addition, a mistake was made that was completely unusual for the Germans. Before the breakthrough began, significant forces were again used to "fetter" the enemy. Oh, it's shackling! It becomes a real scourge of Soviet offensives, diverting from a quarter to a third of the forces that could be used to develop success. The fact is that even if - even if! - the Germans decided to try to transfer troops from the non-attacked sectors of the front to the battle area, this would take time. And the Soviet divisions would have been there from the very first day.
In general, the Korsun blitzkrieg lasted exactly 4 days, after which the destruction of the encircled group began. The grouping was not going to capitulate or die, and the soldiers of General Stemmerman offered fierce resistance. The ultimatum presented by the Soviet command was rejected. By the way, we note again that it is precisely such attempts to fight to the end that call into question the key idea of the blitzkrieg - increasing the pace of operations. At the same time, the German command began to prepare a deblocking strike. Manstein was again appointed as the savior of the fatherland on the scale of the 8th Army.
As always, Soviet historians sing the usual song about the superiority of the Germans in forces, especially in tanks. "As part of some German tanks th divisions (mainly in SS divisions) had heavy tank battalions of Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns. Tiger tanks were also in service with the 503rd and 506th separate tank battalions., - writes A.N. Grylev. In total, Manstein collected about 1000 tanks, despite the fact that only 307 Soviet ones opposed them on the outer ring of encirclement. To be honest, these stories about the ubiquitous "Ferdinands" stuck in my teeth. And in general, what would be the result of a strike by 1000 German tanks is not difficult to imagine.
First, the Germans tried to break through the encirclement in the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, because the distance to the so-called Gorodishchensky ledge was minimal here. But the successes of four tank divisions, which managed to advance only 5 kilometers, turned out to be minimal. Stemmerman, meanwhile, was concentrating his troops on Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, gradually reducing the line of defense and preparing to break through to meet the deblocking groups.
As a result, the main efforts were transferred to the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The tank division "Leibstandarte" appeared here, which spoiled so much blood for our soldiers near Kursk. The commander of the 1st Panzer Army, General Hube, sent an optimistic radiogram to the encircled, urging them to hold on and a firm promise to help them out. He really concentrated three tank divisions with the support of two battalions of "tigers" and on February 4 went on the offensive. On February 6, another tank division arrived at his disposal. To fend off the German attack, Vatutin brought into battle the 2nd Panzer Army, which was still in reserve. Here a reasonable question immediately arises: why was it not previously used to develop success? The German offensive was temporarily halted, and they took a break to regroup their forces.
On the morning of February 11, the Khube shock group (III Panzer Corps) again went on the offensive in the direction of Rizino - Lysyanka. At the same time, the encircled troops of Stemmermann tried to strike towards them from the Steblev area. After fierce fighting, they managed to break through to Shenderovka, and the distance to the vanguards of Khube was only about 10 kilometers. But those miles still had to be covered. Some of the modern Russian historians are trying to justify the frank clumsiness of Vatutin's actions by the fact that the Germans allegedly tried to break through at the junction of two fronts. Full of you! Well, look at the cards you publish in your own books! All events took place in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the junction of the fronts was a few tens of kilometers to the east.
And yet, the situation was really confusing, and the Soviet command confused her. The outer ring of encirclement was held by the Vatutin front, and the inner ring by the Konev front. And it was really difficult to coordinate their actions, although there was a special representative of the Headquarters who was supposed to deal with this. Who? That's right, Marshal Zhukov. It only ended with the fact that “Marshal, who coordinated the actions of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, Soviet Union Zhukov failed to organize a clear interaction between the troops, reflecting the onslaught of the enemy, and was recalled by the Headquarters to Moscow.
In general, the situation was strange - both sides were dissatisfied. The Germans could not break through, the Red Army could not destroy the boiler, although by February 16 it had shrunk to a meager size. The headquarters of the German 8th Army radioed Stemmermann that the offensive of the III Panzer Corps was bogged down and that he himself had to break through to meet him. Stemmermann chose to remain with the rearguard to cover the breakthrough, which was entrusted to command by Lieutenant General Theobald Lieb. By this time, the cauldron was literally reduced to a patch with a diameter of 5 kilometers around Shenderovka. Hitler's permission was required for a breakthrough, but Manstein realized that delaying death was similar, and sent a brief telegram to Stemmermann: “Stichwort Freiheit. Zielort Lysyanka. 23.00 "-" Password "Freedom". Goal Lysyanka.
And at 23.00 the Germans in three columns went to break through with attached bayonets at the ready. After a fierce hand-to-hand fight, some of them managed to break through. However, the left column ran into the tanks of the 5th Guards Tank and was practically destroyed. It dawned, but the fighting was still going on. Konev, realizing that there was a danger of missing the Germans, threw into the attack a brigade of the 20th tank corps, armed with new IS-2 tanks. Having discovered that the Germans did not have anti-tank artillery, the tanks simply crushed the wagons and vehicles with caterpillars.
By noon, the disorganized crowd reached the Rotten Tikich River. The crossing was very reminiscent of everything that happened on the Berezina in 1812, and no statements by German historians will make me believe in "organization and order." Moreover, the German officers themselves admit in their memoirs: for the first time among German soldiers, there are signs of Kesselfurcht - fear of boilers. Pictures of the battlefield clearly prove that there was no order or organization in sight.
Commander tank division SS Viking Gille crossed the river by swimming, although Marshal Konev later wrote in his memoirs: “General Gille, apparently, took off on a plane before the start of the fight, or crawled through the front line, dressed in civilian clothes. I rule out that he made his way on a tank or transporter through our positions and strongholds.. Thank God, no “women's dress” appeared, although no one really made it through the tank.
The outcome of the battle was unsatisfactory for both sides. The Soviet blitzkrieg, which started well, was stopped by its own command, which made it possible for part of the encircled group to escape, although Soviet historiography for a long time insisted on the complete destruction of the troops that fell into the cauldron. At the same time, the encircled divisions ceased to exist as combat units and had to be re-formed. The Germans stubbornly insist that 35,000 people out of 60,000 who were surrounded, broke through, but this raises the most serious doubts. Most likely, as is usually the case in such dubious episodes, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
The next operation, which, by the way, deserves special attention, is Operation Bagration. From my point of view, which everyone is free to challenge, this is the most brilliant operation of the Red Army in the entire period of the Great Patriotic War. In terms of perfection, only Guderian's breakthrough at Sedan and Rommel's blow at Gazala can be compared with it. But the scale of these operations is many times smaller, and, as we well remember, the complexity of command and control increases in proportion to the square of the number, so the achievements of General Rokossovsky deserve much higher marks than the actions of panzer generals. Especially when you consider the stubbornness and experience of the enemy who opposed him.
