The number of Wehrmacht troops on June 22, 1941 The USSR Army: strength and composition

According to military experts, by 1941 the German army was the strongest in the world. Battle-hardened, having learned the taste of victories, the German units approached Soviet border with a sense of superiority. The Wehrmacht soldiers considered themselves invincible.
Systems approach
The German historian Werner Picht believed that it was the Treaty of Versailles, according to which Germany had no right to have an army of more than 100 thousand people, that forced the Berlin generals to look for new principles for the formation of the armed forces. And they were found. And although Hitler, having come to power in 1933, abandoned the "norms of Versailles", the ideology of military mobility of the new army has already won the minds of the German military leaders. Later, the transfer of German soldiers to Spain to defend the Franco regime made it possible to test in real conditions 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, Me-109 fighters and dive bombers of the Stuka-87 type, where the young Hitlerite aviation created its own school of air combat. The Balkan campaign of 1941 showed how important it is to coordinate a large number of equipment. As a result, the German staff officers in front of the Russian company had a successful experience in the use of mobile connections, reinforced by aviation. All this allowed them to create a military organization of a new and, most importantly, a systemic type, optimally tuned to carry out combat missions.
Special training
In 1935, the concept of special training for Wehrmacht soldiers arose in order to make a soldier out of a kind of "motorized weapon". For this, the most talented young men were selected from among the youth. They were trained in training camps. To understand what the German servicemen were like in 1941, you should read Walter Kempowski's multivolume "Sounder". The books contain numerous testimonies explaining the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, including the soldiers' correspondence. For example, there is a story about a certain corporal Hans, who at a distance of 40-50 meters could hit a small window with a grenade. “He was an unsurpassed master of urban combat,” the participant writes. Battle of Stalingrad Hannes, - it was not difficult for him to destroy the machine-gun nest, even if they were shooting from the other side of the street. If he was alive, we could easily have taken this damn house that killed half of our platoon. But in August 1941, a captured Russian lieutenant killed him with a shot in the back. It was ridiculous, because there were so many surrendered that we did not even have time to search them. Dying, Hans shouted that it was not fair. " According to official figures, in 1941, the Wehrmacht lost 162,799 soldiers killed, 32,484 missing and 579,795 wounded, most of whom died in hospitals or became disabled. Hitler called these losses monstrous, not so much because of the numbers, but because of the lost quality of the German army. In Berlin, they were forced to state that the war would be different - a war by all available means. Russian soldiers in the summer and autumn of 1941 showed active resistance. As a rule, these were attacks by desperate and doomed Red Army soldiers, single shots from burning houses, self-detonation. In total, 3138 thousand died in the first year of the war Soviet soldiers, most often in captivity or in "boilers". But it was they who bled the Wehrmacht elite, which the Germans had been preparing so carefully for six years.
Massive military experience
Any commander will tell you how important it is to have fired fighters under his command. The German army that attacked the USSR possessed this invaluable experience military victories. In September 1939, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, easily defeating 39 Polish divisions of Edward Rydz-Smigly, for the first time felt the taste of victory. Then there was the "Maginot Line", the seizure of Yugoslavia and Greece - all this only strengthened the self-awareness of their invincibility. No other country in the world then had so many fired fighters motivated for success. Retired Infantry General Kurt von Tippelskirch believed that this factor was the most important in the first victories over the Red Army. Describing the concept lightning wars, he emphasized that, in contrast to the anxious hours of waiting for a war with Poland, the territory Soviet Russia confident German conquerors entered. By the way, multi-day defense Brest Fortress This is largely due to the fact that the 42nd Infantry Division of the Red Army, which has the combat experience of the Finnish War, was located on its territory.
Precise Destruction Concept
The Germans also focused on the prompt destruction of the centers of resistance, no matter how firmly they were protected. In the opinion of the German generals, in this case, the enemy has a feeling of doom and uselessness of resistance. As a rule, precise, almost sniper shelling was used. This was achieved through the successful use of visual optical observation posts, with the help of which, at a distance of 7-10 km from our positions, the shelling was adjusted. Only at the end of 1941 did the Red Army find an antidote to the all-seeing fascist artillery, when it began to build defensive structures on the reverse slopes of the hills, out of the reach of German optics.
High-quality communication
The most significant advantage of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army was high-quality communications. Guderian believed that a tank without reliable radio communications would not show even a tenth of what it was capable of. In the Third Reich, from the beginning of 1935, the development of reliable ultra-short-wave transceivers was intensified. Thanks to the appearance in the German communications service of fundamentally new devices designed by Dr. Grube, the Wehrmacht generals were able to quickly manage a huge theater of military operations. For example, high-frequency telephone equipment served the German tank headquarters without any interference at distances of up to one and a half thousand kilometers. That is why on June 27, 1941, in the Dubno area, Kleist's grouping of only 700 tanks was able to defeat the mechanized corps of the Red Army, which included 4,000 combat vehicles. Later, in 1944, analyzing this battle, Soviet generals bitterly admitted that if then our tanks had radio communications, the Soviet Army would have turned the tide of the war at the very beginning.
And still nothing helped them, not even the elephants! Thanks to the selfless courage and great love for the Motherland of our fathers and grandfathers, the most perfect military machine in the world was defeated and, I hope, will never be reborn!

Artillery is the god of war!

The infantry is the queen of the fields !!

Tanks are an iron fist !!!.

Dear colleagues, I would like to bring to your attention information on the state and balance of forces of tank armies at the time of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War.

How could you lose in 41g. having 26,000 tanks ?!

Notes (hereinafter simply, - Approx.). Once again, a man, investigating the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, tries on the same methods (and the same shirts) on the Wehrmacht that were in the USSR. No more than the number of tanks. And the quality indicators of tanks (both the USSR and Germany) are generally replaced. We will highlight and disassemble these places separately.

Long and slender columns of armored vehicles are immediately drawn - like the Parade on Red Square ...
Let's compare the tanks on 06/22/41. QUANTITATIVE and QUALITATIVE….
SO, - QUANTITATIVELY
On 22.06.41. The USSR had 12,780 tanks and tankettes in the Western districts ...
The Wehrmacht had 3987 units of armored vehicles on the border of the USSR + German satellites moved 347 tanks to the borders of the USSR.
Total - 3987 + 347 = 4334

Approx. The number 4334 also includes tanks and wedges. We will really understand and count. Nothing secret, official data of the network.

1. Tank Pz I (no more than a wedge), of all modifications (Ausf A and B), including the commander's, as of June 22, 1941, serviceable - 877 units (78%), defective (under repair) - 245 (22% ).
In total, there are 1122 tankettes. This tankette had no cannon armament at all. The main armament is two 7.92 mm MG-34 machine guns. The maximum armor thickness is 13 mm.

