Armament of Afghanistan. Afghan "reduction knife": what happened to military units after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan

"FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW" No. 7.2006 (pp. 15-18)

Colonel A. VASILIEV,

candidate of military sciences

The military-political leadership (VPR) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), in the interests of stabilizing the situation and creating conditions for the implementation of plans for the country's economic and social development, is interested in the early formation of the national armed forces. However, during practical implementation developed with the participation of the United States and Western countries plans for the forced construction of the 70,000-strong Afghan National Army (AHA) by the beginning of 2007, the VPR faced serious difficulties. Low combat training of the personnel of the new army against the background of the growing desertion of soldiers and sergeants, especially in units and units taking part in hostilities against the Taliban, an acute shortage of ammunition, lack of military equipment to equip the units being commissioned, they forced the command of the American armed forces to revise the previously scheduled dates for the final formation of the AHA, postponing them to a later time. According to the calculations of US military advisers, this army will reach its intended size only by May 2008, and full operational readiness only by September 2009.

The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the IRA continues to recruit directorates (operational, organizational and mobilization, training and combat training of troops, personnel, financial, foreign relations, military procurement and supplies, medical, parliamentary and public relations, control and revision) and commands (intelligence, communications, rear and supply). To date, the central office of the Ministry of Defense is staffed by 55 percent. (1,650 servicemen out of 3,000 required by the state), and the General Staff, including its command and control, - only by 35 percent. (2,450 out of 7,000). As of the end of 2005, the number of AHAs reached 30,663.

According to the decree of IRA President Hamid Karzai of December 2, 2002 "On the creation of the Afghan national army" and the new organizational and staff structure developed in accordance with it, the country's armed forces are represented by only two types - ground forces and air forces. The basis of the combat power of the AHA should be the ground forces, including five army corps (AK, 13 brigades) total number 46 thousand people. At present, the headquarters of all corps and nine brigades that make up them have been formed and number 19,790 people.

The most combat-ready unit is 201 AK. However, it is also currently represented by practically only two brigades (the 1st light infantry brigade (LPBR) and the 3rd rapid reaction brigade), while in the 2 LPBR, after sending four battalions to recruit other corps, which are in the stage formation, the headquarters of the brigade and the battalion of fire support (bop) were preserved.

There are two light infantry brigades each, the second being incomplete, are available in 203 and 205 AK, and the third brigades (in priority order) are planned to be completed by May 2006 and April 2007, respectively. 2 LPBR 201 AK will be re-deployed only by September-October 2006.

B 207 and 209 AK on this moment just one LPBR. Their resupply will begin only after the completion of this process in the cities of Kandahar, Kabul and Gardez.

Currently in service with the IRA Armed Forces are 44 T-62 tanks, 41 BMP-1, 13 M-113 armored personnel carriers, 55 BRDM-2, 52 122-mm D-30 howitzers, 120 mortars of various calibers. Besides,

a large number of equipment is disassembled and used as spare parts.

In addition, according to the long-term plan for the phased construction of the AHA ground forces developed by US military advisers until 2010, four regional commands will be deployed: two by the end of 2008 in the cities of Kandahar and Gardez and two by 2010 in the cities of Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

The AHA Air Corps (VC) will organizationally consist of an air transport and helicopter "wings", an engineering service battalion and an air control group. In addition, it is planned to create four air bases at the airfields of Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Gardez, where army corps are deployed. The VK aviation park has five An-32 (An-26) aircraft, seven Mi-8 and six Mi-24 helicopters, and two L-39 training aircraft. The issue of equipping the air corps with combat aircraft is not yet on the agenda. The number of VK personnel as of December 1, 2005 was 189 people, and by 2009 it will be increased to 3,000 servicemen. The largest airfields - Bagram, Kandahar and Shindand - remain under American control for an indefinite period.

With funds allocated primarily by the United States, foreign instructors at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) train personnel for the newly formed AHA battalions. In total, it is planned to prepare it for 78 battalions, including infantry, tank, mechanized, fire support, combat support, and transport. As of December 1, 2005, only 44 battalions were trained at the KVUTs. The rest of the military will be trained in accordance with the schedule developed by US military advisers. At the same time, it is planned to increase its duration at the KVUTS from the current 14 to 16 weeks, and to reduce the number of units in one stream from five to four.

According to the forecasts of Western experts, the pace of AHA construction in 2006 will slow down due to a number of objective factors. The Americans are worried about the low level of professional training of personnel. Formed brigades and battalions, according to US advisers, are not capable of conducting independent combat operations. In their opinion, one of the main reasons for this is the unresolved issues of material and technical support of the newly formed subdivisions. So, when the 44th battalion was released from the KVUTS in November 2005 (according to the organizational structure it is a fire support battalion (bop)), out of 120 units of armored vehicles laid down in the state, only eight vehicles were allocated. In addition to them, the bop did not receive a single howitzer (according to the state, eight 122-mm D-30s), not a single BRDM-2 (there should be eight), not a single unit of engineering or special equipment (supposed to be 22), as well as anti-tank weapons. The troops are experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition for tank guns (T-62) and 122-mm howitzers D-30, rounds for BMP-1 (BMP-2), RPG-7, mines for 82- and 120-mm mortars.