The plan of the operation, which provided for the simultaneous defeat of two enemy groups holding the "Belarusian balcony", belonged to General Rokossovsky. Zhukov claimed that the plan was prepared in Moscow even before the meeting, which was attended by representatives of the Stavka and front commanders. This is the absolute truth. But it is also true that the developments of the Rokossovsky headquarters were sent to Moscow even earlier. This is confirmed by an absolutely disinterested witness - S.M. Shtemenko. By the way, one curious episode is connected with the book of his memoirs “The General Staff during the War Years”.
Some now popular historian decided to sparkle with wit and ridicule one of the proposals of the General Staff. The offer was really not the most reasonable. But the method he chose is even worse - a fragmentary quotation so beloved by the Soviet historical school. Compare for yourself:
“The idiocy of this “new idea” was so obvious that, as Shtemenko recalls, “we were corrected.” We decided - to surround, where to go here. This is what Mr. N writes in his work "Stalin's Ten Strikes". And now let's see what Shtemenko actually said: “During these two days, the goal of the Belarusian operation was finally formulated - to encircle and destroy large forces of Army Group Center in the Minsk region. The General Staff, as already noted, did not want to use the word "encirclement", but we were corrected. The encirclement was to be preceded by the simultaneous defeat of the enemy's flank groupings - Vitebsk and Bobruisk, as well as his forces concentrated near Mogilev. This immediately opened the way to the capital of Belarus in converging directions.. Do you feel the difference? Moreover, this paragraph is already on a completely different page of memoirs and is dedicated to a different episode. But - two words are snatched out, and the broth is ready. No, beware of short quotes!
Operation Bagration.
The operation began on June 22, 1944. Probably, there is some higher justice in this - exactly 3 years after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army began its most brilliant operation. The offensive was carried out on a wide front, but the main blows were delivered in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. The beauty of Rokossovsky's plan was that there was no plan for one gigantic super-cauldron formed by converging strikes on Minsk, after which one would have to fiddle with the destruction of two or three armies, although, most likely, it was possible to surround them. No, small boilers were planned with the rapid destruction of encircled small groups. The ill-fated example of Stalingrad was still fresh in my memory.
First, the German defenses crackled near Vitebsk in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. On the very first day of the offensive, the 6th Guards Army broke through the defenses and expanded the breakthrough to 50 kilometers. There was a gap between the IX and LIII Corps. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, General Reinhardt, requested permission to withdraw. But here, in many ways, the Red Army was helped, oddly enough, by Adolf Hitler. By this time he had lost all sense of reality and was busy building sandcastles on a large scale. Many cities and towns scattered throughout the Eastern Front were declared "fortresses", although in reality they were a few primitive field fortifications hastily built on the outskirts settlements. The units of these "fortresses" were ordered not to retreat and fight to the last bullet. On March 8, 1944, Hitler clarified his definition of a fortress when he issued Order No. 11:
“A distinction will be made between “fortified areas” (Feste Platze), each of which will be subordinate to the “commandant of a fortified area”, and “local strongholds” (Ortzstutzpunkte), under the command of a military commander.
"Fortified areas" will serve as fortresses... They will prevent the enemy from occupying areas of decisive tactical importance. They will allow the enemy to surround themselves, thus fettering the greatest amount of his forces and creating conditions favorable for successful counterattacks.
"Local strong points" are strong points located deep in the war zone, which will be strongly defended in the event of an enemy infiltration. Being included in the main scheme of hostilities, they will serve as a reserve of defense, and in the event of an enemy breakthrough, they will be the cornerstone of the front, forming positions from which it will be possible to carry out counterattacks.
This directive clarified the powers of the commandants of fortified areas and put them under direct subordination to the commander of the corresponding army group. Every person in the fortified area, regardless of military rank or civil status, was subordinate to the commandant. The garrison had to constantly be in the fortified area and prepare defensive structures. Hitler, as a rule, announced the fortified status of the area so late that there was no time to build any significant fortifications before the arrival of the Soviet troops. He ordered the garrison to be at the disposal of the commandant when there was only enough time to take up positions. By Hitler's definition, it is difficult to distinguish between a fortified area and a fortress, except when the fortified areas were mainly on the Eastern Front and, as a rule, did not have fortifications. In general, the Fuhrer personally drove his troops into boilers, which was especially pronounced during Operation Bagration.
Hitler refused to allow LIII Corps to withdraw, but General Reinhardt and Field Marshal Busch, commander of Army Group Center, saw what was happening. They ordered the corps commander, General Gollwitzer, to prepare for a breakthrough. Late! On June 24, the 4th airfield division was surrounded southwest of the city, and the remaining 3 divisions of the corps ended up in a mousetrap in Vitebsk itself. Pay attention to an important point: all the boilers turned out to be quite small, not the ones that the Sovinformburo reports about under the roar of artillery salute. But I didn't have to deal with them either. Already on July 25, the 4th airfield division ceased to exist under the blows of the 39th army, and the Vitebsk cauldron itself broke up into two more. The 246th Infantry and 6th Airfield Divisions were surrounded 10 kilometers from Vitebsk, and the 206th Infantry was stuck in the city. Under the blows of Soviet aviation, their forces were melting away literally before our eyes. By the evening of June 26, the position of the encircled became hopeless, and General Gollwitzer decided to try to break through in order to save what could still be saved. At dawn on June 27, the Germans launched a breakthrough in small groups. The result of such attempts is well known to us from the events of the summer of 1941. LIII Corps was completely destroyed. True, the Germans still continue to argue about what exactly happened to him. According to one report, 20,000 soldiers died and 10,000 were captured. Other historians claim that 5,000 soldiers died and 22,000 were captured. I think when they get it all figured out, it will be possible to amend the new edition of this book.