2. Tank Pz II. Directly on June 22, 1941, a series of releases from Ausf A to G4 ( latest version April 1941). A total of 1,074 tanks. Directly serviceable - 909 (85%), in repair - 165 (15%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.

3. Tank Pz III. Immediately on June 22, 1941, a series of production from Ausf A to J took part. A total of 1000 tanks. Directly serviceable - 825 (82%), in repair - 174 units (17%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.

4. Tank Pz IV. Directly on June 22, 1941, a series of production from Ausf A to E. took part. A total of 480 tanks. Directly serviceable - 439 (91%), under repair - 41 pieces (9%). The maximum armor thickness, only on the E series, and for 223 tanks, is 50 mm frontal.

At the same time, there are 223 (7%) tanks with an armor thickness of 50 mm (the maximum number, excluding faulty tanks).

Tanks with armor thickness from 13 to 30 mm - 2827 (93%) units. And the most massive Wehrmacht tank is the Pz I tankette - 1122 pieces.

Now we begin to deal with satellite tanks.

347 tanks are generally all tanks in a heap of all countries of Germany's allies in World War II. These include Romanian tanks, Renault FT-17 and French B-1bis and Italian Vickers 6 tons... On June 22, 1941, it may have been modern and serviceable tanks, but no more than if there is a desire to laugh. We will not take them into account in this article. Because we will not follow Gareev's methods.

The superiority is exactly 3 times….

Approx. So far, the superiority is exactly 4 times.

However, there is such english proverb: (the devil is in the details).
Let's see the DETAILS
FIRST
Sometimes those who say that, well, we had, there, 3 times more tanks than the Germans, forget that the Germans, in principle, 4334 are serviceable tank equipment, combat-ready.

Approx. With what fright ALL 4334 BECAME WORKFUL AND READY? This is where the details start to surface. Everything is fine. But we won't believe it.

In our country, only tanks of the first two categories (out of 4 available) could be ready for combat ... The first category is a completely new technique.
The second category is serviceable Combat vehicles, used and faulty military equipment requiring maintenance.
The third and fourth categories - there are already various types of repairs - medium repairs, major repairs that cannot be restored, and so on. That is, this third or fourth category can actually be discarded. As for the border districts, there were about 8,000 tanks of the first two categories (excluding those requiring maintenance).

2. The categorization of equipment is nothing more than bureaucratic correspondence only for repair departments. The categorization is intended to indicate the value of the service of a tank (or other equipment) in the army. To the practice of using tanks, categorization is irrelevant.

3. Medium repairs were carried out in the subdivisions by the subdivisions with the involvement of specialists from the repair bodies. In an average repair, there can be tanks not only of III or IV category, but also II and even I. A tank is transferred to the fourth category only before it is written off. Prior to this, the tank is in category III. And it will be repaired.

Pay attention to the logic of the author, who is trying to prove that the USSR had as many tanks as Germany. First, ALL TANKS that GERMANY COULD have are counted. Including tanks with bulletproof armor, as well as tanks produced in 1917. And with regard to the USSR, a note is used that only tanks of the first two categories will be counted, that is, new tanks. This is the only way things are not done. If you want to count - count, only apply the same methods to everyone. Because if we start counting only the new German tanks, produced in 1940 and 1941, then the number of German tanks will be reduced to 1124 pieces and no more.

Where did the 8,000 tanks come from?

Very simple. This is such arithmetic (Pupkina, no pictures). It's just that 4,780 tanks are stupidly equated with old, outdated and outdated tanks. Why was this done? In order to try to prove that there were about 8000 serviceable types.
Pay attention again. When counting German tanks, the words " about" not used. Everything is accurate. There are so many of them. Plus, these still have so much. And all are serviceable.
And the Soviet Union (poorly) has about 8000. There is no accuracy. And it can't be.
Let's really look at the details. And we will compare.

On June 22, in the Western Special Military District alone, there were 1,136 T-26 tanks. It was customary to laugh at this tank in the USSR. But by the way. The captured T-26s were used in the Wehrmacht, both in 1941 and 1942. And in Finland, the T-26 were in service until 1961.

October 1941. The German infantry is advancing under the cover of ... the Soviet T-26 tank (already in other hands).

October 1941. BT-7M, on the other side.

The armored car Ba-20 from the Germans.

Another Ba-20 in other hands.

And this is the T-34, on the other side.

This is the KV-1 tank modernized (by the Germans).

August 1941, most likely - these are not serviceable tanks?

November 1941. Modernized and brought to mind (by the Germans) thirty-four.

September 1941. The Germans did not pass by the KV-2 either, it was also brought to mind. The debugging is visible to the naked eye.

March 1945. Soviet tankers did not disdain German tanks.

Armor - 15 mm (20 mm since 1939), in 1940 the T-26 received shielded armor. But let's not T-26, armor is the only thing inferior to the T-26 German tanks on June 22, 1941.
But in terms of armament, he surpassed them. Because the T-26 had a 45mm 20-K tank gun. The muzzle velocity of the armor-piercing projectile is 760 m / s. Until December 1941, this was enough to knock out any German tank at a distance of 300 meters.
Little of. The latest modifications of the T-26 editions of 1938 and 1939 had a stabilizer in the vertical plane of the gun and sight. Therefore, it was easier for this type of tank (in total, the last modification consisted of 2567 vehicles), it was easier to fire on the move, without short stops.

The ratio is 1 to 2 ... It seems to be not bad ... However, there is such a sad thing: 95% of Soviet tanks had bulletproof armor and could be hit by any anti-tank gun ...

Approx. And 93% of German tanks (we have already proved this above) were tanks with bulletproof armor.

PAK 35/36 pierced armor-piercing projectile from 300 meters in 40-50 mm. With an ordinary projectile, it pierced the armor of 95% of Soviet tanks from half a kilometer.

Approx. And the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K pierced armor of 40-50 mm with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile from 300 meters. With an ordinary projectile, it pierced the armor of 100% of German tanks from half a kilometer.

Speed ​​- firing 10-15 rounds per minute ...

Approx. The Soviet cannon has the same rate of fire of 10 - 15 rounds per minute.

Both the Wehrmacht in 41-42 and the Red Army in 43-45 - tried to avoid oncoming tank battles in the offensive: what's the point of spending a bunch of ammunition, people and equipment forming a breakthrough, and introducing a tank corps / division into it, in order to 20-30 km., Exchange your tanks in battle for enemy tanks? - It is much more reasonable to place your anti-tank defense under the counterstrike of enemy tanks ...

Approx. And here already stop. Dear! You are a blacksmith who jumps from topic to topic. We are not interested in what happened in 1942 and 1943. We're looking specifically at 1941.