The Americans, seeking to limit Russian participation in the creation of the Afghan armed forces, are attempting to solve the problem of meeting the AHA's primary needs for weapons and military equipment by supplying Soviet-made samples to the country from the countries participating in the former Warsaw Pact that have expressed a desire to join NATO. Spare parts for armored vehicles are supplied from Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, artillery-from Slovakia and Mongolia, small arms - from the Czech Republic and Hungary.

At the same time, a significant part of the Afghan generals adhere to somewhat different positions, which speaks out for expanding the independence of the IRA Defense Ministry in dealing with the preparation and use of troops, the formation and spending of defense budget items, and the identification of priority partners in military-technical cooperation. Among them were named Russia, China and India.

The difficulties of military construction in Afghanistan, along with the above reasons, are also explained by the insufficient financing of this process. MO IRA budget for the new fiscal year (started on March 21, 2006), including aid

countries-donors, in comparison with the current period, it is expected to increase by almost 50%, after which it should amount to about 1.4 billion US dollars. At the same time, the Afghan share in it will reach 165 million dollars (8 billion afghanis).

Taking into account all the circumstances noted, military construction vAfghanistan will take at least another five to seven years. The direction and content of this process, as well as the formulation of the state's military-political doctrine, will be determined by the results of the confrontation between representatives of the main political groups in the country's leadership, the preservation of the US military presence on Afghan territory, as well as the capabilities and nature of the sources of funding for the army and the supply of weapons and military equipment. ®

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Afghan National Army
Afghan National Army emblem
Years of existence	since 2001

Afghan National Army (ANA)- military establishment Republic of Afghanistan designed to protect the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the state. Consist of the Ground Forces and National Air Corps... Afghanistan has no navy.

O. Sidorov: The Armed Forces of Afghanistan today and tomorrow
08:37 08.11.2006

It has already become an axiom that the armed forces in any country in the world are the guarantors of the preservation of sovereignty and political stability. And Afghanistan is no exception.

The decree "On the creation of the Afghan national army" issued by the head of the Afghan state Hamid Karzai in 2002 marked the beginning of the formation of the next national defense forces of Afghanistan.

At the same time, the construction of the Afghan armed forces constantly encounters various kinds of obstacles. But in spite of everything, their creation is gradually moving off the ground.

The composition of the armed forces of Afghanistan:

Today, the Armed Forces of Afghanistan consist of the following types of troops:

Ground troops;

Air Force;

Border troops;

State Security Service;

Air defense troops.

Ground forces (namely, five corps) are deployed in the provinces where the Taliban had military bases previously, namely in Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar and Paktia.

History

Afghan National Army soldiers in the 1950s.

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the Afghan army was trained and equipped The Soviet Union... In the 1970s, the number of military personnel in the Afghan army was at its peak - about 200,000 people. The Afghan Army took part in the Afghan Civil War. After the fall of the DRA in 1992, power passed to the Taliban and the united armed forces ceased to exist.

Present time

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghan army was re-formed with the help of instructors from the US and NATO. Afghan President Hamid Karzai set the number armed forces- 70,000 people by 2009. Many military experts believe that this is not enough, and that at least 200,000 people are needed to control the situation in the country. By June 2003, a corps numbering 3,000 had been formed.

Current state

Number

As of May 2008, the strength is over 80,000 troops. By mid-2009, 86,000 people are expected. In October 2008, it was proposed to increase the number to 134,000 people.

Military Band of the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

Structure

Basic structural unit the Afghan army is considered to be a battalion of 600 men. Spetsnaz units are modeled after the US Army. By 2007, 76 battalions are planned. A total of 14 brigades, which will be focused on regional level... Thirteen of these brigades are to be light infantry, one will be mechanized and a spetsnaz brigade.

Five ANA buildings:

201st Corps, based in Kabul (of which the 3rd Brigade, in Pol-e-Chakri, will be mechanized formations of M-113 armored vehicles and Soviet battle tanks
203rd Corps, based in Gardez,
205 corps, based in Kandahar,
Corps 207 in Herat
Building 209 in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Afghan National Army soldiers, including the ANA Commando battalion.

Special Forces

In July 2007, the first special forces battalion was formed in the Afghan army. The commandos took a three-month training course for American special forces. They received training in advanced infantry skills, as well as training in first aid and tactics. They are fully equipped with US Army equipment. Spetsnaz is one of the most elite units of the Afghan army. By the end of 2008, six ANA commando battalions will be stationed in southern Afghanistan to support Canadian forces.

Armament

Weapon

Since the early 1970s, the army has been equipped with Soviet AK-47s as its primary small arms. In 2008, the AK-47 is replaced with US-made M16 rifles. Currently, almost all small arms are made by NATO countries. Some special forces units are also equipped with the M16. ANA also uses Soviet weapons left over from the DRA. This equipment is also used by the Afghan National Police. All AK-47 assault rifles will be stored in military warehouses for future use. This measure is taken in connection with the new standard of the army, in connection with which the ANA should be armed with weapons manufactured by the United States and NATO.