Here we have to make a small digression. As we have already seen, in 1941 the Germans very often managed to conduct a blitzkrieg without the participation of tanks. Almost the same thing happened now. Only one tank army, the 5th Guards, participated in Operation Bagration. The reason was quite understandable: the forests and swamps of Belarus are not the best terrain for tanks, they could only operate along the Minsk-Moscow highway. It was there that the German defense was broken through. Most importantly, the Soviet tanks did not linger, "forming an outer encirclement", but moved on to Borisov, as prescribed by all the canons of the blitzkrieg. Parallel to the tank army, General Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was advancing. Very quickly, the Germans experienced the effectiveness of their own tactics in their own skin. The remnants of the XXVII Corps, which tried to escape from Orsha, ran into the tanks that had broken through, with a completely predictable result.
The Germans faced a difficult task - to try to stop the rapid advance of Soviet tanks, in which the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which was operating south of Rotmistrov's army, also now participated. The Berezina River was chosen as a defensive line. This thankless task was entrusted to the 5th Panzer Division, hastily transferred to Minsk from the Ukraine. She was also assigned to the 505th heavy tank battalion. It was his “tigers” who on June 28 were the first to encounter the 3rd Guards Tank Corps at the Krupki station, but were forced to retreat.
The Soviet command mastered the tricky science of blitzkrieg, and Rotmistrov's tanks did not have to fight alone with the arriving German reserves. On June 29, 5 tanks were already brought up to help the tanks. rifle divisions 11th guards army. With a combined attack by infantry and tanks (!) The German defenses were broken through a little north of Borisov, in a weaker place (!), And after a short battle on June 30, the German defenses on the Berezina collapsed. Guderian could have rejoiced at such a skillful application of his theories, but something tells me that the news of these events did not make the inspector general of the Panzerwaffe happy.
The attack on Minsk from the south, which was led by the 1st Belorussian Front under General Rokossovsky, did not develop so successfully in the first days due to the swampy terrain. But on June 24, the main forces of the front entered the battle, and the German defense was broken through here too. The commander of the 9th Army, General Jordan, decided to throw into battle his only reserve - the 20th Panzer Division. By the way, pay attention to the scarcity of German reserves. A division there, a division here - no more. But these were OKH problems. War is not a chess game where both players get 16 perfect before the start. identical figures. Everyone has what he managed to collect. But failed...
The 20th Panzer Division ran into the advancing Soviet troops south of Bobruisk and was destroyed. By June 26, the 1st Guards Tank Corps reached the city from the south, and the 9th Tank Corps from the east. The very next day, the 9th Panzer Corps captured the crossings over the Berezina, and several more German divisions were surrounded. Rokossovsky did not waste time creating an "iron ring", rightly believing that they would not go anywhere anyway, but abandoned his reserves - the 1st Guards Cavalry and 1st Mechanized Corps - further west, to Baranovichi. The defense of the German 9th Army collapsed along the entire front. True, it is not very clear why the Germans do not like to admit that the affairs of the 4th Panzer Army in the north were no better.
Field Marshal Bush knew that his army group was in danger of total annihilation. Together with General Jordan on June 26, he flew to Hitler's Headquarters, but failed to explain anything to the Fuhrer. The only result of the visit was that Hitler removed both Bush and Jordan. Field Marshal Model was entrusted with saving the situation.
Around 40,000 German soldiers were surrounded in the Bobruisk area. Rokossovsky proved that he perfectly understands how to act in such a situation. Soviet artillery and aviation successfully crushed one German regiment after another, while the tanks continued their advance. Surrounded by XXXI Panzer Corps, it made several attempts to break out of the city, but was dismembered, defeated and destroyed. In just less than a week, about 50,000 German soldiers died during the fighting, and another 20,000 were captured.
After the German front collapsed north and south of Minsk, it was possible to start solving larger tasks. Soviet troops launched an offensive against the capital of Belarus, threatening to trap the remnants of the forces of Army Group Center. The planned cauldron was much larger than all the previous ones, but here the most important thing was done successful condition blitzkrieg - the enemy's will to resist was completely broken.
Here we have to argue a little with the very authoritative historian Stephen Zaloga. He claims that the German command, in desperation, resorted to the last measure and tried to use strategic aviation in order to stop the Soviet offensive. In general, he claims correctly, but he is very much mistaken in details. The fact is that the last major bombing offensive of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front began long before Operation Bagration by the IV Air Corps, and it had completely different goals. Operation Zaunkönig began on March 27 with raids on the Sarny railway junction in order to prevent our attack on Kovel, that is, all this had nothing to do with the battles in Belarus. The raids continued until July 1944. During these operations, the already small stocks of aviation gasoline were practically used up. Therefore, the participation of the He-177 bombers in the July battles was extremely limited, although they did one or two hits on Soviet tanks near Minsk. Moreover, German sources emphasize that although the attacks were carried out during the day, the losses were very small, since the Soviet pilots simply did not have the experience of fighting such large aircraft.
However, let us descend from heaven to sinful earth. The Red Army continued to advance on Minsk from the north and south, and attempts to stop them led to nothing. On July 1 and 2, fierce tank battles took place northeast of Minsk - the 5th Panzer Division and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion tried to stop the 5th Guards Tank Army. Rotmistrov was unlucky again, although, perhaps, he was simply a useless general. And the marshal - even more so. It was not for nothing that he, it was he, who received a reprimand from Stalin, while Chernyakhovsky and Rokossovsky are new stars for shoulder straps. By the way, golden star Rotmistrov managed to get it only in 1965, during the period of the famous Brezhnev distributions. During the war years, he could not be compared with either Katukov or Lelyushenko. Rotmistrov's army again suffered significant losses, but the German tank group simply disappeared. Only 18 vehicles remained in the 5th Panzer Division, and the "tigers" were killed to the last.
Panic reigned in Minsk, very similar to what the Germans themselves saw in France in the summer of 1940. The city was filled with crowds of unarmed fugitives and staff officers, who were not at all eager to die a hero's death, defending Fester Platz Minsk, which was created by Hitler's order. On the contrary, they stormed the trains leaving for the West. Here you can throw a serious reproach to the Soviet aviation, which never managed to block the railways.
The first units of the 2nd Panzer Corps broke into the outskirts of Minsk early in the morning of July 3. In the afternoon, the 1st Guards Tank Corps entered Minsk from the southeast. The 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts united. The resistance of the Germans in the city itself was suppressed very quickly, because, as we have already said, there was no one to defend it. The encirclement closed, and inside were 5 German corps, or 25 divisions. The 9th and 4th tank armies ceased to exist, as did the entire Army Group Center as a whole. It was the biggest defeat of the Wehrmacht in the entire Second world war, much more terrible than Stalingrad. You can talk about further operations of the Red Army - Vilnius, Lvov-Sandomierz, Kaunas, and indeed write a huge volume on the Belarusian operation. But this is already superfluous, and we will not talk about the pursuit of the defeated enemy.
