| Participation of the USSR in conflict times cold War. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Reference material about war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

40th Army
(USSR, 1979-1989)

History of creation

The 40th Army (40 A) was formed in the Turkestan Military District (Turkvo) under the Directive of the General Staff of the USSR General Staff of December 16, 1979. The Army Commander was appointed Lieutenant-General Yu. Tukharinov, First Deputy Commander Turkvo.

From December 10, 1979, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinova, the staffing and compounds of the Turkvo and the Central Asian Military District (Savo) were deployed.

December 12, 1979 At the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, a final decision was made soviet troops In Afghanistan.

The general directive for staffing, deploying and briefing in combat readiness was not given, the troops were ready and unfolded by certain orders of command after the oral orders of the USSR Defense Minister. In just three weeks (until December 31, 1979) more than 30 such orders were given.

Field Office (headquarters) 40 A was deployed in Turkvo, the control of the 34th mixed aircraft housing (34 sac) - in Savo.

On December 24, 1979, the Secretary of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov held a meeting with the Head of the Ministry of Defense, where he announced decision taken Introduce troops to Afghanistan and signed Directive No. 312/12/001.

Until December 25, 1979, about 100 compounds and parts were deployed, the army set of combat and rear support parts. The recycling was intended for more than 50,000 people from Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, transferred from national economy About 8,000 cars and other techniques. It was the largest deployment in the Central Asian region for the post-war period.

Turkvo was deployed:

Two motorized rifle divisions: (5 gv. MSD in a cushion and 108 ms in thermosis); 353-I cannon artillery brigade (353 PBR) 2nd anti-aircraft missile brigade (2 SPR) 56th GW. Array assault brigade (56 DSBR) 103rd separate communication regiment (103 OPS) 28th Army reactive artillery regiment (28 reap) as well as parts, compounds and institutions of special troops.

in Savo, it was deployed:

860th separate motorized rifle Pskov red-known regiment (860 OMD) 186th OMMP (dodged 108 ms)

The composition of aviation included two aviation regimes of bombers (APIB) - 136th and 217th, 115th Guards Fighter Airport (IAP) and two separate helicopter regiments (ORP) - 181st and 280th, 302- I am a separate helicopter squadron (OVE) at 5 gv. MSD, parts of aviation and technical and airfield support.

Three divisions were deployed as a reserve of the introduced group (58th MSD - in Turkvo, 68th MSS and the 201st MSS in Savo).

Also in the grouping were included: 103th Guards Airborne Division (103rd VDD), 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment (345th GW. OPDP).

The time of the state border between the USSR and Afghanistan was established at 15:00 Moscow time on December 27, 1979.

By the time of commissioning of the 40th Army, Soviet parts were already located on the territory of Afghanistan. Introduced in early December, GRU specialty (the so-called "Muslim battalion"), formed in the summer of 1979 to fulfill special tasks, two battalions and 9th company 345th GW. PDP (one of which was stationed since July of the same year, the second arrived together with the Muslim battalion).

Input to Afghanistan.

The first began to cross the 108th MSS, the purpose of which was Kunduz. On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 781st separate intelligence battalion of the 108th MSA was first moved to the territory of the dra. The 4th ardent assault battalion (4th DSHB) of the 56th OGDSBR, who was put by the Salang passage of Salang passage was crossed. The air border of Afghanistan crossed the aircraft of the WTA with a landing and military equipment on board.

The Aviation Squadron (AE) of the 115th GW flew from the Air Force in Bagram. JEP, the rest of the aviation made flights from Turkvo airfields.

Army headquarters, 5th guv. MSD, 56th GW. DSBR (without a single battalion), 353th Artillery Brigade, 2nd anti-aircraft missile brigade, 860th OMP, 103rd service regiment, 28th reap, army parts of strengthening and ensuring remained in the territory Soviet Union.

On the evening of December 27, 1979, the Muslim battalion (154th separate detachment of the 1st formation) and special groups of the KGB took the storm the Palace of the Afghan leader of Amina on the outskirts of Kabul, during which Amin was killed. In the city itself, the divisions of the 103rd GW acted. The VDD, who seized important state and military institutions, and blocked Afghan parts deployed in Kabul.

On the night of December 27 to December 28, 1979, the 5th GW entered Afghanistan. MSD on the route Cook - Shindand. On the morning of December 28, 1979, parts of the 108th MSD overtone at Kabul (except for the two SMEs left under Kunduz and Puli-Humry) reached the Afghan capital and completely blocked it.

Command Team

Hero Russian Federation Lieutenant-General Dubinin Viktor Petrovich on April 30, 1986 - June 1, 1987

Hero of the Russian Federation Lieutenant General Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich June 1, 1987 - February 15, 1989

Weapons, machinery and gear

It should be noted that the Afghan war, after the Great Patriotic War, for the Soviet Army, the USSR, the USSR turned out to be a convenient landfill for testing weapons and organizational structure of troops. On him directly representatives of the Soviet defense industry and the military could test the methods of warfare and the possibility of weapons.

Before this period evaluation of combat qualities military equipment, produced in the USSR, one could appreciate only indirectly - for use in friendly states, in which it was supplied and was used in wars (Arab-Israeli conflicts, Vietnamese War, Iran-Iraqi war, etc.).

Throughout the Afghan War, there was a constant modernization of weapons and re-forming military units and compounds of the 40th army in search of optimal options. Some examples of the modernization of weapons, which influence the realities of the Afghan War, can serve:

The appearance of BMP-1D infantry combat vehicles, BMP-2D and T-62M tank with increased booking.
. The appearance of the BTR-80 armored personnel with improved ergonomics and a more reliable diesel engine.
. The appearance of complexes of intelligence and alarms (anti-personnel seismic groups) 1Q119 "Realizing-1" and 1k124 "Tabun".
. Booking cabins of trucks.
. Installation of radiators of thermal interference and thermal traps on the drum helicopters of the Mi-24 and the airborne helicopters of Mi-8.
. Installation of a more powerful power plant and booking cabins of Mi-8 transport helicopters.
. Modernization of the aiming devices and additional booking of nodes on the Su-25 attack aircraft, SU-17 and MiG-27.
. The use of new high-precision controlled air-earth missiles x-25 and x-29l.

Also, receiving military experience directly in military units, manifested their own initiative, began to use regular weapons outside the framework established by official instructions and technical guidelines.

Such examples can serve:

Installation of automatic grenade launches on the towers of armored personnel carriers and on a variety of rotary supports (for example, on the rear axles of trucks covered in the ground).
. Installation of zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns on trucks.
. Installation of automatic mortars 2B9 "Vasileuk" on the MT-LB tractor.
. Installing infantry machine guns on helicopters.
. The use of infantry flamers and thermobaric shells to destroy the living force of the enemy in the caves and underground communications.
. Using the zesu-23-4 "shill" anti-aircraft gun for firing for terrestrial targets and its modernization under this task with an increase in ammunition that required removal from the design of the radio reception complex.
. Installation on tanks by the forces of military personnel and regular repair shops, directly in military units, mechanical protection against cumulative shells.

Directly in Afghanistan, the Soviet army for the first time in the 40 post-war years passed to the new type of field form, the so-called "Afghan", instead of the morally obsolete traditional nipper with open buttons, halifa and pilots in the summer and from overweights / bustle with cotton pants for a two-breeding jacket with Fur collar and two-layer pants. Also in Afghanistan for the first time, dry soldering for mountain shooters were tested, a new type of blood substitute (perforance), hiking filters for cleaning drinking water and much more.

Tanks in the 40th Army

Despite the presence of the South Borders of the USSR (in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts) at the beginning of the 1980s, about 1000 modern T-64 and T-72 tanks with the charging machine and a more powerful gun of 125-mm caliber, the backbone of the 40th Army Tank Park Associated T-55 and T-62 tanks. Tanks T-64 as part of the OKSVA, were derived from operation due to problems in the operation of a two-stroke diesel in the conditions of high mountains.

Contrary to the established false opinion, the absence of more modern tanks was not due to the lack of a sufficient number of anti-tank agents and armored vehicles at the enemy. The opposing side was obtained in sufficient quantitative tools "Type 78" of Chinese and 75-mm unfortunate guns of M20 American production, not to mention the saturation of opponent's units with manual anti-tank grenaderators RPG-2 / RPG-7 and their analogues of Chinese production, as well as large-caliber DSHK class machine guns that the enemy successfully applied against easily organized goals (BTR, BMD, BMP, MT-LB, etc.):

Thanks to foreign financial assistance, the opposition constantly increasing its anti-tank arsenals. In 1984, the norm was considered the existence of one RPG for ten people, a tight gun, DShK and 2-3 RPGs per group of 25 people, and four DSHK, five Bzo (a custom-effective weapon - Sokre) and a dozen RPGs were assumed to the formation of hundreds of fighters. Only for the first half of 1987, the divisions of the 40th army were destroyed or 580 DSHC and anti-aircraft mounting machines, 238 tight guns, 483 anti-tank grenade launches were destroyed or seized. If in 1983-1985, one RPG-7 accounted for 10-12 militants, then in 1987 - already at 5-6 people ... "

The refusal of military leadership from the use of more modern tanks can be considered an exceptionally successful design of T-55 / T-62 in matters of reliability, maintenance and repair, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the use of tanks in mining, proven practice:

Major General Lyakhovsky, Assistant Head of the Operational Group of the USSR MO in Dr., recalled: "... Tanks ... In most cases," not found "operational spaces for their application, could not shelter the peaks of the mountains, and the" Zelenki "and in battle often became useless . "

Soviet tankers made everything they could in Afghanistan. Whether in place T-55 American "Abrams" or German "Leopards", in the partisan war they would not have achieved more. It is characteristic that during the 2001 surgery, the Americans did not decide to act in Afghanistan by the land group, providing a dirty work by the troops of the anti-caliest opposition, armed Soviet equipment.