Heavy weapons

Model	Photo	Type of	Manufacturer
BTR-60		Armored personnel carrier	the USSR
BTR-80		Armored personnel carrier	the USSR
BRDM-2		Armored personnel carrier	the USSR
BMP-1		BMP	the USSR
BMP-2	-	BMP	the USSR
	-	Armored personnel carrier	USA
			USA

Main battle tanks

Model	Photo	Manufacturer	Notes (edit)
PT-76	-	the USSR
T-55		the USSR
T-62	-	the USSR
Type 59		PRC
		Germany	Will be delivered in 2011 by Canada

Air Defense / Artillery

Model	Photo	Type of	Provider
BM-14	-	Rocket artillery	the USSR
BM-21 Grad		Rocket artillery	the USSR
		Air defense	the USSR
ZU-23-2		Air defense	the USSR
ZPU-4	-	Air defense	the USSR
122 mm howitzer D-30		Cannon	the USSR
152-mm howitzer-gun model 1937 (ML-20)		Cannon	the USSR
152-mm howitzer model 1943 (D-1)		Cannon	the USSR
122 mm howitzer model 1938 (M-30)		Cannon	the USSR
		Cannon	USA

The mullahs of the units play special attention in the training of military personnel. As a rule, there are mosques at the headquarters of formations and units, as well as in educational institutions for personnel.

At the same time, the moral and psychological state of the military personnel of the Afghan Armed Forces remains at a low level. This is due to several factors:

regular clashes between Afghan armed forces and Taliban units;

as a consequence of this, an increase in losses among personnel;

inadequate salaries of military personnel, as a result of which far from the best personnel go to serve;

an increase in the number of deserters among the military.

The moral and psychological state of the Afghan armed forces directly affects the recruitment of volunteers for the regular army.

The main reason for the decline in the number of those wishing to serve in the army is the low level of pay for servicemen. Thus, according to the 2002 decree on the creation of the voluntary National Army of Afghanistan, servicemen are paid a salary of $ 50 during active service, which, in the opinion of conscripts, is an insufficient amount.

The most pressing problems of the Afghan armed forces today are the low training of personnel and high level desertion.

Prospects for military construction in Afghanistan

As a state that does not have an outlet to the ocean, Afghanistan does not plan (and is not able to in the near future) acquire the entire traditional army triad (including the ground forces, the air force, the navy). As a result, the national armed forces of Afghanistan will consist of two branches of the military: the ground forces and the air force.

With regard to the ground forces, it is planned to form military-territorial units located in Kandahar, Gardez, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. 5 army corps (including 13 brigades and 78 battalions) will be formed.

The plans for the further development of the armed forces of Afghanistan envisage an increase in the number by 2007 to 70 thousand soldiers and officers. Further, in the next few years, their number should be doubled.

SCHEME
deployment of formations and units of the DRA army.
(as of 1979)
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia consisted of regular troops (ground troops, air forces and air defense troops) and auxiliary troops (armed formations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security).
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - head of state - chairman of the Revolutionary Council, chairman of the Supreme Council for the Defense of the Motherland.
Direct leadership is entrusted to the Minister of Defense.
The general leadership was carried out by the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff was in charge of: general operational command and control of troops, issues of mobilization, combat and operational training.

Ground troops.

Combat composition: infantry divisions (pd) -10, mountain infantry divisions (gpd) - 1, separate brigades -4, artillery brigades (abr) - 1, separate regiments - 11.
The highest tactical formation is an army corps of different combat composition (2-3 infantry divisions, corps units, units of combat, technical and logistic support and maintenance). The divisions were consolidated into three army corps covering the main operational directions with Pakistan: 1st AK - Jellalabad (Khyber Pass), 2nd AK - Kandahar, 3rd AK - Gardez. The leadership of the units of the ground forces of the Kabul garrison was carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the DRA through the command of the Central Army Corps - TsAK.
The staffing of the ground forces as of 1979 is about 150 thousand people. The manning of the units at the end of December 1979 was about 60% (according to the recollections of the advisers, the units remote from the headquarters of the divisions were manned no more than 40-50%).
Organizationally, the infantry division consisted of 3 infantry (motorized) regiments, an artillery regiment, separate - tank, reconnaissance, engineer-sapper battalions, a communications battalion, an anti-aircraft battalion, combat, logistical and technical support units.
An infantry regiment of three battalions (3 companies in each) composition. The staffing of the infantry regiment was about 130 officers and 1.5 thousand soldiers, the division was about 7 thousand people.
The tank brigade consisted of 3 tank battalions, an infantry fighting vehicle battalion, and auxiliary companies, platoons and services: remrota, vehicle fleet, fuel and lubricants service, fin. service, etc. The staff of the brigade is up to 750 people.
Air Force and Air Defense Forces.
Consisted of three types of troops: the air force (Air Force); anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft missile troops (ZA and ZRV); radio technical troops (RTV). The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Air Defense exercised leadership through the Commander of the Air Force (headquarters of the Combat and Auxiliary Air Commands) and the Commander of the Air Defense (the headquarters of the Air Defense Command). The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Air Defense was also subordinate to the Flight Technical School (LTS), which was then transformed into an Air Force and Air Defense School.