In total, during Operation Bagration, the Germans lost about 400,000 soldiers, 10 generals were killed, and 22 were captured. You can at least count the generals, but even the Germans themselves do not know the exact figures for their total losses. Once upon a time, brave warriors dreamed of marching in parade through Moscow, and on July 17, 1944, their dream came true. True, not quite as it once seemed to all these "dreamers". But 56,000 German soldiers and officers, led by 19 generals, had to pass through the streets of the Soviet capital.
The last operation that we would like to consider will be Yasso-Kishinevskaya. In some respects, it was even a purer blitzkrieg than the Bagration, as in this case the Soviet tanks were put into a clean breach. However, let's talk about everything in order.
Yasso-Chisinau operation.
In the summer of 1944, the German Eastern Front was falling apart literally in all areas - from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. German generals still dreamed of organizing a tough defense, of transferring military operations to a positional channel, as was the case during the First World War. Hitler muttered something about fortresses and an invincible wall. Yes, the Wehrmacht tried to build a wall. It just happened in accordance with the famous phrase: “The wall is rotten. Poke - and fall apart. They poked at the northern sector - Army Group Center shattered into dust. Poked in the south - the Army Group "Southern Ukraine" had no better.
By mid-August, a situation had developed in Moldova that was strikingly reminiscent of Stalingrad. The German 6th Army occupied a ledge that went deep into the front line, and its flanks were covered by the Romanian troops - the 3rd and 4th armies. Perhaps the Germans should have given the unfortunate army a different number, if only out of superstition, otherwise it was just asking for trouble, although now it was commanded by General Fretter-Pico, and not Paulus at all.
The idea of the operation was simple - to strike at two far-distant sectors of the front: northwest of Yass and south of Bender, where the Romanian troops held the defense. In case of success, the 6th Army in full strength found itself in a cauldron and could share the fate of its predecessor. The Soviet command concentrated significant forces and created a multiple superiority in manpower, tanks and artillery in the breakthrough areas. For example, it was possible to bring the density of artillery to 280 barrels per kilometer of the front, which they had not even dared to think about before. The main difference from the Byelorussian operation was that in the southern sector of the front the terrain was much more favorable for the use of tanks, so 1870 tanks and self-propelled guns were assembled here.
The offensive of both fronts began on August 20 after a powerful artillery preparation. The artillery strike was so strong that in some places the first strip of German defense was swept away. Here are the memories of one of the participants in the offensive:
“When we moved forward, the terrain was black to a depth of about ten kilometers. The enemy's defense was practically destroyed. The enemy trenches, dug to their full height, turned into shallow ditches, no more than knee-deep. The dugouts were destroyed. Sometimes dugouts miraculously survived, but the enemy soldiers who were in them were dead, although there were no signs of wounds. Death came from high air pressure after shell explosions and suffocation.
The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Malinovsky, broke through the main line of defense on the very first day, and the 27th Army broke through the second one too. In one day, our troops advanced 16 kilometers. The commander of Army Group South Ukraine, General Frisner, later wrote that chaos had begun in the disposition of his armies. In order to somehow stop the rapidly developing offensive, he threw 3 infantry and 1 tank divisions into a counterattack near Iasi. But this attack was not successful. In the middle of the day, Malinovsky introduced the 6th Panzer Army into the breakthrough, which struck at the third and last line of defense of the Germans.
It is completely incomprehensible for what reasons, but the Soviet Military Encyclopedia suddenly starts talking complete nonsense, talking about the second day of the operation. Say, "the enemy pulled units of 12 divisions, including two tank divisions, to the breakthrough area of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and tried to stop his offensive with counterattacks." Yes, Frisner did not have such forces. He does not mention in a single word about any counterattacks on 21 August. On the contrary, all his thoughts were focused on one thing - how to organize a more or less orderly withdrawal of troops beyond the Prut or even the Danube. Frisner did not want his divisions to share the fate of Field Marshal Bush's troops, so he spat on the vaunted German discipline, spat on the orders of the Fuhrer and ordered the withdrawal of troops. But it was already too late. Soviet tanks were deep in the German rear, cutting off the headquarters of the corps from the headquarters of the 6th Army. General Fretter-Pico did not want to join the commander of the first 6th Army and hastily moved his headquarters further to the rear. So hastily that then he had to wash off the accusations of fleeing from the battlefield for a long time. Frisner tries to justify him, but he himself immediately writes that the headquarters of the army group was forced to take command of the divisions. This is not done from a good life.
On the front of the Romanian 3rd Army, our offensive also developed successfully. On August 22, the 3rd Ukrainian Front finally cut off the German 6th Army from the Romanian 3rd Army. Army General Tolbukhin correctly assessed the potential of both, and therefore decided to leave the Romanians to themselves, concentrating the main efforts on actions against the right flank of the German army. The 4th Guards and 7th Mechanized Corps were thrown into the gap, which began a rapid advance to the west, deviating slightly to the north in order to meet Malinovsky's units on the banks of the Prut. Already on August 23, Malinovsky's 18th tank corps captured Khushi, and Tolbukhin's mechanized corps captured the crossings at Leuseni and Leovo. On the third day of the operation, the encirclement of the German 6th Army was completed! And Guderian himself would envy the pace of advancement of Soviet tanks.
By the way, after the war, another battle broke out near Iasi - the battle of memoirs, in which Guderian and Frisner tried hard to push the blame for this disaster onto each other. However, we will be indulgent to the panzer generals. None of them could save the situation, and in general one should not talk about German mistakes (and who does not allow them?), But about the correct decisions of Malinovsky and Tolbukhin. The fact is that this time the mistakes of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were not repeated. The 6th Panzer Army, without delay and without being distracted by any "encirclement fronts", continued to develop the offensive to the south, in the direction of Bucharest. Did you want blitzkrieg? You got it!