From a technical point of view, these tanks (T-55 / T-62) showed themselves not bad. A four-stroke diesel worked for decades has been fully stable and in the mountains, and in the deserts of Afghanistan. Small dust, which was a real curse, quickly clogged the grids and cyclones of the air cleaner, but its maintenance did not imagine much difficulties.

There were practically no complaints and arming of tanks - 100-mm and 115-mm fragmentation-fugasal shells have a sufficient action on unprotected live strength, and the armored enemy in Afghanistan was essentially not.

Armored equipment in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/otvaga2004/wars0/page/1_afghan_5.htm.

Watchtower

Oxawa differed from the groups of Soviet troops in other states with one important factor - the order of the dislocation of the divisions of the "linear" regiments. If in the USSR Armed Forces in each artillery, motorized rifle, tank, parachute shelves or in motorized rifle and landing and assault brigades, all divisions of the regiment / brigade were within one military town - then in Oxawa, directly in the military town of a linear regiment / brigade, was Only 40-50% of all regiment units. It was usually the headquarters of the regiment and the divisions dodged (orchestra, a curfew), the combat vehicle divisions (intelligence company, engineering and sapper company, chemical protection company, Rota Communication), subdivisions of the rear support (repair company, financial support company, medical ratt) and usually the first and second (numbering inside the shelf) battalion or division. The rest of the units were dispersed by the platforms (motorized rifle / parachute-land / landing assault) or artillery batteries on watchdogs, together with standard combat equipment.

In all forces of the 40th army, 862 wandering outposts were created, which carried the service of more than 35,000 people.

Wikipedia material - free encyclopedia

Structure and organization of the Afghan Armed Opposition

Initially, the task of OK has not included the obligation to lead martialctions Against the formations of armed Afghan opposition and the power of weapons to establish their orders in Afghanistan. But the Soviet troops forced the Soviet troops to begin.

Continued.

Start in № 2 (45) for 2009 (Prelude to the Afghan campaign (1))

The first operation against the rebels of the 40th Army held on January 9-10, 1980. Then on the side of the opposition passed the 4th artillery regiment afghan armywhich was located in the village of Nakhrin (Province of Baglan). At the same time, Soviet military advisers were killed - Lieutenant Colonel Kalasurzine, Major Hebuchko and Gaziev Translator. Two incomplete motorized rifle battalions took part in the operation with the support of tanks, artillery and helicopters, as well as Afghan troops.

Already 4 km after passing the source point, the head hiking outpost was shelled by a group of riders of up to 100 people. The rebels were scattered with helicopters. Then the column blocked the path of the detachment of up to 150 people with three weapons. Overcoming resistance, our units went to the appointed area and disarmed the rebellious regiment. It was the first, but not the last fight.

In further hostilities, together with the Soviet troops, parties and divisions of the Army of Afghanistan, ministries of state security and internal affairs, party activists, as well as units of revolutionary protection, which were created from among the local residents who supported the Kabul government, and armed formations of some tribes were taken part.

In winter, 1980, compared large detachments (100-150 and more fighters) acted against Soviet troops. For example, on January 12, 1980, Soviet divisions were attacked by a squad of riders to 1000 rebels, January 12 - 500 riders squad. At this time, the rebels rarely shied away from direct clashes with Soviet troops. In the report of one of the regiments, I was noted: "During the battle, the enemy showed a special persistence, and the waste of small groups was possible, but the rebels did not take advantage of this, and the battles were fully destroyed." In this case, the actions of the parts and units of the OK bless the differed of the usual.

The overwhelming advantage of Soviet troops in the amount and quality of weapons quite quickly forced the rebels to abandon such tactics, as a result of which they carried more loss. Already by the spring, the opposition detachments began to act predominantly small groups, shy away from the collision with the superior forces of Soviet and government troops. In the future, the nature of the actions of gangs of fundamental changes has not undergone.

Applying methods partisan WarThey were fired from various types of weapons of settlements, military garrisons, airfields, industrial and agricultural enterprises and other facilities, carried out attacks on administrative centers, the location of individual military units, on the rear columns with small protection, single servicemen and small groups, arranged ambushes And also mined roads.

In the spring of 1980, the switches of combat operations increased significantly. There was a significant increase in the number of rebels and detachments. The process of combining individual groups in larger formations has begun.

The battles in the mountains were highly difficult, where the rebels created their baseline areas. The baseline was a plot of hard-to-reach terrain, convenient for the organization of defense and equipped in engineering. It created stocks of the means of armed struggle in warehouses of various purposes. The approach to the area was covered with multi-layer fire and mined. A system of observation, alerts and anti-air defense was created.

A natural question should arise: "Why for 9 years of war, if the 40th army operated mainly successfully, the number of rebels and the scope of their actions not only did not decrease, but also increased?". Indeed, if in 1980 (according to different sources) the number of actively acting rebels was estimated at 20-30 thousand people, then in 1988 it increased to 80-90 thousand fighters.

During the hostilities, civilians inevitably fell under the strikes of the troops. They saw the cause of his troubles and suffering primarily in the presence of foreign (Soviet) troops on the territory of the country and took the weapon, turning it against alien. Such moods were skillfully warmed by the strongest anti-Soviet and anti-government propaganda, deployed by the leaders of an irreconcilable opposition with the support and financing of the West special services, as well as some Muslim countries of the Middle and Middle East.

The second reason was that the Soviet, and Afghan troops after the operation in a particular area were returned to the permanent deployment points. Only a small administration, the so-called Orgyandro, remained on the ground. The organizer was the representatives of the NDPA, ministries of state security, internal affairs, other departments, as well as persons from among the management workers of public organizations, representatives of the clergy that supported government power. To ensure the safety of the work of Orgyria, there was an army unit (as a rule, before the platoon).

The trouble of Orgader was that it was small and did not possess real power. The leaders who were included in it often did not know if or did not want to lead political work with the population, did not use the authority from the locals.

They began to teach them only in 1984 at short-term courses. The influence of the Org Shedron was limited to the most part of the village in which it was located. After the troops left the area of \u200b\u200bthe operation, the surviving rebels were returned to their place, they restored their bases and expelled, and most often destroyed the Orgyandro. After some time again had to carry out operations in the same place.

For example, for nine years in the Panjscher Valley, Soviet troops together with the army of Afghanistan held 12 operations. Nevertheless, government power here was not able to fix it.

There is an opinion that in Afghanistan, the Soviet troops opposed only scattered, poorly organized partisan detachments, which arose spontaneously and acted on themselves, without any coordination of any control body. In fact, this is not so. The movement of the Afghan armed opposition had a well-developed political and military structure. However, it has never been homogeneous. Inside the movement constantly walked a fierce struggle between various parties and groups for the leading position in it.

The origins of the formation and so-in-law of the current groups of Afghan opposition go to the 1960s. In 1969, the Islamic extremist organization "Muslim youth" was established at the Kabulian University, which turned into a shock detachment of Afghan counterrevolution. From 1976 to 1978, on the basis of "Muslim youth" in Pakistan, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA), headed by G. Heckmatary and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, was established - IO, headed by B. Rabbani. In 1979, there were three more large organizations: "The Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan" (Dira) under the leadership of M. Muhammadi, who was led from the party of Heckmarey, led by Y. Halez, who retained the name of the IPA, and the National Front of Rescue Afghanistan (NFSA ), whose leader was S. Muzhaddadi.

By the same time, attempts to unite opposition forces into a single front of the fight against the revolutionary regime of the Republic of Afghanistan. This first Afghan counter-revolutionary alliance called "The Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan" collapsed immediately after its occurrence due to several factors, including fanatical commitment to GMB and contradictions between the parties. Immediately a new alliance arose - "Union of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan", but he also soon ceased to exist.

At the end of January 1980, the Islamic Union for the liberation of Afghanistan was established under pressure from the United States and their allies, which included six major counter-revolutionary organizations: to the five-mentioned five, which were addressed above, was added hastily proclaiming his existence "National Islamic Front of Afghanistan" ( Nifa) led by S. Geilani. But "unity" continued not long. On March 4, Heekmataryar declined to participate in the next press conference of the alliance leaders. In December 1980, the Union collapsed.