Combat composition:

Air Force: aviation regiments - 6;
Air defense: - FOR and ZRV: anti-aircraft missile brigade -1, anti-aircraft artillery regiment - 2 (77 zenap: 100 mm guns -12, paired 23 mm automatic installations ZPU-2 - 16), separate divisions ZA - 4.
- RTV consisted of a regiment and 2 separate radio technical battalions.
The total strength of the Air Force and Air Defense as of the end of 1979 was about 120 fighters and fighter-bombers, about 30 bombers, 20 transport aircraft, 25 helicopters, about 15 thousand people.
An aircraft repair plant (ARP) specialized in MiG-17s worked in Bagram, and in Kabul it was located training base LTSh.
The Bagram air garrison was considered the most efficient.
With the intensification of organized insurgency, the importance of air travel has grown. In this situation, to provide for the Afghan army, as well as to solve top-priority economic tasks, a VTA detachment of 10 An-12 aircraft arrived at the disposal of the advisers' apparatus. It was headed by experienced pilots Mamatov, Ishgiuratov and others. The detachment was based at the Bagram airfield.
To organize interaction with ground forces and increase the effectiveness of the combat use of aviation for the period of hostilities, the deployment of aviation representatives and combat control groups in divisions and corps was practiced.

Acquisition of aircraft.

The mobilization and manning of troops is entrusted to the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. There were no special territorial bodies responsible for organizing conscription, registering servicemen and reservists. The call (capture) of those liable for military service was entrusted to the commanders of formations and units. By the spring of 1979, the work of recruiting centers was organized, but this did not solve the problem of manning the troops and the "catch" system existed along with conscription.
Mobilization capabilities - about 1 million people.

Combat training.

The training of officers was carried out at the Harbi Puhantun Joint Military School, at officer courses, at the Polytechnic Institute, at the Military Medical Faculty of Kabul University, in training units and units and military educational institutions Soviet Union and others foreign countries... The military lyceum (like the Suvorov School) prepared boys in grades 5-12 for officer service.
The combat training of units was carried out according to training programs developed by Soviet military specialists and advisers, which were copies of the programs of the Soviet Army of the 60s, without taking into account the peculiarities of the terrain and the level of educational training of personnel. The training material and technical base was practically absent.
Regimental and divisional artillery is practically unable to carry out fire missions from closed firing positions.
On the territory of the 4th tank brigade was located The educational center- the so-called "courses-B". The courses provided training for specialists from tank units.
The training of flight and technical personnel was carried out mainly in the USSR (pilots - in Kyrgyzstan and the Kuban, engineers - in Ukraine). The training of helicopter pilots on the Mi-25 and Mi-24 was carried out in the USSR, additional training was carried out on the spot by an instructor group of 3 pilots and 4 engineers. Afghan pilots gaining combat experience in difficult conditions civil war... Realizing that they were fighting against their fellow citizens, they were far from always fully aware of the tasks and goals of this struggle. Many of them shied away from assignments for various reasons, including religious ones. Taking advantage of the lack of control over the results of strikes, some pilots reported on the completion of the mission, but in fact dropped deadly cargo in uninhabited areas. Often, bombing was carried out from heights below the minimum permissible, and the bombs fell to the ground without exploding. However, in general, the Air Force and Air Defense were loyal to the new leadership. Cases of hijacking aircraft and direct transition of aviators to the rebels in 1978-1979. did not have.

Armament and military equipment.

The Afghan army was sufficiently equipped with Soviet-made military equipment. In service consisted of:
- tanks of various modifications (T-34/85, T-55, T-62) - about 600 units, incl. T-62 - 92 units;
- armored vehicles (BTR-60, BRDM, BMP-1, BTR-152) - about 300 units;
- artillery pieces - caliber 76 mm and above - about 1500 units.
To increase the mobility of the "K" regiments, they were armed with ZIL-157 vehicles.
A significant part of the weapons and military equipment was out of order due to the low level of technical training of personnel, gross violation operating rules and frequency Maintenance... The personnel were dismissive of her savings. At the slightest malfunction, it was left unattended, no measures were taken for restoration, or it was dismantled, stolen and unsuitable for further operation.

Organization of everyday life.

Units and subunits were located in military towns. In large garrisons (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar), units were located in barracks. The barracks were low adobe buildings. The soldiers slept on wicker beds. Food preparation (shurpa soup and rice for the second with gravy) was carried out at food points. Officers and soldiers ate separately. The officers' diet included meat daily. The soldiers were supposed to eat meat twice a week.
In remote garrisons, in addition to barracks, soldiers could be accommodated in dugouts and small tents. Most of the soldiers had no beds. Soldiers slept on the floor or in yards on mattresses and bedding brought from home during the conscription. The dining room, kitchen, bathhouse were absent. The soldiers prepared their own food on bonfires in small cauldrons.
The officers were treated at the Charsad Bistar Central Military Hospital.

Moral and psychological state.