Meanwhile, the troops of the Soviet 46th Army crossed the Dniester and began to advance in a southeasterly direction. On August 23, when the ring around the main pocket was closed, the 46th Army, as they say, in passing, slammed the Romanian 3rd Army, which capitulated with practically no resistance. Tolbukhin looked into the water when he did not want to allocate large forces to fight it. 3 divisions and 1 brigade surrendered. This turned out to be the last straw that broke the determination of the ruling circles of Romania to continue the struggle. On the evening of August 23, a "coup d'état" took place in Bucharest, as our historians sometimes write. But what kind of revolution was it? King Mihai removed Prime Minister Antonescu and appointed another general in his place - C. Sanatescu. At 11:30 p.m., the king's declaration on the cessation of hostilities against the Allies was broadcast on the radio. The Soviet command did not count on such a result of the operation - Germany lost another ally. Although here, the SVE could not resist telling another tale about the "anti-fascist uprising led by the Communist Party." The funny thing is that modern historians repeat this tale, although literally a couple of pages later they absolutely seriously write that the Communist Party of Romania numbered less than 1000 people and did not have any influence.
In general, by August 23, the inner front of the encirclement was formed, in which there were 18 German divisions. About how they were defeated, General Frisner is modestly silent. In general, he shifts all the blame for the defeat of the 6th Army onto the Romanians and ... Guderian. He himself is not at all to blame, and the Soviet troops, as it were, were present at this, no more.
The large cauldron immediately fell apart into two smaller ones, the liquidation of which was completed on August 27 and 29. After that, the operation could be considered completed. The Yasso-Kishinev operation is characterized by very small losses of the Soviet troops - only about 67,000 killed and wounded, while the Germans lost about 250,000 people. This offensive also had more distant consequences - it opened the way for the Soviet troops to the borders of Bulgaria. As a result, on September 5, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria, but already on September 9, this “war without shots” ended.
In the autumn of 1944, the OKH had to do the thankless task for the second time - to re-form the 6th Army. By the way, few people know, but in last days fighting in Stalingrad, Hitler ordered to collect one soldier from each of the encircled divisions, so that they would become the "core" of the new 6th "avengers" army. Now there was no time to engage in such nonsense, and the army was formed around the Fretter-Pico headquarters that managed to escape. It will be interesting to compare the composition of this ill-fated army in different periods of its existence.
November 19, 1942, on the day the Soviet offensive near Stalingrad began: XIV Panzer Corps (60th and 3rd motorized, 16th tank, 94th infantry divisions); LI Corps (389, 295, 71, 79th Infantry, 100th Jaeger, 24th Tank Divisions); VIII Corps (113th, 76th Infantry Divisions); XI Corps (44th, 384th Infantry Divisions), 14th Panzer Division directly subordinated to the army headquarters.
The reconstituted army on April 9, 1943: XVII Corps (302, 306, 294th Infantry Divisions); XXIX corps (336th, 16th motorized, 15th airfield divisions); XXIV Panzer Corps (11th Infantry, 454th, 444th Security Divisions); corps group "Mitsch" (335th, 304th infantry, 3rd mountain rifle divisions); the 79th and 17th infantry, 23rd tank divisions are subordinated to the army headquarters.
VII Corps (Romanian 14th Infantry, 370th, 106th Infantry Divisions); LII Corps (294, 320, 384, 161st Infantry Divisions); XXX Corps (384, 257, 15, 306, 302nd Infantry Divisions); XXXIV Corps (258, 282, 335, 62nd Infantry Divisions); The 13th Panzer Division is directly subordinated to the army headquarters.
LVII Panzer Corps (76th Infantry, 4th Mountain Rifle, remnants of the 20th Panzer Division), 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, Winkler Group. That is, nothing remains of the August composition.
As we can see, immediately after the defeat at Stalingrad, the dead divisions were not restored, despite the Fuhrer's theatrical gesture. But it is pleasant to note that the 384th Infantry Division came under distribution twice - near Stalingrad and near Chisinau. Well no luck. However, we digress a little.
Summary. The battles of 1944 showed that the Soviet command gradually mastered the art of blitzkrieg - swift cutting blows, encirclement of the enemy armies and their subsequent destruction with the simultaneous development of success by tank units. This detail is especially important, since only the summer offensives demonstrated this in full. During winter operations, our command still paid too much attention to encircled groups. In the summer of 1944, the Soviet command succeeded in several operations in the style of the classic blitzkrieg, which are worthy of being included in any textbook.
Despite the fact that Great Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, and the United States in 1941, they were in no hurry to open the Second Front, which was so necessary for the USSR. Let's single out the most popular versions of the reasons for the delay of the allies.
unpreparedness for war
Many experts see the unpreparedness of the allies for a full-scale war as the main reason for such a late opening of the Second Front - June 6, 1944. What could, for example, oppose Germany to Great Britain? In September 1939, the British army numbered 1 million 270 thousand people, 640 tanks and 1500 aircraft. In Germany, these figures were much more impressive: 4 million 600 thousand soldiers and officers, 3195 tanks and 4093 aircraft.
Moreover, during the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk in 1940, a significant number of tanks, artillery and ammunition were abandoned. According to Churchill, "in fact, in the whole country there were hardly 500 field guns of all types and 200 medium and heavy tanks."
Even more deplorable was the state of the United States Army. The number of regular troops by 1939 was just over 500 thousand people, with 89 combat divisions, of which only 16 were armored. For comparison: the Wehrmacht army had 170 fully equipped and combat-ready divisions.
However, in a couple of years, both the United States and Great Britain significantly strengthened their military capabilities and in 1942, according to experts, they could already provide real assistance to the USSR, pulling significant forces of the German army from East to West.
When requesting the opening of the Second Front, Stalin relied primarily on the British government, but Churchill, under various pretexts, repeatedly refused the Soviet leader.
Fight for the Suez Canal
The Middle East continued to be a priority for Great Britain at the height of the war. In British military circles, an amphibious landing on the coast of France was considered unpromising, which would only divert the main forces from solving strategic tasks.
The situation by the spring of 1941 was such that the UK was no longer enough food. Importing food products from the main suppliers - the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Norway, for obvious reasons, turned out to be impossible.
Churchill was well aware of the need to maintain communications with the Near and Middle East, as well as India, which would provide Great Britain with much-needed goods, and therefore he threw all his forces into the defense of the Suez Canal. The German threat to this region was quite large.
Allied divisions
An important reason for delaying the opening of the Second Front was the disagreement of the allies. They were observed between Great Britain and the United States, which were solving their geopolitical problems, but even more contradictions emerged between Great Britain and France.
Even before the surrender of France, Churchill visited the government of the country, which was evacuated to Tours, trying to inspire the French to continue resistance. But at the same time, the Prime Minister did not hide his fear that the French Navy could fall into the hands of the German army and therefore offered to ship it to British ports. From the government of France followed by a decisive refusal.