In June 1981, the same parties are reiterated. The Islamic Union of Mujahideen Afghanistan is being created. However, he was short-lived. In August 1981, Geilani did not appear at the meeting of the Union, after him, without explaining the reasons, he left the border of Muhammadi, and then left the Union (again without any public explanation) Mujhadadi. Leaders of IPA, IOO and IPA (Y. Halez) committed a complex organizational trick. First, they agreed to the establishment of another Organization of the Islamic Union of Liberation of Afghanistan (ISOA) led by A. Syyaf. Secondly, they managed to split the part of their members from the Union of Dira and NFSA and on this basis to create new three organizations.

In March 1982 it was announced that the Isma is now from seven parties: "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" (Leader - Heckmareyar), "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" (Yu. Halez), "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" (B. Rabbani), " The movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan "(Mansur)," The Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan "(Muzin)," National Front of Salvation of Afghanistan "(M. Mir)," Islamic Union of Liberation of Afghanistan "(A. SYAYF).

Thus, the first version of the "Union of Seven" or Isma-7 arose. Three Organization issued from Isma created their "Union of Three" or Isma-3, which included: "National Front of Rescue Afghanistan" (S. Mojaddadi), "National Islamic Front of Afghanistan" (S. Geilani), "The Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan" (N. Muhammadi).

One and other alliances existed until May 1985. Each of the parties in them retained its independence, its material tools, camp, bases, etc.

Aware of the low efficiency of the disunity against the government of Afghanistan, under pressure from the United States and Pakistan, the leaders of the ISMA-7 and ISMA-3 in May 1985 again adopted a compromise decision on the unification of the United Islamic Union of Minjahedov Afghanistan, which existed until the end of the period under study.

Despite the formal association of the opposition forces, the acute differences continued to be maintained in Isma, the main ones were the personal rivalry of the leaders of organizations, the struggle between them for the distribution of funds received from abroad, national-ethnic and religious contradictions, views on state device countries. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, these disagreements did not become less acute.

Long before the input of the troops in Afghanistan in the country, various terrorist organizations acted in their essence. The first centers of subversive activities destected for the destabilization of the situation in the country were created on the territory of Pakistan in the Peshawara region in the first half of the 1970s. They became a tool in the hands of Pakistani special services and could only function with their immediate financial and other assistance.

Frank intervention in Afghanistan's affairs has acquired a particularly wide range after the April 1978 revolution. With the help of the US CIA specialists, a network of counter-revolutionary camps and bases on the territory of Pakistan were created, the channels of the secret delivery of weapons with opposition formations were worked out.

Since May 1978, equipped with modern weapons Bandgroups in an ever-increasing scale began to move to Afghanistan. In 1984, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan issued " White book", In which the exact location of 94 centers and the preparation of Afghan counter-revolutionaries in Pakistan is given. The same camps appeared in Iran.

By the end of 1979, having a significant part of the country under its control, the counter-revolutionary groups operated mainly openly. Only major leaders of anti-government forces were on the illegal position. Each opposition party had a large number of armed detachments and groups. However, they all did not have any clear organizational structure, a single command, a common action plan.

In 1980, the heads of counter-revolution were attempted to give an armed struggle more organized. In the summer, the Islamic committees began to be created, who were to conduct intensive political work to involve wide segments in the active struggle against the government, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan and Soviet troops, coordinate the combat activity of armed groups. And although the clear organizational and staff structure did not work out, by 1983 some harmony was granted, allowing to allocate some common features.

The lower link was a group of 10-15 people. Several groups (3-7 or more) formed a detachment with a number from 40-60 to 150-200 people who were combined under general guidance into larger armed formations, in most cases named fronts. The front could be the most different and depending on which territory it was the effect of its influence, called the "County Front" or "Province Front". The front of the county was in its composition 300-400 and more rebels, the provinces - from one to several thousand people.

In some cases, the so-called central front was created, under the command of which there were fronts of several provinces. The regular composition of the fronts was not determined and was unstable. Often, armed formeds, consisting of several detachments, did not have any name at all and in combat documents of the 40th army of that period were called "Formation" or "Group".

The main organizational units of armed formations were small groups and detachments. Their leaders were, as a rule, persons who spent a special military training that knew the terrain, the morals and customs of the local population.

In general, the counter-revolutionary sips operating in the territory of Afghanistan acquired a certain structure of political and military leadership, the basis of which was the basis of Islamic committees, created from the number of local religious figures, former feudal and landowners. They headed them in most cases leaders who have passed special training in Pakistan and Iran.

The quantitative composition of the committees was distinguished and determined by the scale of their activities, the number of people and the armed formations in the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility. In most cases, the leadership consisted of 5 to 30 people. The Islamic Committee consisted of 5 departments: managerial, party, military, economic and financial. The military department planned and directly supervised the activities of detachments and sabotage-terrorist groups. Islamic committees of several villages or volosts submitted to the Central Islamic Committee, which was created in the county. The largest of them were united in alliances whose activities were distributed to a significant territory. The Union could include 3-7 Islamic committees.

In 1984-1985 The Afghan opposition takes steps to improve the organizational structure of its armed formations. In the second half of 1984, the opposition leaders moved to the creation of the "Islamic regiments" on the army model. The basis of the regiments was the battalions of the three-dimensional composition. 3-5 battalions were created in the shelf, of which 1-2 were planned to be used in combat actions. They introduced officer posts. The numerical composition of the regiments was strictly defined and could be 500-900 people or more. Along with the shelves, some "partisan battalions" were created in some areas.

In the structure of armed groups of Afghan opposition appeared special divisionsSubordinates directly by the commander: heavy weapons, sapper and communications, which were called upon to solve specific problems of combat and without whom unthinkable in modern conditions, conducting organized hostilities with a well-prepared and armed opponent.

Improving the requirements for the organization and conduct of combat requires the commanders of armed formations of the creation of bodies that facilitated its preparation and maintenance (separation of intelligence, operational, rear and others). The presence of a similar structure spoke of the desire of opposition leaders to centralization in the leadership of an armed struggle, attempts to raise it on a new quality level. However, due to the attachment of the mouth to the territory they controlled, the lack of sufficient financial and other funds created the shelves and battalions actually did not differ from ordinary rebel detachments.

Nevertheless, the total number of opposition formations increased. In October-November 1984, for example, in the province of Herat, the fighting six battalions of the Khazrat Hamza Division ("Hamza") and 11 fronts belonging to the IOA. In other months, the composition of battalions and fronts was partially changed: the previous one appeared and disappeared. In March 1985, they were called as leading combat actions of 9 division battalions and 13 fronts.

In subsequent years, the leadership of the Afghan Council admitted measures to further improve the organizational structure of armed formations of rebels operating in Afghanistan. The implementation of plans to create a battalion and regiment on the basis of small units on the basis of small detachments.

In 1987, the formation of five regiments and one battalion of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA - Gulbeddin Heckmareyar), one regiment of IOA was noted. However, many of these regiments existed only nominally. Created on a relatively combined and territorial basis and deprived of a sufficient base, they essentially remained at the level of previous detachments, which not only were not able to ensure the interests of their party in a particular province, but did not stop the internecine struggle among themselves for the influence zones.

In this regard, the Military Committee of the headquarters of the IPA was developed a plan for the creation of the so-called maneuverable regiments at the level of individual provinces, which had fundamental differences from the usual formations of both the approach to the acquisition of the personnel and the nature of the tasks performed. One of these regiments was formed in December 1987 in the provinces of Parwa and Kapsa. The number of personnel is 450 people. It was completed from the population of the five zones of these provinces.

A maneuverable regiment was subordinate to the Council of Jihad as part of 10 people. Divisions (battalions) acted in their zones. The term and place of collecting all the shelf forces were established by the decision of the Jihad Council. It is characteristic that in addition to the tasks of conducting hostilities against posts and garrons of government troops, the regiment was charged with the obligation and combating hostile IPA formations of other counter-revolutionary parties and organizations.

Despite the diversity of forms of unification of anti-government forces in Afghanistan, by the time of the conclusion of the Soviet troops, all major opposition parties have developed mainly the same type of armed formations. The detachments (groups) and their associations had different names, but the principle of their subordination was the same.

Commanders of the detachments were subordinate to the general head of the armed formation and the Islamic Committee (Military Council) created by the territorial principle. All armed formations, operating in the same province, were subordinate to their general leader (commander of the Central Front), which was appointed from among the major formation and was subordinated to the leadership of the party and its military department.

By the time of the conclusion of Soviet troops, the largest heads of armed formations on the territory of Afghanistan were:

Ahmad Shah Masud., Party accessory - Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOO). Had 233 detachments total number 9020 rebels. They were controlled by the province of Badakhshan, Baglan, Taghar, Kunduz, Ball, Samangan, Kapsa, Parwa.

Turan Ismail, Party affiliation - IOA. There were 199 detachments with a number of 4655 rebels. They were controlled by individual regions of the Gerat province.

Azizhan, party membership "Hazbe Alla" (Party of Allah). He had 66 detachments - 1550 rebels. The detachments were stationed in Herat's province.