The attitude of various categories of officers to the April Revolution was ambiguous. The financially secured part of the officer corps immediately after the April Revolution left the army and took a wait-and-see attitude. Some of them (mainly senior officers) took secondary economic or staff positions that did not correspond to their rank, since the officer's salary was determined not by the position held, but by his rank. Some officers emigrated or went over to the side of the counter-revolution.
The lack of unity in the PDPA negatively affected the relationship between the officers of which they were members. Most of the officers, especially the junior level, members of the PDPA (Khalq faction) unconditionally supported the revolution and had high hopes for its results. Having seized power, the Khalkovites accused the Parchamites of passivity and evasion from active struggle. Following this accusation, they began to diligently uproot their allies from the party and the state apparatus. Repressions followed, up to the physical destruction of the Parchamites, which forced the members of this faction to go underground and hide their belonging to it.
The intra-party struggle in the form of arrests and shake-ups of army personnel (at least 10 during 1978-1979) led to command positions (including the Ministry of Defense, the command of corps, divisions and brigades) a significant number of officers (mainly on the basis of family ties or personal loyalty management) who do not have the appropriate knowledge and skills. The number of officers was reduced almost 10 times, the army more than 2 times. The commanding staff of the army split into separate groups depending on the commitment to the party leaders. Many openly opposed the PDPA.
The soldiers expressed their dissatisfaction with the land reform.

Combat operations of troops.

In the face of unfolding armed opposition government reforms the army was entrusted with the protection of a large number of objects (county centers, infrastructure facilities), which could be performed only if small garrisons were created by force from platoon to battalion. The units allocated for the protection were at a considerable distance from each other and had no communication not only with each other, but also with the headquarters of their units. The RA government, in fact, controlled only the provincial centers, relying on the garrisons stationed there. In a number of county and even provincial centers, the garrisons were blocked by the rebels - Urgun, Asadabad, Khost. In the places of permanent deployment of divisions, up to two infantry battalions remained, which accompanied the goods necessary to support the life of the units. Often, such units had to fight their way through territory controlled by the rebels. The small number and scatteredness of the garrisons did not allow for combat training and educational work. At the same time, such conditions were favorable for the impact of enemy propaganda on the personnel.
Prospecting and the dependent position of the republic's leadership and the passivity of the military command and control bodies led to the fact that by mid-1979 the regular army of about 100 thousand people actually went over to the defense against the disunited and weakly armed opposition detachments numbering about 25-40 thousand people.

Protection of the state border.

The total length of the borders is approx. 5 529 km, including from the USSR approx. 2 350 km
There were no border troops as a branch of the military or a branch of the armed forces. There was no single body responsible for organizing border protection and managing border battalions in the country. As part of the infantry divisions, there was a border service department responsible for protecting only a separate section of the border. One or two border battalions were subordinate to him, which served on the main roads connecting Afghanistan with other states and on which the crossing of the state border was officially allowed. In total, there were about 15 border battalions in the Armed Forces, manned by 30-50%. Small battalions, not equipped with means of transportation and communication, could not ensure the protection of the state border and it was not controlled (except for the checkpoint).
To a large extent, the protection of the state border was entrusted to the tribes living along it, for a fee and benefits. In addition, the state provided them with weapons and ammunition. After the April Revolution, the new government cut off funding and provision of border tribes. The extension to the border tribes of forced conscription into the army was seen by them as an encroachment on age-old traditions and threw the tribal armed formations into the ranks of the opposition. The tribal militia ceased to fulfill the traditional role of the border guard.

Units and subdivisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In August 1978, with the help of advisers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, instead of the previously existing police and gendarmerie, the formation of "Tsarandoi" and the administrative apparatus of local authorities began. It was planned to impose duties on "Tsaranda" in the fight against banditry (units were created following the example of our "Alpha" - their training was assigned to the employees of the Balashikha school), the protection of communications (roads, bridges, tunnels and other state facilities). In addition to these functions, it was planned to entrust the protection of the state border.
Already in the spring of 1979, the formation of the Main Directorate for the Defense of the Revolution began, to which the operational battalions were subordinate (it was planned to create 12 battalions with a total strength of 9-10 thousand people, BRDM - 72 units, 82 mm mortars - 72 units), a training regiment for training the Ministry of Internal Affairs ...
In October 1979, several divisions (companies of 60-80 people) of Tsarandoya were created (with a total number of about 1600 people), which were entrusted with duties to combat banditry, but in fact were engaged in the protection of local authorities (at the level of provincial centers) ... They were armed with PPSh submachine guns and carbines. Up to 2 Tsarandoi battalions carried out tasks to protect facilities in Kabul.