The attacker spends his infantry formations, which are in the majority in the army, to strike at a pre-selected defense sector. The defender can only to a limited extent cover this blow at the expense of the same infantry formations - he could collect for " sealing»Breakthrough of only those of them that were in the immediate vicinity of the affected area. The defender is forced to use valuable motor-mechanized formations to parry the blow, pulling them to the breakable sector of the front ... where he stumbles upon the anti-tank defense on the flanks of the enemy's offensive ....
THEN. the whole multitude of Soviet tanks was devalued by their bulletproof armor ....

Approx. All the same applied to German tanks, even in the defense, even in the offensive. However, this is not the answer to the question “ why". This is nothing more than speculation on the topic. Combat is organized and coordinated action. And not pokatushki, in order to " pulling together, bump". Any anti-tank unit is not without a finite. And even more vulnerable than the tank itself. Therefore, in the USSR, the 45-mm anti-tank gun (PTP) was called - " goodbye homeland"(There was another option" death to the enemy ..... calculation"), And in the Wehrmacht the 37-mm PTP Pak 35/36 was called" mallet».

Now let's take a look at the QUALITY side ...

We had the best tank in the world, the T-34-76 and the KV ... in an open field» - « crowd on crowd"All German tanks ...

Hmm ... anecdote immediately comes to mind ...

There is a tour of the zoo. Comes to a cage with a huge elephant. And then one person asks:
- And what does he eat with you?
- Well, - the guide answers him, - cabbage, hay, carrots, vegetables, total - 100 kilograms.
- And what - he will eat it all? - the curious excursionist is surprised.
- He will eat something, - the guide answers, - but who will give him ?!

Approx. And who, one wonders, is to blame for the fact that Soviet tanks (elephants) were not given 100 kilograms of something a day? And the given anecdote is somewhat not entirely appropriate. Need an example? Please. In August 1941, the tank platoon of Senior Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Konstantinovich Klobanov in only one battle, knocked out 22 enemy tanks. If we take the example of Kolobanov in August 1941, then the question is, who cut Kolobanov's elephants? No one. That is, when no one interfered with the Red Army tankers in battle (from the elephant breeders, in the form of senior officials), the tankers achieved not only results, but also performed real feats.

If there were idiots in the Wehrmacht who only dreamed of how to clash in an oncoming tank battle with enemy tanks, then it is clear that we would have asked them ... But the trouble is, vile nemchura near Prokhorovka, and near Lepel, and wherever she could - substituted its anti-tank unit under the counterstrike of Soviet tanks ... about which tank attacks successfully crashed ... and if the T-34 or KV had a chance, then other tank guns were burned even on the distant approaches ...

Approx. It's not that there were idiots in the Wehrmacht or not. And the thing is that, I repeat the battle, these are organized and coordinated actions. Success in battle is achieved not by a single tank, but only as a result of joint active actions. And if the intelligence of the Germans worked at the proper level and identified Soviet tanks: no infantry, no artillery and air support, then why nod at the Germans. The idiots, it turns out, were not the Germans, but the Soviet command. Which is not clear what he was thinking when he sent his tanks into battle.

BUT! It seemed to be about 1941. How to get the author back in 1941, is it not clear? Prokhorovka is still flowers. But the berries appear further. There really is an anecdote.

Such is the trifle - the proportion of tanks with normal armor (i.e. medium and heavy) capable of withstanding anti-tank artillery was:
- in the Red Army - about 5%;
- in the tank forces of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front - about 50%.

Approx. Here they are berries appeared. It turns out that in 1941 the Germans had medium and heavy tanks, in percentage terms as much as 50%. Whereas in the USSR there are only 5% of them. This is an anecdote, it would be okay to compare it with the tank fleet of Italy, there would be no problems. But with the tanks of the USSR - it's funny. Did the Germans have something equal to the T-35? Or maybe there was something equal to the T-28? Why these tanks were lost - the answer will be below.
We will name Soviet heavy tanks of 1941 without any problems. But, just let the respected author name “ heavy»German tanks on June 22, 1941?

Once again, pay attention to what words are used to describe German tanks - “ medium and heavy". And for the Soviet " faulty and outdated". This is an NLP (neuro-linguistic programming) method. The key in this method is the union “ and". This was always done in the USSR, when it was necessary to denigrate something. This method can blacken anything at all, for example: “ astronauts and sadomites". We didn't say anything bad about the astronauts, but the negative is already on the face. The result will be if this is repeated constantly. This was proven back in the 19th century by Gustave Le Bonne.

But our medium tanks were better than the German ones! Isn't it true !?

Approx. In some ways, yes, but in others no.

I will disappoint, but the best tank of the Red Army T-34-76 in 41g. still inferior to his German " opponent».

Approx. Keyword in the sentence above, the word “ still". Therefore, we will answer the aftor in the same word (and method): the T-34-76 in 1941, after all, was not inferior to any German tank. And therefore we will disappoint the respected author.

ARMOR - as an opportunity to oppose the enemy AT:
T-34-76 - 40 - 45 mm.
PZ-3-J - 50 mm.

Approx. Pz III Ausf. J is a tank produced in March 1941. This is the only thing the author grasped at. But there is one small but. From March to December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J was produced with a 50 mm KwK 38 L / 42 gun (50 mm tank gun, model 1938, with a barrel length of 42 caliber, or 2100 mm).
From December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J began to be produced with a 50 mm KwK 39 L / 60 cannon (50 mm tank gun, model 1939, with a barrel length of 60 calibers, or 3000 mm).

Since March 1941, all T-34s have been fitted with a 76.2 mm F-34 cannon with a barrel length of 41.5 caliber, which is 3162 mm.

There are two clarifications to be made here:
- the strength of German armor was about 1.5 times higher than the Soviet one (for 1941, where did this come from?)
- T-34 armor plates have a rational angle of inclination.

But the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, for example, an artilleryman of a 50-mm cannon was “ violet"At what angle the armor sheets of the tank are bent ... the main thing is to hit.

Approx. So rational tilt angles are bullshit? And why then did all the countries in the world switch to rational angles? But! On a German tank in June 1941, a 50 mm cannon, with a short barrel. A very wonderful weapon. But to cause harm, the T-34 release in March 1941, this gun could only from a distance of 300 meters, and in the side or in the back. Everything. In all other cases, it could not. But even this is not the main thing. Not every hit on a tank and penetration of armor means the defeat of the tank.

And the T-34 could harm the Pz III Ausf J with its 76-mm cannon even from 500 meters, even from 1000 meters. Not just because the gun is more powerful, but in addition to the cannon, the Pz III Ausf J lacked rational angles of inclination of the armor. On which they beat everyone not with a 50-mm cannon, but with a 76-mm one.
In the same example with Klobanov, the KV-1 tank received more than 40 hits in the armor of German shells during the battle. And not only was it not damaged, but also capable of further battles. Very surprisingly, after the battle on August 22, Kolobanov's tank did not fall into category IV. It was for the Soviet tankers " violet Whether a German shell will hit them or not. Because they knew very well that the Germans had short-barreled tank guns, which were not intended to fight armored targets.