Shermad., party affiliation - Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA). I had 39 detachments - 755 rebels. Controlled the province of Nursan.

Jelalludin, party affiliation - IPA (Halez). 57 detachments and groups, about 1,700 people. Controlled the province of Pactte.

The most famous of the listed personalities, of course, was Ahmad Shham Masood.

Therefore, a certificate prepared by the headquarters of the 40th Army in June 1988, which is reproduced below with some abbreviations.

Significant changes in the post-revolutionary period occurred in the armament of the detachments of the Afghan opposition. By the time of entry into Afghanistan, the Soviet troops rebels had the most diverse, mainly small arms. Some detachments have a minor amount of artillery and tanks captured from government troops.

Since 1980, the flow of weapons from Pakistan and Iran hung to the country. Already in 1983, a detachment of 40-60 people had 1-2 machine gun DSHK, 1-2 mortars. Larger formations have pool and mountain weapons, radio stations, passenger and trucks. In 1986, almost all the detachments had DShK and anti-aircraft mountain installations. Since 1983, the rebels began to apply portable anti-aircraft complexes of the edit type, and since 1986 - "Stinger".

In the mid-1984, the Pakistani government took over the supply functions of "irreconcilable". The following provisions were identified: 1 manual anti-tank grenade launcher was issued on a group of 10 people and 9 automata for a detachment of 100 people and more - 1 anti-aircraft mine unit, up to 4 DSHK, 4 tight guns, 4 mortars, 10 grenade launchers and the corresponding number small arms.

In addition, the detachments operating in the areas of airfields and other square objects received reactive installations. As a result, by the beginning of 1986, the gangs were located in large numbers of rifle automatic weapons, large-caliber machine guns and anti-aircraft mounted mining equipment, grenade launchers, mountain 76-mm guns, light 88 mm and 120 mm mortars, portable anti-aircraft rocket complexes of the edite type and "Stinger", Earth-Earth reactive projectiles, various anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

Ahmad Shhax Macud.

Ahmad Shhax Son Mohammad Jana was born in 1333 (1953) in Kishek Gengalak Vosti Bazaisse County Panjucher Parwan Province in the family of feudal. By nationality, Tajik. Muslim Sunnit. Member of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan since 1978. Education is unfinished higher education. He graduated from the 12th classes of the theological lyceum "Abu-Hanifia" in Kabul in 1972, 2 courses of the Engineering faculty of Kabul University in 1974 speaks French, English and Arabic. In 1972, he joined the organization "Muslim youth" existing at the time. The main tasks of this organization at the initial stage were the overthrow of the power of King Zahir Shah, in the subsequent Dauda and the creation in the perspective of the Islamic Republic on the basis of Sharia. A. Shax has good organizational abilities, outstanding personal and business qualities that contribute to the fulfillment of the functions of the leader of the grouping of rebels. Ahmad Shham Masood - volitional, energetic, bold and decisive leader. Adlexed in achieving the goals set is obligatory, this word holds. Smart, cunning, cunning, cruel opponent. It has continued authority among the ordinary composition of the rebels and the leaders subordinate to him, a strong influence on the peaceful population living in the areas controlled by him, and immigrants from the Panjucher gorge living in Kabul, Charikar, Andaraba and other regions. Provided normal conditions for the population in the areas controlled by them (providing food, payment of cash benefits to families who have fallen rebels, the organization of the educational process in schools and a number of other events). An experienced conspirator is hidden, careful, vain and vulsatolov. Analysis of the nearest environment A. Shaxa allows us to conclude that it does not trust in a full one of his assistants. Fearing strengthening the authority of persons from his environment to the detriment of its influence, consciously goes, does not introduce the position of deputy. The closest trusted persons and advisers, as a rule, do not have high official posts in the IOO grouping. There are also relatively private changes in the composition of its nearest environment and as part of personal protection. Thus, at present, there is not a single person in the nearest surroundings of A. Shah, which is capable of unconditionally head the movement of Ioa's rebels in Panjsheter if its current leader is eliminated, only a collegial guide is possible. A. Shhax has experience in conducting the partisan war, management of formations during major military operations, organization of sabotage and terrorist shares. It is considered one of the prominent military theoretics and practitioners of the counter-revolutionary movement of the "Islamic Revolution". It has a fairly developed general education and political outlook. Religiosen, strictly observes a Muslim lifestyle based on the laws of Sharia. In everyday life, unpretentious, hardy.

In the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, by this time, the rebels were admitted by anti-tank managed rockets, in southeastern provinces - 122-mm warmness, in the southern - elongated charges for clearance. Cases of use of helicopters and airplanes were noted to deliver weapons, ammunition and material resources from the territory of Pakistan.

All this would be impossible without a huge financial and military assistance to the Afghan opposition from abroad. Military assistance provided to her in 1980-1986. Only through the CIA line, it was estimated at $ 2 billion for other sources, this figure is much more - for eight Pet (from 1980 to 1988) through Pakistan, 6 billion dollars were held.

Only in 1986, the Afghan opposition was allocated: Germany - 250 million marks, England - 30 million pounds of sterling, France - 60 million francs, Saudi Arabia - about 1 billion dollars. These funds on the territory of Pakistan and Iran were created camps to prepare rebels.

Here is only one of the educational regiments of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Nif). Organization: management, three training battalions, control of the rear regiment. Each battalion includes three training companies. Educational process Provide 4-5 teachers. Three battalions are preparing for all subjects of 15-20 teachers. Among the subjects are studied - tactics, fire training, material part of weapons (small, mortars, grenade launchers, artillery). Preparation time - 1 month. At the end of the preparation, it was summed up, determining the level of combat training of graduates with the participation of American, Chinese and Pakistani advisers, as well as journalists leading to the meeting of the shooting of propaganda films. At this meeting, as a rule, high-ranking persons were present from the management of the organization, as well as teachers of the educational regiment.

The daily routine of the educational regiment was as follows. After lifting, morning namaz and breakfast at 8.00 students diverged in their classes, where until 12.00 were engaged in the established curriculum. The teaching was conducted by Pakistani and Afghan officers. At 12.00 - lunch, midday namaz. Then there was a daytime check of listeners and before the evening they were free from classes. After dinner in the officer dining room, listeners were divided into the barracks of the regiment on vacation.

At the end of learning, determining the degree of training and specialty graduates led by senior groups on vehicles They were delivered to areas close to the border zones, received a certain weapon and then with caravans or directly in groups were transferred to Afghanistan. After that, the group was diverged by provinces and joined the fronts.

The combat groups were preparing for the following basic actions: night ambushes and attacks on small settlements and garrisons, ambushes on the roads, mine war on communications, destruction of power lines of power lines, terrorist actions against NDPA activists who serve as a state administrator of Afghanistan, persons cooperating with Authorities, shelling of public buildings, economic objects.

To the number of objects to attack, as well tutorial IOA "150 questions and answers for the fighter of the partisan squad", also included hospitals, schools, dining rooms that were protected by weakly, and their staff could not have enough strong resistance.

Similar training centers on the territory of Pakistan and Iran had other counter-revolutionary parties. Consequently, by the mid-1980s. Soviet troops were opposed by no longer scattered, acting at their own risk and risk of gang, but well armed, trained in foreign instructors of formation. Nevertheless, not a single major operation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan lost.

The activity of armed groups of the opposition inflicted a huge damage to Afghanistan in 1979-1989. It is enough to note that during the war years they are destroyed and destroyed in the country of 2515 schools, 50 hospitals, 167 medical houses, more than 400 mosques, 10,220 residential buildings, 9600 Dukanov, 55 industrial enterprises and workshops, 1200 administrative buildings, 1600 km of power supply. The victims of terror were 244 thousand peaceful Afghan citizens, including over 100 clergymen, 3,500 teachers.

The price of every person was strictly determined by the leaders of the armed opposition back in 1982 for the murder of a soldier of government troops - 7 thousand Afghani, a party activist - 15 thousand, for a baked tank - 100 thousand. A shot down aircraft was estimated at 1 million.

For a simple Afghan, it was huge amounts. After all, even the driver-Afghan Soviet mixed joint-stock transport and forwarding company AFSOTR - one of the highest paid categories of workers - earned 6-7 thousand Afghans per month, and the salary of an employee or a qualified working part average was 4-5 thousand Afghani.

It is not surprising that for many Mujahideen war against the Soviet and Afghan troops turned into ordinary fishery. This largely explains the increase in the number of armed opposition. But even such a solid remuneration did not attract many Afghans. Then other methods were used for recruitment - terror and intimidation. A system of various punishments in relation to persons evading joining gang was provided. These are penalties in the amount of 70 thousand Afghans for each combat-ready family member, burning houses and other methods of coercion. Even punishable, from the point of view of Dushmanov, misdeed, as listening to radio programs from Kabul and training in the Soviet Union.