Soviet-Afghan military cooperation has been developing since 1955 (the Treaty on Military-Technical and Economic Assistance). The supply of equipment required the presence of Soviet military specialists and consultants. The agreement prescribed their stay on the territory of Afghanistan, as well as the sending of Afghan servicemen to study in the USSR.
Since 1972, the number of Soviet military specialists and consultants has been about 100 people.
The training of national military personnel was organized in the USSR and in the field. Providing economic assistance and training Afghan servicemen allowed the USSR to become the largest supplier of financial resources and technical assistance. Gradually, Afghanistan found itself in the sphere of Soviet influence. With the coming to power of M. Daud, consultants were admitted to the Defense Ministry and the military command and control bodies of the Land Forces: Defense Ministry - 11, in army corps - 3, in divisions 21 (3 consultants for each division staffed at least 50-60%). Lieutenant General L. Gorelov was appointed Chief Military Adviser from October 1975 to December 4, 1979.
By 1978, more than 2 thousand Soviet technical and economic specialists were in Afghanistan.
Immediately after the Saur revolution (April 27, 1978), at the request of the Afghan leaders, the number of Soviet specialists began to increase sharply. The signing of an intergovernmental agreement on military advisers (in May 1978) made it possible to change their status (instead of advisers - advisers), tasks and strength (up to 400 people). Almost immediately after that, advisers were sent to Afghanistan to form the Main Political Directorate of the DRA Armed Forces. As an advisor to the head of the main political department of the Afghan army, he was sent major general V. Zaplatin. By August 1978, political agencies of corps, divisions and brigades were created.
In January 1979, 409 specialists and advisers were working in Afghanistan.
By the end of June, their numbers had increased dramatically: almost 2,500 soldiers. advisers and 2000 advisers from other departments and power structures of the USSR.
The Tsarandoya's advisory apparatus was subordinate to the KGB mission in Afghanistan.
KGB officers also worked under the cover of the diplomatic apparatus. In addition, advisers from the KGB central apparatus were also involved in the formation of the Afghan security agencies, incl. Balashikha school teachers (KUOS).
It should be noted that there is practically no information on the activities of the GRU General Staff during this period in Afghanistan. At the same time, military analysts of the General Staff correctly assessed the situation in Afghanistan, which indicates the presence and effective work residency of the GRU.
Before the PDPA came to power, the advisory apparatus was inviolable. For an encroachment on the life of a military adviser, all the relatives of the attempted assassination were subject to destruction. Beginning in March 1979, the position of advisers (many lived there with their families) in remote provinces was very precarious. They are exposed to shelling, and the risk of being captured by the rebels and the possible betrayal of their sub-Soviet. Moral and psychological pressure from isolation and remoteness from the center. Nevertheless, they performed their duty in good faith.
Ground troops.

1 AK (headquarters - Kabul):
- 7 pd (Kabul, Rishkhor garrison - south-western outskirts of Kabul): 38, 45 (Pulo-Alam), 75 (Pulo-Allam) pp, 3 ap (Kabul), 170 otb (Kabul); 8 pd: 32, 71, 76 pt; 11 pd (Jalalabad): 66 pp, 77 pp, 7 ap; 190 ap (Kabul).
2 AK (Kandahar):
- 5 pd; 7 TBR; 43 gpp; 191 up; oreadn
3 AK (Gardez)
- 12 pd (Gardez): 67 pp (Gardez); 25 pd (Gardez): 18 pp (Khost), 59 ap; 32 gpp; 192 ap

Units of central subordination:
- 18 PD (Mazar-i-Sharif); 17 pd (Herat); 14 pd (Ghazni): 15, 58 pp, pp (Urgun); 20 pp (Baghlan): 10 pp (Puli-Khumri), 31 pp ((Kunduz, units are scattered), 24 pp (Faizabad), 27 pp ??, 4 ap (Nahrin); 9th GPD (Asadabad): 30 gpp (Asmar), 69 gpp (Asadabad), 55 gpp (Barikot);

- 4, 15 tbr (Kabul, Puli-Charkhi); 88 abr (Kabul); brigade "Commandos" (units are located in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Khost); 26 PDP (Kabul); 157 pdp (Bamiyan); 517 pdp (Maldanishhahr); 52 ops (Kabul); 10 engineering sap. regiment; 21 guard regiment; 1 Guards regiment (Kabul).

Air Force and Air Defense

Air Force: 373 tap (Kabul); 322 iap (Bagram); 355 apib (Bagram); 335 glanders (Shindand); 366 iap (Kandahar); 393 uap (Mazar-i-Sharif);
Air defense: - 99 zrb (3 divisions of the C-75 "Dvina", 3 divisions of the C-125 "Pechora", 2 technical divisions), 77 zenap: 100 mm -12 guns, paired 23 mm automatic installations ZPU-2 - 16), separate divisions FOR - 4.

It has already become an axiom that the armed forces in any country in the world are the guarantors of the preservation of sovereignty and political stability. And Afghanistan is no exception. Decree "On the Creation of the Afghan National Army" published by the head of the Afghan state Hamid Karzai in 2002 marked the beginning of the formation of the next national defense forces of Afghanistan.

At the same time, the construction of the Afghan armed forces constantly encounters various kinds of obstacles. But in spite of everything, their creation is gradually moving off the ground.

The composition of the armed forces of Afghanistan.

Today, the Armed Forces of Afghanistan consist of the following types of troops:

Ground troops;

Air Force;

Border troops;

State Security Service;

Air defense troops.

Ground forces (namely, five corps) are deployed in the provinces where the Taliban had military bases previously, namely in Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar and Paktia.

The armament of the Afghan army is represented mainly by Soviet military equipment and weapons: Kalashnikov assault rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers. Armored vehicles are also represented by Soviet BMP-1,2, BTR-60,70, T-55, T-62 tanks.