By December 1941, the command of the Wehrmacht had just revised its attitude towards their tanks. Because the tankers of the Wehrmacht were far from " violet"The Soviet 76-mm armor-piercing projectile will hit them or not.

ENGINE:
T-34-76 - engine " V-2» « was dying»After 40-60 hours of work. This is an indicator of the quality of production.
Pz-III Ausf. J - engine " maybach”Had a service life of 400 hours. This is also an indicator of the quality of production.

SPEED (highway / rough terrain):
T-34-76 - 54/25 km / h
Pz-III Ausf. J - 67/15 km / h
But! On the gravel highway Kubinka Pz-III Ausf. H and J accelerated on a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km / h, while the best indicator for the T-34 was 48.2 km / h. The BT-7 on wheels, allocated as a standard, developed only 68.1 km / h!
WITH THIS: The German vehicle surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it turned out to be less noisy - at the maximum speed of movement, the Pz.III could be heard from 150-200 m, and the T-34 - from 450 m. author that the Soviet tankers, sadly, loved the Pz-III Ausf. J and not only, but even a version of H. Why? Because the tank was of high quality. He did not whistle, did not fall off, and did not turn by itself.

CREW ACCESS:
Pz-III Ausf. J - had a three-man turret, in which there were quite comfortable conditions for the combat work of the crew members. The commander had a convenient turret that provided him with an excellent view, all crew members had their own intercom devices.
In the turret of the T-34, two tankmen were hardly accommodated, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases as a unit commander. Only two out of four crew members were provided with internal communications - the tank commander and the driver. All of the above is absolutely true. But this does not apply directly to the tank itself. This is a problem for Soviet tank generals. Who ordered the T-34, while the tank commander was not a gunner, but a loader. This applied generally to all Soviet tanks produced before 1943. And we emphasize - this is not a problem for the T-34, this is a problem for the Soviet tank school.

Armor resistance of the tank in 41:
- T-37-76 - limited by the lack of armor-piercing shells. At the end of 1941. solved.
- Pz-III Ausf. J - limited to a relatively weak cannon. " At the end of 1941. solved by introducing a new cannon ...

Approx. The lack of an armor-piercing projectile is not an indicator that the tank cannot fight against the tank. German Pz-III Ausf. J behind the eyes and ears, the hit of a 76-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile would have been enough. And one. After the battle, the crew would have to be removed from a completely intact tank and replaced with another.

After reading, the answer to the question does not come. So what's the reason? Why did the USSR, having even 8000 serviceable tanks, manage to blow dry 3050 tanks, of which the overwhelming majority are tankettes, in the initial phase of the war?

After all, everything is calculated very simply. For every German tank there are 2 Soviet ones and another 1900 can be left in reserve. Just in case. You never know what.
But they didn’t do that. And they did not.

As of October 28, 1941, there were 441 tanks on the Western Front, of which 33 KV-1, 175 T-34, 43 BT, 50 T-26, 113 T-40 and 32 T-60. This is from 3852 of the original composition, on June 22, 1941.
On October 28, 1941, on the Western Front, there were 8.7 (almost 9) times less tanks than there were on June 22 of the same year!

But if it is already necessary to answer the question, then there is no problem.

REASONS for the loss of tanks in the USSR from 22.61941 to 28.10.1941:

1. any Wehrmacht tank is not just an armored vehicle. Each tank had the appropriate means of communication. It wasn't just that he had something. These means of communication have been tested, there was some experience in their use. And if a person did not understand or did not want to understand: how a means of communication works, what it is needed for and what they achieve with the help of means of communication in battle, then this person WOULD NEVER BE PUT TO THE POSITION OF A CO-MANDER TANK;

2. the command tank of the Wehrmacht is not just the same tank as the others, just a little different. This is a command vehicle that could take part in battle on an equal footing with all the tanks of the platoon. But at the same time, with all this, she did not just manage, but had a connection with each participating tank. And among other things, the commander of the Wehrmacht tank platoon in his command tank had: communication means for interacting with the infantry, communication for interacting with artillery, communication for interacting with aviation and a means of communication with senior commanders. And if the commander of a tank platoon COULD NOT CORRECT THE FIRE OF THE ARTILLERY, LEAD OWN AIRCRAFT AND COULD NOT INTERACT WITH THE INFANTRY, then such a person would never have been assigned to the position of commander of a tank platoon.

At the time of 2013, in the Russian army, the commander of a tank platoon not only does not have (but does not even dream of having) communication means to interact with aviation, has no connection with his own artillery. Has a very infrequent and very unstable connection with his tanks, as well as (not always) with the infantry;

3 ... a Wehrmacht tank platoon is not three tanks, as was customary in the USSR and now in Russia. The Wehrmacht tank platoon is 7 tanks. Two in each compartment, plus the commander's own 7th tank. Therefore, the tank company of the Wehrmacht could be involved in performing operational tasks... And she was attracted. But why? It is still not clear in the USSR and in Russia. Because the organization is not just different. And it is completely different. It's not even close to the Soviet one.

There were two tanks in each squad for a reason. The essence of the application is simple: the first performs a maneuver (any), and the second covers it at this time. The options for action are generally dark;

4 ... the term for the coordination of the Wehrmacht tank crew is two years (the figure is still wild for the USSR army and even more so for the Russians). People did not just learn from the practical experience of their predecessors, but the crews literally got used to each of their own people. In order to achieve understanding in battle without words at all, from one half-glance. At the same time, special attention was paid to which crew supports, which one acts. And therefore they did not arrange a hodgepodge of people.

The tank commander of the Wehrmacht was not a loader. He was only a shooter in the Pz I tank. On all other Wehrmacht tanks, the tank commander controlled the crew in battle.

And the last thing. The specific customers of the tanks in Germany were not generals, but those who fought in tanks. That is, when the Minister of Armaments of Germany sent his representatives to the troops so that they would give a clear and clear picture of what and how to modernize, the representatives of the Ministry of Armaments talked with the driver mechanics, gunners and tank commanders. And not with the commanders of tank divisions. Commander tank division could only facilitate the delivery of a representative of the Ministry of Armaments to each unit and his protection.

Because the Germans did not have " flying tanks”, But this is why the Wehrmacht managed to get to Moscow on Pz I Ausf A tankettes.
And everything that was slapped in the USSR before 1941, into which the resource was simply colossal (the factories have been sinking space for almost 20 years, it turns out just like that), it was either stupidly thrown (and, accordingly, got the German) or lost - because was not intended at all for the conduct of war. For passages during parades on Red Square, and nothing more.

Gareev's methods still live on. Not only do they rewrite history. To this day, only a quantitative indicator is assessed in the Russian army. And everything is not of high quality. The training of those who will fight in general is not taken into account. Not so long ago, the Chief of the General Staff of Russia Gerasimov declared that: “ The troops are poorly trained, and the staffs are very well prepared».