So, in one of the leaflets common to irreconcilable, it was said: "To those who have radio receivers, the Islamic Committee once again communicates to know, remembered and executed: listen to the Great Sin from Kabul. In hencefight, this act will be punished with a fine of 10 thousand Afghans or cut-off. "

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to reduce everything for these reasons. In Afghanistan, a civil war was walking, which split all the society on opposing groups, ready to beat to death. Military intervention in the internal affairs of the state of various forces from the outside only stimulated it.

To be continued

Evgeny Grigorievich Nikitenko
Major General

The number of USSR troops in Afghanistan. The composition of the grouping of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was forced to turn military events of our time.

What should it have been to achieve the planned success, what it was in reality and what lessons are removed by modern military? In the review, materials from books of famous authors are used, information about which is shown below. The authors who had access to the planning documents and the archives of the 40th Army, result in numbers somewhat different from each other, but allowing up to 10% to estimate the quantitative composition of the grouping of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The quantitative criterion of grouping (the number of combat troops), established by the highest leadership of a country, which leads one of the authors. Ablazov V.I Colonel, Advisor to Air Force and Air Defense (1979-1981). The situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 had significant differences. But the principle of actions in Afghanistan should have been approximately the same as in Czechoslovakia.

We have reported Marshal Ogarkov N.V. That to quickly stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, you need to consistently enter the 30-35 divisions there, which should first block the borders with Pakistan, Iran, to occupy all the most important settlements, airfields, communications and thereby not allow Penetration into Afghanistan armed formations, inflow of weapons, quickly disarm the detachments of the opposition within the country and thereby deprive it with any possibility of armed resistance. Two years later, the main tasks would be solved, and one could bring out of Afghanistan most of the grouping of troops.

In 1989, the Afghan armed forces had about 329 thousand people in their composition (the army - 165 thousand MVD - 97 thousand MGB - 57 thousand), tanks - 1568, BMP - 828, ART. Guns and mortars - 4880, combat aircraft - 126, combat helicopters - 14. During the first half of 1980, this grouping was strengthened by the 201st MSS and two separate shelves. In the subsequent combat composition of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, depending on the development of the military-political situation in the country.

The maximum number of personnel of the 40th army reached 120 thousand soldiers and officers. In early 1988, after making a decision on the withdrawal of troops, the group consisted of about 100 thousand personnel. Gromov B.V. General Colonel, Commander of the 40th Army in RA (1987-1989). In the first days of December 1979, the Minister of Defense Ustinov D.F. Informed the management of the General Staff about the upcoming decision, on the direction of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the amount of up to 75 thousand people.

Attempts by the head of the General Staby Ogarkova N.V. Prove that such a number of troops is not able to solve the problem to eliminate the opposition movement, did not have success. By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th army was mainly completed. In subsequent years (until 1986 inclusive), the combat composition of the troops was specified, the re-formation of some parts was carried out in order to increase their fighting.

As a result, the final composition of the limited contingent of Soviet troops became as follows: - Office of the 40th Army with parts of security and maintenance, - divisions - 4, - Brigades - 5, - individual regiments - 4, - individual protection battalions - 6, - aircraft regiments - 4, - Helicopter regiments - 3, - collateral team - 1, - pipeline brigade - 1, - medical, repair, construction, apartment and operational and other parts and institutions. The maximum number of Soviet troops in the drab was in 1985, 108.8 thousand people (servicemen - 106 thousand), including in combat troops - 73.6 thousand people (the number of combat troops never exceeded the number established by political leadership) . By the beginning of the conclusion, the grouping of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan had in its composition 509 compounds, parts and institutions with a total number of about 110 thousand people.

Its armament had 672 tanks, 1594 BMP, 2862 BTR, 2136 guns and mortars, 326 helicopters, 160 combat and transport aircraft, 18153 vehicles.

Parts of the Oxv were stationed in 25 garrisons, in which there were 45 residential military towns.

End of work -

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28 years ago from Afghanistan, the most combal on that period the army of the world was published - past ten years of fighting with well-trained Mujaheds and mercenaries from more than thirty countries of the world. The legendary 40th, the basis of OXVA (a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan), returned home with unfolded banners - the unfeefeential, who fulfilled his military duty to the end. Here, every soldier was prepared by the fighter, each division - a fighting shock fist. But this potential then, alas, remained unclaimed. Many parts were disbanded, and the whale of the glory of the banners went for storage at the museum.

In total, about 540 different types of units, compounds and organizations were located in the period from December 1979 to February 1989. Some of them were removed from Afghanistan and disbanded during the first year of stay here. And this process continued until the final conclusion of the troops. Under the "knife of the reduction", anti-aircraft missile parts were gone, trap-sieved battalions, numerous construction and assembly management.


By the beginning of the first stage of the conclusion in 1988, the grouping of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had 509 compounds, parts and institutions with a total number of about 110 thousand people. The final composition of the OXVA consisted of control of the 40th army with parts of ensuring and maintenance, 4 divisions, 5 brigades, 4 separate regiments, 6 separate battalions of security, 4 aviation regiments, 3 helicopter regiments , collateral brigades, pipeline brigade, medical, repair, construction, apartment operational and other parts and institutions.
The contingent mechanism, in addition to the combat component, includes a fairly large number of units to ensure. Doctors, context, radio flepens, repairmen, firefighters, voenluori, bath laundry combine, mobile bakeries - a full range of live cycle. 879th Trade Management, providing household needs of the contingent, deployed 177 stores in which imported foodstuffs were available in the Union (albeit), sports suits of famous brands, television and radio equipment (let the record, but guaranteed). Worked and rear, and "front" - clearly, like a clock. And then the whole mechanism, after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, was not needed. Successful stocks have flowed somewhere, much tritely stunned, much leaked on "national apartments" - 1991 was approaching, not only the empire disintegrated, but her army.

The 40th Commercial Army itself as a combat unit ceased to exist almost immediately after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989. For some period, it was recreated within the framework of the Savo (Central Asian Military District), then the army was part of the emerging armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, but here it is already in a strongly truncated composition, with lost team personnelturned out to be not necessary. The combat banner of the 40th twisted in the store in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and is made on the solemn meetings only on the occasion of the anniversary.

"In the euphoria of the division of the Soviet Union, no one really thought about the combat potential of the former Soviet army," says it from Afghanistan, Colonel-General Boris Gromov, says the last commander of the 40th Army. Each of the new leaders of already sovereign states tried to privatize what was in its territory, including the armed forces. So the 40th Army was almost completely stretched mainly in the Central Asian republics. Something, first of all, the nuclear ammunition, managed to bring to Russia. From the part and units that initially entered the OCCA from the territories in the central part of the country or in Siberia and Far EastThey managed to return to the places of the former dislocation and remained in the ranks. But in general, the "Afghan" army could not be kept. But it was with her experience that unique hostilities in the mountains could not only avoid losses in Chechnya, but also to warn the fact of armed conflict. The result we know - they were thrown into battle and unprepared boys, forgetting that the battle could be stopped before it began. And this task was forces at that time precisely by the divisions of the 40th Army. "

The historical analogies are involuntarily asked. By August 1945, the Soviet command transferred large forces of liberated on west Front Forces in Manchuria. Having a rich experience of conducting hostilities troops, multiplied by the high moral spirit of the winners, Soviet soldiers defeated the Million Japanese Quantong Army in less than two months. The victory was given not to numerical superiority, but with high professionalism, coherence and discipline. All these qualities, the former soldiers and officers of the 40th army after Afghanistan, remained unclaimed.

Of the largest and most combat compounds in the composition of OKSVA - motorized rifle 5th, 108th, 2016 divisions, more lucky in terms of preservation and name, and tradition only. Derived in 1989 to the territory of Tajikistan Division, which successfully manifested itself during civil War In this republic, to ensure the safety of civilians and covered the border from Afghanistan, turned into the process of reforming to the Russian military base. I maintained my sequence number and is not only a guarantor of stability in this region, but also to ensuring the safety of the southern frontiers of Russia.

The 5th Guards Motion Truck Division, which was removed after Afghanistan to the territory of Turkmenistan, after the collapse of the USSR became a national compound as part of the Ministry of Defense of this Republic with a deployment site in the city of Cook. Its historical Division number has lost. Almost such fate was also in the 108th MSA, which from January 1992 he became part of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan and was already disbanded in December 1993. Now her former shelves come to the 1st Army Corps in Samarkand. It turned out to be disbanded and the 66th and 70th individual motorized rifle brigades, which this fate was postgrad back in 1988, but the compounds themselves did not disappear without a trace, but they were part of their former motorized rifle divisions.
The 103rd airborne division was not part of the 40th army, as well as the 345th separate parachute regiment (barrams), was in operational submission, however, the paratroopers always participated in the most difficult and responsible operations. They and the territory of Afghanistan left among the latter - covering the withdrawal of the main forces. Even before 1991, the 103rd VDD, derived in Belarus (Headquarters in Vitebsk), was transferred to the Border Guards of the KGB of the USSR and performed tasks on the border with Iran in Azerbaijan. And after the collapse of the country entered the Armed Forces of Belarus and its shelves were transformed into separate guards mobile brigades, and the former 317th PDP received by inherited the banner of the legendary compound. Now it is in the 103rd Guards Airborne Brigade.