After the fall of the Taliban regime, Soviet samples of weapons and equipment began to arrive in Afghanistan from the countries of Eastern Europe, which were previously in the Warsaw Pact and then joined NATO, namely, from Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

At the same time, almost all of the weapons inherited from the Soviet Union require maintenance and overhaul.

The Air Force, as an independent and combat-ready service, currently does not actually represent a real force. The Afghan Air Force has the following number of combat units located in the country.

It is difficult to imagine at what level the state of the flight fleet today, since the above technology back in 2003, for the most part, needed major repairs and expensive technological equipment.

Personnel

In 2005, the armed forces of Afghanistan practically consisted of one type - ground forces with a total strength of about 25 thousand people.

The combat units of the armed forces of Afghanistan number about 20 thousand people. At the same time, 5 thousand are trained in training centers.

It is worth noting that more than 60% of the officers of the new Afghan army in the recent past were mujahideen, since the ranks of the armed forces of Afghanistan are mainly enrolled in citizens who graduated from military schools, as well as persons with combat experience.

The average age of servicemen is 22-25 years old. At the same time, an interethnic balance is observed. This was dictated by the preservation of the representation of various ethnic groups in order to further avoid collisions and conflicts on such grounds. One of distinctive features armed forces of Afghanistan began to adopt the Soviet principle of personnel rotation in the regional context. That is, representatives of the western provinces can serve in the north or south of the country, and, accordingly, representatives of the northern provinces can serve in the west or east of Afghanistan.

At the same time, the moral and psychological state of the military personnel of the Afghan Armed Forces remains at a low level. This is due to several factors:

Regular clashes between Afghan armed forces and Taliban units;

As a consequence of this, an increase in losses among personnel;

Inadequate salaries of military personnel, as a result of which far from the best cadres go to serve;

An increase in the number of deserters among the military.

The moral and psychological state of the Afghan armed forces directly affects the recruitment of volunteers for the regular army.

The most pressing problems of the Afghan armed forces today are low training of personnel and a high level of desertion.

Prospects for military construction in Afghanistan

According to available information, the plans for the development of the Afghan Air Force provide for the formation of the following structural operational-tactical units:

Aviation regiment (which will include four squadrons) consisting of MiG-29 multipurpose fighters;

Regiment of fighter-interceptors Su-27;

Squadrons of Mi-17B and Mi-35 helicopters (modernized Mi-24).

With regard to the deployment of the Afghan Air Force, it will be deployed at four air bases, which, like the ground forces, will be located in Kandahar, Gardez, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

The numerical strength of the Air Force by 2009 is planned to be increased to 3 thousand people. There is one important detail here, which is that during the rearmament and modernization of the Afghan Air Force, the main emphasis will be on combat helicopters.

Taking into account all the pros and cons, under the most favorable circumstances, a new Afghan army will be created no earlier than in 5 years.

At the same time, the difficult military-political situation inside the country, multiplied by the low standard of living of the population and the factual absence of the socio-economic policy of the official authorities, raise concerns about the success of the implementation of the plans outlined by the government of Hamid Karzai for the formation of the national forces of Afghanistan.

28 years ago, the most combat-ready army in the world at that time was leaving Afghanistan - after ten years of fighting with well-trained mujahideen and mercenaries from more than thirty countries of the world. The legendary 40th, the basis of the OKSVA (Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan), returned home with unfolded banners - undefeated, having fulfilled her military duty to the end. Here every soldier was a trained fighter, every division was a combat strike fist. But this potential then, alas, remained unclaimed. Many units were disbanded, and the banners covered with glory were sent to the museum for storage.

In total, in the OKSV for the period from December 1979 to February 1989, there were about 540 various kinds of units, formations and organizations. Some of them were withdrawn from Afghanistan and disbanded during the first year of the contingent's stay here. And this process continued until the final withdrawal of troops. Anti-aircraft missile units, tropospheric communications battalions, and numerous construction and assembly departments went under the knife of reduction.

By the beginning of the first phase of withdrawal in 1988, the group Soviet troops in Afghanistan had 509 formations, units and institutions with a total number of about 110 thousand people. The final composition of the OKSVA consisted of the management of the 40th army with support and service units, 4 divisions, 5 brigades, 4 separate regiments, 6 separate guard battalions, 4 aviation regiments, 3 helicopter regiments , supply teams, pipeline team, medical, repair, construction, apartment maintenance and other parts and institutions.
The contingent's mechanism, in addition to the combat component, included a fairly large number of support units. Medics, signalmen, radio direction finders, repairmen, firefighters, Voentorg, a bath and laundry plant, mobile bakery - a full range of support for the living cycle. The 879th department of trade, providing for the household needs of the contingent, opened 177 stores, where it was possible to buy imported food products (albeit canned), tracksuits of famous brands, television and radio equipment (albeit by appointment, but guaranteed), which were then unavailable in the Union. Both the rear and the "front" worked - clearly, like a clock. And then this whole mechanism, after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, turned out to be unnecessary. Warehouse stocks have flowed away somewhere, a lot has been plundered, a lot has flowed through the "national apartments" - the year 1991 was approaching, not only the empire was disintegrating, but also its army.