But, " highly professional staffs"Neither can they prepare (even before their" almost»Level) of those who will bring victories or defeats to these headquarters in the war.

In 1941, the headquarters were also prepared for so many " OK"That this did not prevent the Red Army from retreating all the way to Moscow.

So, by the summer of 1941 everything was ready for the "liberation" campaign in Europe. According to V. Suvorov, the "liberation" campaign was thwarted by Hitler's preemptive strike at the last moment. And we ask ourselves a question: could it be otherwise? After all, it could not have been Hitler ahead of Stalin by a couple of weeks, but on the contrary! In search of an answer, let us turn to some figures and facts. Let's start with a table characterizing the ratio of the forces of the sides on June 22, 1941 (compiled by me according to "The Thunder" by I. Bunich, the works of V. Suvorov, as well as the following works: Conquest R. Great Terror. Florence, 1978 Hoffman I. Preparation Soviet Union to an offensive war. 1941 // National history. 1993. № 4).

In addition to the overwhelming quantitative, the Red Army also had an enormous qualitative superiority. Some facts are simply amazing - for example, on June 23, 1941, near the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai, one KB tank held back the 4th German tank group of Colonel General Göpner (that is, a quarter of all German armored forces) for 24 hours. Yes, and there are enough other facts - for example, our troops found one destroyed KB, and around - ten destroyed German tanks; KB met a group of German tanks, received over 70 shells, but none penetrated his armor; KB destroyed eight German tanks, he himself received more than 30 shells, but remained unharmed (quoted from: V. Suvorov, The Last Republic. Pp. 356–358). Or here's another: one KB tank for several days resisted 50 German tanks, supported by infantry, artillery, etc. (Yakovlev H.H. Marshal Zhukov, p. 15).

In the early days of the war, Soviet tank armada counterattacked the troops of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group in Ukraine. It was there (and not near Prokhorovka two years later) that the largest tank battle World War II. 5000 Soviet tanks (that is, more than all Hitler had) inflicted such blows on the enemy that already on June 26, F. Halder wrote in his diary about this battle: "We will trust in God." The captured Germans taken in this battle looked depressed and were close to panic; Again, our commanders will have to observe a similar psychological state of the Germans very, very not soon - only after Stalingrad and Kursk (Yakovlev N.H. Marshal Zhukov, p. 25).

And this was not only the case in the tank forces. Here are the entries from F. Halder's diary. August 1: "In the reserve of the Main Command of the divisions - 0" (this is on the 41st day of the war!). August 7: "With the current situation with fuel, it is impossible to carry out major operations" (this is in a month and a half. But how did they prepare for war - I would like to exclaim after V. Suvorov). August 16: “Consumption of ammunition. For the period from August 1, such a quantity of ammunition was delivered, which is provided for by the entire Barbarossa plan (cited in: V. Suvorov Purification. P. 324). And so on - only V. Suvorov cites similar quotes from Halder's diary (and not only from him) in batches.

Further more. An entry from the diary of the same Halder on August 10: "The exhausted German infantry will not be able to oppose these attempts of the enemy with decisive offensive actions." August 11: “What we are doing now is the latest and at the same time dubious attempt to prevent the transition to trench warfare. The command has extremely limited means ... Our last forces are thrown into the battle. " August 22: “... In the afternoon, our disputes and discussions were interrupted by a telephone conversation with Field Marshal von Bock (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center), who again emphasized that his troops were at the line that they had reached in anticipation of an attack on Moscow will not be able to defend themselves for a long time. " Not about the offensive speech. Not about the blitzkrieg. Not to the fat, as if to hold onto what was captured (Suicide. Pp. 342–343).

The question arises: how, with all this, did the Germans manage to move so far into the depths of Russia? How could they, having already been stopped by the end of the summer, and having suffered defeat at Yelnya in early September, again launch an offensive on Moscow on September 30? A sudden blow alone cannot explain this. Perhaps I. Bunich is right, who believes that with the existing balance of forces, by July 1 at the latest, the Germans, despite all the tactical surprise of their strike, should have been stopped and then quickly defeated. Let me remind you once again that the Barbarossa plan as such was based on the premise that all the troops available to Stalin were concentrated at the very border, and after the defeat of these troops, the campaign could be considered won. Unforeseen German plans the troops of the Second and the following strategic echelons inevitably had to stop and defeat the Germans, who were not ready to fight them. By the way, this was exactly how Zhukov reassured Stalin when he nevertheless expressed fears that the Germans would take and attack (according to I. Bunich): even if the Germans attack us themselves, we, with our superiority in forces, will immediately stop them, surround them and destroy them. (Thunderstorm. P. 549). This would have happened, continues I. Bunich, if the Red Army had resisted (Ibid. Pp. 556–557).

The year 1917 became a turning point in the history of our country, in the course of two revolutions the previous monarchical state system was liquidated, in all spheres of life, outdated institutions and bodies of tsarist power were destroyed. The internal situation in the state was rather complicated: it was necessary to defend the new socialist system and the achievements of the October Revolution. The external situation was also extremely dangerous for the Bolsheviks: hostilities continued with Germany, which was leading an active offensive and approached directly to the borders of our homeland.

The birth of the workers 'and peasants' Red Army

The young Soviet state needed protection. In the first months after the October Revolution, the functions of the army were performed by the Red Guard, which by the beginning of 1918 had over 400 thousand soldiers. However, the poorly armed and untrained guard could not seriously oppose the Kaiser's troops, therefore, on January 15, 1918, the Council people's commissars a decree was adopted on the creation of the Red Army (Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army).

Already in February, the new army entered into battles with German fighters in the Pskov and Narva regions, on the territory of Belarus and Ukraine. It is worth noting that the initial service life was equal to six months, but after some time (in October 1918) it increased to one year. Shoulder straps and insignia were abolished in the army as a relic of the tsarist regime. The Red Army troops took an active part in the struggle against the White Guards, with the interventionists from the Entente countries, played an important role in strengthening Soviet power in the center and in the field.

Army of the USSR in the 1920s-1930s

The goal of the Red Army, which the Soviet government set for it, was fulfilled: the internal situation in the state after the end of Civil War became peaceful, the threat of expansion from the Western powers also began to gradually fade away. On December 30, 1922, a significant event took place not only in the history of Russia, but of the whole world - four countries (RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, ZSFSR) united into one state - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The progressive development of the USSR army took place:

1. Special military schools were created to train officers and command personnel.
2. In 1922, another decree of the Council of People's Commissars was issued, which proclaimed universal military service, and also established new terms of service - from 1, 5 to 4 years (depending on the type of troops).
3. All citizens of the union republics, regardless of their national, religious, racial, or social origin, at the age of 20 (from 1924 to 21) were obliged to serve in the army in the USSR.
4. A system of deferrals was envisaged: they could be obtained due to training in educational institutions, as well as for family reasons.