On June 16, 1940, Churchill proposed to the government of the Third Republic an even more daring project, which practically meant the merging of Great Britain and France into one state on enslaving terms for the latter. The French regarded this as an undisguised desire to take over the country's colonies.
The last step that upset the relationship between the two allies was Operation Catapult, which involved the capture by England of the entire available French fleet or its destruction in order to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy.
Japanese threat and Moroccan interest
At the end of 1941, the attack of the Japanese Air Force on the American military base in Pearl Harbor, on the one hand, it finally placed the United States in the ranks of the allies of the Soviet Union, but on the other hand, it pushed back the opening of the Second Front, as it forced the country to concentrate its efforts on the war with Japan. For a whole year, the Pacific theater of operations for the American army became the main arena of battles.
In November 1942, the United States began to implement the Torch plan to capture Morocco, which at that time was of the greatest interest to American military and political circles. It was assumed that the Vichy regime, with which the United States continued to maintain diplomatic relations, would not resist.
And so it happened. In a matter of days, the Americans took over major cities Morocco, and later, having united with the allies - Britain and the "Free France" continued successful offensive operations in Algeria and Tunisia.
Personal goals
Soviet historiography almost unanimously expressed the opinion that the Anglo-American coalition deliberately delayed the opening of the Second Front, expecting that the USSR, exhausted by a long war, would lose its status as a great power. Churchill, even while promising military assistance to the Soviet Union, continued to call it a "sinister Bolshevik state".
In a message to Stalin, Churchill writes very vaguely that "the chiefs of staff do not see the possibility of doing anything on such a scale that it could bring you even the smallest benefit." This answer is most likely due to the fact that the Prime Minister shared the opinion of the military-political circles of Britain, who argued: "the defeat of the USSR by the Wehrmacht troops is a matter of several weeks."
After the turning point in the war, when a certain status quo was observed on the fronts of the USSR, the Allies were still in no hurry to open the Second Front. They were occupied with completely different thoughts: would the Soviet government agree to a separate peace with Germany? The Allied intelligence report contained the following words: "A state of affairs in which neither side can count on a quick complete victory will in all likelihood lead to a Russo-German agreement."
The wait-and-see attitude of Great Britain and the United States meant one thing: the allies were interested in weakening both Germany and the USSR. Only when the fall of the Third Reich became inevitable did certain shifts take place in the process of opening the Second Front.
War is big business
Many historians are perplexed by one circumstance: why the German army allowed the British landing force to retreat almost unhindered during the so-called "Dunkirk operation" in May-June 1940. The answer most often sounds like this: "Hitler received instructions from the British not to touch."
Doctor of Political Science Vladimir Pavlenko believes that the situation around the entry of the US and Great Britain into the European arena of the war was influenced by big business represented by the Rockefeller financial clan. The main goal of the tycoon is the Eurasian oil market. It was Rockefeller, according to the political scientist, who created the "American-British-German octopus - the Schroeder Bank in the status of an agent of the Nazi government" is responsible for the growth of the German military machine.
For the time being, until the time Hitler's Germany was needed by Rockefeller. British and American intelligence agencies repeatedly reported on the possibility of removing Hitler, but each time they received a go-ahead from the leadership. As soon as the end of the Third Reich became obvious, nothing prevented Britain and the United States from entering the European theater of operations.
RIA Novosti continues to publish conversations between Doctor of Historical Sciences Valentin FALIN and the agency's military observer Viktor LITOVKIN. They reveal previously little-known pages of the Great Patriotic War, tell about the mechanisms and springs of certain decisions closed to the general public. highest level which sometimes had a decisive influence on the course and outcome of hostilities.
VL: In the modern historiography of the Second World War, there are various assessments of its final stage. Some experts argue that the war could have ended much earlier - known, in particular, the memoirs of Marshal Chuikov, who wrote about this. Others believe that it could drag on for at least another year. Who is closer to the truth? And what is it? What is your point of view?
VF: Not only today's historiography is arguing on this issue. There were discussions about the timing of the war in Europe and the time of its end even during the war. They have been going on unceasingly since 1942. To be precise, this question has occupied politicians and the military since the forty-first year, when the vast majority statesmen, including Roosevelt and Churchill, believed that the Soviet Union would hold out for a maximum of four to six weeks. Only Benes believed and argued that the USSR would resist the Nazi invasion and, ultimately, defeat Germany.
Eduard Beneš, if I remember correctly, was the President of Czechoslovakia in exile. After the Munich agreement in 1938 and the seizure of the country, he was in the UK?
Yes. Then, when these assessments and, if you will, the assessments of our resilience did not come true, when Germany suffered its first, I emphasize, strategic defeat in World War II near Moscow, views changed dramatically. There were fears in the West that the Soviet Union would not come out of this war too strong. And if it really turns out to be too strong, it will determine the face of the future Europe. So said Berle, US Deputy Secretary of State, coordinator of US intelligence. Churchill's entourage also thought so, including very respectable people who developed the doctrine of the actions of the British armed forces and all British policy before the war and during the war.
This explains, in many respects, Churchill's resistance to the opening of a second front in 1942. Although Tiverbrook, Crippe in the British leadership, and especially Eisenhower and other planners of the American military plans, believed that there were both technical and other prerequisites for defeating the Germans precisely in the forty-second year. Use the factor of diverting the overwhelming part of the German armed forces to the East and, in fact, the 2,000-kilometer-long coastline of France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and even Germany itself, open to invasion for the allied armies. Along the Atlantic coast, the Nazis did not then have any permanent defensive structures.
Moreover, the American military insisted and persuaded Roosevelt (there are several memorandums from Eisenhower on this subject) that a second front is necessary, that a second front is possible, that the opening of a second front will make the war in Europe, in principle, short-lived and force Germany to capitulate. If not in the forty-second year, then, at the latest, in the forty-three.
But such calculations did not suit the UK and the figures of the conservative warehouse, of which there were plenty on the American Olympus.
-Who do you mean?
Well, for example, the entire State Department, headed by Hull, was extremely unfriendly towards the USSR. This explains why Roosevelt did not take Hull with him to the Tehran conference, and why the secretary of state received the minutes of the Big Three meetings for review six months after Tehran. The curiosity is that the protocols were reported to Hitler by the political intelligence of the Reich after three or four weeks. Life is full of paradoxes.