An interesting fate has formed in the 345th parachute regiment, which soon after the withdrawal from Afghanistan had a chance to visit the 104th and 7th landing divisions and had to perform combat missions in the Transcaucasus and in Abkhazia. In May 1998, the 50th military base was created on the basis of the regiment, renamed soon in the 10th peacekeeping airborne regiment. Plans for the formation of the 345th separate landing assault brigade are still under consideration. From the traditions of the regiment, an annual meeting was left on February 11 at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow - exactly at 11 am. On this day, the regiment crossed the border from Afghanistan, and the commander of the Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Valery Vostrotin said to the Odopolians: "We meet the 11th in 11 in a large one." 28 years old, this tradition remains unchanged. In the fighting system and the 56th separate landing assault team (Gardenz-Gazni), she also had to go through a difficult path in the "peaceful life", but it was lucky to stay in the Airborne Forces, which was saved by a brigade from disbandment. Now she is still the proud name of the red-known orders of Kutuzov and the Patriotic War of the Don Cossack array assault brigade and deployed in the glorious city of Kamyshin.

... only the memory of the "Afghans" was not subjected to disbandment, for which February 15 is a special day. Someone will celebrate him at a solemn admission in the Kremlin, someone will raise a glass for the "third toast" in the company of friends. Here, in the near Moscow Khimki, veterans traditionally will unite all cemeteries, where eight of their countrymen are buried, then the monument to the sole special forces in Russia will gather and remember their friends. And there will be no differences between them, even if the current head of interregional public organization The "Union of Competition Veterans" Sergey Makarov was in Afghanin a simple soldier, and his current deputy Alexander Ponamarev served there as an officer. On this day, all "Afghans" are equal.

Epoch chose them

Recently, on the day of the memory of warriors - internationalists, we remembered the feats of those who for more than nine years performed combat missions in Afghanistan. As they say, everyone has their own war - in an ordinary, officer and general. But military duty - he has one. But fulfilling it, everyone carries his personal responsibility. And the higher the position - the higher the responsibility. In this regard, I want to remember a small fragment, which the book of Constantine Simonov ends with "soldiers are not born." Victorious ended Stalingrad battle. And the recently appointed Army commander, General Serpilin, visits the commander of the commander of the Rifle battalion of Captain Sintsov, with whom she was walking along the roads of the war since the summer of 1941.

"" It's good, "Serpilin repeated ..." Rest, while there is an opportunity. " And I will go. Since the army has accepted, things through his head, - Sigh once! - just that the voice was deaf, tired, and about it said fun and loud as about happiness!

Serpilin ... - One of those who most often think only in direct connection with the case, which wagged the war on their broad shoulders - an army or front, and, evaluating their actions, they say how about the horse, - will it pull or does not pull?

But for this apparent rudeness of words, there is a relentful anxious thought about dozens and hundreds of thousands of human lives, the responsibility for which the war put on the shoulders of this, and not some other person. And Sintsov ... thought: ... well, when such a person comes to command the army, because such a person pulls, and it will pull well ... "

Already 27 years since the conclusion of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Over the years, five of the seven commander of the 40th Commercial Army passed away.

Today, on the eve of the Day of Defender of the Fatherland, it is impossible not to remember them - combat Soviet generals - and those who have gone, and living, with the names of which are inextricably linked all those brilliant operations that were carried out by a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In those years, they were all Lieutenant General. However, the military ranks of the former commander I cite in accordance with their further promotion. I also point out the dates of caring from the life of those who will remain in our memory forever.

War in Afghanistan, we, parties, saw "from the height of our posts," - someone can tell about the fighting of his company, someone - his battalion, someone - his regiment ... someone happened to fulfill their duties in Some department, some kind of separation or some kind of service of headquarters and controls ... But to give a holistic picture in the entire army to us, younger and senior officers, of course, is impossible. Therefore, I turned to the 5th book of the semitomic edition called "Unique" Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army of Valentina Ivanovich Varennikov - Frontovik, the former commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. It was the warlord of such a high rank that could appreciate the combat activity of each of the commander of the 40th Army, especially since the Army General Valentin Varennikov in 1984-1989 was the head of the Department of Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan.

"I had the opportunity to almost slowly spend more than four years in this country and take direct participation in all military-political events ... - recalled Valentin Varennikov. - Without exaggeration, I believe that I have a moral right to assess many persons, phenomena and all processes that took place in Afghanistan, since January 1985. And on fundamental issues - and since 1979, because She was engaged in this problem in the General Staff far before the input of the troops. "

The warlord's book contains not only the assessment of the role of each commander of the 40th army, but also transferred the situation of that war. Each of us, who served in Afghanistan, knows about it not at the time. But as it described this setting of Varennikov, - accurately and exhaustively, - could not, probably, no one.

"During your stay in Afghanistan, in fact, each of our soldiers and an officer, without exaggeration, always had to be ready for battle everywhere," said Valentin Varennikov in his book in his book. - The main types of hostilities - the offensive and defense - had many different features, subtleties that were characteristic only for Afghanistan. But I would like the reader at least mentally imbued with the feeling that each of us experienced in Afghanistan. When you are in your Soviet military town, relax a little, feeling the potential strength of the big team, - whatever the gang nor attacked, it will definitely get along the teeth. That is why we, in the operational group, for each officer and the general were not only a gun, but also a machine with a charged store, as well as several hand grenades. But when you go out or go beyond this town, all internally gather - it is necessary to be always ready for the reflection of a sudden attack. You're all - as a compressed spring: Streets are Kabul, or Rocks Gorge ... Or the Desert ... "

Reading these lines from the book of the general of the army of Valentina Varennikov, I immediately remember, as before departure in Bagram at the end of December 1979, at the airfield in Engels, where an intermediate landing was made, we, Vitebsk paratroopers, issued ammunition - three store soldiers On the machine, and officers are two stores on the gun. But as soon as we landed in Afghanistan, each immediately received a complete ammunition of cartridges for automata - 450 pieces. Issued automata and us, officers. And with them, we never parted in Afghanistan ...

However, I will return to the book of General of the Army of Valentina Varennikov.

"Since his speech came about the commander of the 40th Army," he wrote, "you need to say about each of them. I think that I will not be mistaken on fundamental issues.

In my opinion, the most severe burden fell on the shoulders of the first three commander ... "

Colonel-General Yuri Vladimirovich Tukharinov (3.5.1927 - 20.12.1998) - Commander of the 40th Army from December 1979 to September 23, 1980.

"The first commander was Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov. At the time of the appointment by his commander of the army, he served as the First Deputy Commander of the Troops of the Turkestan Military District. General Yu.V. Tukharinov received the task to expand the army (i.e., to mobilize it), introduce it to Afghanistan and get up with garrisons in accordance with the prescription of our General Staff. Reader, I hope, can imagine what a huge amount of work it was necessary to fulfill to resolve these problems. He allowed them successfully. And although Tukharinov was in the post of commander short time, he left good memory about himself. "

Lieutenant-General Boris Ivanovich Tkach (10/25/1935 - 10/24/2010) - Commander of the 40th Army from September 23, 1980 to May 7, 1982.

From the book Valentina Varennikova:

"The Second Comandarm was Lieutenant General B.I. Weaver. It was an experienced general, in the leadership of the army, not new to the army, but no one has commanded anyone else in such conditions. Weaver - too. And although the fighting of the parts of the army began during its predecessor, but the main shaft came to weave and replaced him V.F. Ermakova. General weaver was actually a "pioneer" of all large-scale operations, as well as the arrangement of our troops in Afghanistan. The case was very complicated, but he coped with his tasks. "

Army General Viktor Fedorovich Ermakov - Commander of the 40th Army from May 7, 1982 to November 4, 1983. Currently - General Inspector of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Council of the All-Russian Public Organization of Veterans Armed Forces Russian Federation.

From the book Valentina Varennikova:

"A real storm of the sea I saw on the north and western shore of the fishing peninsula during my service there. Imagine how suitable huge trees are covered by one another. And on their ridges, in some way there are huge logs, obviously dropped from the top decks of forestshozov, dangle and turn away like matches. Everything in the zone of one kilometer from the shore is spinning as in the whirlpool. And suddenly a man rushes into such a raging sea ...

Here in such a raging "whirlpool" took the 40th Army Lieutenant-General Viktor Fedorovich Ermakov. In extremely short time it was necessary to study everything, to understand, to anticipate the possible development of events in order to accurately make decisions and firmly manage the situation. The ranks of the army increased slightly - rebuff the rebels had to be given decent, and General Yermakov did it successfully. By purchasing a wonderful combat experience, he then skillfully commanded the central group of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, then the Leningrad Military District, and at the final stage of the service was the authoritative Deputy Minister of Defense for Persons. "

Colonel-General Leonid Estafyevich General (3.5.1937 - 13.8.1991) - Commander of the 40th Army from November 4, 1983 to April 19, 1985.