The geopolitical situation in the world was heated to the limit due to the aggressive foreign policy Nazi Germany, another threat of war was created, in this regard, the army was modernized: the military industry was actively developing, including aircraft and shipbuilding, and the production of weapons. The size of the army in the USSR in the 1930s steadily increased: in 1935 it amounted to 930 thousand people, three years later this figure reached 1.5 million soldiers. By the beginning of 1941, there were more than 5 million soldiers in the Soviet army.

The Red Army of the USSR at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1942)

On June 22, 1941, there was a treacherous attack by German troops on the Soviet Union. It was a real test of the strength of not only the entire people, but also the Red Army. It is worth noting that, in addition to progressive trends in military development, there were also negative ones:

1. In the 1930s. a number of prominent military leaders (Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir, etc.) and commanders were accused of crimes against the Soviet state and shot, which contributed to the deterioration of the situation with military personnel. There was a shortage of talented and competent army commanders.
2. In fact, the not very successful conduct of hostilities by the Soviet army in the war with Finland (1939-1940) showed its unpreparedness for battles with a serious enemy.

A number of statistical indicators indicate the military superiority of the Third Reich at the beginning of the war:

• in terms of the total number of troops, Germany surpassed the army of the USSR - 8.5 million people. against 4.8 million people;
• in the number of guns and mortars - 47.2 thousand from the Nazis against 32.9 thousand from the Soviet Union.

During the summer and autumn of 1941, German troops swiftly seized territory after territory, approaching Moscow in the fall of the same year. Only the heroic actions of the Red Army in the battle near Moscow did not allow the "blitzkrieg" plans to come true, the enemy was driven back from the capital. The myth of the invincible German war machine was destroyed.

However, the first half of 1942 was not so rosy: the Nazis went on the offensive, were successful in the battles in the Crimea and in the Kharkov battle, the threat of the capture of Stalingrad was created. In the second half of 1942, the quantitative growth of our army and qualitative changes took place:

• the volume of supplies of military equipment and ammunition increased;
• the system of training officer-command personnel was improved;
• the role of tank troops and artillery increased.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which began in 1942, ended in February 1943 with a successful counteroffensive by the Red Army, which defeated the troops of Field Marshal von Paulus. From now on, the strategic initiative in the Great Patriotic War passed to the USSR.

1943 was a turning point for the Soviet army: our soldiers successfully carried out military operations, won a victory in the Battle of Kursk, liberated Kursk, Belgorod from the Nazis, and gradually began to liberate the country's territory from the aggressor. The troops became much more combat-ready, in comparison with the first stage of the war, the army leadership skillfully implemented complex tactical maneuvers, brilliant strategy and ingenuity. At the beginning of the year, previously canceled shoulder straps were introduced, the system of ranks in the army in the USSR was restored, Suvorov and Nakhimov schools were opened throughout the country.

In the spring of 1944, the Soviet army reached the borders of the territory of the USSR and began the liberation of the European countries oppressed by German Nazism. In April 1945, a successful offensive began on Berlin, the capital of the Third Reich. On the night of May 8-9, the German military leadership signed an act of surrender. In August 1945, the Soviet Union launched a war against militaristic Japan, defeated the Kwantung Army and forced Emperor Hirohito to admit defeat.

In total, over 34 million Soviet citizens took part in these long four years of hostilities, a third of whom did not return from the fields of the Second World War. During the war, the Red Army demonstrated its readiness to fight mercilessly against any enemy encroaching on our homeland, liberated the countries of Europe from fascist enslavement, and gave them a peaceful sky overhead.

Cold war

After the end of World War II and the death of JV Stalin, the foreign policy doctrine of the USSR changed: peaceful rivalry and coexistence of the countries of the socialist and capitalist camp were proclaimed. However, this doctrine was a kind of formality, since in fact, already in the 1940s. the so-called cold war began - a state of political, cultural confrontation between the Soviet Union, the ATS member states, on the one hand, and against the United States and the West (NATO), on the other.

Conflicts that threatened the world with another military clash regularly flared up: the Korean War (1950-1953), the Berlin (1961) and Caribbean (1962) crises. But despite this, N.S. Khrushchev, as the leader of the Soviet state, believed that it was necessary to reduce the army, the arms race led to an uneven development of the economy. During the 1950-1960s. the size of the army decreased from 5.7 million people. (1955) up to 3.3 million people. (1963-1964). During this period, the vertical of power in the domestic army was finally formed: its leadership belonged to the Minister of Defense, and the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR also owned the possibility of management. The composition of the Soviet armed forces is being formed. They included:

• ground troops;
• air Force;
• Navy;
• strategic missile forces (Strategic Rocket Forces).

The armed forces of the USSR in the era of detente

In the early 1970s. took place an important event- the signing of agreements in Helsinki (1972), which for some time managed to suspend the arms race and confrontation between the countries of the socialist and capitalist camps. However, this period was not calm for the Soviet army: the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee actively used it to support regimes friendly to the Soviet Union in African countries.

The largest armed conflicts of the 70s of the twentieth century, in which the USSR and the Soviet army were directly involved, were the Arab-Israeli war (1967-1974), the war in Angola (1975-1992) and Ethiopia (1977-1990) .). In total, more than 40 thousand soldiers were involved in the wars in Africa, the death toll from the Soviet side was more than 150 people.

In addition, the regimes friendly to the USSR received a large amount of ammunition, armored vehicles, aviation, a huge amount of money was sent to the countries, as well as party workers and technical specialists. Soviet troops were stationed in the territories of the countries of the socialist camp: in Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Mongolia, their largest representation was on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, The 20th Panzer and 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions were located in the Polish People's Republic.

The size of the Soviet army gradually declined, reaching in the early 1970s. a mark of 2 million people. The war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) became the culmination and, of course, tragic event that marked the end of the era of detente in international relations and claimed thousands of soldiers' lives.

This is the scary word "Afghan"

1979 became the starting point for a new local armed conflict, in which the USSR army took an active part. In Afghanistan, a conflict erupted between the country's leadership and the opposition. The Soviet Union supported the ruling People's Democratic Party, and the US and Pakistanis supported the local mujahideen.

On December 12, the Central Committee of the CPSU made a decision to send a limited contingent of troops to the Asian country. Especially for these purposes, the 40th Army was created, headed by Lieutenant General Yu. Tukharinov. Initially, more than 81 thousand Soviet servicemen, most of them conscripts, went to Afghanistan. Despite the successful actions of the 40th Army, the Afghan mujahideen, who received financial and military support from the United States and Pakistan, did not stop fighting. Every year the number of Soviet troops stationed in this country increased, reaching by 1985 a maximum level of 108.8 thousand people.