After the Battle of Kursk in 1943, which ended in the defeat of the Wehrmacht, on August 20, the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain, as well as Churchill and Roosevelt, met in Quebec. On the agenda was the question of the possible withdrawal of the United States and Britain from the anti-Hitler coalition and of entering into an alliance with Nazi generals to wage a joint war against the Soviet Union.
But because, according to the ideology of Churchill and those who shared this ideology in Washington, it was necessary to "detain these Russian barbarians" as far in the East as possible. If not to break the Soviet Union, then to weaken it to the utmost. First of all, by the hands of the Germans. That was the task.
This is the old, old Churchillian intent. He developed this idea in conversations with General Kutepov back in 1919. Americans, British and French fail and cannot crush Soviet Russia he said. This task must be entrusted to the Japanese and Germans. In a similar vein, Churchill instructed Bismarck, the first secretary of the German Embassy in London, in 1930. The Germans behaved in the first world war like idiots, he argued. Instead of focusing on defeating Russia, they started a war on two fronts. If they had only dealt with Russia, then England would have neutralized France.
For Churchill, it was not so much a fight against the Bolsheviks as a continuation Crimean War 1853-1856, when Russia tried well or badly to put a limit to British expansion.
In Transcaucasia, Central Asia, in the oil-rich Middle East...
Naturally. Therefore, when we talk about different options waging war with Nazi Germany, we should not forget about the different attitudes towards the philosophy of alliance, towards the obligations that England and the United States assumed before Moscow
I'll digress for a moment. In Ghent in 1954 or 1955 there was a symposium of priests on the topic - do angels kiss? As a result of many days of debate, conclusions were drawn: they kiss, but without passion. Allied relations in the anti-Hitler coalition were somewhat reminiscent of an angelic whim, if not the kisses of Judas. The promises were without obligation or, worse, to mislead the Soviet partner.
Such tactics, let me remind you, disrupted the negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France in August 1939, when something could still be done to curb Nazi aggression. Defiantly, they left the Soviet leadership no choice but to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. We were exposed to the blow of the Nazi military machine, ready for aggression. I will refer to the directive as it was formulated in Chamberlain’s cabinet: “if London does not evade the agreement with the Soviet Union, the British signature under it should not mean that in the event of a German attack on the USSR, the British will come to the aid of the victim of aggression and declare war on Germany. We must reserve the opportunity to state that Britain and the Soviet Union interpret the facts differently."
A well-known historical example, when Germany attacked Poland, an ally of Great Britain, in September 1939, London declared war on Berlin, but did not take a single serious step to really help Warsaw.
But in our case there was no question of even a formal declaration of war. The Tories proceeded from the fact that the German skating rink would pass to the Urals and tamp everything along the way. There will be no one to complain about the treachery of Albion.
This link of times, the link of events existed during the war. She provided food for thought. And these reflections, it seems to me, were not very optimistic for us.
But let's go back to the turn of the forty-fourth - forty-fifth year. Could we end the war before May or not?
Let us put the question this way: why was the landing of the allies planned for the forty-fourth year? For some reason, no one emphasizes this moment. Meanwhile, the date was not chosen by chance. In the West, they took into account that near Stalingrad we lost a huge number of soldiers and officers, military equipment. There were also colossal casualties on the Kursk Bulge ... We lost more tanks than the Germans.
In 1944, the country mobilized seventeen-year-old boys. Almost the entire village was cleared. Only at the defense plants spared the age of 1926-1927 - their directors were not released.
American and British intelligence, evaluating the prospects, agreed that by the spring of 1944 the offensive potential of the Soviet Union would be exhausted. That the human reserves will be completely used up, and the Soviet Union will not be able to strike the Wehrmacht with a blow comparable to the Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk battles. So, by the time the allies landed, having been bogged down in the confrontation with the Nazis, we would cede the strategic initiative to the United States and England.
By the time the allies landed on the continent, a conspiracy against Hitler was also dated. The generals brought to power in the Reich were to disband Western Front and open space for the Americans and the British to occupy Germany and "liberate" Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria ... The Red Army was to be stopped at the borders of 1939.
I remember that the Americans and the British even landed troops in Hungary, in the Balaton region, with the aim of capturing Budapest, but the Germans shot it all...
It was not a landing, but rather a contact group to re-establish ties with the Hungarian anti-fascist forces. But not only that failed. After the assassination attempt, Hitler survived, Rommel was seriously wounded and dropped out of the game, although in the West they were betting on him. The rest of the generals chickened out. What happened happened. The Americans did not succeed in an easy march across Germany to bravura music. They got involved in battles, sometimes difficult, remember the Ardennes operation. Nevertheless, they solved their problems. They solved them, at times, rather cynically.
I'll give you a specific example. US troops approached Paris. There began an uprising. The Americans stopped thirty kilometers from the capital of France and waited for the Germans to kill the rebels, since they were, first of all, the communists. It was killed there, there are different data, from three to five thousand people. But the rebels took control of the situation, and only then did the Americans take Paris. The same was observed in the south of France.
Let's go back to the point from which we started our conversation.
Winter of the forty-fourth - forty-fifth year.
Yes. In the autumn of 1944, several conferences were held in Germany, led by Hitler, and then on his behalf by Jodl and Keitel. Their meaning boiled down to the following - if you give the Americans a good thrashing, the United States and England will awaken a great taste for negotiations that were conducted in secret from Moscow in 1942-1943.
The Ardennes operation was conceived in Berlin not as an operation to win the war, but as an operation to undermine allied relations between the West and the Soviet Union. The United States had to understand how strong Germany was, how interesting it was for the Western powers in their confrontation with the Soviet Union. And how much the Allies themselves do not have enough strength or will to stop the "Reds" on the outskirts of German territory.
Hitler emphasized that no one would talk to a country that was in a difficult situation - they would only talk to us when the Wehrmacht showed that it was a force.
Surprise was the decisive trump card. The Allies occupied winter quarters, they believed that the Alsace region, the Ardennes mountains - a great place to relax and a very bad place for military operations. The Germans, meanwhile, were about to break through to Rotterdam and cut off the Americans from using the ports of Holland. And this circumstance will completely decide the entire Western company.
The start of the Ardennes operation was postponed several times. Germany did not have enough strength. And it began precisely at the moment when, in the winter of 1944, the Red Army was waging heavy fighting in Hungary, in the Balaton region and near Budapest. At stake were the last sources of oil - in Austria and some in Hungary itself, which were controlled by the Germans.