From the book Valentina Varennikova:

"Lieutenant-General Leonid Evstafyevich General, who accepted the army from Ermakov, of course, it was necessary to keep the captured initiative parts of the 40th army. And with this task he coped. Particularly successfully conducted fighting in the provinces. Personally, being a brave and energetic person, he dwined throughout Afghanistan, visited many bindings, risking his life. And, undoubtedly, it had a positive effect on the course of the fighting. "

General Army Igor Nikolaevich Rodionov (1.12.1936 - 19.12.2014) - Commander of the 40th Army from April 19, 1985 to April 30, 1986.

From the book Valentina Varennikova:

"Lieutenant-General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov arrived at a shift. Surprisingly, the fact: in the period 1972 - 1974 both were commanded by the shelves in the Carpathian Military District, i.e. Were in my submission. Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov perfectly commanded a motorized rifle regiment of the subordinate district of the 24th "iron" motorized rifle division (distinguished himself with this regiment on the teachings of the Defense Minister A.A. Grechko), and Leonid Evstafyevich Generals perfectly commanded the motorized rifle regiment of the 128th motorized rifle division, which stood in Uzhgorod. They met in Afghanistan as brothers and how the brothers spread goodbye.

The main merit of Rodionova was the introduction of a strict, clear system to all the processes of life and activities of the army, which allowed the opportunity to use the possibilities of the army as efficiently. Naturally, this approach, first of all, has a positive effect on the preparation and conduct of hostilities by all kinds of labor of troops, as well as on the preparation of the army management bodies. The pedantical fulfillment of their duties personally and the provision of the same requirements for the headquarters and the services of the army, to the subordinate troops, undoubtedly, quickly and very positively affected the life of the army. But the main thing is less loss. And this goal was based on all activities.

When preparing the operation in Kunar, it was Rodionov introduced the order of detailed playback of action options in the upcoming battles on the layout of the area (sandbox). This occupation passed although long, but alive, and most importantly - everyone went, realizing that it was necessary from him personally and subordinate to him units, which will be the procedure (interaction) when performing a combat mission.

We all regretted that in the second year of the command of this army, Rodionov had to leave this post due to renal and stone disease. But in Afghanistan, he left significant, and the operations spent were at the height. He then became not just the commander of the district, and the commander of the outstanding Transcaucasian Military District ...

After the Transcaucasia Rodionov perfectly led the highest body of the ELITA Russian armyThe armed forces of our friends, as well as high officials of the state apparatus - the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Sun. Every time, speaking in front of the new set of listeners, he said: "Learn well, diligently. Use all the possibilities of the Academy to replenish your knowledge. After all, you will go to high posts, you will be finalized by the fate of our armed forces, and this is the fate of the Fatherland ... "

At the final stage of his service, Rodionov was appointed Minister of Defense of Russia. I believe that the appointment was worthy ... "

Hero of the Russian Federation, General Army, Viktor Petrovich Dubinin (1.2.1943 - 22.11.1992) - Commander of the 40th Army from April 30, 1986 to June 1, 1987.

From the book Valentina Varennikova:

"First Deputy Commander of the 40th Army, General Viktor Petrovich Dubinin accepted the army from Rodionov. In fact, did not accept, but became the post of commander. He himself personally possessed quite high qualitiesBut also much he inherited from Rodionov. Therefore, things in the army went fine. He took office that the army commanded had long been long ago, he knew everything. Dubinin is a standard of honesty and conscientiousness. Possessing outstanding organizational abilities and insightful minds, as well as manifest personally, courage and courage, he organized and successfully conducted very complex and responsible operations. It was a bright figure. And at the final stage of my service, he perfectly performed the duties of the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. We all, the military, grieved that heavy illness carried him from life in the heyday. "

Hero of the Soviet Union General-Colonel Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov - Commander on the territory of Afghanistan 40th Army from June 1, 1987 to February 15, 1989. Now - deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

From the book Valentina Varennikova:

"In 1987, the Seventh Comandarm was appointed to the 40th Army. They were Lieutenant General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov. He arrived from the post of commander of the 28th Army (Grodno, Belarusian Military District). Boris Vsevolodovich not only was not a newcomer in Afghan affairs, but knew Afghanistan and his problems perfectly. It was his third approach to this country. Initially, he served here the head of the 108th motorized rifle division, who was standing north of Kabul. Then was the commander of the 5th motorized rifle division, which was mainly located in the Herat district and Shindand, controlled the entire situation in the Iran-Afghan border. After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff and services in the Carpathian Military District as the First Deputy Commander of the 38th Army (Ivano-Frankivsk), he again arrives in Afghanistan - already as a general for special instructions - the head of the Group of Representatives of the General Staff. The main task of this general and his group was to be in the position of complete independence, check the fulfillment of orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Head of the General Staff of the USSR, to give objective assessments to all phenomena (especially combat actions) and chiefs that were conducting certain or other Events. Naturally, it was necessary to act not formally, but with benefit to do, therefore it was often necessary to provide all the assistance to commanders in the preparation and conduct of combat operations. Naturally, if someone from the leadership of the army, any division or regiment embraced something, he rechecked and spoke to the relevant boss in the face: "It looks wrong. In fact, there is the next setting ... "And then he expressed what is really, because he checked before it personally (or on his instructions, someone from the group). Naturally, and Gromov, and the team headed by them (Colonels Y. Kotov, Gromov, V. Petrichenko) had to lead a shuttle lifestyle: circumstances demanded a lot to keep on a special control, and therefore in the literal sense to dangle in the country in detail to study it in detail and Know everything and everyone. After all, it was about the life of our people.

Having accepted the 40th Army, Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov did not spend time on either moral and physical adaptation, nor for the study of the roots in the rebellious movement or the features of the party and state leadership of Afghanistan, nor the more on the study of the 40th army's troops. All this was known to him before the subtleties, and certain changes in the creature of the case did not change. Therefore, he immediately began to command so that she was long in Afghanistan for a long time.

B.V. Gromov is a man of amazing, tragic destiny. Much in life he had to survive. Therefore, his heart, wounded by experiences, reacts very sensitively to human suffering. That is why he was with me there was a firm in making a maiden: "To reduce the loss of personnel of the 40th army as much as possible. He skillfully and professionally prepared and spent all operations and also skillfully solved the historical challenge to bring the army from Afghanistan.

Being a smart and gifted warlord, he was deserved at the final stage to be deserved to Kiev Military District. Then he became Deputy Minister of Defense (having visited these posts in the position of First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR) - and it is quite natural and deserved ... "

When you read all these exhaustive characteristics, which gave in his book, General of the Army of Valentin Varennikov, each of the seven commander of the 40th army, involuntarily looked at such lines. "He dwined around Afghanistan, visited many bindings, risking his life," this is about Colonel-General Leonid Evstafyevich General. And this is about the army general Victor Petrovich Dubynin: "With an extraordinary organizational abilities and an insightful mind, and also manifesting personally courage and courage, he organized and successfully conducted very complex and responsible operations." All military commanders in Afghanistan have repeatedly showed their personal courage. Each of them had a risks of his life, managing combat operations in various provinces of the country. The courage of the military man holder is, first of all, the ability to take responsibility for the only correct decision to them, on which the life of thousands of his subordinates depend. But in war, not all decisions are accepted in the headquarters. Much has to be done directly on the advanced positions, on the battlefield. War in Afghanistan was special. There was no clear "front line", there was no idea about a solid "advanced" - it was a moon war, raid operations and combat operations were sometimes practically in complete environment.

As a confirmation, I will bring passages from the memories of the commander of the 40th Army of the Army General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionova:

"In the Afghan army, starting from Friday or Saturday, - weekends, some holidays, no fighting, they walk, and we, the army, which was introduced to take on security features and release the contingent of the Afghan armed forces To conduct hostilities with counter-revolution, as they talked in the media, gradually overturned all the fighting for their shoulders. As a result, we began to fight instead of Afghans ...

With a small operational group of officers, they often had to fly out, to travel to the fighting areas that went in a circle during the year ...

The war went insidious, because there is no front, the focused enemy army before you is also not, the enemy from all sides. And the day, and at night, and in the summer, and in the winter, the bullet could be obtained from any side if you go with an open mouth. The army got used to fight with a real opponent, seeing his in front of him, feeling him, knowing that there were flanks, some rear, and in Afghanistan everything was mixed in Afghanistan. The troops came out of the garrison, the fighting was carried out, shot ammunition, eaten food, returned to the point of permanent deployment, and those who were fought with whom - descended from the mountains and continued to engage in their work or peaceful or antimire. They supported the government or not, it was difficult to understand ...

For my whole life, a sense of satisfaction with the system that existed in the Soviet army has been preserved. Her positive features revealed mainly during the fighting. That is, the impeccable performance of the tasks assigned, dedication, loyalty to the oath, courage, mutual assistance, mutual execution. "

In Afghanistan, he risked every life - and ordinary, officer, and general.