In 1985-1986. The 40th Army conducted a number of successful military operations in the Kunar Gorge, in Khost. In 1987, Kandahar became the main military arena, the battles for which were particularly fierce.

After M.S. Gorbachev's rise to power, there was a gradual transition from the doctrine of rivalry to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between the ATS and NATO countries. In 1988, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee decided to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On February 15, 1989, this decision was finally implemented: the 40th Army returned to the USSR.

For ten years Afghan war The Soviet Union suffered massive losses: in total, over 600 thousand Soviet soldiers took part in the monstrous "meat grinder", of which about 15 thousand people did not return home. During the fighting, several hundred aircraft, helicopters, and tanks were destroyed. Afghan has inflicted huge mental wounds on thousands of former soldiers, generations of young children have become victims of the ideological interests of the state.

1989 - 1991 became a turning point in our history: the former once mighty Soviet state collapsed before our eyes, the Baltic republics adopted declarations of sovereignty and began to secede from the Union, between the peoples of the republics began to break out local conflicts due to disputed territories. One of the largest was the clash between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-Karabakh, in the suppression of which parts of the Soviet army took part.
Changes took place in the geopolitical world system: the unification of Germany took place, velvet revolutions swept away the socialist regimes in the Balkans. Military units previously deployed abroad began to be forced to leave the territories of the countries.

The army was in decline: military units were disbanded en masse, the number of generals was reduced, thousands of tanks, aircraft, and armored vehicles were written off.

Liquidation of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the creation of national armies

The agony of the Soviet Union continued: the August events of 1991 demonstrated the impossibility of the existence of a union state. The parade of sovereignties began.

By the summer of 1991 total number The Armed Forces amounted to almost 4 million people, but in the fall there were events that put an end to the existence of a unified union army: in the fall in a number of republics (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, etc.), presidential decrees announced the creation of national military formations.

On December 25, 1991, President M.S. Gorbachev de jure announced the liquidation of the Soviet Union as a state, thus, the question of the existence of the Soviet Armed Forces was a foregone conclusion. A new page began in the history of the Russian armed forces, the general army of the former USSR split into many independent units.

Among the many poorly studied questions of the pre-war history of the Red Army, the question of its strength in 1939-1941 stands out for its almost complete undevelopedness. The documents currently available on this issue are rather fragmentary, often using rounded numbers. Nevertheless, these data give a general idea. There are two types of population statistics commonly used. personnel: regular and list. The first is a purely calculated indicator, and the second reflects the real state of the armed forces. Units outside the norms were considered formations that could be used in peaceful production and were supported by the budget of civilian departments. These included a special railway corps, operational railway regiments, a construction corps, construction battalions and other similar formations. "

By the beginning of 1939, the strength of the Red Army was 1 910 477 people (of which 1 704 804 in the ground forces and the Air Force, 205 673 in units outside the norms). As statistics show, at the beginning of 1939, there were 7 Red Army men for 1 person in command personnel, 27 Red Army men for 1 person in political personnel, 10 Red Army men for 1 person of other command personnel, and 3 Red Army men for 1 person of junior command personnel. The total number of liable reserves as of July 1, 1939 was 11,902,873 people born in 1899-1918, of which 7,892,552 people were trained, and 4,010,321 were not trained. It was supposed in 1940 in 1 - 1.5-month training to train 3 million people, mostly in deficit military specialties.

In the summer of 1939, the size of the army was 1,698.6 thousand personnel (apparently, units outside the norms are not taken into account). The military conflict on Khalkhin-Gol demanded the conscription of 173 thousand people in reserve to reinforce the troops of the ZabVO and the 1st AG. Formally, this contingent was called up for training camps, but on July 16, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0035 of July 17, it was mobilized for the period until February 1, 1940. During the partial mobilization that began on September 7 in 7 military districts (BUS ), 2,610,136 people were called up (see Table 5), who on September 22, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 177 of September 23, were declared mobilized "until further notice."

At the same time, according to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1348-268ss of September 2, 1939, from September 5, the next call for active military service for the troops should have begun Of the Far East and 1 thousand people for each newly formed division, and from September 15, and for all other districts. In total, 1,076 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army until December 31, 1939. In addition, according to the new Law on General Military Duty of September 1, 1939, the service life of 190 thousand conscripts of 1937 was extended by 1 year.By September 20, 1939, the number of Red Army exceeded 5 million people (including 659 thousand recruits). Normalization of the situation on western borders ah, the USSR allowed on September 29 to begin to reduce the size of the Red Army, and by January 7, 1940

Army of the USSR: strength and composition

1,613,803 people were dismissed. On October 2, 1939, the government approved the proposal of the People's Commissar of Defense to dismiss those called up for training camps for the Far East. By December 1, the troops of the LVO and KalVO remained mobilized, the BOVO and KOVO continued to dismiss those called up from the reserve, and the MVO, OVO and HVO ended their dismissal and switched to peacetime organization. On December 27, the total number of the Red Army was up to 3,568 thousand people (units outside the norms are not taken into account).

However, the outbreak of war with Finland demanded that the losses be replenished and the size of the Red Army increased. On December 28, 1939, it was decided to call into the Red Army 546,400 people to reinforce the troops of the western military districts and 50,000 reserve commanders. At the same time, 5 junior draft ages - 376 thousand people - were drafted into the PriVO, the Ural Military District and the Siberian Military District. Thus, it took 972,400 to reinforce the army. During the Soviet-Finnish war, 550,000 men were drafted into the Red Army. In total, from September 1939 to March 12, 1940, 3,160 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army from the reserve, of which 1,613 thousand were dismissed, and 1,547 thousand people remained in the army.

After the end of the war with Finland, the Soviet command again faced the question of reducing the size of the army. In a memo No. 16314 / ss dated March 29, the People's Commissar of Defense informed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR that as of March 1, there were 4,416 thousand people in the Red Army, of which 1,591 thousand were reservists who came from the reserve and 163 thousand - Red Army men of the 1937 draft. The People's Commissar asked for permission to dismiss 88,149 people from the rear units and institutions formed for the active army, and 160 thousand people of the assigned staff, called up in September 1939 in BOVO, KOVO, KalVO and OdVO. In addition, the People's Commissar reported on the dismissal of 80 thousand volunteers ^. All these measures were approved on April 1 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and formalized by Resolution of the Defense Committee No. 159ss.