This was one of the reasons why Hitler decided to defend Hungary no matter what. And why, at the height of the Ardennes operation and before the start of the Alsatian operation, he began to essentially withdraw forces from the western direction and transfer troops to the Soviet-Hungarian front. The main force of the Ardennes operation - the 6th SS Panzer Army was removed from the Ardennes and transferred to Hungary ...
Under Haymashker.
In essence, the redeployment began even before Roosevelt and Churchill's panic appeal to Stalin, when they, translated from diplomatic into ordinary language, began to ask: help, save, we were in trouble.
But Hitler was estimating, and there is evidence of this, that if our allies so often exposed the Soviet Union to attack and openly waited, but whether Moscow could stand it, if the Red Army would not break, then we can do the same. As in 1941 they were waiting for the fall of the capital of the USSR, when in 1942 not only Turkey and Japan, but also the United States were waiting to see if we would surrender Stalingrad in order to decide to revise our policy. After all, the allies did not even share intelligence information with us, for example, about the plans for the German offensive across the Don to the Volga and further to the Caucasus, and so on and so forth ...
This information, if I am not mistaken, was given to us by the legendary Red Chapel.
The Americans did not provide us with any information, although they had it by the day and hour. Including the preparation of the operation "Citadel" on the Kursk Bulge ...
We, of course, had good reason to take a closer look at how our allies know how to fight, how much they want to fight and how much they are ready to advance their master plan when carrying out operations on the continent - a plan that was called "Ranken". Not "Overlord" was the basis, but "Ranken", which provided for the establishment of Anglo-American control over all of Germany, over all the states of Eastern Europe, in order to prevent us from going there.
Eisenhower, when he was appointed commander of the forces of the second front, received a directive: prepare the Overlord, but always keep the Ranken in mind. If favorable conditions arise for the implementation of the Ranken plan, discard the Overlord, and direct all forces to the implementation of the Ranken plan. The uprising in Warsaw was launched under this plan. And many other things were carried out under this plan.
In this sense, the forty-fourth year, the end of it - the beginning of the forty-fifth became the moment of truth. The war was not on two fronts - East and West, but the war was on two fronts. Formally, the allies were fighting, which is very important for us - they certainly tied up some part of the German troops. But their main idea was to stop, if possible, the Soviet Union, as Churchill said, and individual American generals expressed it more sharply, "to stop the descendants of Genghis Khan."
Incidentally, Churchill formulated this idea in a crudely anti-Soviet form as early as October 1942, when our counter-offensive on November 19 near Stalingrad had not yet begun. "We need to stop these barbarians as far east as possible."
And when we talk about our allies - I in no way want and can not belittle the merits of the soldiers and officers of the allied forces who fought like us, not knowing anything about the political intrigues and machinations of their rulers - they fought honestly and steadfastly . I am not belittling the aid that we received under Lend-Lease, although we have never been the main recipients of this aid. I just want to say how difficult, contradictory and dangerous the situation was for us throughout the war until its victorious salute. And how difficult, at times, was the adoption of a decision. When they didn’t just lead us by the nose, but continued and continued to simply expose us to a blow.
That is, the war could really have ended much earlier than May 1945?
If I answer this question absolutely frankly, then I will say: yes, I could. Only it is not the fault of our country that it did not end in the forty-third year. Not our fault. If only our allies honestly fulfilled their allied duty, if they adhered to the obligations that they assumed before the Soviet Union in the forty-first, forty-second and in the first half of the forty-three. And since they did not do this, the war dragged on for at least one and a half to two years.
And most importantly, if it were not for these delays with the opening of a second front, there would have been 10-12 million fewer casualties among the Soviet people and among the allies, especially in the occupied territory of Europe. Even Auschwitz would not have worked, after all, it began to operate at full capacity in the forty-fourth year ...
Answer left the guest
G. K. Zhukov writes in his book: “The victory of our troops near Stalingrad
marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet
Union and the beginning of the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory. FROM
this time and until the very end of the war, the Soviet command completely
took the strategic initiative. "
One cannot but agree with such an assessment. Assuming there weren't
victory at Stalingrad, it becomes clear that the Germans would gain a foothold on
Caucasus, in the Volga region, they would launch a new offensive against Moscow, and the war
would drag on for many years, full of deprivation and suffering of our people,
Seeing our defeat, the allies are unlikely to stay with us. They are so
delayed the opening of a second front in Europe, watching the course of events and
waiting for who will be stronger - us or the Germans. It is possible that Germany
would have achieved world domination, as Hitler dreamed, but this
happened. After the Battle of Stalingrad, everyone realized that a turn had come, and
doubts about our strength disappeared. We have begun a new offensive phase in the war,
leading to victory over Nazi Germany. This change took place after
Stalingrad.
What the battle on the Volga meant for the Germans, writes Lieutenant General Vsetfal:
“The defeat at Stalingrad horrified both the German people and their
army. Never before in the history of Germany had there been such a
terrible loss of so many troops.
After the liquidation of the encircled grouping of German troops near Stalingrad,
the fascists themselves fled from the Caucasus in a panic, fearing a new “cauldron”.
Soviet troops, developing a winter offensive to the west, occupied Rostov,
Novocherkassk, Kursk, Kharkov and a number of other important areas. General operational
the strategic situation for the enemy deteriorated sharply throughout the Soviet
German front.
Some foreign historians distort the facts when they claim that
victory at Stalingrad was achieved not by military art, but by our
overwhelming superiority in manpower and resources. Assessing the value
Battle of Stalingrad, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky writes in his book “The Case
whole life”: “No matter how zealous modern bourgeois
falsifiers in a malicious distortion of history, they fail
eradicate from the consciousness of mankind greatness
Stalingrad victory. And for our and for future generations forever
it will remain indisputable that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler's
the clique, despite all efforts, could not restore the former
efficiency of his army, found himself in a zone of deep military
political crisis. Battle of Stalingrad rightly defined as
the largest military-political event of the entire Second World War”.
To this we can add the opinion of US President Franklin
Roosevelt, expressed in the letter presented to Stalingrad after the battle: “From
in the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this charter to Stalingrad,
to celebrate our admiration for his valiant defenders, the bravery,
whose fortitude and dedication during the siege of September 13, 19442
years to January 31, 1943 will forever inspire the hearts of all free
of people. Their glorious victory stopped the wave of invasion and became a turning point
point of war of the allied nations against the forces of aggression.