This is what, for example, recalled the first commander of the 40th army of Colonel-General Yuri Vladimirovich Tukharinov, Major General Vitaly Kuprianovich Pavlichenko, who was then the head of the 5th motorized rifle division political waste: "Active support in the placement of divisions of the 5th motorized rifle division in Herat and Shindande, as well as in settlements The Western border of Afghanistan has provided us with the commander of the 40th Army Lieutenant-General Yu. Tukharinov. General Tukharinov oversees the Guards Division, personally took part in the planning and implementation of the combat operations of the division against the Mujahideen groups, often leaving the places of hostilities. The authority of the commander of the army was our absolute. He acted confidently with the knowledge of military affairs. The commander of the Division, his deputy, head of intelligence departed to the place of hostilities with the commander. Returned more often B. good mood, beyond. Rested at dinner. Then there was an analysis of the operation ... "

Those who had a chance to fight in Afghanistan under the command of Lieutenant-General Boris Ivanovich Weaver, recall that he was respectfully called the "Equal General", since he was constantly in parts and combat orders, in the areas of combat operations, and at the headquarters Litted. Journalists wrote: "For two years of command of the army, Tankist Boris Tobach, in the number of taxes, it was to assign a pilot's title ... He had" his "An-26 and helicopter, which he left for a while to sort out the setting, give the necessary orders and fly further" .

But what he himself told Boris Ivanovich in one of the interview:

"The column in which I was, moved a small wetland. Part of the cars passed normally, only one tank was stuck. Tankers seized the second tank, then the third. As time went. I decided to come and figure out. While approached, the tankers have already cope and rushed forward. I was alone. He began to return to his best, and here the bullet hit my left leg to the ground. Zaleg, I can't move. Well, I think, everything, the end. But the fighters realized that there were no me for a long time, and moved to me towards me. They quickly understood what was the matter, and gave a volley toward the mountains, from where the shot was allegedly sounded. Then two branches of soldiers climbed to shelter sniper. Dustman himself did not find, but discovered weapons - the American rifle M-16. On her trunk, three notches were made in the form of Roman numbers ten "x" and another diagonal chest. This rifle was transferred to the Tashkent Military Museum. "

Some of the former commander of the 40th Army wrote a book. Among them - both Army General Viktor Fedorovich Ermakov. Special attention deserves such a fragment from his book "Afghan Knowing":

"I will say honestly, the tightened silence on the battlefield even had discomfort, causing thoughts:" What do our opponents conceal? Why so long do not allow yourself to know? Where and when can I expect the next strike from them? "

Maybe a comparison is too straightforward, but it seems to me that a person begins to get used to war as a natural state, and when there is no fighting, he often cannot understand what he needs to do

As for fear - I do not deny, fear was. In the war scary, and when a man is banging, they say, I'm not afraid of anything, "don't believe. They simply have people who fulfill their duty, overcoming their feeling of fear, act boldly, seeking victory. But there are also those that fear of death absorbs entirely, and then they lose the will and reason before the fight, which significantly reduces their chances of winning, since panic, cowardice - the worst helpers in the battle. "

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov during the war in Afghanistan three times in parts of a limited contingent of Soviet troops - from February 1980 to August 1982, from March 1985 to April 1986, and in 1987-1989. That's what he tells in his book "Limited Contingent" about one of the first operations conducted in the spring of 1980, when Boris Vsevolodovich was also the head of the headquarters of the 108th motorized rifle division:

"Spring battles brought a limited contingent with a tremendous experience. We revised a lot - ranging from the preparation and construction of troops for the movement and ending with the development of interaction with aviation, artillery and management of them ...

At about the same time, Tukharinov ordered me to conduct a fighting near Kabul. Freshings were constantly accomplished from the Khairabad district, and, according to intelligence data, large attacks on the army headquarters were assumed.

At that time, the term "raid actions along the roads was very common. One or two battalions acted along several tracks, clearing around them the territory, destroying and exciting opposition warehouses. Then returned. The same task was supplied to us ...

I conducted these combat actions in the post of headquarters of the division, Ruslan Aushev participated in them. It was then that I first felt an unpleasant feeling of confusion. We approached one of the small ridges, followed by Kislak, where, according to our assumptions, dust dust. Do not reach the kilometers to three to the pass, stopped the column, sent forward to the intelligence and cover. On the radium car, taking a small guard, I went. It was necessary to make a decision on the spot - how to take this kischlak. When approaching the pass through our cars, the fire suddenly opened. Almost everyone who was talking to someone later, was tested at such minutes about the same thing. The first shelling demoralizes man completely. Although you are internally ready and you know that the fire can be opened at any moment. Moreover, you yourself go to risk ...

During the fighting, which I conducted directly, we have already tried to protect the movement of the columns, blocking the roads and exposing the findings on the adjacent ridges ... "

It was not easy for combat experience in Afghanistan. For him sometimes had to pay blood. But each commander of the 40th Army tried to take care of the most accurately. Once again I remind you of the words of General Army of Valentina Varennikov, which he described the commander of the 40th army of Colonel-General Boris Gromova: "That's why he was hard to know in the life of the maiden:" Maximize the loss of personnel of the 40th Army. "

At the end of the article, it would be unfair not to tell about Hero of the Soviet Union General of the Army General Valentina Ivanovich Varennikov (12/15/1923 - 6.5.2009), which more than four years, in 1984-1989, was the head of the Department of Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan. It was no longer the first war of General Varennikov. The honored military leader has fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. During the war, he was wounded three times, awarded four battle orders. In June 1945 he participated in the Victory Parade, I met the banner of Victory brought from Berlin and accompanied him to the General Staff. The Great Patriotic War he graduated in military rank captain. So about the courage of the combat general knew everything. Here is just a small fragment from his "Afghan" memories:

"In March 1985, something like my fighting baptism took place ... it was so. Being in your office at the army headquarters, where I also had my workplace, I disassemble my affairs. Suddenly, Lieutenant General Lieutenant L.e. Generals and reports: Just talking to the main military adviser G.I. Salmanov, and he said that the infantry division of government troops is surrounded in the Panjsherk gorge, which the rebels of Ahmad Shah are destroyed ...

I called for my group of six people a helicopter at the headquarters of the army and flew to the area of \u200b\u200bcombat operations.

We flew in a pair: our group on a traffic helicopter, followed by a helicopter of a combat, who received the task to strive the air defense agents, opening fire on the first helicopter. When we began to approach the site, where they had to land, from the ground they reported: there is an intense shelling of dresses of the entire district from mortars, and in addition, the helicopter tramples on our site, which sat down in front of us: Dubanam managed to beat him. From the ground added: "Let it be confused by - a platform allows you to land another helicopter."

With the crew commander, they agreed that even before touching the land chassis, he would open the door, and we would jumped onto the ground without a ladder. I jumped second, and unsuccessfully landed not evenly on both legs, but mostly on the left (wounded on Vistula in 1944). The foot fell, and I fell, but quickly rose and ran from the ground to the neighbor, it turns out that shelling not only from mortars, but everything was shot out of the machine guns. Several steps-jumps, and I overcame a small stream and immediately turned out to be Duwal, along which a trench was tested, broken in full growth (in full profile - if you speak Military language). Once in the trench, I watched the rest, jumping out after me from the helicopter, fled also in this direction. Helicopter, immediately wrinkled, went to the base (we agreed that he would come by team on us) ...

The supervisory point was equipped on the northern outskirts of the Baracki Kishlak ... We began to prepare a decisive fight.

The fight began in the morning. And in the afternoon, the motorized rifle regiment of the 108th division was still broken and unlocked the part of the Afghans. The shooting of all kinds of weapons on both sides was subsided, it was again flared up to the stirrement. And so throughout the day ... "

The war in Afghanistan is the brightest pages of the history of the Armed Forces of the USSR, telling about the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, whose combat actions were led by experienced, perfectly prepared military leaders. Limited contingent of Soviet troops All tasks on the territory of the neighboring state fulfilled to the end. In confirmation of this, at the end of the article, I again appear to the book Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army of Valentina Varennikov. Here, as he assessed the result of the nine-year-old war:

"Someone after the war in Afghanistan is trying to hold parallels with the war of Americans in Vietnam. But it is ridiculous. For purposes, nor for tasks, nor for the methods of action, nor in the number of accepted troops, nor losses and especially for the results of these two events have no similarity. Moreover, if the Americans fled from Vietnam, our troops accompanied the people of Afghanistan solemnly, with tears and flowers, because we eventually actually won a military-political victory: did not give opposition supported by the United States and Pakistan, crushing the people of Afghanistan as during our period stay and a few years after the departure of Soviet troops. Plus, we strongly helped to implement the "Policy of National Reconciliation", which found a wide response in the folk masses, and if the United States and Pakistan were interested in the world on this earth, it would come back in the 80s. Finally, our material and technical assistance to Afghanistan, of course, affected the moral and political spirit of this people.

Finally, about our soldiers and officers. Lying the heads of the graves of those killed in the fulfillment of their duty, giving an oath that they would forever remain in the memory of our people, it should be noted that everyone who had the honor to visit Afghanistan and even more so to participate in hostilities, of course, represent the Golden Fund of Our states. It is those who passed this test ... may quickly show high human qualities. And it is above all. "

Alexander Kolotilo

"A red star"