The 40th Combined Arms Army itself as a combat unit ceased to exist almost immediately after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989. For some period it was recreated within the SAVO (Central Asian Military District), then the army ended up as part of the nascent armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, but even here it, already in a greatly reduced composition, with lost command personnel, turned out to be unnecessary. The battle banner of the 40th migrated to the storerooms of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and is brought to solemn meetings only on the occasion of anniversaries.

“In the euphoria of the division of the Soviet Union, no one really thought about the combat potential of the former Soviet army- says the last commander of the 40th Army, who was withdrawing it from Afghanistan, Colonel-General Boris Gromov. Each of the new leaders of already sovereign states tried to privatize what was on its territory, including the armed forces. So the 40th Army was almost completely stretched out mainly across the Central Asian republics. Something, primarily nuclear weapons, was successfully withdrawn to Russia. Those units and subunits that were originally part of the OKSVA from territories in the central part of the country or in Siberia and on Far East, managed to return to the places of their former deployment and remained in the ranks. But on the whole, the "Afghan" army was not preserved. But it is with her experience, the unique experience of military operations in the mountains, that it would be possible not only to avoid losses in Chechnya, but also to prevent the very fact of an armed conflict. We know the result - untrained and unprepared boys were thrown into the battle, forgetting that the battle could have been stopped even before it began. And such a task was within the power of the units of the 40th Army at that time. "

Historical analogies involuntarily suggest themselves here. By August 1945, the Soviet command had transferred large forces of the liberated to western front troops to Manchuria. Troops with rich experience in warfare, multiplied by the high morale of the winners, Soviet soldiers In less than two months, the millionth Japanese Kwantung Army was defeated. The victory was won not by numerical superiority, but by high professionalism, coordination and discipline. All these qualities that the soldiers and officers of the 40th Army possessed after Afghanistan remained unclaimed.

Of the largest and most combat formations in the OKSVA - the motorized rifle 5th, 108th, 201st divisions, only the latter was more fortunate in terms of preserving both the name and tradition. The division that was withdrawn in 1989 to the territory of Tajikistan, which successfully proved itself during the civil war in this republic to ensure the safety of civilians and covered the border from Afghanistan, turned into a Russian military base in the process of reforming. The 201st has retained its serial number and is not only a guarantor of stability in this region, but also ensures the security of Russia's southern borders.

The 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was withdrawn after Afghanistan to the territory of Turkmenistan, after the collapse of the USSR, became a national formation as part of the Ministry of Defense of this republic with a station in the city of Kushka. The division lost its historical number. Practically a similar fate happened to the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, which in January 1992 became part of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan and was disbanded in December 1993. Now its former regiments are part of the 1st Army Corps in Samarkand. The 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle brigades, which suffered this fate back in 1988, turned out to be disbanded, but the formations themselves did not disappear without a trace, but merged into their former motorized rifle divisions.
The 103rd Airborne Division was not part of the 40th Army, as well as the 345th separate paratrooper regiment (Bagram), was in operational subordination, but it was the paratroopers who always participated in the most complex and responsible operations. They also left the territory of Afghanistan among the last - covering the withdrawal of the main forces. Even before 1991, the 103rd Airborne Forces, withdrawn to Belarus (headquarters in Vitebsk), was transferred to the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR and performed tasks on the border with Iran on the territory of Azerbaijan. And after the collapse of the country, it became part of the armed forces of Belarus and its regiments were transformed into separate guards mobile brigades, and the former 317th PDP inherited the Banner of the legendary unit. Now it is in the 103rd Guards Airborne Brigade.

The 345th Airborne Regiment had an interesting fate, which soon after its withdrawal from Afghanistan happened to be part of the 104th and 7th Airborne Divisions and had to carry out combat missions in Transcaucasia and Abkhazia. In May 1998, on the basis of the regiment, the 50th military base, soon renamed the 10th Peacekeeping Airborne Regiment. Plans for the formation of the 345th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade are still under consideration. From the traditions of the regiment, the annual meeting on February 11 at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow remained at exactly 11 in the morning. On that day, the regiment crossed the border from Afghanistan, and the commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Valery Vostrotin told his fellow soldiers: "We will meet on the 11th at 11 at the Bolshoi." This tradition has remained unchanged for 28 years. The 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (Gardez-Ghazni) also remained in combat. disbandment. Now she still bears the proud name of the Red Banner Orders of Kutuzov and Patriotic War Don Cossack airborne assault brigade and is stationed in the glorious city of Kamyshin.

... Only the memory of the "Afghans", for whom February 15 is a special day, was not disbanded. Someone will celebrate it at a gala reception in the Kremlin, someone will raise a glass to the “third toast” in the company of friends. In Khimki near Moscow, veterans will traditionally visit all the cemeteries where eight of their fellow countrymen are buried, then they will gather at the only monument in Russia to the fallen commandos and commemorate their friends. And there will be no differences between them, even if the current head of the Interregional public organization"Union of War Veterans" Sergei Makarov was a simple soldier in Afghanistan, and his current deputy, Alexander Ponamarev, served there as an officer. On this day, all "Afghans" are equal.