The beginning of the reduction of the Red Army led to the fact that by November 10, 1940, 1,205,120 people of the junior command and rank of the reserve were dismissed, and the remaining 9,101 people who were detained should have been dismissed before January 1, 1941. People's Commissar of Defense, order No. 0110 should have "detained until further notice the middle and senior commanding staff of the reserve" and until November 1, 1940, the Red Army men of 1937. True, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Red Army men of 1937 were detained in the army until On January 1, 1941, on January 20, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 023, according to which the "meeting the requirements of the service," the commanding staff of the reserve, detained until further notice by the order of June 3, 1940, were to be enlisted in the cadres of the Red Army. All others were subject to dismissal "to the reserve by February 15, 1941"

The dismissal of the assigned personnel led to the fact that from the fall of 1940 the payroll of the Red Army was below the regular one. It was not possible to find documents reflecting the number of personnel of the Red Army in the winter - spring of 1940-1941. It is only known that both the staff and the payroll of the army grew. From March 25 to April 5, 1941, in all military districts, except for the PribOVO and the Far Eastern Front, there was a partial conscription into the Red Army of citizens born after September 1, 1921 and did not pass the draft in 1940. In total, 394 thousand people were drafted ... The call passed in an orderly manner, on a strictly fixed date, without publicity in the press and at meetings. The conscripts were notified only with personal summons, and the recruiting offices were equipped only from the inside, no posters or slogans were hung from the outside. On May 15, 1941, the call-up of the assigned reserve staff began on the BUS, which were supposed to last until July 1. In total, by June 22, 1941, 805,264 people were called up, which was 24% of the contingent called up for mobilization, and the number of the Red Army again exceeded 5 million people.

During the two pre-war years, the Red Army was significantly increased, its number, excluding units outside the norms, increased by almost 2.7 times. Naturally, such a rapid organizational development of the Red Army was accompanied by an increase in the number of weapons and military equipment (see Table 1), the production of which also increased.

Table 1

In total for 1939 - the first half of 1941, the troops received from industry 81 857 guns and mortars, 7448 tanks and 19 458 combat aircraft. By the summer of 1941, the Soviet Armed Forces were the largest army in the world.

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The state of the armed forces of the countries participating in the Second World War by the beginning of 1945

Armed Forces of the USSR. As a result of the measures taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the heroic efforts of the entire people, the composition, technical equipment and armament of the army and navy by the beginning of 1945 increased compared with the summer of 1944. As part of the active army, in the reserve of the Headquarters The Supreme Command, on the western, southern and Far Eastern borders there were 9,412 thousand people, 144.2 thousand guns and mortars, 15.7 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and 22.6 thousand combat aircraft. The ground forces numbered 8 118 thousand people, the Air Force - 633 thousand. Navy- 452 thousand and the Air Defense Forces of the country - 209 thousand people 51. Compared with June 1944, the number of Soviet Armed Forces increased by more than 400 thousand people, the number of guns and mortars - by 11.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations - by more than 3.9 thousand and combat aircraft - at 800 52. After three and a half years of bloody war, the Soviet Army became more powerful and well armed. This once again reflected the great advantages of the socialist system and its enormous potentialities.

The improvement of the structure of large formations, formations and units of the ground forces continued with the aim of improving command and control, increasing their maneuverability, strike and fire power. In connection with the reduction of the front line, the number of front and army formations decreased. By the end of 1944, the Karelian and 3rd Baltic fronts, the 7th and 54th armies were disbanded. This allowed the Soviet command to replenish the freed up forces and means of the fronts and armies, as a result of which their combat strength increased significantly. They began to possess greater striking and firepower, mobility.

On the balance of forces on June 22, 1941

The equipping of troops with machine guns, heavy and medium tanks, aircraft and cars has increased. The technical equipment of the troops of the active army has especially increased (Table 1).

Table 1. Growth of technical equipment Soviet army by January 1, 1945 (as a percentage of June 1, 1944) 53

What are the ratios of losses in the Second World War, the Germans and ours, without the civilian population?

Mike piligrim Sage (13915), closed 4 years ago

Eternal student Higher Mind (144830) 4 years ago

According to careful calculations of historians, demographers and other specialists, domestic and foreign (see the list of sources at the end, which can be consulted and get a more detailed personal idea of ​​the losses). combat losses of the Red (Soviet) Army in the Second World War amounted to about 6.6 million people who died on the battlefield. The German army (only German, excluding the losses of the allies) in battles with us alone lost 3.7 million people (about 4.6 million in total). In other words, we lost in battle 1.8 times more soldiers and officers than the Germans who fought with us.

In addition, 1.2 million of our captured soldiers died in German captivity, and 0.6 million captured German soldiers died in our captivity. In total, about 2.4 million Germans were taken prisoner (together with their allies - 3.5 million see above) and about 3 million of our soldiers.

If we compare general figures so called. Of "irrecoverable losses" of the armies, that is, all killed, captured, commissioned for injury or illness, all soldiers who died or were discharged for various reasons, then the figures for both us and the Germans will be much higher.

By May 1945, the size of the Soviet Army was 11 million. Thus, 23 million were lost (recall that the total conscripted army in 1941-45 was 34 million). The size of the German army (again, only German, no allies). surrendered in May 1945 was about 4 million people. Thus, about 17 million servicemen (out of 21 million conscripted) have left in the German army, and if we consider the ratio of losses by this indicator, then we have them 1.3-1.4 times higher than that of the Germans. That is, in the end we arrive at an approximate ratio on which most researchers now agree, and which was named at the very beginning.

As a result, we lost more, mainly due to heavy losses in the first year of the war - from mid-1941 to mid-1942. In addition, we suffered heavy losses during the liberation of Eastern European countries and Germany itself. Naturally, the Germans managed to prepare well for the defense, realizing even after the Battle of Kursk the most likely development of the situation, and the attacking side always loses more people.

Between October 1944 and May 1945, the death toll of Soviet Army personnel amounted to about 1 million. During the same period, our allies (USA, Great Britain, Canada, France). advancing on the Germans from the west, lost about 500 thousand.

But at the same time, it must be borne in mind that, as already mentioned, more than 190 German forces were deployed against us (it is also known that at the end of 1944 and in 1945 a huge number of the most efficient German units urgently transferred from western front to the east). And during the same period, we have advanced significantly further: the Allies - 500-600 km from the Atlantic coast to West Germany, we are more than 1000 km from the western borders of the USSR to Berlin.

Nina Siciliana Expert (400) 4 years ago

Sergey Makarevich Oracle (95626) 4 years ago

Information about the size of the Red Army, replenishment and losses for the period from the beginning of the war to March 1, 1942

REFERENCE

On the size of the Red Army, replenishment and losses

1. By the beginning of the war, the total strength of the Red Army was 4,924,000 people. of them called up for large training fees before the announcement of the mobilization of 668,000 people.

2. From the beginning of the war and until August 1, 2,456,000 were received by the Red Army, of which 126,000 were marching replenishment and 2,330,000 as part of formations and units.

As of August 1, 1941, that is, forty days after the start of the war, the actual strength of the Red Army was 6,713,000. of them: on active fronts 3.242.000 people. and in the districts 3.464.000 people.

Losses during this period were equal to 667,000 people.

If we take into account the losses, then the number of the Red Army on August 1 would have been 7,380,000 people.